An exploration of the existence of clergy child sexual abuse dark networks within the Victorian Catholic Church

IF49 Doctor of Philosophy

Sally Muytjens
BJus(Hons) Queensland University of Technology

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Justice
Faculty of Law
Queensland University of Technology
2019

Supervisors

Principal Supervisor - Dr Jodi Death has a PhD and is currently a senior lecturer in the School of Justice. Dr Death’s areas of research include institutional child sexual abuse.

Associate Supervisor - Dr Mark Lauchs is an Associate Professor at QUT. Dr Lauchs areas of research include ‘Dark Networks’ in the area of organised crime.
**Statement of Original Authorship**

The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted to meet requirements for an award at this or any other higher education institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made.

Sally Muytjens

QUT Verified Signature

Signature

Date 17 September 2019
Key words

Catholic clergy; child sexual abuse; dark networks; social network analysis; grey networks; resources; victims
Abstract

Literature, inquiries and media reports show that the occurrence of Catholic clergy child sexual abuse is a global phenomenon and an established fact (Webber and Babwin 2014; Doyle 2006; Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 95). Catholic clergy child sexual abuse networks have been acknowledged informally through media reports on Catholic clergy as “paedophile networks” (Smith 2013; Carney 2012; Gavrielides 2013), though stringently denied by the Catholic Church. It has been acknowledged in the literature that child sexual abuse by Catholic clergy involves a network of supervisors who have transferred clergy perpetrators of child sexual abuse from parish to parish, often ending up in the same parish (Smith 2013; Carney 2012; Gavrielides 2013). There is some evidence that this has resulted in clusters of clergy perpetrators of child sexual abuse in parishes (Neil 2015; Deery and Morris-Marr 2015). This thesis will analyse data from the RCICA (2014-2017), VPI (2012-2013) and Broken Rites Australia website to explore the existence of an illicit or dark network of clergy perpetrators of child sexual abuse in the Victorian Catholic Church. Social network analysis is used to create a network map and identify ties between clergy perpetrators of child sexual abuse and examine how these ties were used to facilitate child sexual abuse and effectively operate as a dark network (Raab and Milward 2003, 419; Chen 2012, 102).
Acknowledgements

I have many people to thank for their support and encouragement over the last three and a half years.

I would like to thank my Principal Supervisor Dr Jodi Death and Associate supervisor Professor Mark Lauchs for their invaluable advice, support and knowledge. It has not been an easy journey though it has definitely been one worth taking. Researching the topic of Catholic clergy child sexual abuse has been an emotional task. I have experienced great anger towards the perpetrators and deep empathy and sadness for the victims. The emotions I experienced fade to insignificance in comparison to that of victims of Catholic clergy child sexual abuse. I decided to use the term victim rather than survivor, out of respect for those who were so severely affected by clergy CSA, that they did not survive. It is my hope that this PhD will be the beginning of an acknowledgement of the depths and extent of the organisation of the crime of clergy child sexual abuse.

I would like to thank professional editor, John McAndrew, for providing copyediting and proofreading services, according to the guidelines laid out in the university-endorsed national ‘Guidelines for editing research theses’.

I would also like to thank Queensland University of Technology for supporting my research through the provision of a research training program (RTP) scholarship.

Last but definitely not least, I would like to thank my friends and family who were a constant source of support and encouragement. Most of all I would like to thank my sons Jordan, Utah and Louis for their patience, love and for being an endless inspiration to me.
Table of Contents

An exploration of the existence of clergy child sexual abuse dark networks within the Victorian Catholic Church ................................. 1

Statement of Original Authorship .............................................................. 2

Key words ................................................................................................. 3

Abstract .................................................................................................. 4

Acknowledgements .................................................................................. 5

Chapter 1 Thesis Introduction ................................................................. 10

1.1 Contextual Background ................................................................. 11

1.2 Child sexual abuse ......................................................................... 13

1.3 Thesis overview ............................................................................ 14

1.4 Research Questions ..................................................................... 20

Chapter 2 Literature Review ................................................................. 21

2.1 Child sexual abuse ......................................................................... 21

2.1.1 Gender differences in victims of CSA ........................................... 22

2.2 Child sexual abusers ..................................................................... 25

2.3 Clergy child sexual abuse .............................................................. 26

2.3.1 Clergy perpetrator of CSA characteristics .................................. 26

2.3.2 Prevalence of clergy CSA .............................................................. 26

2.4 Clergy perpetrator of CSA theories .............................................. 27

2.4.1 Abused-abuser theory ................................................................. 28

2.4.2 Situational and opportunistic offending ...................................... 29

2.4.3 Theories specific to the institutional setting of the Catholic Church .......................... 31

2.5 Victim selection - grooming victims, families and communities .... 34

2.6 The Catholic Church’s perceptions of childhood and sexuality ...... 36

2.7 The role of the Catholic Church – Clericalism and narcissism ...... 37

2.8 The Catholic Church as a closed system ....................................... 39

2.8.1 Canon law and criminal law ......................................................... 40

2.8.2 A code of silence ....................................................................... 43

2.9 Church response to clergy child sexual abuse ............................... 44

2.10 CSA networks ............................................................................ 46

2.11 Conclusion .................................................................................. 47

Chapter 3 Theory .................................................................................. 49

3.1 Social networks ............................................................................ 50

3.2 Social network typologies .............................................................. 51
3.2.1 Dark and light dichotomy................................................................. 51
3.2.2 Grey networks .............................................................................. 52
3.3.3 Organised criminal networks.......................................................... 53
3.2 Dark networks .................................................................................. 54
   3.2.1 Degrees of DN visibility ................................................................. 55
   3.2.2 DN motivations and how this effects operation strategy ................. 55
   3.2.3 Dark network resources ................................................................. 56
   3.2.4 DN recruitment pathways .............................................................. 58
   3.2.5 Network resilience ....................................................................... 59
   3.2.6 The significance of removing actors and DN ties ......................... 61
3.3 Social network analysis (SNA) .......................................................... 61
   3.3.1 The purpose of conducting SNA .................................................... 61
   3.3.2 Examples of applications of social network analysis to DNs............. 63
   3.3.3 SNA – Network actor ties .............................................................. 66
   3.3.4 The importance of strong and weak ties for DN operation .............. 67
   3.3.5 DN clusters and ties ..................................................................... 69
   3.3.6 Centralised and decentralised networks ......................................... 70
   3.3.7 Using SNA for DN disruption ....................................................... 71
   3.3.8 Limitations of conducting social network analysis of dark networks .... 73
3.4 Conclusion ....................................................................................... 74
Chapter 4 Methodology ....................................................................... 76
4.1 Introduction ..................................................................................... 76
4.2 Data boundaries ............................................................................... 77
4.3 Data sources .................................................................................. 77
   4.3.1 Royal Commission into institutional responses to child sexual abuse .... 79
   4.3.2 Victorian Parliamentary Inquiry (VPI) into the handling of child abuse by religious and other organisations......................................................... 80
   4.3.3 Broken Rites Australia (BRA)......................................................... 80
4.4 Limitations of data .......................................................................... 81
4.5 Collecting attribute and relational data ............................................. 84
4.6 Qualitative and quantitative approach ............................................. 85
4.7 Transferring data to the Excel document ......................................... 86
4.8 Entering Excel data into the Visualsys program ............................... 87
4.9 Coding of data into themes ............................................................. 88
4.10 Analysis and results ....................................................................... 90
4.11 Resources and funding required .......................................................... 91
4.12 Individual contribution to the research team........................................... 91
4.13 Limitations ............................................................................................ 91
4.14 Ethics ................................................................................................... 92

Chapter 5 Data.......................................................................................... 93
5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 93
5.2 Clergy DN actor ties .............................................................................. 94
  5.2.1 Clusters of clergy DN actors ................................................................. 94
5.3 Sharing DN resources utilising cross-institutional weak ties................. 97
  5.3.1 Victim sharing ..................................................................................... 98
  5.3.2 Victim sharing between DN actors with strong ties.......................... 99
5.4 Patterns in situational DN offending .................................................. 100
  5.4.1 Boarding and orphanage dormitories .................................................. 100
  5.4.2 Physical abuse followed by CSA in the classroom and school grounds ....... 101
  5.4.3 In the victim's home .......................................................................... 102
  5.4.4 CSA on trips away with clergy DN actors ........................................... 103
  5.4.5 In the confessional .......................................................................... 104
  5.4.6 Gifts and bribes used to groom victims .............................................. 108
5.5 The DN utilising the grey network of the Catholic Church’s response to clergy
  CSA to facilitate CSA, protect the DN and DN resilience ...................... 109
  5.5.1 Transferring known clergy perpetrators of CSA ................................. 110
  5.5.2 Transferring known clergy perpetrators of CSA to senior positions ....... 112
5.6 Clergy perpetrators of CSA as mentors for other clergy perpetrators of CSA and
  in recruitment roles ............................................................................ 113
5.7 Maintaining silence - Covering up/protecting perpetrators ................... 114
5.8 Church minimisation and denial of the occurrence of clergy CSA ........ 116
5.9 Whistle-blowers .................................................................................. 118
5.10 Conclusion ........................................................................................... 120

Analysis Chapters................................................................................... 122
6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 122
Chapter 6 Analysis: Clusters, Strong Ties and Weak Ties ....................... 125
6.2 Dark network clusters .......................................................................... 125
  6.2.1 The importance of clusters with strong ties ......................................... 126
  6.2.2 Overview of clusters of Catholic clergy perpetrators in Victoria ........... 129
6.3 The importance of clergy DN weak ties ............................................. 137
  6.3.1 Clergy perpetrators utilising strong and weak ties strategically ............ 138
6.4 Structure of DN and resilience .............................................................. 141
Chapter 7 Analysis of the Operation of a Dark Network of Clergy Perpetrators of CSA

7.1 Introduction

7.2 Dark network resources according to type and motivation

7.3 Clergy dark network resources

7.3.1 Light networks providing cover for dark networks

7.3.2 The dark network resource of clericalism

7.3.3 Religious duress as a DN resource

7.4 Dark network resource of shared knowledge

7.4.1 Patterns in grooming methods

7.4.2 The institutional setting

7.5 Patterns of situational clergy CSA

7.5.1 Clergy CSA committed in the confessional

7.5.2 Clergy CSA committed in school classrooms

7.5.3 Clergy DN actors supervising school or orphanage dormitories

7.5.4 Clergy CSA committed in the victim’s home

7.5.5 Clergy CSA committed on outings or holidays with victims

7.6 Shared DN methods for maintaining silence and DN protection

7.6.1 The confessional

7.6.2 Corporal punishment as a DN resource

7.6.3 Psychological child abuse and victim blaming

7.7 The rite of confession absolves guilt of DN actors

7.8 DN actors supported by other DN actors acting as mentors

7.9 Utilising dark network ties to share DN resources

7.9.1 Sharing victim information

7.9.2 Victim sharing within clusters

7.9.3 Victim sharing cross-institutionally

7.10 Conclusion

Chapter 8 Analysis of the Grey Network as a Dark Network Resource
8.7 Grey network patterns for the cover-up of clergy CSA ........................................ 200
  8.7.1 Clergy CSA complaints ...................................................................................... 200
  8.7.2 Minimisation of the occurrence of clergy CSA by grey network actors .......... 201
  8.7.3 Denial of clergy CSA ........................................................................................ 204
  8.7.4 Catholic laity silencing complaints of clergy CSA .............................................. 207
8.8 Treatment and silencing of whistle-blowers ......................................................... 209
8.9 Grey network and celibacy violations .................................................................... 216
8.10 Grey network actors placing DN actors in recruitment roles and supporting dark
     network resilience ................................................................................................ 217
8.11 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 221
Chapter 9 Thesis Conclusion .................................................................................... 224
9.1 Summary ................................................................................................................ 224
9.2 Research question findings .................................................................................... 225
9.3 Limitations ............................................................................................................. 229
9.4 Findings summary .................................................................................................. 230
9.5 Implications ............................................................................................................ 231
Glossary of terms ........................................................................................................ 230
References .................................................................................................................. 232

List of Figures
Figure 3.1: Centralised, decentralised and mesh like networks ................................. 71
Figure 6.1: Example of visual representation of Cluster 3 on network map created on
          the Visualys software program ............................................................................ 135
Figure 6.2: Map snapshot showing Br McGee and Br Eastmure as belonging to two
          clusters ................................................................................................................... 140
Figure 7.1: Example of three DN Actors committing CSA against shared victims 182
Figure 8.1 Bishops who transferred clergy perpetrators between 1939-2001 .......... 191
Figure 8.2: Bishops of Ballarat Diocese over Data time frame .................................... 192
Figure 8.3: Statistics for Catholic Church membership globally: 1970-2015 ............. 221

List of Tables
Table 3.1 Network tie types ....................................................................................... 66
Table 4.1: Number of clergy perpetrators in each religious order within data
         boundaries ............................................................................................................ 87
Table 5.1: Cluster 1 .................................................................................................. 95
Table 5.2: Cluster 3 .................................................................................................. 96
Table 6.1: Cluster 1 ................................................................................................. 130
Table 6.2: Cluster 2 ................................................................................................. 132
Table 6.3: Cluster 3 ................................................................................................. 134
Chapter 1 Thesis Introduction

1.1 Contextual Background

Child sexual abuse (CSA) is by no means a recent phenomenon. CSA is a global phenomenon affecting approximately 11.8% of children (Bohm, Zolner and Liebhardt 2014, 636). Historically, sexual activity between an adult and child was not categorised as CSA (Ames and Houston 1990). With the spread of Christianity came the condemnation of sexual activity between men and boys (Keenan 2013, 21). In 305 A.D., the Synod of Elvira were the first council for which there are written records which explicitly condemn clergy CSA (Berry 1992 cited in Doubleday, Wiley and Bottoms 2013; Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 54; Robertson 2010, 14). In the 4th century guidelines were established which included harsh punishments for monks who sexually molested boys. The Book of Gomorrah (1051), the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), the Fifth Lateran Council (1514) and the Council of Trent (1545–63) all condemned clergy guilty of sodomy (RCICA 2017a, 168,170; Tapsell 2014; Doyle, Sipe and Wall 2006, 20). Spanish Inquisition files for Valencia between 1565 and 1785 found that in cases where clerics were accused of committing sexual crimes these were committed against adolescents, including religious novices (Jordan 2000, 126-127).

Condemnation of sexual abuse of boys by clergy is also present in canon law as stated in Canon XVIII, “Clerics committing sexual sins and those who sexually abuse boys (Laeuchli 1972, 47) are threatened with irrevocable exclusion”. The Roman Catholic Church recognised clergy CSA as a problem and legislated against its occurrence over 1600 years ago (Farrell 2009, 41; Doyle and Rubino 2004, 577). However, from the mid-19th century there was a distinct shift away from dismissing priests guilty of serious sexual violations including for soliciting in the confessional and an increasing reluctance to hand over priests accused of sexual crimes to civil authorities in some countries (Tapsell 2015, 118). This shift occurred due to a growing separation of the Church and the state. This shift continued when Pope Pius IX issued instructions that “restraint must be shown in demoting priests to the secular state and that allegations
of solicitation in confession must be kept absolutely secret” (RCICA 2017a, 176). In Australia, the earliest documentary references to clergy CSA in Catholic institutions are from the middle of the 19th century (RCICA 2017a, 15).

More recently, the Whitlam Report 2012, Cunneen Report 2014 and the Victorian Parliamentary Inquiry, Betrayal of Trust Report 2013 have been published. These reports and inquiry found that over centuries Church leaders allowed a Church culture to develop through minimisation, keeping secret and inadequately responding to clergy CSA (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 242). Inquiries typically focus on the most prolific perpetrators (Calkins et al 2015, 629). However, since the intense publicity surrounding the extent of these crimes, the Catholic church has been increasingly scrutinised regarding the nature of clergy CSA. The extent of CSA within the Catholic Church made it the first religion to gain significant attention from the media, researchers, politicians and the public (Gavrielides 2013, 618).

In the Australian context, CSA by Catholic clergy has been high on the agenda since the 1970s. The conviction of Fr Michael Glennon in 1978 on charges of CSA highlighted this agenda (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 99). In 1988, the Australian Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ACBC) established the euphemised name of the ‘Special Issues Committee’, which was established to develop a protocol for responding to complaints of CSA (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 99). The 1992 protocol was unable to deal with the increasing number of cases of CSA, and this led to the Towards Healing protocol being published by the ACBC. Following this, in 1996, Archbishop Pell developed a separate CSA protocol, the Melbourne Response which dealt with complaints of clergy CSA in Melbourne exclusively (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 99).

The Catholic Church has 1.2 billion members worldwide and is the largest single denomination in Australia, which includes 22.6% of the total population (Australian Bureau of Statistics Census 2016). Focussing on clergy CSA in the Catholic Church is warranted, as reports of CSA committed by Catholic clergy are higher than any other
religion or institution (Doyle 2017, 1; Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 195; Robertson 2010a, 6). In 1985, an ethnographic study based on 25 years of collecting data and treating priests, confirmed that 6% of Catholic priests were involved in CSA (Doyle, Sipe and Wall 2006, 213). The John Jay study was important for establishing the extent of Catholic clergy CSA. It also served to refute Cardinal Ratzinger’s claim that fewer than 1% of priests committed CSA (Robertson 2010, 23). Data from John Jay’s study (2004), which focusses on Catholic clergy CSA between 1960-85, exceeds the previous figures, with figures of 10% in the 1970s, and of 8% in the 1980s (Doyle, Sipe and Wall 2006, 214). Although 90-92% of Catholic clergy did not commit CSA, the consequences of CSA by clergy is so destructive that even a small percentage warrants extreme concern (Doyle, Sipe and Wall 2006, 80). The following paragraph provides a definition of CSA. Throughout this thesis where the perpetration of CSA by Catholic clergy is being referred to specifically, the term clergy CSA will be used.

1.2 Child sexual abuse

As CSA is the criminal activity focussed on in this thesis, a definition of this follows. CSA is defined by the RCICA (2012-2015) as

any act which exposes a child to, or involves a child in, sexual processes beyond his or her understanding or contrary to accepted community standards. Sexually abusive behaviours can include the fondling of genitals, masturbation, oral sex, vaginal or anal penetration by a penis, finger or any other object, fondling of breasts, voyeurism, exhibitionism and exposing the child to or involving the child in pornography. It includes child grooming, which refers to actions deliberately undertaken with the aim of befriending and establishing an emotional connection with a child, to lower the child’s inhibitions in preparation for sexual activity with the child. (RCICA 2017, 19)

The significance of this research is highlighted by a gap in the literature specifically examining Catholic clergy perpetrators of CSA as a dark network (DN). A review of literature from 1981 to 2013, conducted by Bohm, Zolner and Liebhardt (2014, 637), found only six articles conducted research specific to clerical perpetrators of CSA, therefore highlighting a gap in research in the area of clergy CSA generally. The
literature does acknowledge that clergy CSA involves a network of Catholic hierarchy who have moved clergy perpetrators of CSA from parish to parish, and often this resulted in clusters of clergy perpetrators of CSA in the same parish (Pratt 2005, 282; Steinfels 2002, 16; Neil 2015, 2; Clifton 2002, 2; Deery and Morris-Marr 2015, 1). However, this acknowledgment of a clergy CSA network has not extended to mapping and analysing these networks using social network analysis (SNA) to examine how ties between network actors are utilised to facilitate clergy CSA. The following section provides an overview of the content and structure of this thesis.

1.3 Thesis overview

Chapter 2 contains a detailed review of literature pertinent to this thesis. It examines available research on topics relevant to clergy CSA. The chapter begins by highlighting how perceptions of CSA have changed over decades. These changes contributed to an acknowledgement of the occurrence of clergy CSA. However, the occurrence of clergy CSA is examined from an individual and institutional perspective and does not study how clergy perpetrators acted in cooperation. Various theories on CSA offending, offender characteristics and grooming methods used by general population child sexual abusers and specific to Catholic clergy child sexual abusers, will be outlined. Reviewing this literature highlights patterns in the methods used by clergy perpetrators to commit CSA. These patterns form part of the analysis which evidences these as a shared network resource which demonstrates organised criminal activity. Similarities and differences between clergy perpetrators of CSA and general population child sexual abusers show the unique context of clergy CSA. Attributes of the Catholic Church’s culture and structure are outlined as these were exploited by clergy perpetrators to facilitate CSA and remain covert. The final section of the literature review Chapter 2 examines the response of the Victorian Catholic Church to clergy CSA and how this fits within the characteristics of a grey network.

Chapter 3 provides an overview of the theoretical frameworks applied to this research. It outlines the theory of dark networks, and while there is debate over whether SNA is more of a method than a theory, most SNA methods use common conventions and
concepts and will be included in the theory chapter (Clark 2007; van der Hulst 2009, 2011; Wesserman and Fraust 1994, 2011). As Catholic clergy CSA DNs have not been previously researched, comparative literature is limited to DNs with similar characteristics. A review of DN literature outlines the traits and various typologies present in different types of DNs as these vary in visibility, structure and illicit activity.

In past decades, SNA has been utilised to analyse licit or light networks, though in recent years has gained momentum in its application to DNs. SNA can be applied to DNs to reveal hidden patterns and ties between network actors within the network and provide insight to how they operate which can be used to disrupt DNs. As will be explained further, SNA not only provides a visual representation of a network but also illustrates the ties between network actors and nodes. SNA concepts such as strong and weak ties, are explained in this chapter. The nodes in this research are the institutions where known clergy perpetrators were present. As the use of SNA is reasonably new in the area of DNs, there is still much that is uncertain, and although the research literature identifies the potential benefits of SNA, there are also apparent limitations which will be outlined at the end of Theory Chapter 3.

Chapter 4 outlines the research methods and design used for this thesis, provides a rationale for using these methods and states the limitations. The methodology used for this thesis is designed with the aim of answering the research questions. A detailed explanation for the data boundary selected and the three data sources used to code data is provided in the methodology chapter. Additionally, the limitations in accessing data are highlighted to demonstrate why these limitations are apparent. However, it will also be shown that despite limitations, the data set is robust. The coding of qualitative and quantitative data into relevant themes pertaining to each of the 99 clergy perpetrators is detailed. Once the data is coded it is entered into a word document which is transferred to an Excel spread sheet. The data for each clergy perpetrator is then entered into the mapping software program, Visualsys. This stage of the process results in a visual representation of the network of 99 clergy perpetrators in Victoria between 1939-2000. The network map (see Appendix 2), shows the ties between clergy perpetrators and their connections to specific geographic locations.
This is analysed in conjunction with qualitative data to formulate the analyse in chapters 6, 7 and 8. SNA is conducted to build on an understanding of how this DN operated. The main purpose of SNA is to determine the structure and identify ties between actors and analyse how these ties are used in relation to the operation of a network (van der Hulst 2009; Bright, Hughes and Chalmers 2012, 151).

**Chapter 5** is the data chapter and provides representative examples from the data to demonstrate apparent themes. The analysis Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will further examine and discuss these themes using examples from the data chapter to exemplify the analysis. Further examples and more detailed data regarding individual clergy perpetrators of CSA are provided in Appendix 1. The chapter begins by evidencing ties between clergy perpetrators of CSA to show that rather than committing CSA on an individual level these DN actors are connected on an organisational level. Furthermore, qualitative data shows these ties being utilised to support and share DN resources with fellow clergy DN actors. The data chapter provides examples of clergy DN resources and how these are shared between clergy DN actors. Clergy DN resources include victims, victim information, shared knowledge for the facilitation of CSA and silencing of victims. The data reveals common patterns for committing CSA and for silencing victims. The role of the grey network of the Victorian Catholic Church in facilitating clergy CSA has been well documented. The data chapter extends on this knowledge by providing examples of patterns in the response of the Catholic Church to clergy CSA which functioned as a DN resource. One of these patterns was promoting known clergy perpetrators of CSA to senior positions which not only provided further access to victims but also placed them in positions where they were better able to protect the DN from exposure.

**Chapter 6** is the first of three analysis chapters. It evidences the presence of a DN of clergy perpetrators of CSA by showing that they are connected. DN actor tie types are defined and the significance of these ties are analysed. A DN is “any group which seeks to conceal itself and its activities from authorities and protect members from detection” (Everton 2012, xxv). The covert nature of DNs is due to the engagement in

It is already known that clergy perpetrators of CSA were present at some institutions at the same time. One documented example of a cluster of clergy perpetrators of CSA was at St Alipius Primary School, Ballarat. In 1971, four out of five of the personnel at St Alipius, were child sex offenders. These personnel included Br Robert Best, Br Edward Dowlan, Fr Gerald Ridsdale and Br Stephen Farrell, all of whom have been convicted of CSA (Family and Community Development Centre 2013, 57; Clifton 2002; Neil 2015; Donovan 2015; Griffith 2002; RCICA 2016). Best was there from 1968-73, Dowlan in 1971, Farrell from 1973-74 and Fitzgerald from 1962-75 (Family and Community Development Committee 2013, 17). Research has not previously been extended to include evidencing these clergy perpetrators conducting illicit activity in an organised and cooperative way.

This research gap highlights the significance of this proposed research as it seeks to examine the ties between 99 Catholic clergy perpetrators of CSA and whether these ties were utilised to facilitate CSA in the form of a collusive, organised and covert DN. This thesis aims to evidence this theory and, additionally, show that DN actors took advantage of the light or licit attributes of the Catholic Church to commit CSA. Analysis in Chapter 6 evidences the presence of a DN of clergy perpetrators of CSA by showing that they are connected. DN actor tie types are defined and the significance of these ties are analysed.

Chapter 7 is the second analysis chapter which extends on the analysis in Chapter 6. This is done by evidencing the operation of a DN by providing examples and analysis of clergy DN actors utilising ties to obtain and share DN resources. In the context of this thesis, DN actors are clergy perpetrators of CSA, and DN resources are material and non-material resources utilised by the DN to facilitate clergy CSA. The primary
material resource for the clergy DN is that of child victims, selected and groomed for the purpose of committing CSA (Everton 2012, 17 and 92; Cunningham, Everton and Murphy 2016, 4). Other non-material resources are utilised by the DN as a means of obtaining the primary resource of victims. Non-material resources include sharing of knowledge (Duijn, Kashirin and Sloot 2014, 5; Moldoveanu and Baum 2011, 393; Everton 2012; Morselli 2009) regarding how and where to groom victims and commit CSA, covering for other DN actors’ CSA and methods for silencing victims. The data also evidences DN actors sharing victims. It is the utilisation of ties to share DN resources which evidences the operation of a DN as this shows DN actors operating in an organised and reciprocated way (Cunningham, Everton and Murphy 2016, 4).

Raab and Milward (2003, 419) discuss whether networks, overt and covert, can be used to coordinate activities to either benefit all human beings or to inflict harm. The internet is an example of a network which has benefited society, but it also serves to facilitate DNs of paedophiles who utilise it for predatory reasons, such as finding and sharing victims. This highlights a key difference between light and dark networks, where light networks are inherently good, DNs are self-serving (Milward and Raab, 2006). The light network of the Catholic Church has the ability to impose sanctions on clergy perpetrators of CSA. Despite this, the Catholic Church has predominantly chosen not to do so which represents the function of the grey network which was exploited by the clergy DN to facilitate clergy CSA.

**Chapter 8** is the third and final analysis chapter. It evidences that the response of the Catholic Church grey network served as a significant clergy perpetrator DN resource. The grey network includes those members of the Catholic hierarchy who transferred known clergy CSA perpetrators to institutions where they had access to further child victims. The grey network also comprises those who silenced CSA complaints and covered for clergy perpetrators of CSA. The significance of the role of the Catholic Church grey network in facilitating clergy CSA became more evident through the evidence presented at the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (RCICA 2011-2015), and the Victorian Parliamentary Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (VPI 2013). The response of minimisation and secrecy served to
protect the network and contributed to the resilience or longevity of the network’s operation. Themes of denial used to explain this acceptance include ties to the sexual, social freedom of the 1960’s and a lack of clergy awareness of the issues involved in reporting CSA (Spraitz and Bowen 2015, 12). The primary objective of the Catholic Church in responding to the occurrence of clergy CSA, was preventing scandal and safeguarding the wellbeing of priests and institutions over the welfare of children (Doyle 2006, 212). Additional to the harm caused by Catholic clergy CSA is the Catholic Church’s response, which has been one of denial, secrecy and cover-up. This response fits within the definition of a grey network; however, this has not been researched as such.

A grey networks’ characteristics include “secrecy and cover-up and despite their apparent legal status, utilise methods which cannot be openly acknowledged” (Neil and Peterie 2018, 132). The grey network response was utilised by the DN of clergy perpetrators of CSA as a DN resource which served to protect the clergy DN. Chapter 8 demonstrates the ways in which the grey network of the Catholic church facilitated continued clergy CSA through action and inaction. It will be shown that without the support of the grey network, the DN of clergy perpetrators would not have continued to flourish and the clergy DN would have been less resilient. The Catholic Church hierarchy contributed to continued clergy CSA by transferring known clergy perpetrators from parish to parish and hiding CSA (Falkenhain 1999; Smith 2013; Carney 2012; Vince and Rubinsztein-Dunlop 2012; Gavrielides 2013; Ryan 2013).

Chapter 9 is the concluding chapter of the thesis. It provides a summary of each chapter and highlights significant findings of the thesis. Findings include those relevant to answering the research questions and findings which are beyond the scope of this thesis though warrant further research. Implications of these findings and the potential for applying this research method to other cohorts are discussed.
1.4 Research Questions

1. Is there a dark network of clergy perpetrators of CSA apparent in the Victorian Catholic Church?

2. How does social network analysis explain the operation of a DN?

3. How is the grey network exploited by the DN to facilitate clergy CSA and support DN resilience?

In summary, and in relation to answering the research questions, first, the network map (see Appendix 2), of DN actors illustrates the geographical placement, DN actor ties and movement of DN actors across institutions. Second, the qualitative data and literature are used to analyse how ties between actors were used to share DN resources to facilitate clergy CSA. SNA applied in the context of the Victorian Catholic Church clergy DN also examines whether DN actors utilised the licit or light network of the Catholic institution to facilitate clergy CSA. It will be demonstrated that the light network attributes of the Catholic Church were exploited by clergy DN actors to commit CSA. Third, the network map illustrates the ties between clergy DN actors and their Bishops and Archbishops. These ties are analysed to evidence consistent responses to clergy CSA by grey network actors. These responses functioned as a DN resource which protected DN actors, facilitated clergy CSA and contributed to the resilience of the DN.
Chapter 2 Literature Review

2.1 Child sexual abuse

As CSA is the crime at the centre of this thesis, an overview of how this crime has been perceived in prior decades provides social context to the time frame in which much of the clergy CSA in the data set for this thesis occurred. The gravity of the occurrence of CSA has not always been realised and has been perceived in different ways over the last few decades regarding who are likely perpetrators of CSA. Historically, CSA was unlikely to be discussed, and when a family member was the perpetrator it was an off-limits subject (McCabe and Murphy 2016, 33). Recent research on institutional CSA is outlined in later sections. Prior to focussing on institutional CSA and the Catholic Church institution more specifically, it is important to review how research has changed over recent decades to show the current status of clergy CSA research. Similar to the changes in perceptions of where CSA is likely to occur, recent decades have seen a recognition of the short- and long-term impacts on a victim of CSA.

The following chronology of research illustrates the change in perceived seriousness of the effects of CSA. In the mid-1950s, the effects of CSA were not considered particularly harmful but by the 1980s long term harm was being acknowledged (Pratt 2005, 263). Research conducted in the 1980s states that long term risks for sexually abused children include depression, self-injurious behaviour, anxiety and interpersonal distrust (Browne and Finkelhor 1986). Research from the 1990s found common effects from CSA such as behavioural problems, low self-esteem, sexualised behaviour and symptoms consistent with post traumatic disorder (Kendall-Tackett, Williams and Finkelhor 1993; Widom and Ames 1994). Glover, Williams and Kisler (2011) identify three categories of outcomes for victims of CSA including psychiatric disorders, dysfunctional behaviours and neurobiological dysregulation which is an inability to control behaviour and emotions and can predispose an individual to substance use and other psychiatric disorders. Daray et al. (2016, 91) state CSA in childhood may affect cognitive and emotional development and can result in suicide ideation and attempts when the CSA victim becomes an adult. Apparent here is that
continued research over several decades has found increasingly serious impacts of 
CSA and a recognition of CSA as a crime of public concern (McCabe and Murphy  
2016, 33). Recent decades have also seen an increase on research on male victims  
of CSA which was previously neglected (Gartner 2018).

2.1.1 Gender differences in victims of CSA

As females constitute most known victims, most of the existing CSA research is based 
on data relevant to female victims of CSA and this has been applied to CSA of young 
males (Grosskopf 2010, 1). As a result of inquiries into clergy CSA it has been 
revealed that boys like girls, experience significant CSA. In contrast to what was  
previously known regarding CSA victims, it is now known that most Catholic clergy  
CSA victims are male (John Jay College 2004; Parkinson, Oates and Jayakody 2012), 
and males are less likely or take longer than females to disclose CSA (Cashmore and  
Shackel 2014, 77; Hunter 2011; Pribe and Svedin 2008). As a result, the CSA of 
boys has received increased attention as prior to this, most research on CSA focused  
on girls (Cashmore and Shackel 2014, 75). A prevalence of boys as victims of clergy  
CSA is supported by a study conducted by John Jay College on a U.S national level  
to examine clergy CSA within the Catholic Church between 1950–2002 (John Jay  
College 2006). The John Jay College study (2006) found that 81% of victims were 
males between the ages of 11 and 14, and an additional 6% being males under the 
age of 7 (Ackerman and Khan 2012, 254).

The higher rates of clergy CSA of boys may be explained by research which shows  
that while girls are more likely to experience intra-familial CSA, boys are more likely  
to experience extra-familial CSA, which occurs outside of the familial environment in 
a perpetrator’s home, institution or a public place (Richards 2011; ABS 2005).  
Regardless of whether the CSA is extra- or intra-familial, where the perpetrator is a  
thrusted family or church member, the likelihood of disclosure decreases, and the  
impact is more severe (Fogler et al. 2008).
An additional factor is that some religious orders have male and female clergy in the form of brothers and nuns. Significant to clergy CSA being a male dominated problem, Catholic orders, De La Salle and Christian Brothers do not have a female equivalent and further to this, Christian Brothers only care and educate boys (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 144). Therefore, clergy perpetrators of CSA had greater access to boys, particularly in institutions operated by De La Salle or Christian Brothers. Research by Terry and Freilich (2012, 437) found that victim selection was based on access to victims. The high prevalence of boys as victims does not assume that homosexuality is the reason for this but that this prevalence may simply be opportunistic offending due to situational factors (Holt and Massey 2012, 606).

According to (RCICA 2015c, 5), Catholic clergy accused of CSA in Victoria were mostly male, and only 8% of abusers were female. Research indicates that boys may be worried about perceived homosexuality; may feel shame or be confused about their sexuality and fear becoming predators themselves due to the abused abuser theory (Dorahy and Clearwater 2012; O’Leary and Barber 2008; Gartner 2018, 7-9). These factors contribute to non-disclosure and benefited clergy perpetrators as male victims were less likely to disclose CSA. Some barriers to disclosure are not unique to the Catholic Church, as within cultures of youth-serving organisations there is a tendency for reports of CSA to be ignored and for the abuser to be believed rather than the victim (Shakeshaft 2004; Shakeshaft and Cohan 1994). Therefore, children who have been victims of CSA are less likely to disclose CSA as they doubt they will be believed (Palmer and Feldman 2017, 29). However, additional barriers to disclosing Catholic clergy CSA include a fear of disclosing to devout Catholic families because of attitudes about sex, a fear of being ostracised and bringing shame on the Church and an overarching fear and reverence for clergy (RCICA 2017a, 25).

The influence which clericalism had on not only victims but also parents of victims of CSA created a psychological duress which caused many victims to remain silent for many years (Doyle 2006, 189). Many victims have reported initial feelings of disbelief, intense fear during the abuse and after regarding disclosing the abuse, feelings of guilt and betrayal and loss of spiritual lives (Doyle 2006, 190). Parents and family of victims
often refused to believe the victim and victims were sometimes punished for making disparaging remarks about a priest, while other parents felt unable to report the abuse to the Church (Doyle 2006, 190; Gavrielides 2013, 625). The Catholic laity have tended to deny or minimise clergy CSA, and secular authorities have displayed a lenient attitude to clergy perpetrators to protect the Church (Doyle 2006, 191).

Disclosure of CSA is not a simple process as children may not realise that an incident is CSA or may be unwilling to disclose CSA out of fear or loyalty (Smallbone, Marshall and Wortley 2008). For this and other reasons such as a fear of negative consequences, disclosure of CSA is frequently delayed or not reported in an official capacity (Pipe, Lamb, Orbach and Cederborg 2007; London, Bruck, Ceci and Shuman 2005; McElvaney 2015). This delay or non-reporting of CSA effects successful prosecution of perpetrators of CSA, postpones needed therapeutic treatment for victims and leaves more children vulnerable to CSA (Tashjian et al. 2016, 149).

The above paragraphs highlight that CSA research has progressed by acknowledging the occurrence of clergy CSA and that the effects of CSA on victims is devastating. Research has also progressed by acknowledging that males are predominantly the victims of clergy CSA and by recognising differences between male and female victims of CSA. Of particular significance to this thesis is the fact that male victims of clergy CSA take longer to disclose CSA. Later paragraphs will show that male victims were likely chosen by clergy perpetrators based on access and opportunity. This research shows how the Catholic Church institutional setting provided opportunities to commit clergy CSA which will be discussed further. Also significant is that longer delays in disclosure of clergy CSA by male victims' aided clergy perpetrators of CSA in remaining covert. The following section examines the type of individuals who commit CSA and the theories behind this type of offending.

Being sexually attracted to children is not in itself an offence though acting on this attraction becomes a criminal offence (Richards 2011, 2). Therefore, the methods used to select, groom and commit CSA are key to exploring this occurrence and also
for potentially preventing CSA. There are similarities between general population perpetrators of CSA and clergy perpetrators of CSA; there are also key differences which enhance opportunities for clergy CSA, which will be outlined later in this chapter and discussed further in Analysis Chapter 7.

2.2 Child sexual abusers

Existing research discusses child sexual abusers using several categorisations and definitions. A paedophile is “an individual who is exclusively sexually attracted to prepubescent children under the age of 13” (Malatesta 2008, 7; Cartor, Cimbolic and Tallon 2008, 312; Blanchard et al. 2009). An ephebophile is when an offenders’ victim is adolescent and primarily male (Ryan, Baerwald and McGlone. 2008, 2; Cartor, Cimbolic and Tallon 2008, 312; Prentky and Barbaree 2011, 506). The term hebephilia is used to describe sexual interest in pubescent children (Stephens, Goodwill and Cantor 2017, 301; Cartor, Cimbolic and Tallon 2008, 312).

According to Sipe (1990,1995) based on typology descriptions, approximately 2% of priests could be described as paedophiles and 4% could be described as ephebophiles. More recent results of a forensic evaluation of 78 clergy perpetrators of CSA, showed that “12% of clergy perpetrators of CSA meet the diagnostic criteria for paedophilia, while 5% meet the diagnostic criteria for ephebophilia” (Leygraf et al. 2012). The various definitions of CSA offenders adopted by researchers can influence the statistics of the prevalence of CSA presented in research (Price-Robertson, Bromfield and Vassallo 2010). For this research, the term ‘clergy perpetrators of CSA’ will be used as it may not always be possible to make this distinction with the available data. The following section outlines characteristics specific to clergy perpetrators of CSA and highlights similarities between general population child sexual abusers.


2.3 Clergy child sexual abuse

2.3.1 Clergy perpetrator of CSA characteristics

Studies examining factors that may explain the cause of clergy CSA found that clergy perpetrators tend to be similar to general population child sex offenders though there were differences found in the characteristics of education and intelligence (D’Alton, Guilfoyle and Randall 2013, Plante and Aldridge 2005, Langevin, Cumoe and Bain 2000, Ukeritis, 2005). A common finding related to the cause of clergy CSA is the relationship between celibacy and the emotional health of priests (Doyle 2006, 195). Sipe (1990) similarly states that the “clerical subculture hides a dimension of life from the public and it is in this hidden life that sexual dysfunction is both nurtured and enabled”. Importantly, Calkins, Tallon and Terry (2008, 629) note that while there are clergy with high recidivism rates, it should be acknowledged that clergy have a range of CSA offending behaviours and managing clergy perpetrators as a homogenous group may detract from understanding and prevention of CSA.

Research on clergy perpetrators of CSA has tended to focus on prevalence rates, psychological and individual characteristics (Firestone, Moulden and Wexler 2009). D’Alton, Guilfoyle and Randall (2013, 698) considered clergy’s psychosexual and psychological development as precursors to the perpetration of CSA. Additionally, it has been found that vulnerability factors which include a predisposition to the perpetration of CSA, were intensified by clerical training and culture (D’Alton, Guilfoyle and Randall 2013, 701). However, these studies do not explain the extent of clergy CSA in the Roman Catholic Church specifically, which has been shown to have the most prolific occurrence of clergy CSA comparable to other religions (Doyle 2017, 1; Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 195; Robertson 2010a, 6).

2.3.2 Prevalence of clergy CSA

Despite Catholic Church authorities responding to the recent clergy CSA crisis with astonishment, framing this as a fairly new issue, Church records indicate that evidence of Catholic clergy CSA had reached public and legal visibility centuries earlier (Isely
Catholic clergy CSA dominated the United States media and research literature through the 2000’s and was widely viewed as a U.S. problem (Terry 2012). However, it became clear that clergy CSA was a worldwide problem. Countries where prolific clergy CSA has been reported also include Ireland, Belgium, Canada, U.K., Austria, Germany, South Africa and the Netherlands (Conway 2014; Bohm, Zolner and Liebhardt 2014). This is not to say that there is not a clergy CSA crisis in other countries which have yet to come to light. Neither does this research suggest that the Catholic Church is the only religion where clergy commit CSA, though few other religions have come under the same degree of scrutiny as the Catholic Church in recent times (John Jay College of Criminal Justice 2004, 2011). Children may be at risk in various religious institutions as well as in schools and other youth-serving institutions (Calkins et al. 2015, 581).

Given the clandestine and criminal nature of CSA, rates are difficult to accurately gauge, though significantly, approximately half of clergy CSA is committed by priests (Ackerman and Khan 2012, 254; Family and Community Development Committee 2012e, 2). The significance of these figures is that priests mostly work unsupervised and therefore have greater access to victims (Calkins et al. 2015, 580). While clergy CSA is not a problem unique to the Victorian Catholic Church this is the cohort focused upon for this research. Various theories specific to clergy CSA have been put forward though have generally not been substantiated and appear to be aimed and shifting blame from the Church as an institution.

### 2.4 Clergy perpetrator of CSA theories

Various theories for clergy CSA include that cases of CSA happened decades ago and newly ordained priests are unlikely to commit CSA (Ostrowski 2010, 46). Some theories place blame on homosexual priests (Donohue 2003, 41), which is refuted by Plante and Daniels (2004), Keenan (2013) and Frawley-O’Dea (2007). Further theories argue that the celibacy leads to frustration and leads to inappropriate sexual behaviour (Ostrowski 2010, 46) and that the media have exaggerated the issue to bring shame to the Church (Ostrowski 2010, 46). The “rotten apple” theory similarly
exculpates the extent of clerical CSA by stating that “there are a few bad apples in any group and most priests would never abuse a child” (White and Terry 2008, 662). Literature refutes this theory as one that can be relied upon as a defence for clergy CSA (Death 2013; White and Terry 2008). The “rotten apple” theory has been similarly used by police hierarchy to blame corruption on a few rogue police officers (White and Terry 2008, 659). Although these theories hold little credibility, it is important to outline these as these theories have been presented as explanations for the occurrence of Catholic clergy CSA. The ‘abused-abuser’ theory is similarly unreliable though this theory may be more reliable in the context of clergy CSA.

2.4.1 Abused-abuser theory

Some psychotherapists adhere to the theory that paedophilia is caused by the offender being sexually abused in childhood (Graham 1996, 193; Finkelhor 1984; Craissati and McClurg 2002). Garland and Dougher (1990) coined for this theory the term ‘abused abuser hypothesis’. The main issue with this theory is that it is based on self-reports of accused or charged perpetrators of CSA and therefore does not include CSA victims who did not become CSA offenders. The ‘abused abuser’ theory has been found to have significant variance in research results, which renders this theory unreliable (Hall and Hall 2007; Keenan 2013; McDevitt 2012; Salter 2003; Simons 2007). Even though some CSA offenders do have a history of CSA, most victims of CSA do not commit CSA later in life (Richards 2011, 6).

Although the literature generally does not support the abused abuser theory, research has found that clergy may be different in this regard. Sipe (1995) found, based on a study of 473 priests in the United States who had committed CSA, that 70% to 80% had themselves been sexually abused as children, some by priests, with 10% reporting that the clergy CSA occurred during seminary training. This is supported by a study conducted by Perillo, Mercado and Terry (2008, 611), which analysed data from the 2004 John Jay College report and found that a history of CSA was one of the strongest predictors for Clerics to become repeat offenders. Psychologist Dr Keenan stated that while the abused abuser theory is not supported in general population CSA
offenders, clergy who have experienced CSA may be different in this regard (RCICA 2017b, 598). Therefore, if this theory is applicable to the clerical setting, this highlights the significance of seminary training as a recruitment tool for clergy perpetrators of CSA.

Explanations for why certain individuals commit CSA have focussed on dispositional factors such as an inability to be form close relationships with others (Marshall, Champagne, Brown and Miller 1997; Smallbone 2005), problems with self and sexual parameters (Lindsay, Steptoe and Beech 2008; Cortoni and Marshall 2001), and generally focus on the individual. These theories do not account for how the social and situational contexts may affect opportunities to commit CSA. It is important to examine the situational context of clergy CSA and how the institutional structure contributed to and facilitated Catholic clergy committing CSA. Analysis Chapter 7 evidences that the culture, structure and institutional setting of the Catholic Church functioned as resources for the proliferation of clergy CSA.

2.4.2 Situational and opportunistic offending

As outlined previously, current theories for explaining clergy CSA are varied and fail to offer a valid and complete explanation. Considering situational CSA adds to the understanding of the context in which CSA occurs. In addition to the above-mentioned child sexual abuser typologies, situational child sexual abusers target children due to an inability to form adult sexual relationships due to poor social skills, and they target children as victims of opportunity (Miller 2013, 507; Richards 2011, 2). Situational factors play a key role in CSA, as a desire to commit CSA cannot be fulfilled without the opportunity to do so (Lilly, Cullen and Ball 2015; Ward 2002). Opportunistic CSA offenders seek situations where they have access and authority over children so as to commit CSA (Kaufman et al. 2016, 14).

Clergy CSA has been studied from a situational perspective by analysing data from CSA studies to understand the opportunities clergy had or manipulated in order to
commit CSA (Terry and Freilich 2012, 437). Rather than examine why offenders commit CSA, this research examines patterns in how victims were selected and where these crimes were committed. Terry and Freilich (2012) found that equal access to boys and girls resulted in little difference between the locations of where CSA was committed against boys and girls. However, boys were more likely to be abused in social situations such as on retreats, on vacation or in the church setting. CSA committed by priests predominantly occurred in parishes and schools (RCICA 2015c, 5). The higher rates of clergy CSA of boys is supported here, as historically, clergy have spent more time with boys in these settings (Terry and Freilich 2012, 446). Although duration of CSA was found to be similar for male and female victims, when boys and girls reach Catholic high school level they are separated, which means that priests and brothers predominantly work with boys. Cahill and Wilkinson (2017, 95), state that there is clear evidence that CSA is “a male problem in a male dominated institution”.

There is some diversity in the characteristics of clergy perpetrators of CSA though there are distinct similarities in the opportunity structure situational CSA (Terry and Freilich 2012, 450). While some sexual offenders are focussed on children as victims' other sexual offenders can be drawn into CSA through peer influence and the situational context, which is crucial to understanding multi-perpetrator CSA (Salter 2013, 26). A study conducted by Holt and Massey (2012) supports the above research as it concluded that victims were not selected based on gender, but that CSA was a function of opportunity. This research also questions whether CSA stems from sexual preference or increased opportunities to offend against males (Holt and Massey 2012, 607). The notion of fixed sexuality has also been challenged as sexual fluidity is present in other institutional settings such as prison (Sykes 1958; Plummer 2003; Keys 2002). As in a prison environment, CSA committed by clergy could similarly be opportunistic due to the unique level of frequently unsupervised access they have to children. The above theories place the situational context as key to victim selection. Additionally, the institutional setting of the Catholic Church provided unique levels of access to child victims.
2.4.3 Theories specific to the institutional setting of the Catholic Church

CSA has been extensively researched regarding the effects, trauma and grooming of victims (Malatesta 2008; Grosskopf 2010; Agustina 2015; Kennison 2004). However, less research has been conducted on CSA offenders in institutional settings (Calkins et al. 2015, 580). CSA in institutional settings is pertinent to this thesis as the analysis in Chapter 7 will evidence that the Catholic Church institutional setting was exploited by the clergy DN to facilitate CSA. Institutional CSA occurs because of a power differential between institutions and children, dependent on the institution, being exploited (Australian Senate 2001, 2004; Faulkner 2003). The abuse of power in institutional settings has been found to be harsher (Magalhães et al. 2009), and it occurs for a lengthier amount of time (Spröber et al. 2014). Furthermore, the trauma of CSA may be exacerbated in an institutional setting due to the victims reduced ability to be believed, protected and supported (Blakemore et al. 2017, 35). Additionally, children are isolated from their families in institutional settings, and recent research shows that social isolation of children increases the risk factors for vulnerability to CSA (McCabe and Murphy 2016, 35). The situational contexts of youth institutions are favourable to opportunistic offenders, and children are particularly vulnerable due to having adults in positions of trust within these institutions (Calkins et al. 2015, 581). In comparison to extra-familial CSA in other settings, institutional CSA is more likely to involve multiple offenders (Australian Senate 2001, 2004; Spröber et al. 2014). The presence of multiple clergy perpetrators at an institution is apparent in the data for this thesis. The significance of this is evidenced in the analysis in Chapter 7 in regard to clergy perpetrators supporting one another’s offending, evidencing patterns of organised illicit behaviour. Additionally, the institutional setting of the Catholic Church was conducive to hiding and providing opportunities to commit clergy CSA.

Church run institutions have a huge capacity to escape scrutiny and will go to extreme lengths to hide institutional offending (Salter 2013, 33). Clerical roles involve unsupervised counselling and giving children the rite of confession where they have one-on-one contact with children which provides a unique level of access to children (Calkins et al. 2015, 580). Clergy’s exalted status provided perpetrators with a façade of being beyond criticism or suspicion, and parents granted these perpetrators
unsupervised access to their children (BRA 2016ac; RCICA 2017b, 625). This is partially due to there being a high proportion of clergy compared to supervising Bishops. In the Melbourne archdiocese, the largest diocese in Victoria (Family and Community Development Committee 2013c, 3), four auxiliary Bishops are responsible for monitoring 305 diocesan priests in 214 parishes (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 257). Considering that it is the responsibility of Bishops when assigning a priest to a parish to ensure that priest has all the necessary intellectual, spiritual and moral qualities required for the position (Doyle, Sipe and Wall 2006, 181), the ratio of priests to Bishops questions the adequacy of this screening process. Additionally, an apparent reluctance by Bishops to investigate CSA complaints provided little deterrence for would be clergy perpetrators of CSA.

Furthermore, clergy used their clerical status and power differential to silence child victims by telling them that no one would believe a child over a representative of God (Robinson 2007; Gavrielides 2013, 625). In the context of CSA occurring in the Catholic Church, the added component of the power differential intensifies the coercive relationship between children and clergy (Family and Community Development Committee 2012, 6), making disclosure of clergy CSA even less likely. Death (2015, 102) argues that covering up clergy CSA is “a function of institutional power, reliant on the silencing of victims and serving to protect the Church’s elite status”. This is similarly stated in the submission provided to the RCICA by the Truth and Justice Council which states,

The priest “inherits all of the social advantages of being male”, together with “additional power” through his seminary education, his status as a public figure, his position in the Catholic Church as a “representative of Christ”, his privileged access to people’s inner lives through the pastoral relationships he has with them, and the “largely unquestioned perception within the Church that church leaders always tell the truth”. (RCICA 2017b, 614)

The RCICA final report noted that there is a heightened risk of CSA when certain pre-existing factors regarding an individual’s motivations combine with situational and
institutional factors (RCICA 2017b, 591). Calkins et al. (2015, 591) argue that clergy perpetrators of CSA pursued opportunities to work with children, and due to their respected status it was likely they worked unsupervised. In contrast, McAlinden (2012, 161) states that while some offenders may seek positions which provide contact with children (Sullivan and Beech 2004), for others it may be that the institutional setting provides opportunities to commit CSA. This opportunistic nature of clergy CSA is not due to a specific sexual attraction to children but more so the availability and vulnerability of children (Erooga 2008, 65). The importance of situational and contextual factors in understanding clergy perpetrated CSA is apparent considering that clergy are an atypical group of perpetrators of CSA with few identifiable paedophile pathologies, though there is much information which indicates opportunistic CSA (RCICA 2017b, 593). These situational contexts paired with clergy positions of trust are favourable to opportunistic offending (Calkins et al. 2015, 581; Smallbone and Cale 2015).

Data from the John Jay Study (2004) regarding situational clergy CSA shows that 40.9% of clergy CSA occurred in the priest’s home or presbytery, 16.3% in the church, 12.4% took place in the victim’s home, 10.3% occurred in a holiday home and 10.3% occurred in schools (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 254). An Austrian study of adult survivors of Catholic clergy CSA showed similar results regarding the places where Catholic clergy CSA took place. Study participants reported that 81.7% of clergy CSA occurred in boarding schools, orphanages, monasteries or convents, 14.4% occurred in parishes or churches (Lueger-Schuster et al. 2014, 58). In an Australian context, the RCICA final report (2018, 351) states that 49.2% of clergy CSA occurred in schools, 28.7% in residential institutions, 24.1% in places of worship and religious activities and .03% in other types of institutions affiliated with the Catholic Church.

Research focusses on individual clergy perpetrators utilising the institutional structure of the Catholic Church to commit CSA. Reference to patterns of clergy CSA does begin to recognise collective behaviours though this has not been analysed as collective patterns of organised behaviour. In institutions, children were isolated and accessible, and the instances of clergy CSA demonstrate of a pattern of situational or
opportunistic offending (Calkins et al. 2015, 581; Smallbone and Cale 2015). Clerical status and situational offending can also be linked to grooming methods used by clergy perpetrators of CSA. Perpetrators of network CSA are usually extra-familial and have less influence over the child victim than a familial perpetrator would. Therefore, they must use a combination of bribes, threats and emotional manipulation to groom the child (Salter 2013, 30).

2.5 Victim selection - grooming victims, families and communities

There is extensive research available on CSA and methods used by paedophiles to groom victims (Malatesta 2008; Grosskopf 2010; Agustina 2015; Kennison, 2004) though this has not been applied in a Catholic clergy CSA context. Grooming is a crucial part of the offending process, and research shows particular methods of victim selection and grooming of victims and their families. Grooming means “to prepare, as for a specific position or purpose”, though in the context of CSA there is no universal definition which encapsulates this process (McAlinden 2012, 22). Other definitions extend on this by describing grooming as “a process by which a person prepares a child, significant adults and the environment for the abuse of the child” (Whittle et al. 2013; Craven, Brown and Gilchrist, 2007). Grooming behaviours can include manipulating and controlling a child and their family (McAlinden 2012, 11; Craven, Brown, and Gilchrist 2006, 297). These definitions acknowledge that grooming extends beyond the child to the manipulation of adults. Likewise, Kloess, Beech and Harkins (2014, 128) discuss three types of grooming, which include self-grooming, grooming family and grooming the child.

Self-grooming refers to an offender overcoming internal restraints and justifying CSA (Craven, Brown and Gilchrist 2006). Grooming the environment and significant others refers to targeting vulnerable families such as single parent families or mourning families (Craven, Brown and Gilchrist 2006; Leberg 1997; Van Dam 2006; RCICA 2017a, 23). Child sexual abusers may entrench themselves by becoming “indispensable” to parents; by offering to do tasks with a child that parents do not have time for, placing themselves in positions of trust (Craven, Brown and Gilchrist 2007;
In the final report of the RCICA (2017), it is stated that there were many reports of clergy perpetrators of CSA who “ingratiated themselves into families, became regular visitors to the home and sometimes stepped into the role of ‘father figure’”.

Grooming methods used by clergy have similarities to general population child sexual abusers though the role of clergy places them in a position of trust which can be used for the purpose of grooming. Increased contact creates further opportunities for grooming, to commit CSA and to reduce the chances of discovery (Smallbone and Wortley 2001; McAlinden 2012, 85). The processes of grooming demonstrate how CSA offenders seek and exploit vulnerabilities in families to manipulate access to child victims. Grooming can extend beyond victims and their families to a community in which the offender wants to establish a trusting persona.

CSA offenders also groom the community or an institution they live or work in by presenting themselves as a trustworthy and dependable member of that community in order to gain access to children (McAlinden 2012, 123). This not only creates opportunities for CSA but also if a victim discloses abuse, the offender will be considered more believable than the child (McAlinden 2012, 123). The data for this thesis evidences patterns in the methods and situational contexts used for grooming. These patterns are part of the analysis of the DN resource of shared knowledge for how to commit CSA. The data similarly evidences examples showing patterns in the methods used to silence victims. In addition to these apparent patterns, the teachings of the Catholic Church lay a foundation for children to be perceived as sinful and in need of saving from their sinful selves; therefore, allowing the harsh treatment of children to be considered acceptable practise. Analysis in Chapter 6 will show that this was used as a tool of compliance for committing CSA and for maintaining silence by clergy perpetrators.
2.6 The Catholic Church’s perceptions of childhood and sexuality

Catholic culture is founded on guilt, shame and sin and begins with children being viewed as “uncivilised little savages incarnating Adam’s original sin” (Browning and Bunge 2009). A culture of shame and secrecy surrounding the discussion of sex or sexuality were used by the Church as a method of social control and helps explain the Catholic Church’s obsession with secrecy (McAlinden 2012; Inglis 2014; Doyle, Sipe and Wall 2006, 8). Until 1995, parents were urged to Baptise their infants as soon as possible as the Church’s theology stated that ‘children who died before baptism would spend eternity in Limbo” (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 235). This apparent urgency to save children from their sinful selves resulted in the age for receiving first communion and confession being lowered in 1910, from 12 years to 7 years, to avoid the danger of sexual thoughts or actions threatening the child’s innocence (McGrail 1988 in Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 256). This meant that priests had increased access to young children. The Church’s perception of children displays an entwining of sex and sin, and a belief that children required harsh discipline.

Historically and contextually, as was the case for CSA, the physical abuse of children was not always framed as a type of child abuse. Corporal punishment was widely used and accepted in schools as a form of discipline. Corporal punishment is often defined as “the use of physical force with the intention of causing a child pain, but not injury, for the purposes of correction or control of the child’s behaviour” (Man 2016, 26; Holden et al. 2014). Physical punishments which would be considered unacceptable if imposed on an adult are deemed acceptable when imposed on children under the guise of behavioural control (Man 2016, 26; Baumrind, Larzelere and Cowan 2012). Corporal punishment was banned in Victorian government schools in 1985 and in non-government schools in 2006, following the enactment of the Education and Training Reform Act 2006 (Vic.) (AIFS 2017).

Some justifications for child physical abuse are imbedded in religious texts, “He that spareth his rod hateth his son: but he that loveth him chasteneth him betimes” (Prov. 13:24 New International Version). Corporal punishment was justified in the in the Old
and New Testaments, which advocated that beating a child would rid the child of sin and break their will (Hall Fitz-Gibbon 2017, 40). This use of corporal punishment is supported by a study of a clergy perpetrator network in Bindoon, Western Australia, which found that disclosing CSA by victims resulted in physical beatings, being called liars and being shamed (Death 2018, 94). Furthermore, corporal punishment was carried out in an institution, and by individuals who have narcissistic traits and have little outside accountability. The following paragraphs will outline narcissistic characteristics of the Catholic Church which buoyed the occurrence of clergy CSA.

2.7 The role of the Catholic Church – Clericalism and narcissism

The Catholic Church has a worldwide membership of more than one billion and is ruled by clergy (Doyle 2006, 189). Clericalism is “grounded in the erroneous belief that clerics constitute an elite group and, because of their powers as sacramental ministers, they are superior to the laity” (Doyle 2006, 190). Clerics were granted social and legal privileges and enormous power due to their association with God (Doyle 2006, 194; Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 223). These ‘powers’, presently and historically, have led to numerous social privileges which have enabled different levels of corruption (Doyle 2006, 192; Sanchez 1972). Churches are institutions in which “religious leaders are afforded instantaneous trust from committed congregants, which then translates into vast power in the hands of clergy members, a powerful combination that easily breeds abuse” (Weinhold 2009, 531). Bishop Robinson (2007) argues that the veneer of respectability that is applied to clericalism can lead to an inability to accept opposition or fault. The RCICA found that clericalism was a contributory factor to clergy CSA in the context of

the theology of priesthood; the theory of ‘ontological change’; the theological view of the Catholic Church as a ‘perfect society’; canon law; the interaction of clericalism with narcissism; ideas of power and powerlessness; the intersection between clericalism, the avoidance of scandal and a culture of secrecy in the Church; and how clericalism informs interactions between the Church and the wider community and the civil authorities. (RCICA 2017b, 588)
The view of clericalism as a contributing factor to clergy CSA is supported by numerous researchers (Appleby 2002, 13; Berry 1992 cited in Doubleday, Wiley and Bottoms 2013; Cozzens 2004; Doyle 2003; Frawley-O’Dea 2007; Lane 2010; Robinson 2007; Seasoltz 2010). The influence of clericalism had the additional effect of creating a religious duress which effectually maintained silence beyond the victims and families, to society (Doyle 2006, 189). Religious duress is fear based on a belief in a requirement for obedience to God which creates a moral pressure to placate rather than displease God and was used by clergy perpetrators of CSA to control victims (Doyle, Sipe and Wall 2006, 230).

Clerical narcissism is "the conscious or unconscious concern to promote the particular interests of the clergy and to protect the privilege and power that traditionally has been conceded to those in the clerical state" (Weinhold 2009, 534). Clerical narcissism is apparent when disclosures of clergy CSA are met with misplaced concern for the perpetrator rather than the victim (Gardner 2012, 107). Miller (2013, 512) suggests that clergy perpetrators of CSA have “a chronic sense of narcissistic entitlement and a failure to have their need for admiration met leads to exploitive relationships with children in their parish”. Kochansky and Cohen (2007, 42) suggest that there may be a link between narcissism and clergy CSA as “these individuals can be extremely manipulative, grandiose and have an intense need to be admired and loved”. Narcissism was found to be a prominent personality trait in clergy perpetrators of CSA, and the combination of this trait with mandatory celibacy may contribute to the risk of clergy committing CSA (RCICA 2017b, 604). In addition to the trait of clerical narcissism, institutional narcissism also contributed to the covering up and, therefore, facilitation of clergy CSA.

When institutions respond with arrogance when “asked to engage with issues outside their immediate preoccupation, this indicates institutional narcissism” (Gardner 2012, 106). Institutional narcissism is reflected in how the just treatment of victims came second place to defending clergy who commit CSA. In Australia, the Catholic Church has largely been able to control victim compensation through Towards Healing and The Melbourne Response in Victoria. Victims were paid meagre compensation on the
proviso that the Catholic Church did not have to admit responsibility (Gleeson 2016). Additionally, the Ellis defence was used to escape civil litigation. The Ellis defence prevented civil litigation against unincorporated bodies such as the Catholic Church and questioned the vicarious liability in regard to its clergy by claiming that clergy were employed by the parish, which is not a legal entity (Morrison 2014). One of the recommendations of the RCICA was to repeal this defence. This was done by introducing a ‘proper defendant’ law which means that institutions must nominate an entity with assets as a proper defendant and the assets of an associated trust can be used to satisfy the claim (Speakman 2018, 17). The use of the Ellis defence, clerical narcissism combined with Church teachings regarding children and sexuality, a culture of secrecy and a pattern of denying responsibility provided protection for clergy perpetrators of CSA. Analysis in Chapter 6 will show that these licit features of the Catholic Church were exploited by the clergy perpetrator network to facilitate and hide clergy CSA. Additionally, the licit functions of the Catholic Church were also exploited by clergy perpetrators of CSA. The closed system of the Catholic Church was also conducive to keeping the perpetration of CSA hidden.

2.8 The Catholic Church as a closed system

Within the Catholic Church, power is given to specific individuals such as a Bishop whose position is filled by appointment, not election. The Pope has the ultimate power; he is not subject to judicial scrutiny, and his decisions cannot be appealed (Robertson 2010a, 8). This absence of scrutiny is also apparent in the next hierarchal tier as Bishops and Archbishops who head individual geographic divisions of the Church possess full judicial, legislative, and executive power in their Diocese (Marr 2013, 558). There is no separation of powers, nor are there any checks and balances, and as a result Bishops have not been sufficiently accountable for decisions they have made regarding allegations of clergy CSA (RCICA 2017b, 44). Similarly, illicit networks may create their own norms and become a “law unto themselves” (Granovetter 1992, 45), and in this context illicit activities “can take on an aura of normality and members protect one another from outside sanctions” (Lauchs, Keast and Yousefpour 2011, 112). In addition to the normalisation of clergy CSA, the Catholic Church has hidden behind its own code of law (Doyle 2017, 103).
2.8.1 Canon law and criminal law

The Catholic Church’s canon law played a significant role in the continued facilitation and occurrence of CSA. One of the most significant differences between CSA offenders in the general community and clergy perpetrators of CSA is that child sex offenders in the general community when apprehended, are subject to criminal laws. Whereas clergy believe they are subject to canon law only, through which CSA is regarded as a sin as well as a crime though the Church response is focussed on sin, and punishment is in the form of penance (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 96; Robertson 2010a, 43). This is part of the justification used to keep CSA complaints internal. When complaints of CSA were taken seriously by Bishops, the Catholic Church’s response was to refer them treatment rather than the criminal justice system (Onderzoekscommissie 2011; John Jay College 2004).

The statehood of the Catholic Church means that the Pope, as head of the state, can never be sued or prosecuted, and the Holy See has immunity which removes its liability for civil wrongs (Robertson 2010a, 8). Even under canon law if clergy are accused of paedophilia this is viewed as something beyond the offender’s control and, therefore, can be used as a defence under ecclesiastical law as clergy cannot be blamed for uncontrollable impulses (Robertson 2010a, 28). Under Canons 1395 and 1321, no one can be punished for an offence unless it is “gravely imputable by reason of malice or culpability” (Robertson 2010a, 47). This has been used as an excuse because paedophilia is considered to be a psychosexual disorder, and, therefore, even if tried under canon law, the ultimate penalty of dismissal cannot be imposed (RCICA 2017b, 716).

Victoria legislates in the Crimes (Sexual Offences) Act 1980 that “criminalised sexual acts between children (less than 16 years old) and individuals in a position of authority or trust in relation to them and identified such circumstances where the offender is in a position of authority of care in relation to the victim as an aggravating factor”. In 2006, Victorian legislation those in a “position of authority” included “ministers of
religion; youth workers; sport coaches; counsellors and employees of youth residential centres acting in the course of their duty in relation to the child” (Boxall, Tomison and Hulme 2014, 82). Although clergy CSA has been reported to police, prior to the 1980s Catholic Church leaders were not challenged by any government body through investigating the occurrence of clergy CSA (Doyle 2017, 103-104).

In recent years, members of the grey network of the Catholic church have been held accountable, with Bishops being charged with covering up continued CSA. Adelaide Archbishop Philip Wilson was found guilty on May 22, 2018 of covering up CSA during the 1970s (Notzon 2018). As such, Wilson is the highest-ranking Catholic cleric ever to be convicted of this offence under s316 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), although this conviction was later overturned on appeal (Wakatama and Milington 2018). The Catholic church’s third ranked official, and one of the most powerful officials in the Vatican, George Pell, has been charged and convicted of CSA committed in the 1970s and 1990s (Griffith 2018; Dreher 2018). These charges and convictions represent recent moves to hold not only those who covered up, and, therefore, facilitated continued CSA, but also clergy who committed CSA, accountable for their crimes.

A culture of exemption from secular law is a significant factor in the high rates of CSA by Catholic Church clergy and in explaining the longevity of the occurrence of clergy CSA. Some accounts of clergy CSA demonstrate audacious CSA offending. For example, Chrissie Foster, the mother of two victims of clergy CSA, describes the astounding levels of CSA committed by the parish priest against children in the primary school where her daughters attended (Foster and Kennedy 2010). Similarly, astonishing levels of CSA was committed by clergy at St Alipius Parish School in Ballarat (Marr 2013). Victoria Police at the VPI (2013) gave evidence that there has been a substantially higher rate of clergy CSA in the Catholic Church compared to other religious communities (Parkinson 2014, 121).

As stated previously, the Catholic Church’s views or response to adult-child sexual activity changed from condemnation and harsh punishment to secrecy and hiding the
occurrence of clergy CSA. Covering up of clergy CSA dates back to 1922 with the issuing of the *Crimen Sollicitationis* which set out instructions on the procedures to follow for the canonical crime of solicitation (Scorer 2014, 58). *Crimen Sollicitationis* imposes an oath of secrecy regarding clergy CSA victims, a worldwide policy of absolute secrecy of clergy CSA (Tapsell 2014). This secrecy being commended by the Catholic hierarchy is apparent in the following example. Bishop Pican concealed knowledge that a priest in his diocese had committed CSA against numerous boys and was given a three-month suspended prison sentence. Cardinal Castrillón, then Prefect of the Congregation for the Clergy wrote to him, congratulating him:

You have acted wisely, and I am delighted to have a fellow member of the episcopate who, in the eyes of history and of other bishops, would prefer to go to prison rather than denounce his priest-son. For the relationship between priests and their bishop is not professional but a sacramental relationship which forges very special bonds of spiritual paternity. (Tapsell 2014, 232)

Benedict XVI, Joseph Ratzinger, was head of the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) from 1981 and as such had authority over CSA cases (Formicola 2013, 533; Robertson 2013). In 2001, Ratzinger engineered covering up cases of clergy CSA by directing all complaints of CSA be sent to the CDF under Pontifical Secret (Robertson 2010a, 121). Ratzinger oversaw and covered up clergy CSA cases for two decades and went on to become Pope Benedict from 2005 to 2013 (Formicola 2013, 533). Incongruously, as Pope Benedict XVI, while visiting Scotland in 2010, in response to clergy CSA problem he stated,

These revelations were for me a shock and a great sadness. It is difficult to understand how this perversion of the priestly ministry was possible, he told reporters. How a man who has done this and said this can fall into this perversion is difficult to understand. It is also a great sadness that the authorities of the church were not sufficiently vigilant and insufficiently quick and decisive in taking the necessary measures. (Galef 2010)

According to Pope Benedict XVI, contributing factors to clerical CSA include, “inadequate procedures for determining suitability for priesthood, a tendency for
society to favour clergy, and misplaced concern for the reputation of the church which resulted in a failure to apply canonical penalties” (Formicola 2013, 539). New clerical CSA guidelines were issued by the Church in July 2010, which include predatory behaviour against minors and possession of child pornography, but noticeably, do not include a canonical requirement to report predatory behaviour (Formicola 2013, 542). In 2010, Ratzinger adamantly refused to direct Bishops to report cases of CSA to police and, as a result, known clergy perpetrators continued to be treated with Pontifical Secrecy (Robertson 2010, 26). In the same vein, Pope Benedict’s predecessor Pope John Paul II responded to sexual corruption by stating, “keep quiet, deny, apologise if necessary, and when in doubt, attack the messenger” (Family and Community Development Committee 2013d, 4). Pope Francis has recently issued a decree which includes that clergy are obligated to report clergy CSA to their Bishop and that anyone can report clergy CSA (SBS 2017, 1). However, this decree does not direct Bishops, clergy or laity to report clergy CSA to police. This code of silence is similarly apparent in DNs in other contexts.

2.8.2 A code of silence

In the context of police corruption networks, this code of silence extended to “prohibiting disclosing perjury or other misconduct by fellow officers, or even testifying truthfully if the facts would implicate the conduct of a fellow officer” (Chin and Zhang 2008, 238). Merrington (2017, 61) found that police corruption networks exploit the light network’s resources to facilitate DN operations. Research on a sports doping network showed that protecting the network included inflicting harm through bribery, bullying and threats and enforced a code of silence (USADA 2012 cited in Bell, Ten-Have and Lauchs 2016, 60). A code of silence or omerta was created by the Italian mafia and is applied to mafia members and anyone who witnesses mafia criminal activity to ensure silence regarding their illicit activities (UNODC 2008 cited in Bell, Ten-Have and Lauchs 2016). Omerta extended to a refusal to give evidence to the police (Fielding 2017, 17). Similar methods were utilised by clergy perpetrator networks within the Victorian Catholic Church to maintain silence and, hence, resilience of the network of clergy CSA.
Intimidation and blame in the name of God and the threat of being sent to hell was used to overcome resistance to or disclosure of CSA as this had a powerful effect on children (RCICA 2017a). Fogler et al. (2008, 308-309) similarly state that clergy perpetrators exploit the fear of punishment from God to gain compliance from victims, though add that compliance was also gained through promises of spiritual rewards such as going to heaven. Furthermore, Scorer (2014, 54) states that even when documents are forced from the Church, there is very little incriminating evidence contained in such documents. An outline of the response of the Catholic Church hierarchy, the grey network, to Catholic clergy CSA will be presented in the following section. Analysis Chapter 7 will discuss how these responses were utilised by the DN of clergy perpetrators of CSA to facilitate clergy CSA and maintain network resilience.

2.9 Church response to clergy child sexual abuse

Shaw (2008) suggests that “it is the culture of secrecy of the Catholic institution that has made the scandal spin out of control, from the cover-ups to the transfer of priests accused of sexually abusing children”. The scandal and further impact on victims of clerical CSA related not just to the abuse but also to the response, or lack of it, by the Catholic Church superiors (Conway 2014, 319). In December 1996, Australian Bishops and religious leaders released the document ‘Towards Healing’: Principles and Procedures in Responding to Complaints of Sexual Abuse against Personnel of the Catholic Church in Australia. In November 2012, then Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced The Commonwealth Royal Commission (2012) investigating institutional responses to CSA, which placed the Catholic Church in Australia under intense public scrutiny. Most priests believe that the RCICA was very much needed, and that clergy CSA occurred as a result of clericalism being imposed by the highest authority, which they felt powerless to confront (Power 2014, 4).

Despite Bishops having the power to initiate judicial inquiries, investigations and trials, Bishops transferred offending clergy from one parish to another or overseas to cover-up CSA (Doyle, Sipe and Wall 2006, 186, 189). However, when investigations did occur, Bishops could not judge impartially a man whose welfare is his sacred duty and,
therefore, cannot provide an impartial court (Robertson 2010a, 50). The issue of impartiality and separation of powers is further complicated by the fact that a Bishop cannot absolve himself of this duty and report the offence to police as this is not allowed under pontifical secret (Robertson 2010a, 56). This means that any report of clergy CSA is dealt with under strict confidentiality, and if the Bishop were to report the offence to the police, he could be excommunicated (Tapsell 2014).

Bishops responding to complaints of clergy CSA by transferring known clergy perpetrators is analysed in Chapter 8 as this response was a significant factor in the facilitation of clergy CSA. This response has not been analysed in the context of functioning as a DN resource which was exploited by clergy perpetrators of CSA. The first known case of clergy CSA in Australia was committed by a Benedictine deacon, who in 1849 confessed his crimes in a letter to the President of the Benedictines (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 50). This admission of committing CSA resulted in this deacon being sent back to England where he ministered from 1852 to 1901 (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 51). This is an early example of the Church’s consistent response to known clergy perpetrators of CSA. This being that perpetrators are transferred to other parishes or overseas to continue their clerical role (Robertson 2010, 30). This practise of transferring known clergy perpetrators aligns with the concept of network resilience, which is discussed in the following theory Chapter 3.

There is some evidence that Catholic hierarchy not only sought to protect the Catholic Church but may have also had self-serving motivations. These sources are from 2001 and 2006 though are included here as the arguments are worthy of further consideration in the context of this thesis. Coldrey (2001), who joined the Christian Brothers in 1958, refers to sexual networks as small groups of clergies breaking their vows on sexual matters. These clergy perpetrators support each other through silence and covering for one another and consist of substantial numbers (Coldrey 2001, 31). Members of the sexual underworld support one another in seeking positions of responsibility by praising one another and condemning any critics (Coldrey 2001, 37). Coldrey’s (2001, 68) explanation for why the Catholic Church does not address CSA
is that this sexual underworld is so pervasive that acknowledging and addressing this may well destroy a Diocese.

This is further supported by Doyle, Sipe and Wall (2006, 206), stating that silence is maintained by clergy also because many of them are sexually active not necessarily with minors but with adult woman and men, and some have fathered children. Therefore, this broad breaking of celibacy provides protection for clergy perpetrators of CSA as clergy can use blackmail of other clergy who have broken their vows, to remain covert. As stated by Doyle, Sipe and Wall (2006, 278), “Corruption does not seep up from the bottom it is raining down from the top”. The various institutional responses of the Catholic Church inadvertently served to facilitate clergy CSA and support DN resilience, which will be further examined in the analysis in Chapter 8. Furthermore, Chapter 8 evidences overlap between clergy responsible for responding to clergy CSA and clergy who were perpetrators themselves; therefore, showing that motivations for covering up clergy CSA extended beyond protecting the Catholic Church. The following section examines how general population CSA offender networks operate, as a point of comparison for later analysis.

2.10 CSA networks

Most of the current literature around the facilitation of CSA networks concerns CSA via the Internet. The Internet is an example of a light network of licit information sharing and social media being used to facilitate DN’s of illicit paedophile activity. The Internet has also facilitated sexual exploitation of children through online grooming and trafficking (Seto 2013; Wolak, Mitchell and Finklehor 2006). CSA offenders now have enhanced opportunities to communicate directly and covertly with their victims online (Olson et al. 2007; Michalopoulos and Mavridis. 2012, 196). Prior to the Internet, paedophiles were often identified and apprehended through the interception of child pornography at airports or mail facilities (Bourke and Hernandez 2009, 184). Access to child pornography was expensive, of poor quality and difficult to obtain (Wortley and Smallbone 2006). By the 1980’s, paedophiles were using computers and modems to communicate, create networks, and exchange information on victims
Online paedophile communities are used to trade illicit material and provide social reinforcement and mutual support for CSA (Bourke and Hernandez 2009, 190; Wilcockson 2006; Holt, Blevins and Burkert 2010, 20). These communities normalise an individual's already present, deviant sexual interest in children through justifications and denial of injury and victim (Harkins and Dixon 2010, 91). These mutual affiliations, support and sharing of resources are some of the characteristics of a social network and are also characteristics present in a DN of clergy perpetrators of CSA, which will be outlined in the following theory chapter 8. Numerous organisations connect individuals with an interest in sex with children (Harkins and Dixon 2010, 91), and these organisations claim to have thousands of members from various professions (Victims of Violence, 2008). This highlights the prevalence of CSA amongst an array of individuals converging into a network of child sexual abusers, supporting and facilitating continued CSA. The following chapter outlines the concepts of social network analysis (SNA) and dark networks (DN)s, which will be used to analyse the DN of clergy perpetrators of CSA in the Victorian Catholic Church.

2.11 Conclusion

The available literature on clergy CSA is extensive regarding the culture and structure of the Catholic Church’s role in enabling the occurrence of CSA. Theories are put forward as to why CSA is so extensive within the Catholic Church in particular. Some theories are based on sexuality while others refer to opportunistic offending, celibacy and clerical narcissism. Explanations for the apparent significant increase in offending include themes of denial such as “moral panic”, media conspiracy, and “a few rotten apples”, which have been utilised to minimise the severity of the issue (Ostrowski 2010, 46; White and Terry 2008, 662).
The Catholic Church’s response to complaints of clergy CSA was to transfer known clergy perpetrators of CSA from parish to parish without alerting the new parish to the fact that these were known perpetrators. Much of the literature on the topic of the church’s management of clergy perpetrators centred on hiding behind canon law and placing itself outside of the reach of criminal law sanctions. Although the Catholic Church is ruled by canon law, the research shows that Canon laws regarding CSA were rarely applied. The lack of action by the Catholic Church is the greater shame as this narcissistic response allowed clergy CSA to continue (Guido 2008, 257).

Collusion amongst clergy was shown by way of remaining silent about clergy CSA. Literature of victim sharing or perpetrators aiding one another in the commission of their crimes was not found in relation to clergy perpetrators though this research is available in relation to online paedophile organisations. This gap highlights the significance of this proposed research as it seeks to examine the ties between clergy perpetrators of CSA and whether these ties were utilised to facilitate CSA in the form of a collusive and covert DN. This thesis aims to support this theory and additionally, show that DN actors took advantage of light network attributes of the Catholic Church to commit CSA. Furthermore, it will be argued that the resilience of the DN was aided by the grey network of the Catholic Church through covering up clergy CSA and transferring known DN clergy perpetrators to institutions where they had further access to victims. The following chapter outlines the theories relevant to this thesis and will examine various types of social networks and how SNA can be used to tell the story of how these networks operate.
Chapter 3 Theory

A review of DN literature specifically outlines the traits and various typologies present in different types of DNs as these vary in visibility, structure and illicit activity. As SNA will be utilised for this research, examples of contexts in which SNA has been applied will be discussed to illustrate the relevance of this analytical tool to this research. In past decades, SNA has been utilised to analyse licit or light networks, though in recent years has gained momentum in its application to DNs. SNA can be applied to DNs to reveal hidden patterns and ties between network actors within the network and provide insight to how they operate, which can be used to disrupt DNs. As will be explained further, SNA not only provides a visual representation of a network but also illustrates the ties between network actors and nodes. The nodes in this research are the institutions where known clergy perpetrators, referred to as DN actors, are present. As the use of SNA is reasonably new in the area of DNs, there is still much that is uncertain and although literature identifies the potential benefits of SNA there are also apparent limitations. The limitations of SNA will be outlined at the end of this chapter as these are applicable to the limitations of this thesis.

As Catholic clergy CSA DNs have not been previously researched, comparative literature is limited to DNs with similar characteristics. The licit institution of the Catholic Church is framed as a light network and licit functions of the Catholic Church are light network attributes. Strong similarities are apparent in police corruption DNs and Catholic clergy CSA DNs as both operate within a licit institution or light network. For example, both police and clergy institutions have a cultural code of silence, which is one of the light network attributes utilised by the DN to facilitate covert activities. Similar to the clergy DNs, there is little comparative research available regarding grey networks. However, similar concepts are used to explain the grey network’s role and its responses to clergy CSA, as DN resources. To provide a thorough understanding of the theory of DNs this chapter begins by explaining social networks more broadly and their various forms.
3.1 Social networks

A social network is any set or sets of actors where there is a system of social relationships tying actors to one another (Leinhardt 2014, xiii; Wasserman and Faust 1994, 21; van der Hulst 2009, 106). Actors may be individuals, groups or organisations. Relationship types are varied, and the type of relationship focussed on will define the network (Burcher and Whelan 2015, 104). Therefore, selection of the type of tie to focus on in constructing a social network will affect the social network produced (Milward and Raab 2006, 344).

SNA remedies a gap in studying the social dimensions of crime (Fielding 2017, 17). Social network research studies social systems by examining the structure based on social ties and actors’ attributes. Attributes are shared opinions and behaviours of actors and are characteristics of individual actors or of the group (Scott 2013, 3). Social networks are often comprised of actors with similar backgrounds and interests (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones 2008, 12). Therefore, depending on what commonalities draw these individual actors together, social networks can enhance socially beneficial activities but also have the potential to foster harm (Jackson 2008). The potential for harm is apparent in hidden and illicit networks, also called dark networks (Raab and Milward, 2003; Milward and Raab, 2005; Jackson 2008). Social networks utilised for covert and illicit activity will be focused on for this thesis. SNA examines social networks by mapping and analysing the social ties among actors to reveal relevant relationships and show the relative connectedness of the individuals within the network (de Nooy, Mrvar and Batagelj 2005, 5; Bright, Hughes and Chalmers 2012, 153). Although this thesis examines a DN of clergy perpetrators, the light network of the Catholic Church also plays a role in the operation of this network. The licit functions or attributes of the Catholic Church form part of the analysis in Chapter 6 regarding how these attributes were exploited by the DN of clergy perpetrators of CSA.
3.2 Social network typologies

3.2.1 Dark and light dichotomy

Research literature compares DNs to licit, light or bright networks, such as the Internet, which are less secretive in nature and are used for licit purposes (Raab and Milward 2003, 419). The distinguishing feature of dark and light networks is that light network ties are utilised for overt or licit activities whereas DN actors use ties to engage in covert or illicit activities. Light networks such as the Internet, are inherently good and benefit society, whereas, DN success comes at a cost to individuals and potentially societies (Raab and Milward 2003). Although dark and light networks are distinctly different, DNs can operate within a light network and use the structure and licit nature of the light network to enhance opportunities to commit crime. Clear examples of this occurrence are present in police corruption networks and Catholic clergy perpetrators of CSA networks, which are explained further below.

Goldsmith and Lysaght (2012, 124) state a preference for the term ‘illicit networks’ rather than ‘dark networks’ as they point out that not all illicit networks are dark or hidden. The term illicit network incorporates illicit networks which are quite visible, such as types of crime where government officials are involved, and illicit activity is not hidden. It could be argued that this terminology fits well with the Catholic clergy CSA as CSA was not always hidden. However, for the purpose of comparing clergy perpetrator of CSA networks with the literature on similar illicit networks, the term dark networks is applied.

Terminologies used for network typologies are not always consistent as different terminology is used for the same concepts (Cockbain, Brayley and Laycock 2011, 145). While the term DNs is consistently apparent in the literature, research on criminal organisations may be analysing DNs, though they may not always be referred to as such. Regarding licit networks, as stated above, these may be referred to as light or bright networks (Raab and Milward 2003, 419). Another type of network are
grey networks, which are inherently licit though as evidenced in the following paragraphs can inadvertently enhance DN activities.

3.2.2 Grey networks

A grey network “is a network that occupies, and to an extent creates, a zone of legal ambiguity” (Neil and Peterie 2018, 141). Grey network characteristics include secrecy and cover-up, and despite their apparent legal status, utilise methods which cannot be openly acknowledged (Neil and Peterie 2018, 132). Grey network actors may not directly participate in illicit activity though they can be implicit through inaction in response to knowledge of illicit activity. Although grey networks are rarely referred to as such in the literature, the context of what constitutes a grey network is referred to. For example, Cockbain, Brayley and Laycock (2011, 154) discuss facilitators of child sex trafficking networks who enable this illicit activity by overlooking suspicious activity such as permitting men to check in to hotels with young girls.

Grey network theory was applied to Australian asylum seeker policies to demonstrate how grey networks were used to manage internal contradictions. In an Australian context, the asylum seeker deterrence policies have been broadly condemned as breaching Australia’s international law obligations (AHRC 2013, 2014a, 2014b). In this context, a grey network implements methods that occupy an ambiguous space regarding legality and transparency (Neil and Peterie 2018, 141). Operation of asylum seeker detention centres has been contracted out to SERCO, to manage detention centres on behalf of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Neil and Peterie 2018, 134). The ambiguous nature and lack of transparency is apparent in the lack of clarity regarding whether SERCO or the Australian government makes detention centre decisions (Neil and Peterie 2018, 141). Additionally, staff working at detention centres have to sign non-disclosure agreements, and access is denied to media and human rights organisations are denied access (Fleay 2015; Nethery and Holman 2016), adding to the lack of transparency.

It is stated above that grey networks are inherently licit though inadvertently enhance DN activities through supportive measures. Interestingly, defining an outlaw motor cycle gang as criminal depends on the extent of club member’s involvement in
organised crime and whether club leaders are involved in the execution of crimes (Barker 2014, 13). Similar to the framework of grey networks, the literature discusses organised criminal networks and the overlap between licit and illicit organisations. The following paragraphs outline this similarity and the lack of consensus regarding a clear definition of organised criminal networks.

3.3.3 Organised criminal networks

There is limited agreement in the literature regarding the definition of organised crime, which affects the way this is applied in criminal policy (Sergi 2017, 27). Organised crime is conceptualised based on structure, entrepreneurial traits, unlawful associations with a collective identity, the illicit activities of the organisation or the trading of prohibited goods or services (Kleemans 2014 cited in Paoli 2016; Paoli 2003; Hobbs 2013; Varese 2011). Mafia characteristics are entwined with discussion of organised crime groups, which are said to have added social and cultural dimensions and the capacity to govern (Dalla Chiesa 2010, Varese 2011).

Sergi (2017) states that it is not possible to define organised crime or mafia without criticism. However, Albanese (2014, 4) argues that there is consensus that organised crime is an enterprise which functions to profit from illicit activities and that organised crime’s survival is ensured through “use of threats, force and corruption to maintain a degree of immunity from criminal laws”. A further distinguishing feature is that organised crime is usually a career for these criminals (Albanese 2014, 88). An organised crime group is defined under international law as “… a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit” (UN 2004, Article 2[a]).

Defining the essential characteristics of organised crime based on illicit activities and illicit actor’s activities overlooks the potentially more serious activities of licit actors involved in state or corporate crime (Schulte-Bockholt 2010). The literature evidences
many examples of licit actors benefiting from organised crime (Hall 2012, 372). Fielding (2017, 17) discussed organised crime in terms of patterns of interaction within networks. Opportunistic criminals are characterised by intermittent and potentially dissimilar crimes, whereas organised criminals have more uniform patterns of offending. Additionally, organised criminals establish norms, provide contacts and referees, transmit information about suitable targets and maintain a code of silence (Fielding 2017, 21).

Although there are variations in the distinguishing features of organised crime networks, these all fit within the classification of DNs (Demiroz and Kapucu 2012, 271). However, the study of DNs is complicated when these are entwined with licit organisations. These DNs function with a degree of legal cover and can blur lines between licit and illicit activities (Demiroz and Kapucu 2012, 272). An example of the entwining of licit and illicit organisations is the use of illicit organisations by licit organisations to dispose of toxic waste (Fielding 2017, 22). Similarly, illicit organisations rely on connections to licit organisations to, for example, launder money (Hall 2012, 369). These examples highlight a discrepancy between law and policing as some illicit activities are ignored by law enforcement agencies (Hall 2012, 373). In the context of the clergy DN, the licit Catholic organisation was used to hide illicit activity, which often resulted in complaints of CSA not reaching law enforcement agencies but were instead dealt with internally. When illicit networks function with a degree of legal cover this adds to the challenge of studying DNs (Demiroz and Kapucu 2012, 272). The following section will provide examples of DNs and the various levels of secrecy they adopt to suit operational needs.

### 3.2 Dark networks

A DN is “any group which seeks to conceal itself and its activities from authorities and protect members from detection” (Everton 2012, xxv). Bakker, Raab and Milward (2012, 33) refer to DNs as a new area of research which focusses on covert networks operating illicitly. The covert nature of DNs is due to the illicit activities being conducted by the network. Examples of DNs include terrorist organisations, youth
gangs, drug-trafficking rings, price fixing cartels and other criminal enterprises (McBride and Hewitt 2013; Chen 2012; Krebs 2002; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001; Pressey, Vanharanta and Gilchrist 2014, 1438). Although DNs seek to remain hidden, there are various degrees of visibility according to the operational needs of the individual DN.

### 3.2.1 Degrees of DN visibility

Visibility refers to how easily illicit network activity, breaking laws of the state, is detected without investigative effort (Milward and Raab 2006). DNs operate under varying degrees of visibility or darkness. DNs dealing drugs require a degree of visibility so that customers can find them, though would maintain low visibility to avoid detection by police (Lauchs, Keast and Vy Kim 2011, 4). Terrorist DNs seek high levels of secrecy and, therefore, low levels of visibility in the planning stages of an attack, though post attack, terrorist groups have high visibility as the attack is used to publicise their cause (Lauchs, Keast and Vy Kim 2011, 4). A paedophile network engaging in CSA would seek complete secrecy and would, therefore, belong in the darkest of network categories (Lauchs, Keast and Vy Kim 2011, 4). In contrast, Catholic clergy CSA DNs did not need complete secrecy as illicit activity was known but covered up by dark and grey network actors (Formicola 2013, 533; Brand; Death 2015, 102; Scorer 2014, 58; Notzon 2018). DNs may trade visibility for efficiency, while others choose complete secrecy over improved efficiency. To reduce their visibility, it is common for criminal networks to reduce their size or create looser structures (Bouchard 2007).

### 3.2.2 DN motivations and how this effects operation strategy

While DN theory has been applied in a variety of contexts, these are not uniform as each DN will behave differently in accordance with differing goals and motivations (Cunningham, Everton and Murphy 2016, 294). Time considerations strongly influence the efficiency-secrecy dilemma of networks (Morselli and Petit 2007). Where DNs are primarily motivated by material gains, efficiency is preferred over secrecy as remaining invisible requires greater time and effort, and, therefore, this extra time will
result in a fewer material gains. This situation may require the creation of a central network core which, as will be discussed below, makes them more vulnerable to disruption. Whereas, conversely, a terrorist DN usually spends time waiting for the right opportunity to act and can, therefore, prioritise secrecy (Morselli and Petit 2007). While DNs have potential advantages, it is difficult for a DN to utilise all of these at once. As stated, DNs usually need to trade between increased efficiency and secrecy, as increasing one will deplete the other. However, in the context of Catholic clergy CSA, analysis in Chapter 7 evidences that the institutional setting contributed to the DN’s ability to remain hidden.

The analysis Chapters 7 and 8 evidence how different types of DN ties served different though important purposes in the operation of the clergy DN. Weak ties are a significant component of DN structure and operational strategy. Actors with weak ties are not as closely connected as DN actors with strong ties, though are very useful in acquiring new DN resources (Levin and Cross 2004, 1480; Cunningham, Everton and Murphy 2016, 11; Granovetter 1973). However, extending the DN to weak ties also increases DN vulnerability and visibility (Sparrow 1991). These strategic decisions on whether to utilise weak ties will affect the resilience of the DN. However, the risks involved in introducing new DN actors can be mitigated through DN actors positioned in the role of brokers. Brokers are positioned between unconnected actors or groups and can use this position to control the flow of DN resources (Bright, Hughes and Chalmers. 2012, 23; Burcher and Whelan 2015, 109; Burt 2005). Brokers can help contribute to cultivating trust between DN actors who are not known to each other and, therefore, manage the network of contacts (Della Porta and Vannucci 2011). This role is significant regarding managing not only trust but also social capital, and reputations as brokers can provide guarantees for the exchange of resources within the DN (Merrington 2017, 68).

3.2.3 Dark network resources

The types of network resources being shared varies dependent on the type of illicit activity. Network resources are not necessarily material resources such as money, resources can also be non-material such as job promotion or information. Death
(2018, 95) analysed a clergy perpetrator of CSA network in Bindoon, Western Australia and found evidence of child victims being identified by clergy for the purpose of resource sharing in the form of victim information. In this context, victim information is a non-material DN resource whereas victim sharing is a material DN resource. Patterns in the methods used to groom victims, commit CSA and silence victims are DN resources as these patterns represent the DN resource of shared knowledge (Duijn, Kashirin and Sloot 2014, 5; Moldoveanu and Baum 2011, 393; Everton 2012; Morselli 2009). Individual actor skills, knowledge and information are features of the DN typology (Robins 2008). Moldoveanu and Baum (2011, 397), extend this by arguing that it is the individual, collective and interactive knowledge which is key to successful coordination of network activity. It is this collective or shared knowledge which will be focussed on in the analysis Chapters 7 and 8 regarding shared patterns for committing clergy CSA.

Ties between DN actors are facilitated by trust between actors founded on a reciprocation of transferring resources, rewarding cooperation, or by fear of the consequences of non-compliance (van der Hulst 2009, 106; Milward and Raab 2006, 350; RCICA 2017a). Finances are a resource necessary for the continued operation of many DN’s. DN’s such as drug traffickers and terrorist networks like Al Qaeda need means for financing their operations (Milward and Raab 2007, 347). Terrorist networks are not motivated by money, though money is a necessary resource for funding their illicit activity (Bakker, Raab and Milward 2012). In the context of a DN of perpetrators of CSA, to facilitate covert offending, actors use their ties to transfer resources (Everton 2012, 17).

In relation to the DN cohort for this thesis, resources include victims, victim information and job security and protection through covering up for one another by silencing victims. Additionally, DN actors share a mutual trust that fellow DN actors will reciprocate sharing resources and support a mutual desire to remain covert. Moldoveanu and Baum (2011, 393), argue that “trust can be understood as a system of interactive beliefs that the trustful and the trusted share about each other’s propensity to register and report relevant information to one another”.

57
In addition to this interpersonal trust, Kramer (2010, 82) argues that organisations have a collective trust which is conferred on other members of the organisation. Individuals within an organisation will take part in collective actions for the common benefit of the organisation based upon a collective mutual trust. To identify trustworthiness, DN actors engage in action to signal their trustworthiness and watch for behavioural cues to the other actors' goodwill and can become institutionalised through habitualisation (Weber et al. 2005; Six et al. 2010 cited in Kroeger 2012, 753). Institutionalised trust patterns become a collective attribute of the organisational subgroup and cross-generational transmission allows these trust patterns to endure long term (Kroeger 2012, 747; Kroeger 2013, 277). Trust is key to DN resilience regarding sharing resources and protection of fellow DN actors. Another important element of DN resilience is the ability to recruit new DN actors; this requires a high level of trust on the part of the recruiter. DN resilience is dependent on the ability to recruit trustworthy members therefore, they tend to recruit through strong (rather than weak) ties (Berman 2009; Tilly, 2004, 2005). DNs can also recruit through weak ties, which can enhance a network's impact, but this is likely to reduce trust and security (Smith 2014).

3.2.4 DN recruitment pathways

Recruitment pathways refers to the various reasons law abiding individuals become involved in DN activity (Smith 2014). These reasons may include a need to pay debts, to improve their financial or social status, they may enjoy risk-taking activities, or be motivated by psychological processes (Hobbs 2013; Kleemans and De Poot 2008; KPMG 2013). In the context of the Catholic Church, it is not suggested here that all recruitment of seminarians was for the purpose of recruiting new members for the DN. However, where clergy DN actors are tasked with this recruitment, parallels can be drawn between the literature regarding DN recruitment. Catholic clergy CSA victims who came from devout Catholic families have an internalised belief that priests are superior to the laity, and for Catholic parents, having their child selected as a potential recruit was considered a great honour (Doyle 2006, 205).
Recruitment is an important aspect of maintaining network numbers. The data evidences clergy perpetrators in seminary training roles where clergy were in a position to act as mentors to seminarians. Mentor relationships are also apparent between clergy perpetrators. Criminal mentors model actions and provide guidance, support and social persuasion for criminal activity (Laferriere and Morselli 2015, 861; Sutherland 1947). The data chapter discusses clergy perpetrators who were placed in roles of recruiting boys into the priesthood. The importance of recruitment and mentoring to the DN is that the ability to be able to replace DN actors is crucial to DN resilience (Ayling 2009).

3.2.5 Network resilience

A distinguishing feature of licit and illicit organisations is that illicit organisations are constantly faced with a balance between efficiency and secrecy (Toth et al. 2013 cited in Duijn 2014). Illicit organisations that maintain control over illicit activities while also maintaining secrecy are more successful in their criminal achievements (Bouchard and Nguyen 2010, 132). This success depends on the illicit network’s ability to efficiently share information and resources throughout the network (Duijn, Kashirin and Sloot 2014, 5). Therefore, network disruption relies on early disruption of the flow of information and resources. Early disruption is crucial as illicit networks are fluid, and disruption must occur swiftly to pre-empt reorganisation by the illicit network to avoid disruption (Spapens 2011; Morselli 2009).

Bakker, Raab and Milward (2012, 33) sought to examine the reasons why some DNs are more resilient than others. Network resilience is measured by its response to attacks and its ability to mitigate uncertainty and re-establish a stable structure (Bakker, Raab and Milward 2012, 35). DNs must be resilient in order to avoid detections and continue operating (Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain 2012, 195). As DN Catholic clergy perpetrators of CSA have continued over many decades, six decades for this thesis, this demonstrates a highly resilient DN. Research on DN resilience shares some important commonalities. Resilient networks are flexible and persistent despite pressure from threats and can adapt to lost DN actors by replacing these with new DN actors and ties and make strategic compromises (Lauchs, Keast

Bouchard (2007) refers to these characteristics the DN’s ability to recover, adapt and change to reduce its vulnerability. These resilience characteristics allow the DN to avoid or recover from an attack. Baker (2013), similarly defines DN resilience as a DN’s ability to either remain operational amid attacks or to recover from disruptive events by changing itself over time. The Lance Armstrong team doping network, maintained resilience by remaining covert and keeping DN ties dormant and activated them only when vulnerable in order to counter an attack (Bell, Ten Have and Lauchs 2016, 63). Terrorists and organised crime groups have similar concerns in regard to secrecy; however, the purpose of the DN significantly impacts their preference for safety or efficiency (Demiroz 2012, 273). Terrorist organisations tend to remain inactive until the optimal time comes for an attack. Whereas, organised crime groups prioritise making monetary gains and, therefore, aim to maximise their income in the most efficient way (Kenney 2007; Morselli 2009).

As in a police corruption DN, the Catholic Church has the additional resilience characteristic of an embedded culture of silence, camaraderie and exclusivity (Chan 1999; Punch 2009; Shaw 2008). Police corruption DN actors could rely on the layers of protection to eliminate any threat of investigation of their illicit activity (Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain 2012, 201). However, historically, police corruption DNs have been ceramic, meaning that the DN can endure great pressure such as an inquiry but as soon as one DN actor decides to blow the whistle, the DN structure usually collapses (Fitzgerald 1989; Herbert and Gilling 2004; Wood 1997). Although this has not occurred in the context of Catholic clergy DN actors, this highlights a vulnerability and may also contribute to explaining why whistle-blowers were treated so harshly (Family and Community Development Committee 2012c, 7; RCICA 2015h, 11; Family and Community Development Committee 2013b, 5). This treatment of whistle-blowers by the grey and dark networks of the Victorian Catholic Church will be examined in the analysis in Chapters 7 and 8.
3.2.6 The significance of removing actors and DN ties

Removal of actors from a DN has a flow on effect (Carley 2006, 55) as when actors are removed, ties are also broken, whereas actors continue to exist if only ties are disrupted (Bakker, Raab and Milward 2012, 50). Therefore, DNs that lose actors and are unable to replace them will no longer be operational (Bakker, Raab and Milward 2012, 51). Resilience in this sense relates to the “functional stability or maintenance of network operationalisation when the DN is confronted with a disturbance or ‘shock’” (Bakker, Raab and Milward 2012; Milward and Raab 2006). Understanding a network’s resilience is an important part of being able to disrupt a network.

The focus of SNA research has been on exploring the ability of SNA to provide insight to how crime groups operate to find potential DN vulnerabilities (Azad and Gupta 2011; Malm, Kinney and Pollard 2008; Lauchs, Keast and Yousefpour 2011). While there is still much to learn about the adaptive nature of DNs, the aim of this thesis is to provide further insight into the methods used to facilitate a clergy DN in Victoria. The characteristics, typologies and different operational strategies of DNs provide insights into how DNs facilitate illicit activity and utilise distinct methods to maintain resilience. SNA is increasingly being utilised to analyse DNs to produce valuable insight into the ways in which illicit organisations operate (Bright, Hughes and Chalmers 2012, 151). SNA builds on an understanding of how DNs operate by providing a visual representation of DN actors and how ties are used to share DN resources to facilitate illicit activity. The following section highlights the significance of SNA for uncovering and potentially disrupting DNs.

3.3 Social network analysis (SNA)

3.3.1 The purpose of conducting SNA

SNA gained popularity in the study of social phenomena though SNA has become an important tool for studying organised criminal networks (Brandes et al. 2013, 3; Rostami and Mondani 2015, 1). This thesis aims to contribute to strengthening SNA as a theoretical tool for understanding and analysing criminal networks. The value of
SNA is in its focus on the structure of relationships within a network, which represents the interaction between network actors (Brandes et al. 2013, 2; Prell 2015, 1). SNA can be applied to dark and light networks providing empirical content to social context (Everton 2012, 11). For this thesis, the focus is on clergy DN actors and the ties which connect them to form a DN and how these ties are used to share DN resources. In the context of this thesis, DN actors are clergy perpetrators of CSA, and overarching ties include a mutual religious affiliation and a desire to commit CSA.

SNA was developed through the social science disciplines of psychology, social anthropology and sociology. Psychology focussed on social relations, social anthropology studied systemic conflicts, while sociology combines these to examine sociological concepts such as roles and positions (Prell 2015, 20). The relevance of psychology is apparent in Gestalt psychology, which argued that the whole of the mind was more important than the individual parts (Prell 2015, 21). Therefore, highlighting the importance of studying networks as a whole rather than on an individual basis.

SNA uses many terms adopted from graph theory including actors and ties (Prell 2015, 9). SNA has been used in a basic form of link analysis since the 1970s to more recent use of core SNA concepts and measures (Masys 2014; Leinfeltand and Rostami 2012). The application of SNA has not been confined to analysing DNs as it has also been used widely to analyse a variety of licit networks. These include tracking and prevention of the spread of contagious diseases; predicting population displacement after a natural disaster and studying online licit social behaviour (Rostami and Mondani 2015, 1; Lu, Bengtsson and Holme 2012; Kossinets and Watts 2009). There have been earlier attempts to apply SNA to criminal networks for the purpose of criminal intelligence (Krebs 2002; Sparrow 1991). Despite this, it is argued that criminology may be behind this network trend (Papachristos 2014). Despite limitations regarding accessing DN data, SNA can tell a story of the DN, regarding which actors are connected and interpret how these ties are used by DN actors to facilitate illicit activity (van der Hulst 2009).
3.3.2 Examples of applications of social network analysis to DNs

SNA can identify structural patterns and key actor roles which may not be easily discovered otherwise (Morselli and Roy 2008; Schwartz and Rouselle 2008). As stated by Bright, Hughes and Chalmers (2012, 151), SNA is increasingly being utilised to analyse criminal organisations to produce valuable insight into the ways in which these illicit organisations operate. Valdis Krebs applied SNA to the terrorist cell responsible for the 11 September 2001 terror attacks (Krebs 2002), and it has been highly influential for studies in this area. Krebs (2002) research exemplifies the benefits of SNA for understanding crime and terror networks.

Krebs visually mapped the terrorist network by analysing the ties between each individual terrorist or DN actor. Krebs found that the nineteen hijackers were broken up into clusters of four to five actors and within each cluster there was one pilot. It was found that several hijackers on the same flight had strong ties. The pilots communicated between each of the clusters, and most other actors had no ties. Therefore, detection of one actor (other than a pilot), would mean that only that actor’s cluster was at risk, keeping the rest network fairly safe. This illustrates the resilience of the network structure, a point that has been strongly made in the work of Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001), Scorer (2014, 54) and Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain (2012, 195).

Ball (2016, 164) states that while research on SNA where data is plentiful, as in the case of the September 11 attacks, is useful for exploiting and disrupting criminal networks, more research is needed on pre-empting such attacks. SNA has been applied to a variety of DNs largely for the purpose of finding ways to disrupt DNs. Fronzetti and Remondi (2017) used SNA to examine a money laundering network and to explore ways SNA could be used to disrupt this network. Bright, Hughes and Chalmers (2012) applied SNA to an Australian methamphetamine trafficking network. This produced insights into the network structure, the various roles and interactions between DN actors, and highlighted possible network vulnerabilities (Bright, Hughes and Chalmers 2012, 174). These findings were similar to those produced by SNA of
criminal networks based on offender databases, transcripts of surveillance and court proceedings (Goldsmith and Lysaght 2012, 125).

Eiselt (2018, 111) describes the development of a terrorist network and examines ways to destabilise the network. Looking at the trust network, different options for DN disruption are considered. One option was to remove an actor from the network either through arrest of a potential terrorist or by using disinformation to discredit a DN actor to facilitate rejection of that actor by other members of the trust network. The other option was to add a node or actor in the form of an informer or undercover agent to disrupt group consensus (Eiselt 2018, 115). Most SNAs of terrorist groups are based on data of a single point, though Everton and Cunningham (2013, 94) used longitudinal network data to analyse the Noordin Top terrorist network from 2001 to 2010. This analysis demonstrated the usefulness of conducting longitudinal research to show how DNs respond to exogenous factors such as the capture of key actors.

Burcher and Whelan (2015, 104-105) applied SNA to the ‘London Bombers’, the groups responsible for the successful and attempted bombings in London in 2005. This research showed that SNA can reveal significant insights into criminal networks, can identify key actors and can provide unique approaches to disruption. Burcher and Whelan (2015, 106) used SNA to examine how legitimate actors such as business men and lawyers contribute to criminal networks. It is stated that network boundaries can be ambiguous, and defining network boundaries, that is, which actors to include in the SNA, will impact the SNA outcomes.

Cockbain, Brayley and Laycock (2011) applied SNA to internal child sex trafficking networks in the UK to generate insight and inform ideas for targeted intervention. Understanding structural weaknesses allows exploitation of these to disrupt the network. This research studies victim networks and offender networks. Findings include that it is likely that these offender networks were formed from pre-existing social networks and that internal child sex trafficking networks offended in a group setting where offending was considered socially acceptable. As offending was not
hidden from peers this is viewed as an opportunity to utilise police informants to identify offenders.

Everton (2016) used SNA to study the interaction of social networks and religious violence. It is argued that pre-existing religious beliefs and socio-political factors will contribute to groups being drawn together and limit ties to outsiders. Such groups will recruit through strong ties to protect the groups’ security and integrity. Based on this argument, it is suggested that authorities maintain ties with groups in danger of radicalisation to prevent these groups becoming extreme (Everton 2016, 210). Lauchs, Keast and Yousefpour (2011) apply SNA to a police corruption DN to reveal the hidden relationships to aid in the prevention of corruption. Studying DNs which are placed within licit networks is challenging as they operate under the cover of legal organisations (Demiroz and Kapucu 2012, 272). Policing and priesthood share a number of characteristics, as both have organisational structures with a distinct subculture which supports secrecy and group solidarity (White and Terry 2008, 675). These examples demonstrate that DNs structures and operational strategies can differ depending on the type of illicit activity and DN objectives.

SNA can be used to either explore theories or to confirm hypothesis. Exploratory SNA “involves visualisation and manipulation of concrete networks, whereas hypothesis testing boils down to numbers representing abstract parameters and probabilities” (de Nooy, Mrvar and Batagelj 2005, xxv). Creating a network map entering actors, nodes and ties between these illustrates the relationships between DN actors (Keast and Brown 2005, 12). This thesis applies exploratory SNA by focusing on relationship ties, DN ties and clusters of Catholic clergy perpetrators of CSA. Rather than focus on individual clergy CSA perpetrators or actors, this thesis seeks to examine, applying SNA, how ties between individual DN actors are used to share DN resources and support DN resilience.
3.3.3 SNA – Network actor ties

While some have noted that SNA is more of a method for examining complex social structures than a theory, SNA methods are built on a common set of concepts and conventions (Clark 2007, van der Hulst 2009, 2011, Wesserman and Fraust 1994, 2011). These assumptions are that ties are used to transfer different types of resources, and these social structures are seen as enduring patterns of ties between actors (Azarian 2005; Knoke and Yang 2007; Wasserman and Faust 1994). Ties between DN actors can be through a direct link such as a work relationship or ties may be indirect such as being members at the same club (Keast and Brown 2002, 9). SNA analysis focuses on ties between a cohort of actors rather than characteristics of each actor such as race or gender. The types of ties focussed on will influence research outcomes, as different types of ties have different effects on how they function as part of the network (Milward and Raab 2006, 344). For example, if the SNA was aimed at finding ways to disrupt a DN by focusing on disrupting finances, the financial ties would be focussed on (Everton 2012, 2). Examples of types of ties relevant to this research include ties of trust, religious affiliation, social and physical mobility and formal ties based on hierarchy (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 18; McGloin and Kirk 2010). Examples of types of ties which may be applicable to a variety of DNs are as follows:

Table 3.1 Network tie types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Ties</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Association or Affiliation Ties</td>
<td>Members of the same club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological Ties</td>
<td>Kinship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioural Ties</td>
<td>Communication ties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Ties</td>
<td>Migration, physical mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Ties</td>
<td>Organisational hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Connection</td>
<td>Bridge connecting two points, road, river</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Ties</td>
<td>Business transactions, financial flows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentimental Ties</td>
<td>Friendship, liking, respect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status Movement Ties</td>
<td>Social mobility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Wasserman and Faust 1994)
As in police corruption networks, Catholic clergy DN actors rely on DN ties, which are reinforced by an overarching culture of secrecy (Edwards and Levi 2008). According to Schein (2004), “culture can be broadly understood in terms of the following categories: shared meanings, formal rituals and celebrations, rules of the game, habits of thinking, group norms and observed behavioural regularities when people interact”. Tie types are influenced by an actor’s position in the DN, as ties can be on a broader affiliation level, or closer ties may be due to working in proximity. The strength of these ties is analysed in terms of strong and weak DN ties. Both strong and weak ties serve important though different functions regarding the operation of a DN. The use of strong and weak ties is focussed on as part of the analysis which demonstrates these tie types serving a significant role in the operation of the clergy DN.

3.3.4 The importance of strong and weak ties for DN operation

Strong ties exist between closely linked DN actors and can provide support to other DN actors in times of pressure (Granovetter 1973, 1983; Stark 2007). Strong ties provide emotional support, material support, reciprocation and foster trust and solidarity among individual actors and, therefore, less risk (Cunningham, Everton and Murphy 2016 14; Granovetter 1982, 1973, 1362). Strong ties are shared amongst actors who move in the same circles such as in clusters and provide support for actors within a cluster; weak ties provide reach and serve as sources of new information and resources (Levin and Cross 2004, 1480; Cunningham 2016, 14; Onnela et al. 2007). In larger networks, clusters of actors with strong ties contribute to efficiency (Demiroz and Kapucu 2012, 274). Cluster actors can conduct illicit activities together without having to access weak ties to source DN resources (Xu and Chen 2008). Additionally, actors with strong ties share greater trust, which off sets risk of exposure (Fielding 2017, 26). DN actors with strong ties embed actors in illicit activities and expand their offending repertoires (Andresen and Felson 2012). Strong ties serve a unique function though weak ties serve an equally unique and important role in relation to support for illicit activity and access to DN resources.
Granovetter’s (1973) “The Strength of Weak Ties” is the most cited SNA article (Prell 2015, 76). The importance of weak ties is their ability to provide DN actors with access to DN resources beyond what can be accessed from their strong ties. Weak ties can form bridges that tie clusters of actors together, which is of particular importance in networks without a core (Granovetter 1973, 1983; Stark 2007, Everton and Cunningham 2013, 98; Prell 2015, 76; Fielding 2017). Therefore, material or non-material resources such as information, influence, trust or finance will reach a greater number of actors when accessed through weak ties (Granovetter 1973).

The significance of the different capabilities of strong and weak ties lies in their potential use for DN disruption. The removal of weak ties from a network can do more damage to the DN than removing a strong tie; as stated above, whatever DN resource is being diffused will be transmitted further by a weak tie. Granovetter (1973, 1366) explains this through using the example of a rumour being spread amongst a circle of close friends who have strong ties. This rumour is likely to circulate this close friendship group but without weak ties (marginal individuals), will not extend beyond this cluster. Weak ties can provide a short path across a network which increases efficiency in networks which do not have a clear central node (Sparrow 1991). Granovetter (1973, 1370) applied this theory to a variety of job seekers to ascertain whether these individuals secured a new job based on information from a close contact (strong tie) or a weak tie. In most cases the job contact was a weak tie, which demonstrates that weak ties are more likely to belong to different social circles than strong ties and, therefore, have access to new information. In the context of a DN, weak ties can be used to create new ties to DN actors and potentially new opportunities to share DN resources and further illicit activity.

Brown and Konrad (2001, 438) conducted a similar study to Granovetter (1973) which supported Granovetter argument that weak ties serve as bridges to new individuals. However, both studies were based on small samples and require longitudinal studies to further test the theory of the strength of weak ties. Levin and Cross (2004, 1480) found similar results regarding the importance of weak ties in obtaining new information, though added the element of trust and found that whether trust is low or
high, weak ties still provide more valuable knowledge than strong ties as they are able to provide new information. These consistent findings provide strong support for the importance of weak ties regarding building on and sharing various DN resources. However, Marsden and Campbell (2012, 20) add a valid caveat to the above findings by arguing that even when a tie has the capacity to transfer resources there is no guarantee that it will do so, though it is concluded that a measure of tie strength should include potential rather than realised resource flows. This is not to say that strong ties do not have an important role as these ties provide dependable support for individual actors within a group or cluster (Granovetter 1982). As previously stated, the different capabilities of strong and weak ties can be used for DN disruption strategies.

Previous literature shows that SNA of DNs can be used to disrupt illegal networks (Everton 2012; McBride and Hewitt 2013). Gaining an understanding of the network structure, functions and strategies provides insight into how to develop effective disruptive strategies to disable criminal networks. Researched examples of DNs have collusion, illegality and a desire to remain covert in common. It is important to note that due to the secretive nature of these networks, not all relevant information is available (Raab 2006; Bright, Hughes and Chalmers 2012; Burcher and Whelan 2015; Chen 2012). As is the case for clergy CSA networks, DNs are hidden from view and can potentially have devastating effects on society (Chen 2012, 102).

3.3.5 DN clusters and ties

Despite the intrinsically covert nature of DNs, SNA can identify the overall structural pattern of the network and how information and resources flow between actors (Scott 2013, 14). A key focus of SNA is to detect clusters of actors which are cohesive “subgroups where concentrated patterns of social interaction is the basis for solidarity, shared norms, trust and collective behaviour” (de Nooy, Mrvar and Batagelj 2005, 61; Everton 2012, 23; de Nooy 2011, 61). Identifying clusters of perpetrators or actors is a major focus of SNA, as these sub groups have shared norms and collective behaviour (de Nooy, Mrvar and Batagelj 2005, 61). Scott (2013, 124) states that “overlapping cluster membership creates network interrelations which integrates a
system of clique relations”. As the DN analysed in this thesis is extensive, it is relevant to note that in larger networks clusters are particularly significant. This is because clusters of DN actors can conduct illicit activities without risking exposure by communicating through numerous nodes (Xu and Chen 2008). The structure of a DN also effects the resilience and risk of exposure. DNs predominantly have a decentralised structure, which increases the resilience of the DN.

### 3.3.6 Centralised and decentralised networks

Baran (1964) conducted research on network vulnerabilities based on structure. In doing so, he ascertained that a centralised network was obviously more vulnerable to attack and that the mesh like or decentralised network was least vulnerable as removal of one node still maintained a connection between other nodes (Barabasi 2014, 145). In a decentralised network, multiple smaller hubs would need to be removed simultaneously and not replaced to make the DN vulnerable as this would have the effect of centralising the DN. A centralised core makes a network much more vulnerable as there is a central point to attack (Cockbain, Brayley and Laycock 2011, 149). However not all networks have a centralised core directing network operations (Morselli and Petit 2007). A decentralised network provides alternative links to network institutions and maintains network connections (Barabasi 2014, 144).

Targeting key actors in decentralised network rarely shuts down the network but instead causes further decentralisation making key actors more difficult to target and, therefore, increasing resilience (Brafman and Beckstrom 2006). The decentralised structure of the network being analysed highlights the added DN resilience. Network studies have found that DNs tend to be more decentralised, as placing DN actors on the periphery of the DN protects them from detection (Baker and Faulkner 1993; Tenti and Morselli 2014). Further to this, it has been identified that central DN actors are not necessarily actors who hold powerful positions, as DN actors of high status are often not apparent in network reconstructions (Agrest et al. 2016, 30). Although the Victorian Catholic Church clergy DN is a decentralised network, clergy DN actors, such as George Pell, who also belong to the grey network and hold powerful positions, do
not appear in any of the clusters. Therefore, in centralised networks, targeting the core or central actors is likely to be ineffective in disrupting the network. Fig. 3.1 shows three network structures.

Figure 3.1: Centralised, decentralised and mesh like networks

(Baran 1964 In Barabasi 2014, 144).

3.3.7 Using SNA for DN disruption

SNA is used to determine the structure of the network and the main players of the DN, which is the information which can be utilised to disrupt criminal networks (deNooy, Mrvar and Batagelj 2005, 1). Therefore, disruption of a DN requires disrupting DN connections so as to halt the sharing of DN material and non-material resources such as victims and victim information (Duijn, Kashirin and Sloot 2014, 5). Conversely, disruption can sometimes make networks stronger as the DN reorganises itself and replaces compromised actors to maximise resilience (Fielding 2017, 24). An example of this occurrence was the shutting down of the dark web drug site, Silk Road in 2013. Since then, new bigger dark web sites have taken Silk Road’s place, as they learned from the disruption of Silk Road and improved their resilience (Lott 2018). Similarly, professional cyclists have studied the USADA report on sports doping and have become better educated regarding the administration procedures of performance-enhancing drugs (Lentillon-Kaestner and Carstairs 2010; Ohl et al. 2013; Trabal and Duret 2003).
Researchers not only need to decide what ties to focus on, but they also need to be aware that DNs actively attempt to evade both detection and intervention. There are many ways of disrupting DNs though these disruption strategies are formulated on incomplete data and, therefore, may not include all the key DN actors (McBride and Hewitt 2013, 32). Despite these limitations, researchers have constructed visual representations of DNs using available data, such as mapping what is known about terrorist networks post-attack (Sageman, 2004, 2008; Pedhahzur and Perliger 2006; Xu and Chen 2008). These researchers found that terrorist networks have higher clustering than is apparent in other social networks. However, even when using data collected post-attack, bias and incompleteness of data is not known; therefore, the accuracy of findings is limited to the context of what is known. What is known also includes correctly identifying the key DN players to focus on for strategic DN disruption.

Borgatti (2003) defines the “‘key player problem’ as identifying which actor(s) to remove from the DN to have the largest impact on network performance”. Ideally with complete DN information, the optimal intervention would be to remove the actor with the most connections though the effectiveness of disruption decreases as less is known about the network. In small networks, key actors can be easily identified though when networks are larger and more complex SNA is useful in identifying key actors (Schwartz and Rouselle 2009, 188). Borgatti (2003, 2006) refers to these actors as key players who are important for identifying intelligence priorities when investigating social networks. Targeting key players with the greatest amount of influence in a DN and the strongest ties between actors can maximise disruption of networks (Schwartz and Rouselle 2009, 203). Targeting actors with the strongest ties will provide a greater quantity and quality of information regarding resource sharing (Schwartz and Rouselle 2009, 204). Removal of key actors also removes trusted actor ties, which can interrupt the flow of information through a DN (Everton and Cunningham 2013, 94).
3.3.8 Limitations of conducting social network analysis of dark networks

A significant challenge in conducting DN research is the difficulty in accessing data which documents the relationships between DN actors, due to the covert nature of illicit activities (Xu and Chen 2008, 65). Additionally, access to crime network data is restricted by criminal justice organisations, and cohorts being researched are difficult to access due to their illicit activity (Rostamin and Mondani 2015, 4). Another limitation is that crime network data has discrepancies as many crimes are not discovered or reported, and, therefore, are not included in the official data (Ouellet, Boivin, Leclerc and Morselli 2013). Researchers have approached the data access challenge when researching hidden networks by collecting relevant data from various sources such as court documents, media articles and interviews (Bright, Hughes and Chalmers 2012, 153; Bouchard and Amirault 2013, 120). SNA researchers often use multiple datasets to improve validity. Rostami and Mondani (2015) used three different datasets to build a network of a Swedish street gang. Windle (2013) used three biographical accounts to ensure validity of the data and also to provide an insider’s voice to the activities of an organised crime network. The validity of data was checked by comparing the three autobiographies (Windle 2013, 385).

Another limitation of SNA is defining a specific boundary, referred to as ‘fuzzy boundaries’. Fuzzy boundaries refer to deciding on research boundaries regarding which actors and ties to include or exclude from the analysis (Burcher and Whelan 2015, 107; Athey and Bouchard 2013; Duijn, Kashirin and Sloot 2014). These boundaries specify the network cohort (Prell 2015, 10). When conducting SNA of a DN it is important to set boundaries as to which actors to include in the analysis, as this boundary will influence the analysis outcome. A further weakness is that most SNA of DNs have focused on individual level networks and have neglected institutional levels of DNs (Roberts and Everton 2011, 23). Although these limitations have been acknowledged, the impact of these limitations on SNA needs further examination (Borgatti, Carley and Krackhardt 2006; Xu and Chen 2008; Tsvetovat and Carley 2006). Morris and Deckro (2013) state, “we still do not know enough about the strengths and limitations of SNA when applied to DNs, we need to know more as to the precise capabilities of SNA for understanding and disrupting DNs”.
3.4 Conclusion

Most cases of institutional CSA remain undetected (Firestone, Moulden and Wexler, 2009). CSA research within an institutional setting is rare (Colton, Roberts and Vanstone, 2010; Moulden, Firestone and Wexler, 2007; Sullivan and Beech, 2002). McAlinden (2012, 147), discusses how perpetrators of CSA make use of institutional features such as power, authority, secrecy and trust to commit CSA. These features are heightened in Catholic institutions due to the lack of supervision and accountability, and a veil of secrecy and clergy perpetrators of CSA can exploit these features to avoid detection and facilitate CSA (McAlinden 2012, 148; Douglas 1986). Secrecy amongst members of a DN is an essential feature and is a distinguishing feature between dark and light networks (Fielding 2017, 16). This argument acknowledges that the Catholic Church institution was used to commit CSA and to remain covert. However, it does not extend on this by examining these institutional features from a network perspective as the focus is on individual offending.

In summary, social networks are systems of relationships of many types, which tie actors together (Leinhardt 2014, xiii). The type of relationship and type of tie focussed on will determine the social network produced (Burcher and Whelan 2015, 104; Milward and Raab 2006, 344). Social networks often comprise actors with similar backgrounds and interests, and these shared characteristics are the network attributes (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones 2008, 12; Scott 2013, 3). Clergy DN actors are connected by a shared faith, and ties are facilitated by trust and the ability to reciprocate cooperation by exchanging resources (van der Hulst 2009, 106; Milward et al. 2006, 350).

Social network typologies include dark illicit networks and light licit networks. However, there are degrees of visibility dependent on the need for complete secrecy. In the context of the clergy CSA DN, complete secrecy was not necessary as the committing of CSA by clergy was known but covered up by dark and grey network actors (Formicola 2013, 533; Death 2015, 102; Scorer 2014, 58; Notzon 2018). That DN actors could rely on the Catholic Church’s culture of silence and the support of
fellow DN actors partially explains the resilience of the DN, which is apparent in its continuing operation over six decades (Punch 2009; Shaw 2008). Additionally, the DN exploited licit institutional features such as power, authority, secrecy and trust to commit CSA (McAlinden 2012, 148).

SNA maps DN actor ties, reveals relative connectedness of individual DN actors and interprets how these ties are utilised to share DN resources (Everton 2012, 17; Bright, Hughes and Chalmers 2012, 153). In relation to clergy DN actors, resources include victims, victim information, job security, protection through covering up for one another and trust. There is a mutual interpersonal trust that sharing of DN resources will be reciprocated by other DN actors and also a collective trust conferred on members of the same organisation (Kramer 2010, 82). DN actors with strong ties, apparent in DN clusters, are likely to be more similar, provide strong support and solidarity for collective behaviour (Murphy 2016, 14; Everton 2012, 23; de Nooy, Mrvar and Batagelj 2005, 61). Weak ties are also crucial to DN resilience though for different reasons, as weak ties can be used to extend the DN and access new resources (Granovetter 1973, 1983; Stark 2007; Everton and Cunningham 2013, 98). The main limitation that data is difficult to access (Rostamin and Mondani 2015, 4) is overcome by DN researchers by extracting data from various sources (Bright, Hughes and Chalmers 2012, 153; Bouchard and Amirault 2013, 120). The following methodology chapter explains how this thesis used a similar approach to access a more complete and robust data set.
Chapter 4 Methodology

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter demonstrated that the application of SNA to various licit and illicit networks has been beneficial for providing insight to how such networks function. These benefits are transferrable to the analysis of illicit networks or DNs, though unlike licit networks, data is not easily accessible (Raab 2006; Bright, Hughes and Chalmers 2012; Burcher and Whelan 2015; Chen 2012). Current SNA of DN research highlights the difficulties in conducting research with limited data, and this thesis acknowledges these limitations. In the context of Catholic clergy CSA, the limitation of accessing data is extended due to the Catholic Church’s code of silence, a lack of records kept and the institutional setting as a closed system (Tapsell 2014; Scorer 2014, 54). The literature has examined various types of DNs conducting a range of illicit activities. However, SNA has not been conducted on clergy perpetrator DNs. Based on the literature review and the apparent gaps in research, the current chapter outlines how this research was conducted to address these gaps and answer the proposed research questions. This chapter outlines the research methods and design used for this thesis, provides a rationale for using these methods and states the limitations. The methodology used for this thesis is designed with the aim of answering the following research questions.

Research questions

1. Is there a dark network of clergy perpetrators of CSA apparent in the Victorian Catholic Church?
2. How does social network analysis explain the operation of a clergy DN?
3. How is the grey network co-opted by the clergy DN to facilitate clergy CSA and support DN resilience?

Prior to explaining the reasons data sources were chosen and the limitations of available data, it is important to speak to the nature of the data set. Of utmost importance is an acknowledgement of victims’ voices as a key source of data. The
inclusion of victims' voices has significantly contributed to a robust data set. This data presents descriptions of highly traumatic events which have had lifelong impacts on victims of clergy CSA whose past disclosures resulted in disbelief and punishment. Due to the pragmatic nature of academic writing, description of traumatic events may appear to lack the outrage they warrant. The straightforward description of these traumatic events is not intended to minimise the significant harm caused by each and every instance of clergy CSA.

4.2 Data boundaries

Data collected is narrowed to within the geographic boundaries of the state of Victoria, Australia, as the RCICA and Broken Rites Australia (BRA) contain data from various Australian states. The Province of Melbourne comprises the Archdiocese of Melbourne and the diocese of Ballarat, Sandhurst, and Sale as suffragan dioceses (RCICA 2017b, 23). The geographic boundary of Victoria was decided upon due to data pertaining to the whole of Australia being beyond the scope of this thesis and the time frame for completion. A further factor for this boundary was that in addition to the RCICA and BRA, the VPI added specific data for Victoria, and this combination of sources was considered proficient for obtaining a reliable data set.

The Archdiocese of Melbourne had 842 priests in ministry during the period 1950 to 2010, the largest number of diocesan priests in any Catholic Church authority (RCICA 2017c, 105). Catholic clergy includes Diocesan priests who are attached to a Diocese and make a promise of celibacy, and Religious priests and Brothers belonging to a religious order who take a vow of chastity, which is effectively the same as celibacy (Doyle, Sipe and Wall 2006, 9-10). The already geographically narrowed data is further narrowed to Catholic clergy as the RCICA and VPI incorporate a number of religions.

4.3 Data sources
This thesis is formulated through an examination of publicly available documents to gather quantitative and qualitative data specific to clergy perpetrators of CSA within the Victorian Catholic Church. Data pertains to individual Catholic clergy perpetrators of CSA in relation to their CSA offending collected from three sources. It is common when using SNA to incorporate a variety of data sources due to the difficulties of obtaining data on DNs. One example of this is apparent in SNA of a Swedish street gang using three different datasets (Rostami and Mondani 2015, 1). Similarly, SNA of a terrorist network used the autobiographies of three terrorists to cross-check the accuracy of the data being coded (Altier and Thoroughgood 2012; Windle 2013, 385).

For this thesis, the term ‘clergy’ includes priests and brothers, though in discussion of DNs, clergy may also be referred to as DN actors. In discussion of the grey network, these individuals will be referred to as grey network actors or by their titles, such as Bishop. Data is collated using transcripts and submissions from the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (RCICA 2014-2017), transcripts from the Victorian Parliamentary Inquiry into the handling of child abuse by religious and other organisations (VPI) (2012), and Broken Rites Australia website (BRA ndak). These sources were selected because they complement each other: the RCICA and BRA containing data collected Australia-wide and the VPI focus on Victoria. The VPI and RCICA are of an inquisitorial nature and present accounts from both sides of the inquires whereas BRA presents and advocates for victims of Catholic clergy CSA. The RCICA and VPI focus on a limited number of clergy perpetrators of CSA presented in the public domain. BRA presents a comprehensive collection of allegations, charges and convictions of clergy CSA. These sources complement each other as the RCICA and BRA provide extensive detail of particular clergy perpetrators whereas BRA provides a greater number of perpetrators.

Although media articles are significant due to the role played in raising awareness of the extent of clergy CSA occurring within the Catholic Church (Smith 2013; Carney 2012; Vince and Rubinsztein-Dunlop 2012; Gavrielides 2013), these may be limited in reliability. It is for this reason media data is limited to its use in providing data on recent court cases which are not yet apparent in the literature, to maintain a robust data set.
4.3.1 Royal Commission into institutional responses to child sexual abuse

The RCICA is not only the largest commission ever conducted in Australia but also one of the largest inquiries into institutional CSA on an international scale (Wright 2017, 1). The RCICA, a five-year inquiry into institutional responses to CSA, was announced on November 2012 by then Prime Minister, Julia Gillard (RCICA 2015e). The announcement was in response to a reluctance of institutions to address the problem of CSA and repeated calls for the government to respond, and it symbolically signalled the seriousness of the problem of CSA within institutions (RCICA 2017, 2; Budiselik, Crawford and Chung 2014, 5). It was also apparent that CSA was not a problem of a distant past and was not confined to particular institutions (RCICA 2017, 2; Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 76). Cahill and Wilkinson (2017, 210) outline six models for explaining clergy CSA, and all six focus on systemic institutional issues. The RCICA is focused on systemic issues of how CSA was responded to in relation to allegations and incidents of CSA in institutional settings Australia wide (RCICA 2017, 20). These systemic issues will demonstrate ways in which the institution of the Catholic Church facilitated continued CSA by Catholic clergy in Victoria.

The complete data set of the RCICA extends beyond what can be included in a thesis, and as is the case for all included data, the data has been limited to Catholic institutions in the state of Victoria. The RCICA data is limited to Cases 16, 28 and 35 as these cases are within the selected data boundary of Victoria. Case study 16 (seven transcripts, 21 submissions) concerns the Melbourne Response, a process established by the Catholic Archdiocese of Melbourne to respond to CSA committed by priests, religious and lay persons (RCICA 2014, 1). Case study 28 (27 transcripts) consists of three public hearings into Catholic Church institutions in and around Ballarat and how these institutions responded to allegations of CSA (RCICA 2016, 1). The focus was on three clergy paedophiles. These clergy perpetrators of CSA were Monsignor John Day, Fr Gerard Ridsdale and Fr Paul Ryan (RCICA 2016a). Case study 35 (17 transcripts) considers the response to CSA by the Archdiocese of Melbourne from the mid-1980s to 1996 (RCICA 2015, 1). This case study focused on eight clergy who had the most complaints made against them, which included Fathers Fasciale, O'Donnell, Pickering, Baker, Searson, Daniel, Gannon and Robinson (RCICA 2015c, 2). The focus of these three case studies limits the number of clergy
perpetrators of CSA included though provides some qualitative depth on their offending. Although the commission is focussed on the response of institutions to CSA, it also provides rich data regarding how these responses were utilised as clergy DN resources and evidences various connections between clergy perpetrators of CSA. Identifying these ties and how these were used to share DN resources is key to conducting SNA.

### 4.3.2 Victorian Parliamentary Inquiry (VPI) into the handling of child abuse by religious and other organisations

The Victorian Parliamentary Inquiry is selected as a source for similar reasons to the RCICA though this inquiry has a focus on Victoria, which has a more specific boundary relevant to this research. The VPI was established to inquire into how religious and non-religious institutions respond to CSA committed by personnel within these institutions (Family and Community Development 2012b, 1). Although this inquiry is limited to the state of Victoria it does include several religious groups and organisations. Therefore, for the purpose of this research, data was only collected from Catholic institutions included in this inquiry, which resulted in 50 submissions and 29 transcripts giving testimony to the occurrence of clergy CSA in the Catholic Church.

### 4.3.3 Broken Rites Australia (BRA)

Further information was collected from the public website of survivor support group, Broken Rites Australia. BRA is not affiliated with any religious group although the executive team are Catholics and were all victims of Catholic clergy CSA (BRA ndaj). Broken rites research began in 1993, and articles are written by individuals experienced in research and advocacy with the purpose of exposing Catholic clergy perpetrators of CSA and supporting their victims (BRA ndaj). BRA data was accessed via the website link titled “Black Collar Crime” (BRA 2016ac), under the headings of “Criminal Cases” (235 perpetrators), “Civil Cases” (125 perpetrators) and “Court Cases with No Conviction” (five perpetrators); each article was read to extract clergy perpetrator of CSA information. The section with lay teacher perpetrators was excluded as the data was focused on clergy.

Articles and case studies provide detailed information about perpetrators but protect the privacy of victims through the use of pseudonyms. Therefore, there is more data
available regarding perpetrators than there is for victims. In Australia, BRA has been a key source of advocacy for victims and an important source for exposing clergy perpetrated CSA and its cover-up (BRA ndal). It has been selected as a source of data because of the extensive and thorough nature of the work produced, which provides insightful qualitative data.

Utilising data from the three sources helped to fill gaps but the amount of data on perpetrators was of unequal proportions and detail. Therefore, the resulting data set was reliable and based on available data but did not represent a complete data set of CSA offending in Catholic institutions in Victoria. This representation is not a complete model of reality, and, even if all known clergy perpetrators and victims were included, a completely accurate model is unobtainable as unknown clergy perpetrators and victims would not be included. The data set did, however, provide enough detail to highlight commonalities in offending patterns, sharing of victims, transferring of perpetrators and other methods of covert offending which will be discussed in detail in the analysis in Chapter 7. As stated by Morris and Deckro (2013, 88), the “representative social network obtained from various sources, will be missing data and may contain spurious data, this is even more likely when dealing with DNs”. The network structure provided in this research is based on known clergy perpetrators. Therefore, while it can confirm the existence of a clergy DN within the Victorian Catholic Church, it does not include unknown perpetrators. As such, this research does not claim to show the full extent of the DN. The difficulties of obtaining complete data sets is one of the limitations of studying DNs.

4.4 Limitations of data

A general limitation is the restricted access to data. This may be due to the sensitivity of the information or restrictions on access to criminal justice data (Rostami and Mondani 2015, 4). Additionally, as mentioned above, undiscovered or unreported crimes are not included in the data. In addition to DN data being difficult to access, the data on DNs are complex, as they come from different sources and suffer from various biases (Rostami and Mondani 2015, 2). However, as mentioned above,
sourcing data from three sources has helped to fill gaps and validate findings. A further limitation is the unbalanced availability of perpetrator and victim identities.

While it is imperative to protect victim identities where this is desired, this does limit the data’s ability to confidently evidence victims who may have been abused by multiple clergy, which may help demonstrate victim sharing between DN actors. Although this evidence is limited, the victim data is sufficient to provide some evidence of this occurring. The BRA does not provide any identifying victim information but does name clergy perpetrators. The RCICA does include victim names where the victim has allowed this, but some victims have opted not to use their names, or this may be due to ongoing legal action, and letters are used in place such as ‘BAV’. Most clergy perpetrators of CSA are named unless their names have been redacted from material that might prejudice relevant criminal proceedings (RCICA 2017, 4). In the VPI, names of clergy perpetrators of CSA and victims of CSA are available, although in some submission’s sections have been redacted as these sections have been deemed confidential. For example, one victim may have their name published in VPI transcripts, have a pseudonym in a BRA article and be referred to as BAB for example, in the RCICA. Pseudonyms were often used, particularly in BRA but also in the RCICA and VPI to protect victims.

It is imperative to the accuracy of the data to prevent duplicating data and potentially presenting one victim as two or three separate victims. Therefore, only victim data where their real name has been used or the letter abbreviation such as BAB will be included to ensure the accuracy of the data. There is a possibility for duplication of victim data in a case where a victim is identified with an abbreviation in RCICA data but use their real name in VPI data. The process of entering data into the networking mapping software will be detailed below. It is during this process that any potential duplication of data will become apparent as similar data may already be apparent in the data already entered, pertaining to a specific perpetrator and a victim with either their real name or an abbreviation. Where there was any uncertainty, the data is not included.
The above paragraph states the scope of available data regarding victims and perpetrators in relation to each source. This demonstrates some of the limitations in available data. A complete data set is also limited to those victims of CSA who were involved in the VPI or the RCICA and does not represent all victims of CSA in Victoria or Australia. Due to the extent of clergy CSA, the RCICA focused on the most prolific clergy perpetrators of CSA. Therefore, there is no data available in this source on clergy perpetrators of CSA who were not part of the RCICA or the VPI. This translates into more data being available on some clergy perpetrators of CSA than others. Limitations of available and relevant data is the inconsistent availability of pertinent detail. For example, data on the seminary clergy perpetrators attended could potentially demonstrate a further link between DN actors. However, this data was minimally available and cannot be evidenced through the data and, therefore, is not included as part of the SNA.

One of the main challenges in conducting research on DNs is the difficulty in gaining access to data which evidences ties between offenders due to the covert nature of illegal activities (Xu and Chen 2008, 65; Cunningham, Everton and Murphy 2016, 295). In the case of this research, information was reliant upon victims who had come forward with allegations of CSA and that these allegations had been reported or recorded. The fact that these networks are hidden makes reliable and complete data very difficult to obtain. As mentioned above, Windle (2013, 384) used three terrorist autobiographies to access DN data. As in Windle’s (2013) research, personal accounts of criminal activity are important sources for gathering data which is otherwise not accessible. This highlights the validity and importance of including CSA victim testimony in this data set. The following section explains the types of data searched for to demonstrate ties between DN actors.

Morselli (2009, 24) has applied SNA to different criminal networks, but the challenge with each application is accessing data. Current SNA of DNs research highlights the difficulties in conducting research with limited data, and this thesis acknowledges these limitations. In the context of Catholic clergy CSA, the limitation of accessing data is extended due to the Catholic Church’s code of silence, a lack of records kept and the institutional setting as a closed system (Tapsell 2014; Scorer 2014, 54).
Regarding data on Catholic clergy CSA, a comprehensive data set is virtually impossible given the archival practises of CSA complaints, where complaints were not recorded, and code words or euphemisms were used when complaints were recorded (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 54; Gleeson 2016; Scorer 2014, 54). The literature review in Chapter 2 examines the culture of the Catholic Church as a closed system with little outside oversight and its role in supporting clergy perpetrators of CSA (Keenan 2013).

4.5 Collecting attribute and relational data

Utilising SNA concepts, each clergy perpetrator was considered an actor within the DN and actors were linked by attribute and relational data. Attribute data relates to “attitudes, opinions and behaviours of actors that do not contradict one another and are regarded as qualities or characteristics that belong to them as individuals or as a group” (Scott 2013, 3; Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 230). For this analysis, the overarching light network attribute of clericalism played a major role in facilitating clergy CSA. Clericalism is “the belief that clergy are superior to the laity through an association with God which provided clergy with social and legal privileges and vast power” (Doyle 2006, 194; Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 223). The desire to commit CSA was an attribute shared by clergy perpetrators and was the attribute which linked clergy DN actors and separates clergy DN actors from the clergy grey and light networks. Attribute data for this data set included offending behaviours such as victim grooming and selection, patterns of offending, methods of maintaining silence of victims and ties to other perpetrators. This attribute data demonstrated shared behaviours, characteristics and opinions regarding committing CSA.

“Relational data are an essential element of any network and concerns ties and affiliations or relationships between actors that connect actors as a group that relate one agent to another and cannot be reduced to the individual” (Scott 2013, 3). Relational data included the time frame of offending, the overarching affiliation of the
Catholic Church and links between the geographical placement of clergy perpetrators of CSA by Diocese and more specifically, institution. This relational data was used to evidence the ties which were utilised to facilitate clergy CSA. These ties evidenced an organised clergy DN, as clergy DN actors used ties to obtain and share DN resources and reciprocate protection for fellow clergy DN actors.

4.6 Qualitative and quantitative approach

The sources outlined in the data section above were utilised to collect information about clergy perpetrators relevant to their offending. This research collected empirical data pertaining to individual clergy in regard to their offending. This data included, where available, number of victims, years of offending and the number of allegations, charges and convictions. This empirical data provided context for the extent of individual clergy DN actor’s CSA history. Moreover, the qualitative data provided a deeper insight into offending behaviour which could be used to demonstrate clergy DN actors interacting to facilitate CSA. A mixed methods approach allowed for a more comprehensive assessment of the relational data (Scott 2013, 4).

Qualitative data included, where available, the clergy perpetrators’ name and title, order, diocese, and the time frame in which they offended in the relevant institution. Where this information was available, the corresponding victim’s name was included in the data. Further qualitative data included transfers between institutions, relationships between clergy, shared victims, protection of other DN actors, promotion of DN actors, shared information regarding victims, methods of grooming and committing CSA. This data provided a deeper insight into the interconnectedness of clergy DN actors and the methods used to protect the clergy DN and, therefore, maintain DN resilience.

The clergy perpetrators of CSA were listed in alphabetical order according to surname. Relevant data from the RCICA and VPI was added to the alphabetical list. The alphabetical order was adhered to so that additional information could be easily added to individuals and avoided adding clergy to the list more than once. This process produced a live Microsoft Word document with an alphabetic listing of 99
Catholic clergy perpetrators of CSA in Victoria. This data was transferred into an Excel spreadsheet in the same alphabetical order.

### 4.7 Transferring data to the Excel document

The data was alphabetically tabled in an Excel document according to perpetrators’ surnames. This allowed for new information regarding each perpetrator to be added progressively as each data source was examined. The Excel document was structured with the surname in the first column and titled columns for other relevant data. The columns were titled name, Order, place of work, place of offence, year/s of offence, charge/allegations, Diocese, victims’ name, age and sex, seminary training and a final column titled, notes. The notes column included any information which was considered potentially relevant. This included information such as clergy sharing accommodation, visiting each other, overseas transfers post complaints of CSA or detail provided by victims about the offence or perpetrator. This was not a complete list though the information in this final column was of a qualitative nature and was considered important for the analysis.

The relevant data from the BRA Word document was added to the relevant columns set up in the Excel document. It is important to restate that the data entered into the Excel spreadsheet was limited to the information available in the sources. Therefore, each perpetrator did not necessarily have information provided in each of the above-mentioned columns. The data was based on known, charged and convicted perpetrators only and, therefore, did not illustrate the full extent of offences. The collated data from each of the 99 perpetrators were entered into the Excel document. This process involved transferring any data which belonged under the titles name, Order, place of work, place of offence, year/s of offence, charge/allegations, Diocese, victims’ name, age and sex, seminary training and other. Upon completion of entering data from Broken Rites into the Excel document, the same process was followed for the RCICA and VPI data.
4.8 Entering Excel data into the Visualsys program

At this stage, the Excel document contained varying amounts of data covering different aspects of the offending of 99 Catholic clergy perpetrators of CSA between 1939 to 2001. The following table (Table 4.1) provides a breakdown of number of clergy perpetrators in the various religious orders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Order</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian Brothers</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salesians of Don Bosco</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St John of God</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marist Brothers</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parish Priests</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De la Salle</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jesuit</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marianist</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vincentian Order</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missionaries of the Sacred Heart</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pallottine Order</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1 Number of clergy perpetrators in each religious order within data boundaries

Using the data from the Excel document, starting from the first alphabetically listed cleric, the data was entered into the social network analysis tool, Visualsys, a software program which can produce a visual map of networks. The software program Visualsys is a SNA program which shows the ties and interconnectedness of perpetrators and creates a visual representation of the network (see Appendix 2). Visualsys also has the capability to highlight the strongest ties in the form of clusters of DN actors. This was examined regarding the structure of the DN and highlighted the role of the Victorian Catholic Church hierarchy by linking DN actors to Bishops. Mapping clergy perpetrators of CSA to demonstrate a network has not been conducted in public inquiries. This highlights the significance of this thesis as the
research process endeavours to evidence ties connecting clergy perpetrators of CSA to form an operational DN.

A clergy icon was placed on the network map (Appendix 2) with name and title. The parish icon was added next and named, and the two were linked by arrows. The program had various links in the template with which the clergy could be selected and clicked on and dragged to link to the parish where the offence was committed. If one cleric had offended in multiple parishes, then further parish icons were added and linked to the DN actor. If there were known victims of this cleric at this parish, then the school boy or girl icon was selected and added to the map and named, and, again, a link was selected to link the parish and the perpetrator to the victim. This process was continued through the list of 99 perpetrators, gradually building a detailed and complex network map.

Circle icons were placed high on the map to represent all four Diocese and relevant Bishops in Victoria, which are Sale, Melbourne, Ballarat and Sandhurst. This was useful not only for keeping the map organised but also highlighted the occurrence of clergy CSA as being more predominant in some Diocese’ than others when parishes were linked to the Diocese and Bishop they were connected to. Therefore, links showed ties from the cleric, to the parish, to the Diocese and finally to their Bishop. This visual mapping highlighted the perpetrators present at each parish within concurrent timeframes, transfers between parishes and shared victims. On completion of entering all the available data, the software program provided a visual map of the occurrence of CSA and ties between clergy perpetrators within the Victorian Catholic Church based on the available information.

4.9 Coding of data into themes

Data pertaining to each of the 99 clergy perpetrators was entered into Visualsys mapping software. This data includes clergy perpetrator name, institution and dates CSA was committed. Where a clergy perpetrator committed CSA at more than one
institution, the map illustrated transfers and CSA between various institutions. The Microsoft Word document containing the data was collated into themes. Themes of significance to analysing clergy perpetrators of CSA, DNIs and SNA include, grooming techniques, patterns of offending, methods used to remain covert, recruitment and situational offending. This data formulated qualitative data as it provided description and analysis of these topics presented in the data and analysis chapters. Themes of significance to linking DN actors included cross-institutional connections, victim sharing, DN resource sharing and clergy perpetrators working and offending at the same institution simultaneously or concurrently. These collated themes form the basis of data Chapter 5 and will be further unpacked and critically analysed in the analysis chapters 6, 7 and 8.

The data in the Excel spreadsheet was cross-checked against the network map in Visualsys to ensure that the data matched, and all clergy perpetrators of CSA were included in the map. This was an important step as the Visualsys software did not have the capability of searching for names. Therefore, checking for missing or repeated data had to be searched for visually. The information provided for each perpetrator varied in detail as it reflected and was limited to, the available data from the sources used. The list of clergy perpetrators consisted of a variety of orders, titles and occurrence of offending. The commonalities were that the list included Catholic clergy who had committed CSA which had been admitted to through an apology or an out of court settlement, or they had been charged and convicted of these offences, which occurred between 1939 through to 2001. Apologies, settlements and charges are included as relying solely on convictions would not produce a robust or accurate representation of the occurrence of Catholic clergy CSA. Victim complaints are also included as these have been acknowledged as a legitimate source during public inquiries and commissions. Appendix 1 is replete with examples of all of these forms of acknowledgment of clergy CSA. In addition to this many clergy perpetrators died or committed suicide before they could be convicted or attend civil proceedings (BRA ndl, BRA ndp, BRA ndu, BRA ndx, BRA ndz, BRA 2017g, BRA 2015, BRA 2016b, RCICA 2015a).

The data chapter provides a description of the themes which emerged from the collated research material from data sources. Where relevant, some information was quantified to highlight prevalence or common patterns. Patterns of offending could be
quantified to the number of perpetrators using the same pattern to offend. This included situational offending, that is, where clergy CSA occurred. There was a pattern of clergy perpetrators of CSA committing CSA in school dormitories and classrooms; in the victim’s home, and/or taking the victim on a school camp or holiday. The number of clergies who offended in these settings could be quantified to demonstrate a pattern of offending. Common grooming methods were also apparent such as supplying potential child victims with cigarettes, alcohol and pornography. Clergy perpetrators of CSA would also entrench themselves in the family’s life and groom parents of victims. The number of clergy perpetrators utilising any of the above-mentioned strategies were counted and included in the data chapter. This provided evidence of patterns utilised by clergy perpetrators. The analysis chapterunpacks this data further and analyses the significance of this data.

4.10 Analysis and results

Social network data were collected and collated to conduct social network analysis and in combination with the visual map, represented “underlying social dimensions of interactions among actors to answer specific research questions” (Morris and Deckro 2013, 74). SNA was used to determine the structure of DNs (Bright, Hughes and Chalmers 2012). SNA frequently uses mathematical calculations to determine closeness, betweenness and centrality measures, though this SNA focused on ties between actors and institutions to tell a qualitative story rather than a quantitative one. Quantifying DN characteristics is said to be less prone to subjectivity and bias (van der Hulst 2009) though there still may be bias in the selection of data included. Combining quantitative and qualitative data adds depth of meaning to statistical evidence. Including data of the hierarchy of the institution showed the presence of a grey network. How this was exploited by the clergy DN to facilitate CSA is demonstrated in analysis Chapter 8.

In summary, the process for conducting the research for this thesis involved initially deciding on data sources and data boundaries; selecting a focus and boundary for research was necessary due to the limitations of a set time frame. While the selected data set was extensive and robust, this does mean that this research was based on a distinct cohort and was reliant on available data. This limitation was extended due
to the significant impediments to reporting clergy CSA and the secret nature of not only the Catholic Church but also of dark networks. Therefore, the data utilised in this research represents only a fraction of the clergy CSA committed. The process of collecting and collating data into themes relevant to the research questions provided valuable information. Examples of the data according to themes is outlined in the following data Chapter 5.

4.11 Resources and funding required

There was no funding required for this research. All research and analysis tools were provided by QUT free of charge.

4.12 Individual contribution to the research team

There was no collaboration for this research other than with supervisors. The research to date was reliant upon materials that were publicly available. This project fitted within the Crime Justice and Research Centre’s research expertise on sexual violence.

4.13 Limitations

This research was limited to publicly available data and included reported offences and allegations only. Therefore, the data did not include non-reported child sexual abuse within the Australian Catholic Church. Additionally, the Catholic Church was also able to hide behind canon law as a means of protecting its secrets. It needs to be stated from the outset that this research examined one specific area of criminal activity conducted by perpetrators within the Catholic Church. The specific crime being examined was child sexual abuse by Catholic clergy. These crimes were not limited to Victoria and did extend beyond Australia’s borders, but the boundaries for this research were set within Victoria. These crimes, and the crime of CSA particularly, were not limited to clergy and were also committed by nuns and Catholic laity. The scope of this research was limited by the enormity of criminal acts committed within the Catholic church as boundaries had to be set to analyse a manageable data set.
4.14 Ethics

No ethics approval was required as the data for this research was publicly available.
Chapter 5 Data

5.1 Introduction

As stated in the methodology chapter, the RCICA (2014-2017), VPI (2012-2013) and Broken Rites Australia website were the three sources of data for this thesis. This chapter explains the themes which became apparent in the data relevant to answering the research questions. To answer the research questions, it had to be first established whether there was a DN of clergy perpetrators of CSA apparent in Victoria. The data sources were used to identify known perpetrators of clergy CSA. However, evidencing the presence of clergy perpetrators of CSA did not suffice to demonstrate the presence of a DN. To demonstrate a DN, the connections or ties between these DN actors had to be shown, as well as the use of these ties to share DN resources between DN actors. The qualitative and quantitative data evidenced that contrary to being random solitary perpetrators of CSA, these clergy were connected to form a DN which supported and facilitated clergy CSA and acted to support DN resilience. Additionally, the data provided evidence of the DN exploiting light network attributes and grey network responses to complaints of clergy CSA, to facilitate clergy CSA and further support DN resilience. The data collected provided the evidence which is used in conjunction with the literature to support the arguments in the analysis chapters.

Evidencing a DN of clergy perpetrators of CSA in Victoria was done by highlighting the interpersonal ties between DN actors regarding mentoring of DN actors by other DN actors and committing CSA in the same institution or visiting other DN actors at other institutions. The operation of a DN was evidenced by data which showed these ties being utilised by DN actors to share DN resources. These resources included material resources in the form of sharing victims and non-material resources included victim information, shared knowledge, reciprocal support and trust and covering for one another by silencing victims of clergy CSA. Also apparent in the data were patterns in places where clergy CSA occurred, grooming methods and methods for silencing victims. Although there was no direct evidence of DN actors sharing this knowledge with other DN actors, patterns in the use of the same strategies was significant and indicated that knowledge of these strategies was shared.
The data also showed how DN actors utilised light network attributes and the grey network’s response to clergy CSA as DN resources. The light network attribute of clericalism provided DN actors with the unquestioned trust and superiority bestowed on clergy, which was utilised to commit CSA (RCICA 2017b, 614). Similarly, the light network attribute of corporal punishment was utilised by DN actors to gain compliance and the silence of victims. The second part of this chapter will provide examples of the grey network’s response to complaints of clergy CSA. These responses included denial, cover-up, and the consistent practice of transferring clergy subject to CSA complaints. These responses served to facilitate continued CSA and, therefore, DN resilience. The grey network also placed a number of perpetrators in positions conducive to committing CSA such as being in charge of dormitories. This was one example of qualitative data being utilised to produce quantitative data as the quantification of DN actors placed in charge of dormitories demonstrates this was a common occurrence and pattern used by the grey network and exploited by DN actors.

Examples are provided for explanatory purposes though these were limited to one or two examples relevant to each set of data. Further examples are included in Appendix 1, which provides a brief overview for each of the 97 alphabetically listed Catholic clergy perpetrators of CSA who formed the basis of this research. Additionally, further examples are provided as part of the analysis in the analysis chapter. Based on the data boundaries of this research, the following section shows examples of the ties between DN actors. This begins by outlining clergy perpetrators of CSA working at the same institution, either simultaneously and/or sequentially.

5.2 Clergy DN actor ties

5.2.1 Clusters of clergy DN actors

Individual DN actor data entered into the software program Visualsys provided a visual representation of DN actor ties (available in Appendix 2). One type of tie shown was the presence of Catholic clergy perpetrators of CSA working and committing CSA at the same institution, occurring simultaneously and sequentially. The mapping of data illustrated 16 distinct clusters of clergy perpetrators of CSA. As stated in the theory
chapter, clusters of DN actors are “groups of DN actors with strong ties which are a foundation for shared norms, trust and collective behaviour” (de Nooy, Mrvar and Batagelj 2005, 61; Everton 2012, 23). Identifying clusters of perpetrators or actors, is a major focus of SNA. In addition to identifying strong ties in clusters, it can also identify DN actors belonging to more than one cluster, which evidences DN interrelations (Scott 2013, 124). The data provided examples of this as some DN actors found in clusters were also present in other clusters at different times. Clusters of clergy perpetrators of CSA included Victorian Catholic institutions with more than two DN actors present. The following section provides some examples of the 16 clusters of clergy DN actors illustrated in the network map. The entire Visualsys map can be seen in Appendix 2, though due to the complexity of the map and the extent of data, the cluster data is individually presented in Appendix 3 in graph form.

In 1971, at St Alipius (see Table 5.1, Appendix 3), four clergy perpetrators of CSA worked and committed CSA at this school simultaneously (RCICA 2016, 4). The data showed that between 1962-1975 there was a consistent presence of clergy perpetrators of CSA at this school.

**Table 5.1: Cluster 1**

![Table 5.1: Cluster 1](image)

Cluster 3 (See Table 5.2, Appendix 3), St Augustine’s, in Geelong had a procession of clergy perpetrators of CSA. The following chronology of convicted clergy covering four decades demonstrates a successive presence of clergy perpetrators of CSA at
this institution. Br McGee worked and committed CSA between 1939-44 and again between 1951-54 (BRA 2016i). Br Eastmure worked and committed CSA at this parish between 1944-45 and again in 1954-62 (BRA ndl). These dates also demonstrate clergy perpetrators of CSA being transferred to other parishes and returning in later years to parishes where they had offended. Another example of this is Br Hackett who worked and offended at St Augustine’s between 1957-59 and returned as the superintendent there between 1967-69 (BRA nds). Another perpetrator, Br Webster, preceded Hackett as superintendent between 1954-59 (BRA 2011b). Other clergy perpetrators working successively at St Augustine’s include Br Jordan in the early 60s (BRA 2016i), Br Brian Thomas in 1969 (BRA 2016z), Br William Houston from 1969-70 (BRA 2016g) and Br Pascal Alford was in charge of a dormitory from 1970-78 (BRA nd).

Table 5.2: Cluster 3

![St Augustine's Geelong](image)

Notably, between 1954 and 1959, Eastmure and Webster worked at this institution concurrently. Hackett was also at this institution for three years during this period. Therefore, over this period there were three clergy perpetrators of CSA present at this
institution, one of which, Webster, was the superintendent or principal of the institution. In 1967, Hackett, became superintendent. It is also apparent that during 1969, two clergy perpetrators of CSA, Thomas and Houston, were both working at this institution. This data shows a sequential flow of known clergy perpetrators of CSA apart from the period between 1946-1950. This data is limited to the sources used for this research and may not present a complete chronology of clergy perpetrators.

The above examples evidence clusters of more than two clergy DN actors with strong ties as they are geographically placed at the same institution. The data also provides examples of institutions where one-to-two clergy perpetrators of CSA were present. For example, Br Morgan committed CSA at Monivae College, Hamilton in the 1960s but was not the only perpetrator (BRA 2016n). Br Eddie Mamo plead guilty to a further 21 indecent assaults against 14 victims at Monivae College and was jailed a second time in 2015 (BRA 2015d). One of the senior administrators at Monivae College in Mamo's time (1970s) was Fr Michael Reis (BRA 2015d). Reis was sentenced to jail in Queensland in 2008 after pleading guilty to committing CSA in Queensland (BRA 2015d). This data is important to identify solitary DN actors, representative of DN weak ties, explained in the theory chapter. As is further analysed in the analysis chapter, DN actors with weak ties played a significant role in DN. The following paragraphs will provide some examples of the role of DN actors with weak ties and how this benefited the operation of the clergy DN.

5.3 Sharing DN resources utilising cross-institutional weak ties

The data also shows ties between clergy perpetrators of CSA across institutions. Ties are utilised to cover-up CSA committed by other DN actors, and to share victims across institutions. These were apparent in the form of DN actors silencing complaints of victims of other clergy where victims went outside their own parish to complain or seek help. DN actors would visit other DN actors at their parish for the purpose of victim sharing, sometimes bringing victims from their own parish. Victims were also
taken by clergy perpetrators of CSA to visit other DN actors at a holiday home or on trips to various destinations.

A clergy CSA victim gave evidence to the RCICA using the pseudonym BTU, which states that while at St Kilda, Fr Pickering sexually abused him (RCICA 2015g, 45). He reported it at the time to the parish priest at the neighbouring parish. This priest was Fr Wilfred Baker, who was himself an abuser. Baker told Pickering that the boy had complained. Pickering later asked the boy why he had told Baker, and the complaint went no further (RCICA 2015c, 12). This provides an example of DN actors from different parishes with weak ties, protecting each other by warning the other that one of his victims had disclosed the CSA he had committed. Alerting another clergy perpetrator to a victims’ CSA disclosure in the confessional is contradictory to the stance clergy have taken regarding breaking the seal of confession where this could implicate a clergy perpetrator in committing clergy CSA (RCICA 2017a, 23). This data supports the analysis regarding the importance of weak ties and the extended protection of the DN.

5.3.1 Victim sharing

Clergy DN actors also visited one another in their various parishes. A victim was taken by Fr Gubbels to visit St Augustine’s orphanage to stay overnight at St Augustine’s (BRA 2014b). After the overnight stay, Gubbels brought a St Augustine’s boy back to Melbourne to stay at the victim’s house (BRA 2014b). The victim stated that “Gubbels would take boys to stay at a house on the Victorian coast”. Data also shows that Br Alford took boys from St Augustine’s to visit Gubbels at the Corpus Christi seminary (BRA 2014b). In this example, Gubbels, takes his victim with him to visit another parish, St Augustine’s, and leaves after an overnight stay with another boy from St Augustine’s. Alford reciprocates the visit and brings boys to visit Gubbels at the seminary, evidencing sharing the DN resource of victims. A former resident of St Augustine’s orphanage at Geelong stated

In 1975, when I was eleven, I was put into St Augustine’s after my parents separated. Jack Gubbels used to visit there. He slept in a dormitory with the
boys. One night, he hopped into bed with me and handled my genitals. On another occasion Brother Alford, from St Augustine's, took some of us boys in a mini-bus to Melbourne, where we visited Gubbels at the Corpus Christi seminary. (BRA 2014b)

As students and roommates at Corpus Christi seminary, Frs Glennon and Pidoto, would travel to St Augustine’s to counsel boys, and they were both later jailed for committing CSA (BRA 2014b). Also, around this time, Gubbels, mentioned above, was an honorary probation officer, supervising young male offenders, and while at South Melbourne, Gubbels had access to boys from St Vincent's Boys' Home (BRA 2014b). Focusing on Gubbels, the above data demonstrates that through his movement between parishes, Gubbels had access to vulnerable boys in multiple institutions.

5.3.2 Victim sharing between DN actors with strong ties

A victim of clergy CSA, Neil Wileman started at St Patrick's in 1972. The dormitory master was Br Ring who during the year, went on retreat. When Ring was away, Br Dowlan took over as a dormitory master and was also a teacher at the school (RCICA 2015e, 35). Dowlan sexually abused Wileman either in Dowlan's cubicle or in the back of the classroom approximately two or three times a week for about 12 months (RCICA 2015e, 36 & 37). In 1973, Ring returned to the school after several months away on retreat and began sexually abusing Wileman (RCICA 2015e, 38). During the same period as both Dowlan and Ring were sexually abusing Wileman, another Brother at St Patrick’s whose name has been redacted for reasons of privilege, also, sexually abused Wileman (RCICA 2015e, 39). In addition to sharing victims within clusters and across institutions, the data evidences distinct patterns in where and how clergy CSA was committed. Patterns of behaviour amongst DN actors evidence the DN characteristic of collective behaviour and shared knowledge amongst DN actors (Everton 2012, 23)
5.4 Patterns in situational DN offending

The following paragraphs use data examples to highlight distinct places where DN actors committed CSA. Consequently, highlighting that similar patterns were utilised by multiple DN actors. Each method will be discussed separately as a distinct method of situational clergy CSA. DN actors utilised specific places which were conducive to providing opportunities to commit CSA. These include the victims’ home, the confessional, taking victims on trips away and in Catholic institution classrooms and dormitories. Although committing CSA was not solely confined to these places, multiple DN actors utilised the same places to commit CSA. The first method to be discussed is the CSA committed by clergy in Catholic institution dormitories. Based on the data collected from the RCICA, BRA and the VPI the following paragraphs provide testimony from victims and examples of the patterns of situational CSA being discussed here.

5.4.1 Boarding and orphanage dormitories

The following example demonstrates methods used to commit and cover-up clergy CSA. Br Aloysius Webster, the principal of St Augustine's boys’ orphanage, Geelong from 1954 to 1959, was a perpetrator of CSA (BRA 2011b). One victim was abused by Webster, which started shortly after Webster came to St Augustine’s and continued for more than two years, two or three times a week (BRA 2011b). Br William Houston similarly committed CSA against boys in his care at St Augustine’s orphanage (BRA 2016g).

Br Edward Dowlan took advantage of his role as dormitory supervisor at St Patrick’s College and committed CSA against children while in their beds. The following testimony provides insight to CSA from the child victim’s perspective. Paul Tatchell gave evidence to the RCICA about what he witnessed as a boarder at St Patrick’s in 1974.

On my first night at St Pat's, I didn't sleep. No sooner had the lights gone out when I seen Dowlan walking between the beds, stopping from time to time,
leaning over at certain beds, whispering softly and appearing to be kissing the boys (RCICA 2015b, 8) …. Punishment was always done in the seclusion at Dowlan's bedroom at the end of the dormitory, almost always you were punished after lights were out. Every night you'd just line up at the dormitory, he'd call your name and when the lights go out, you'd get a hiding from him from in front of the room. Dowlan would call in the first victim and after he was punished, he would go to the bed of the next victim and the process would go on and you would get an extra six hits for not going in his room (RCICA 2015b, 10) …. When I got six on the backside you had to take your pyjama pants down and your underpants down. If you were wearing underpants you got an extra hit, because Dowlan did not allow us to wear underpants to bed (RCICA 2015b, 11).

Data evidences seven clergy perpetrators of CSA in charge of school boarder dormitories utilising this position and situational context to commit CSA. As in the case of Wileman's abuse, physical assaults often occurred in conjunction with CSA. CSA did not only occur in boarding dormitory sleeping quarters as the institutional setting provided further opportunities for clergy to commit CSA.

5.4.2 Physical abuse followed by CSA in the classroom and school grounds

The data examples below highlight the use of physical abuse as a precursor to CSA to either intimidate or use as a prelude to 'comforting' victims. Physical abuse was utilised as a DN resource. These assaults occurred in the classroom, in the perpetrator’s office, in the sick bay and in the school playground. The first example, Br Dowlan, committed CSA against boys in classrooms, sports rooms and showers. Dowlan was a prolific perpetrator, and further data is available in Appendix 1. Typically, Dowlan would upset a boy through physical or verbal abuse and would then cuddle them and commit CSA (BRA ndb). This is apparent in the testimony regarding Br Dowlan’s method of offending provided to the RCICA by a victim from St Patrick's College Ballarat, Peter Blenkiron. “Once, when I had been taken to the back of the class, I started crying after the strapping. Dowlan tried to comfort me and this is when the sexual abuse started” (RCICA 2015e, 100). Much of Dowlan's CSA was
committed at the back of a classroom full of children who were told not to look back (RCICA 2015e, 23). Dowlan’s CSA also occurred in unoccupied classrooms where Dowlan would use the guise of discipline to intimidate boys into going to the place where the CSA would occur.

A similar example of this method of committing CSA is apparent with Fr Julian Fox, who also used physical abuse as a precursor to committing CSA. “One boy was sent to Fox for disciplining in Year 9 and Fox hit him several times on the backside over his pants and then again with his pants removed” (BRA ndn). This boy was caned and sexually assaulted again by Fox after Fox saw him running in the hallway (BRA ndn). According to this victim, another Salesian priest, Fr Julius Chiste, was in the room and witnessed the CSA but did not assist the boy (BRA ndn). The data evidences five clergy perpetrators of CSA who used the institutional setting of the school to commit CSA. Four of the five clergy perpetrators of CSA used physical abuse as precursor to committing CSA. The threat of being sexually abused was omnipresent in the data examples of clergy CSA in classrooms. Other situational contexts are also apparent in the data though it should be noted that DN actors did not necessarily restrict committing CSA to one situational context as some committed CSA in a variety of contexts.

5.4.3 In the victim’s home

Another pattern of committing CSA used by clergy was to entrench themselves into the lives of Catholic families. The families were often single parent families or families who were otherwise vulnerable. These perpetrators would eat meals with the family, offer bedtime prayers and offer to take the children away on various trips (BRA 2016ac, BRA ndb). Utilising the light network attribute of the Catholic perception of clergy being above reproach or suspicion, parents granted these perpetrators unsupervised access to their children (BRA 2016ac, BRA 2013). Examples of this method of accessing victims follows.
While ministering at Gladstone Park (in 1976-7), Fr Baker used his priestly status to befriend a family whose son was aged 12. Baker would go to the boy's bedroom under the guise of helping with school work and commit CSA. Baker would make this boy sit on his knee while giving him lessons (BRA nda, para 15). Baker also took this boys away on trips and showered with him (BRA 2016ac). Clergy CSA was also committed in victim’s homes by DN actors, Br John Dyson (BRA ndj), Fr Fasciale (BRA 2017p), Fr Aulsebrook (BRA 2016ac), Fr Robert Claffey (BRA 2016a), Fr Ridsdale (BRA 2017k), Fr David Daniel (BRA ndh), Fr Anthony Eames (BRA ndk), Fr Dan Hourigan (BRA ndu) and Fr Kevin Howarth (BRA 2013). These ten examples of clergy committing CSA in the homes of their victims is limited to the available data provided by victims. Therefore, this discussion serves to provide insight into one of the patterns utilised by DN actors to commit CSA and the exploitation of the licit role of clergy. Another apparent pattern is an extension of the previous pattern. Once some clergy perpetrators of CSA had secured the trust and friendship of parents, they would offer to take their children on various trips where they had isolated access to victims.

5.4.4 CSA on trips away with clergy DN actors

Patterns in grooming will be discussed later though it should be mentioned here that although this section outlines taking children away on trips as a pattern of situational CSA, this is enabled through a process of grooming the child and their family (Kloess, Beech and Harkins 2014, 128). The trips away varied from a trip to a holiday house or taking children to Catholic Church affiliated camps. The following DN actors used their clerical status to gain unsupervised access to victims.

Fr Gubbels became a friend of a family at Croydon parish and one year later, the 12-year-old son was allowed to go with Gubbels by car to Queensland for a three-week trip where he was sexually abused by Gubbels (BRA 2014b). Baker would take pupils, mostly altar boys from Melbourne parishes on trips to his parents’ house in Maryborough, Queensland (BRA nda, para 9; RCICA 2015f, 4). Seven victims were assaulted in this house, where they had been forced to share a bedroom with Baker (BRA nda, para 9).
The following example has an additional component as it evidences a clergy DN actor not only taking a victim away on a holiday but also evidences this DN actor connecting with weak ties from outside of the clergy DN. BTU provided the following evidence at the RCICA.

I remember one occasion, it may have been around 1971 or 1972, I can't remember exactly, I travelled with Fr Ronald Pickering to Adelaide for about five days for a holiday. By this time, I regularly visited Fr Pickering, so my mum didn't question me going away with him on a holiday. I would have been about 16 or 17 years old. We stayed in a hotel and I stayed in the same room as Fr Pickering and he continued to abuse me. I remember one night during this trip, we went to a local hotel for dinner where Fr Pickering met up with someone, who I think was called Fr Gavin, and three other men. I don't remember Fr Gavin's last name, but he was quite young, about 30 years old. I don't know who the three other men were, they were not priests, but my impression was that they were involved in the church in some way. All the men had boys with them around the same age as me. I was made to sit on the kids' table while the men sat on a different table (RCICA 2015g, 46).

A total of six clergy perpetrators of CSA who committed CSA on camping trips or holidays are apparent in the data. In addition to the above examples, other DN actors who took children away on trips to commit CSA include Fr Morey (BRA 2013a), Br Farrell (RCICA 2015b, 51), Fr Glennon (BRA ndp) and Fr Wilson (BRA 2018, para 5). These examples demonstrate the trust parents placed in clergy and that there were occasions where clergy abused this trust to sexually abuse children. Furthermore, clergy DN actors exploited the light network attribute of their role as clerics, to use the privacy of the confessional to commit CSA.

5.4.5 In the confessional

The confessional was a significant DN resource as it served multiple purposes. It was used to screen vulnerable potential victims, to commit CSA, to absolve clergy perpetrators of CSA of guilt and to embed the victims' feeling of guilt (BRA 2014; BRA 2017k; Family and Community Development Committee 2013a, 18; Robertson 2010a,
3). As was the case of Fr Ridsdale who committed CSA during the sacrament of Confession (BRA 2017k). While at Doveton parish, Fr Searson committed CSA in the confessional, which became so problematic that he was banned from hearing children’s confession after numerous complaints (BRA ndae).

Searson’s sexualised conduct included having children sit on his knee in confession, having them kneel between his knees during confession, tape recording ‘hot’ confessions, cuddling girls and having girls do handstands in front of him in their dresses. Julie Stewart gave evidence that Searson indecently assaulted her in the confessional in 1984 and 1985. Stewart was approached by the police in 1990 and signed a statement in which she alleged being pulled onto Searson’s lap and held against his erect penis in the confessional in 1985. Ms Stewart was told by the police officer that there was ‘not enough to go by’. (RCICA 2015, 19-20).

Fr Jim Scannell’s abuse provides one example of assigning guilt to the victim. Scannell aka James Henry aka Br Frederick raped a 12-year-old boy who had an absent father at St Anne’s in Kew. In Confession after the CSA had taken place, “the victim was required to confess his sin for participating in the sexual abuse” (BRA 2014). In addition to the confessional being used to commit CSA, it was also used to groom and select victims (Robertson 2010a, 3). Fr Paul David Ryan used the privacy and intimacy of the confessional to groom his victims (Family and Community Development Committee 2013a, 18). As one victim stated, “in Confession, priests had access to children’s inner-most thoughts and feelings enabling them to select the most vulnerable victims” (BRA ndk).

Children would also disclose clergy CSA in the confessional, this was used as a way of identifying victims. The following testimony provides evidence of this occurring. BTU gave evidence at the RCICA regarding reporting his sexual abuse:

The first time I ever told anyone about Fr Pickering sexually abusing me was in about 1968, when I was about 13 or 14. I went to a neighbouring parish, St
Colman’s at Balaclava, to go to confession. My confession was heard by Fr Baker, and I confessed to what Pickering had been doing to me. As soon as confession had finished, Baker wanted to chat to me. We had a conversation in the church about what I had just told him in confession. The conversation was not about the abuse that I disclosed to him; instead, what Baker wanted to know was where I lived. I thought this was odd (RCICA 2015g, 49).

Another form of victim selection or victim sharing is apparent in the following evidence. A victim of CSA, using the pseudonym BAV, testified that not long after being sexually abused by Br Best he was in the school yard and someone pinched me on my face. BAV looked up and saw it was Fr Ridsdale and with him was Br Best (RCICA 2015e, 24).

Ridsdale just smiled at me. Sometime later I was in Grade 6 and I went to the beach with Ridsdale and some of the other boys from the school. On the way back, I sat next to Ridsdale in the front passenger seat of the car. Ridsdale sexually abused me. Another time, I was sorting out bottles in the shed behind the presbytery at St Alipius Catholic Church. Ridsdale was there and he started to touch me. He then took me into his bedroom in the presbytery and sexually abused me. As I was leaving the presbytery the other priest who lived there, Fr George Pell, arrived home. I saw the back of Pell but did not know if he saw me and Ridsdale or not (RCICA 2015e, 24).

The above paragraphs outline some of the examples of the patterns of situational CSA utilised by clergy DN actors. As briefly mentioned above, grooming methods were used to select victims. As for situational clergy CSA, the data also evidences patterns in grooming methods utilised by clergy DN actors, further evidencing patterns in DN actor offending behaviours. The grooming methods used were similar to those used by general population paedophiles though there are apparent differences. The exploitation of the light network attribute of clericalism by DN actors and how this enhanced opportunities to commit CSA is discussed in Chapter 6. The literature review discusses how grooming extended beyond the victim to the victim’s family. An example of grooming a child and the child’s family follows.
Paul Daniel Hersbach testified at the RCICA in relation to his own and his family’s abuse by Fr Rubeo. Rubeo committed CSA against Hersbach’s father and his father’s twin brother, Will. Rubeo would visit the school to seek to recruit altar boys, and the Hersbach brothers volunteered. Rubeo became a frequent visitor to their home and the CSA began when the boys were 11 or 12 and became more frequent when the boys were 13-15 (BRA 2014c). Paul Hersbach described the extent of Rubeo’s grooming of the extended Hersbach family:

My father was abused over a period of about eight years, from the age of 10 until he was about 18 years old. Neither twin knew of each other’s abuse until later in life, in 1997 (RCICA 2014, 52). My parents got married when they were 19 years old in 1973. Rubeo officiated at their wedding. After their marriage in 1973 he gave them $10,000 as a deposit towards the purchase of a house in Gladstone Park. Rubeo took over the running of the family and behaved like he was in charge. My parents have told me that he inserted himself into the middle of their marriage, their day-to-day life, their decisions and the upbringing of my siblings and me. Rubeo would open my parents’ mail, pay bills and buy groceries for the family (RCICA 2014, 52).

When Rubeo became the parish priest at East Preston in 1985, the Hersbach family moved with him to the presbytery and lived there for a year. Paul Hersbach stated,

My brother, Adam, and I lived in one section of the presbytery while my parents lived in another with my sisters, Kathryn and Elizabeth. Rubeo lived in another section. While living in the presbytery at East Preston, I was sexually abused by Rubeo on multiple occasions (RCICA 2014, 53). A few months after we got back from Africa my father told my siblings and me that he had been sexually abused by Rubeo when he was a child. I remember feeling numb at the time. I struggled for many years to understand why Rubeo had been able to continue to be part of our lives, and why my father was unable to say no to him. I grieved for the loss of Rubeo from our lives (RCICA 2014, 54). In this setting I disclosed that Rubeo had abused me. This was the first time I had disclosed to anyone the specifics of my abuse and its impacts on me. (RCICA 2014, 57)
The CSA committed by Rubeo against Paul Hersbach’s father and Uncle continued into controlling them as adults which led to Rubeo committing CSA against a second generation in the same family. This example not only demonstrates the control Rubeo had over this family but also highlights that this grooming and control can be so pervasive that it extends over decades and generations. The following section provides examples of other grooming methods utilised by clergy perpetrators of CSA.

5.4.6 Gifts and bribes used to groom victims

Some clergy perpetrators of CSA used gifts and bribes to groom potential child victims. An altar boy from the Doveton parish under Fr Thomas O’Keeffe in the 1970s stated,

He ran cricket for all the boys of Holy Family school during school lunch and recesses as well as on Sundays after Mass. After matches we would go to the presbytery and have ice-creams and soft drink. Eventually, after he had established a rapport with us, he'd offer us some of his magazines, all pornography. My older brothers also recall this. We never told our parents. After O'Keeffe moved to the Thornbury parish, he remained in contact with my family. He used to visit us in Doveton on Sunday nights. Often, he'd bring new board games for me and my brothers. On a few occasions during school holidays my brothers and I (and a few other kids) would stay at O’Keeffe’s presbytery in Thornbury. We'd all see films, play sports and games. Porn magazines would be shown around in the evenings. (BRA ndac)

Victims state that “Fr Pickering encouraged boys to engage in illicit behaviours such as smoking, drinking, pornography and sex and have a boy stay in his bed overnight” (BRA ndaj). Pickering would wrestle with a boy on the bed, tickle the boy’s stomach and then engage in CSA (BRA ndaj; RCICA 2015g, 42). Victims also stated that “Pickering used promises of watching television or videos or receiving pocket money to lure victims to his bedroom” (BRA ndaj). Pickering was at the East St Kilda Parish for about three years, between 1966 and 1969. BTU was abused by Pickering around twice a week for three years (RCICA 2015g, 45).
The preceding content has outlined what the data evidences in regard to Victorian Catholic clergy DN actor ties and how these ties were utilised to share DN resources. The main DN resource is victims, though other DN resources are used to acquire this DN resource. These resources include shared patterns of identifying, selecting and grooming victims. Additionally, patterns in how and where clergy CSA was committed shows collective behaviour and shared knowledge regarding the methods of committing CSA. Reciprocal support amongst DN actors is shown in examples of DN actors silencing other DN actors’ victims and by identifying potential victims to each other. The following section will evidence how the DN of clergy perpetrators of CSA utilised responses of the grey network of the Catholic Church, to facilitate clergy CSA and maintain DN resilience. These attributes and actions effectually become DN resources.

5.5 The DN utilising the grey network of the Catholic Church’s response to clergy CSA to facilitate CSA, protect the DN and DN resilience

The Victorian Catholic Church grey network consists of those who facilitated clergy CSA though are not necessarily committing CSA. The data evidences consistent responses by Catholic hierarchy and clergy of denial and minimisation regarding the occurrence of clergy CSA. Additionally, the transferring of known clergy perpetrators of CSA to new parishes without advising the new parish of the history of clergy CSA supported DN coverup and resilience. The analysis chapter will discuss how these actions were utilised by the DN to support and facilitate clergy CSA. The following data examples will show how the grey network contributed to the resilience of the DN by silencing complaints of clergy CSA and by placing known clergy perpetrators in positions which served the DN. Although this occurrence has been well documented, these examples are in the context of how grey network responses were conducive to continued clergy CSA and were a valuable DN resource.
5.5.1 Transferring known clergy perpetrators of CSA

Known clergy perpetrators of CSA were transferred from parish to parish in response to complaints of CSA. Parishioners were not given any prior warning or knowledge at any time that a known perpetrator of CSA would be in charge of their parish, working unsupervised with their children. The Victorian enquiry highlighted this occurrence and provides significant evidence. When Archbishop Hart was asked during the enquiry who decides on placement and duties of parish priests, he replied, “Ultimately, I do” (Family and Community Development Committee 2013c, 4). Archbishop Hart had 86 abusers on his books, of whom 60 or 61 were still alive and is quoted as stating with pride that only one of these perpetrators of CSA had been defrocked (Family and Community Development Committee 2013d, 3). Br J. McDonald, Deputy Province leader of Christian Brothers, in his testimony at the VPI, stated that a number of clergy perpetrators of CSA were protected though this was not by organisational design (Family and Community Development Committee 2013, 16). In contrast to this statement, the following examples evidence a consistent response of transferring known clergy perpetrators of CSA to other parishes which appears to be an organisational response. Evidence of transferring known perpetrators will be shown through the provision of specific examples from the evidence given at the VPI and RCICA. A select few examples are outlined below though further evidence of this is provided in the analysis chapter.

In 1986, a complaint was made that Fr Pickering had committed CSA against a young boy at St James Parish, Gardenvale in 1982. Archbishop Little informed Pickering of the complaint and Pickering promptly went on extended leave to England. Pickering ultimately returned to Gardenvale later, in 1986. Nothing was done following this complaint (RCICA 2015g, 12). Pickering continued to offend into 1989 (RCICA 2015g, 14). Fr Ridsdale committed CSA at parishes or church locations throughout Victoria. Archbishop Little knew of a number of allegations of CSA against priests in the archdiocese throughout the 1970s and 1980s and received complaints against six priests. Four of these, Fr Kevin O’Donnell, and Frs Baker, Searson and Pickering had been the subject of earlier complaints to him (RCICA 2017b, 128).
The first complaints against Fr Ridsdale were made in the 1970s (Family and Community Development Committee 2012a, 6). He was transferred to Mortlake in 1981, where further complaints were made to the diocese about Ridsdale’s behaviour (Family and Community Development Committee 2012a, 6). Parents of a badly injured victim of Ridsdale’s CSA, complained to Monsignor Fiscalini but were urged to, ‘remain quiet for the church’s sake’. Complaints were made in Horsham in 1987 and again in 1990, following which, Ridsdale was transferred to the United States (Family and Community Development Committee 2012a, 6). In Ballarat, of the 107 substantiated claims of clergy CSA, 67 of these offences were committed by Ridsdale (Family and Community Development Committee 2013a, 24). The significant number of victims of Ridsdale is testament to how the transferring of DN actors allowed the continued proliferation of CSA by known clergy perpetrators of CSA.

The data provides examples of known clergy perpetrators of CSA being not only transferred within Victoria but also interstate. During 1979, “the Melbourne archdiocese arranged for Fr Gubbels to transfer to the Townsville diocese in Queensland where Gubbels was placed in charge of a Collinsville parish in 1980-81” (BRA 2015b). In 1982, he returned to Melbourne Archdiocese, as an assistant priest at St Edmond’s parish, Croydon, where Fr Pidoto (another clergy perpetrator) was also working at that time. In the case of Fr Klep, when police began instituting charges against Klep, the Salesians arranged for Klep to work in Samoa (BRA 2017e). Similarly, Fr Treacy was transferred to Queensland after pleading guilty to CSA and receiving a non-custodial sentence (BRA 2016ad).

As has been evidenced in the RCICA and the VPI, Catholic Bishops were responsible for transferring known clergy perpetrators of CSA to parishes without warning them of the cleric’s CSA history (Family and Community Development Committee 2013c, 4). In some cases, such transfers occurred multiple times. The data also highlights the frequent occurrence of replacing one clergy perpetrator with another (Krstic 2012, 3). The role of Bishops and other grey network actors will be discussed further in the analysis chapter. The grey network’s protection of clergy perpetrators of CSA
extended to interstate and international transfers to avoid prosecution. Although this was not always the reason, as sometimes these transfers were a temporary measure taken until complaints dissipated and the cleric was transferred back to Victoria, sometimes in a promoted role.

5.5.2 Transferring known clergy perpetrators of CSA to senior positions

The role of dormitory master has been outlined above as a situational context conducive to committing CSA. Catholic clergy perpetrators of CSA were frequently placed in positions of trust despite knowledge of their offending. These positions of trust include being in charge of school dormitories and/or being permitted to take children away on camps or holidays and teaching sex education to students, as was the case for Brs Toomey, Searson, Glennon and Day (RCICA 2015b, 61; BRA 2015a). Additionally, some know clergy perpetrators of CSA were promoted into senior positions of vice-principal and principal, which increased their power and access to victims. In 1982-86, known clergy perpetrator of CSA, Fr Frank Klep was transferred back to Rupertswood, Sunbury, as principal. Concerned “parents confronted the Salesians' Australian administration and demanded Klep's removal, but the Salesians refused” (BRA 2017e). Parents then threatened legal action and Klep was sent on a study trip to Rome and the United States (BRA 2017e).

Fr Julian Fox, a physically and sexually abusive priest became vice-principal and principal of Sunbury in Rupertswood College, where he was in charge of punishing boys, during which Fox committed CSA (BRA ndn). “In 1988, for the next five years, Fox was appointed as the head of the Salesian Order in Australia, supervising Salesian schools in several States. In 1994-1998, he was at St Joseph's College, Ferntree Gully, again “ (BRA ndn). The Victorian police want to interview Fox, but in 2003 the church gave him a job in Rome as a web-master on the Salesians' worldwide website (Family and Community Development Committee 2012b, 7). Fox uses Rome as his base, but he travels the world (Family and Community Development Committee 2012b, 7).
The above examples evidence the promotion of known clergy perpetrators of CSA to positions which provided them with further power and influence. These more senior positions enable further capacity to protect the DN and placed some clergy perpetrators of CSA in positions where they belong to both the dark and grey networks, and they became perpetrators of CSA with further power to cover-up and protect the DN. Further to this, the data reveals an occurrence of clergy perpetrators of CSA being tasked with the role of recruiting and training young boys for the priesthood. Also apparent are instances of clergy perpetrators of CSA choosing other clergy perpetrators of CSA to be their mentors. This data provides examples of DN actors sharing the DN resource of shared knowledge regarding mentoring roles and potential grooming and recruiting of young seminarians.

5.6 Clergy perpetrators of CSA as mentors for other clergy perpetrators of CSA and in recruitment roles

Mentoring roles provide opportunities to use the DN resource of sharing information through training or mentoring, on DN operation strategies. In 1976, “seminary authorities learned that Fr Paul Ryan had been engaged in sexual relationships with about 6 trainee priests during his seminary course” (BRA 2017m). Following this, Ballarat Bishop Mulkearns sponsored Ryan as a candidate for the priesthood and Ryan spent the next five years at the Melbourne seminary. At the end of 1976, Ryan lived with known clergy perpetrator of CSA, Fr Pickering, the parish priest of St Peter's parish at Clayton. Ryan also frequently visited a later parish of Pickering's in Gardenvale (BRA 2017m). Ryan was placed at Gardenvale under the care of Fr Pickering by the Catholic Church authorities (D'Brass 2013, 2). It was during this time that Raymond D'Brass was regularly abused by Pickering from the age of 9 to 13 from 1979 to 1983 (D'Brass 2013, 2). Ryan travelled to England to stay with Pickering when Pickering was transferred (RCICA 2016a, 33). At the RCICA, Bishop Finnigan praised Pickering for being a wise spiritual counsellor who would offer Ryan hospitality and encouragement (RCICA 2015f, 90). In addition to one-on-one mentoring roles, some DN actors were transferred into roles where they trained young boys. At Healesville, DN actor, Fr David Daniel, trained about 30 altar boys. One of these victims idolised
Fr Daniel and wanted to become a priest, this victim’s training included CSA being committed by Daniel (BRA ndh).

Similarly, at a time when Fr Klep was facing charges of child molestation he was appointed as spiritual director to Fr Rubeo at that time, and he was convicted months later. However, his counselling role to Rubeo continued. (Family and Community Development Committee 2013c, 6). In addition to DN actors being placed in the roles of mentors and trainers, the Catholic psychologist trainees were sent to Ronald Conway, was also known to commit CSA against patients during therapy sessions (BRA ndak). These examples evidence how transferring known clergy perpetrators of CSA to roles which facilitated further clergy CSA supported DN resilience. Additionally, the data shows that grey network actors further supported DN resilience by protecting DN actors by silencing complaints of clergy CSA.

5.7 Maintaining silence - Covering up/protecting perpetrators

As stated in the literature review, victims of clergy CSA were kept silent through the imposition of clericalism and threats of or infliction of physical abuse. Victims who did report clergy CSA to their parents or another clergy were often berated and sometimes physically beaten for lying about a priest or Brother. Andrew Collins was a victim of Br Toomey. When Collins went home and told his parents that Toomey had sexually abused him his mother called him a liar and refused to believe that Toomey could do anything like that (RCICA 2015b, 59). Collins was also beaten and grounded by his parents (RCICA 2015b, 60). This in turn silenced most victims. The data shows that in cases where victims were believed by their parents, the parents’ complaints were ignored, or the parents were berated by clergy in a similar manner.

When Fr Fasciale assaulted two sisters, during home visits. When the family complained to Fasciale’s superior in Geelong, Fr O'Regan the family was asked to remain silent to protect the reputation of the priesthood (BRA 2017p; RCICA 2015d, 20). When Fasciale died, church leaders, including George Pell, gave this perpetrator of CSA a grand funeral, demonstrating the church’s high regard for this priest (BRA 2017p).
Bishop Connors was questioned at the RCICA, in regard to the Catholic church’s view on CSA. Connors stated that the Catholic Church had a culture of keeping things as in-house and private as they could when there were allegations of CSA (RCICA 2015i, 7). The CSA committed against Paul Hersbach and his brother, father and uncle has been discussed previously (RCICA 2014, 52). It is the way the Catholic church responded to Hersbach’s complaint which provides further explanation of the silencing of victims.

After disclosing clergy CSA, complainants were pressured to see a psychiatrist on the Catholic Church payroll. They also had to see Mr Peter O'Callaghan, QC who had been appointed by Archbishop Pell to receive and adjudicate on any complaints about CSA by Melbourne diocesan clergy (RCICA 2014, 57). Paul Hersbach provided the following comment in regard to the process of having his complaint heard:

About six weeks after my meeting with Mr O'Callaghan I received a letter from him dated 20 April 2006. In the letter Mr O'Callaghan said that based on my memory there did not seem to be much point in taking my matter to the police and that if I did go to the police, he would not be able to take any further steps in relation to my case until the police matter was completed. The letter also said that on the assumption that I would not go to the police Mr O'Callaghan was satisfied that I was a victim of CSA by Fr Rubeo and that he referred me to the Compensation Panel. (RCICA 2014, 58)

This system of dealing with complaints internally was consistently used in the Melbourne Response set up by Archbishop George Pell. There are obvious issues where the party being investigated investigates itself. Added to this is the ethical issue of accepting complaints on the proviso that complaints end there and do not go to the police for further investigation. Furthermore, the Catholic church frequently minimised clergy CSA by referring to occurrences of clergy CSA as a problem requiring treatment not a criminal offence or as something that was not particularly harmful to children (Pratt 2005, 263). The focus was on minimising apparent indications of grooming and committing CSA against children. An example of this is present in the following testimony of George Pell at the RCICA.
5.8 Church minimisation and denial of the occurrence of clergy CSA

At the RCICA, Cardinal George Pell was questioned regarding the response to Br Dowlan’s inappropriate behaviour towards children. Pell was questioned regarding the time when he was living at St Alipius presbytery and working as assistant priest in the Parish of Ballarat East from 1973-1983 (RCICA 2016b, 50, line 47). The following testimony by Pell provides examples of how clergy CSA was minimised through terminology such as ‘infraction’ and ‘harmless’ when referring to the occurrence of CSA.

Q. When you were assistant priest from 1973 onwards, did anyone come to you - by anyone, I mean priest, parishioner, parent, child - with gossip, innuendo, rumours, complaints about any of those Brothers?
A. There was talk about the eccentricity of Brother, is it Fitzgerald?
Q. Yes.
A. But there were no specific accusations.
Q. What was it about the Brother that showed him to be eccentric?
A. I think he used to - it's alleged he'd - when some of the boys were leaving he'd give them a kiss. He was very strange, old-fashioned, but a good teacher; there were things like that (RCICA 2016b, 53).
Q. At the time, did you see him kissing the children as sexualised behaviour?
A. No, it was common knowledge, and the general conviction was, it was harmless enough.
Q. It was merely showing affection to the children; is that how it was thought?
A. Yes, he was an older man and it was - I remember it being discussed and mentioned to me, and people were aware of it and they weren't insisting that anything be done (RCICA 2016b, 54).
Q. What did you hear about Dowlan?
A. I heard that there were problems at St Pat's College.
Q. What sort of problems?
A. Unspecified, but harsh discipline and possibly other infractions also.
Q. When you say, "possibly other infractions", you mean of a sexual nature?
A. I do (RCICA 2016, 56).
Another example of minimising the occurrence of CSA was apparent when Br Frank Keating’s barrister told the Melbourne County Court that Keating was "not a real paedophile" because Keating had a ten-year heterosexual relationship with a woman (BRA ndy, para 18). The data evidences examples of extending the minimisation of clergy CSA to outright denials, as was the case with the following victim of clergy CSA. BAB describes the response he received to disclosing this abuse:

About three months after the CSA occurred, we had a visiting priest come to St Alipius to hear confession. I don’t recall this priest's name, but I thought this would be my opportunity to say what had happened. During the confession the priest asked me, 'and what are your sins?' The first thing I said was, 'Well, Br Fitzgerald has done things to me'. I remember, there was silence for about 30 seconds and then the priest said, 'That didn't happen'. When he said that, I realised that was going to be the position and there was no point in me telling anyone else. (RCICA 2015a, 61)

The DN was not only supported by grey network actors through minimising and denying the occurrence of clergy CSA, but the data evidences inaction on the part of Catholic laity grey network actors being equally complicit in covering up clergy CSA. At Gladstone Park, Fr Baker became friendly with a family who had a son. As described earlier, Baker sexually abused this boy on trips away and in the boy’s bedroom. The boy’s father complained about Baker to the chairman of the parish school board, magistrate Brian Cosgriff (BRA nda). Cosgriff consulted another Catholic layman and barrister, Brendan Murphy. Rather than notify police, they only notified Archbishop Frank Little (BRA nda). The family was visited by then Archbishop Little’s secretary, Monsignor Connors, who placated the family so that the complaint remained a secret (BRA nda).

Despite the Catholic Church’s attempts to silence and cover-up clergy CSA some individuals spoke up against clergy CSA. These individuals experienced harsh intimidation tactics and backlash from members of the Catholic Church. Some examples of individuals who attempted to advocate for victims and put a stop to CSA
are outlined below. The data shows an apparent dichotomy in the treatment of those who covered-up clergy CSA opposed to those who attempted to expose it.

5.9 Whistle-blowers

Denis Ryan, a former police officer with Victoria police, while stationed at Mildura between 1962 and 1972 became aware of CSA occurring in the parish (RCICA 2016, 10, line 40). In 1971, Ryan received a phone call from the headmaster of St Joseph’s College in Mildura, John Howden. Howden requested that Ryan come to see him without letting Ryan’s Detective Sergeant know that he had called (RCICA 2016, 10, line 41). Howden told Ryan that he had received a complaint from a parent that Monsignor Day had committed CSA against her daughter (RCICA 2016, 10, 42). Ryan obtained statements from five current or former students of St Joseph’s College or Sacred Heart Primary School in Mildura. All five victims provided a statement alleging that Day had sexually abused them as children (RCICA 2015h, 10). Ryan presented this evidence to his superiors and received the following response:

Inspector Irwin and Detective Sergeant Barritt interviewed Day on 10 November 1971. Day denied all the allegations. A report from Inspector Irwin to the Superintendent about this interview recommended that no further police action be taken. Inspector Irwin quoted a case concerning bestiality from 1844 that ‘it is monstrous to put a man on his trial after such a lapse of time. How can he account for his conduct so far back? … No man’s life would be safe if such a prosecution were permitted. It would be very unjust to put him on trial. (RCICA 2016, 11)

Ryan was warned in early December 1971, by a Mildura priest, Fr Taffe to “Drop the inquiry into Monsignor Day or you’ll be out of a job” (RCICA 2015h, 11). On 10 December 1971, Ryan and Howden wrote a letter to Bishop Mulkearns detailing allegations of the seven complainants who had made statements and requested a meeting with the Bishop (RCICA 2015h, 11). Mulkearns responded that he had been assured that the police had investigated the accusations and satisfied themselves that there was no substance to the charges (RCICA 2016, 12; 50). He also wrote, “With
regard to the question of moving Monsignor Day from the Parish of Mildura, this is clearly impossible under the circumstances as any such move would be tantamount to a public declaration that I consider him guilty” (RCICA 2016, 12; 51-52). Mulkearns informed Taffe that he had been appointed assistant priest of Port Fairy and expressed his gratitude to Taffe for his “co-operation in handling the difficult situation which arose in Mildura” (RCICA 2016, 14; 59). In contrast, Ryan was instructed to apply for a transfer from Mildura. Ryan did not want to leave Mildura, so he submitted his resignation from the Victoria Police in April 1972 (RCICA 2016, 16; 65).

Similarly, teachers Carmel Rafferty and Pam Krstic lost their teaching careers as they were excluded from further teaching posts in the Catholic education system (Family and Community Development Committee 2013b, 5; Rafferty 2012; Lawther n.d., 30). Similarly, a previous principal and another teacher at this school who had objected to Searson's CSA, also lost their careers for speaking out (Family and Community Development Committee 2013b, 5). As parish priests employed the principal and all school staff (RCICA 2015f, 13), this highlights the challenges faced by employees of Catholic schools when reporting CSA and demanding something be done about clergy committing CSA.

Physical abuse was also used to silence complaints of clergy CSA. As the following example shows. In 1969, Paul was a student at St Alipius in Ballarat in Br Gerald Fitzgerald's Grade 3 class. Br Best, the school principal, also teaching Grade 6, called Paul to his office.

Paul was aware of Br Best's fondness for belting the boys; the nervous child entered and was told by Best, "It's all right. Just want to talk to you" (BRA 2017). Best then sexually penetrated the boy. Soon afterwards, Paul told his own class teacher, Fitzgerald, what Best had done. Fitzgerald responded by hitting him and then asked the boy again what happened, and when Paul repeated the claim he was struck again. After being asked a third time, Paul replied: "Nothing happened" (BRA 2017). Paul could not bring himself to tell his parents, so he approached a Catholic priest who responded with a "backhander" and
threatened his life, saying: “If you tell anyone what happened I will f***ing kill you”. (BRA 2017)

The data shows further examples of the use of physical abuse to silence complaints of CSA. When the student representative of council made a formal complaint to the headmaster of St Patrick’s, Br Nangle, the student representative council was disbanded. The student who made the complaint “was taken down to the back of the school and was viciously beaten by Brs Dowlan and Rowe” (RCICA 2015b, 22). The data provides evidence of grey network actors deliberately acting to cover-up clergy CSA though this is framed as occurring in the context of protecting the Catholic Church. However, the data does evidence that some grey network actors had motivations beyond protecting the Church.

Reasons for the culture of hierarchical deceit about clergy perpetrators of CSA include that some “Bishops have been involved in sexual crime or sexually predatory behaviour and that Bishops are part of a network which operate for institutional and personal advancement” (Family and Community Development Committee 2013d, 2). At the VPI, Sipe explains, "Sexual activity between an older priest and an adult seminarian or young priest sets up a pattern of institutional secrecy. When one of the parties rises to a position of power, his friends are in line also for recommendations and advancement” (Family and Community Development Committee 2013d, 2).

5.10 Conclusion

This chapter has provided representative examples from the data to demonstrate themes apparent in the data. The analysis chapters 6, 7 and 8 will utilise the data examples to further examine and discuss these apparent themes in relation to demonstrating the operation of a DN. Further examples and more detailed data regarding individual clergy perpetrators of CSA are provided in Appendix 1. The chapter began by evidencing ties between clergy perpetrators of CSA to show that rather than committing CSA on an individual level these DN actors are connected on an organisational level. Furthermore, the data shows that these ties are utilised to support and share DN resources with fellow DN actors. DN resources include sharing victims with strong and weak DN actor ties and sharing knowledge for the facilitation
of CSA, apparent in the common patterns for committing CSA. Similarly, the data evidences common patterns for silencing victims. The role of the grey network of the Victorian Catholic Church in facilitating clergy CSA has been well documented though is further evidenced here to demonstrate how the grey network’s response to clergy CSA serves as a DN resource. The exploitation of the light and grey networks by the DN will be further examined in the following analysis chapters 7 and 8.
ANALYSIS CHAPTERS

6.1 Introduction

The following chapters aim to contribute to explaining how Catholic clergy perpetrators of CSA in Victoria functioned as a DN and how this DN facilitated and sustained clergy CSA for decades. The first analysis chapter examines the geographical placement of and ties between, known clergy perpetrators in Catholic institutions in Victoria. The data shows clergy perpetrators working and offending at the same institution, resulting in clusters of clergy perpetrators at one institution. These clusters are the result of either sequential or simultaneous placements of clergy at particular institutions. Examples of clergy perpetrators as solitary actors at an institution are also apparent. The significance of these various placements in the context of a DN, will be analysed in this chapter. It will be shown that the geographic placement of actors and the types of ties, shows similarities and contextual differences to DNs in the literature. It will be evidenced that the strategic placement of DN actors supported clergy DN resilience. Different types of ties will be focussed on to evidence connections on a broader network level, and in the context of ties between individual actors.

SNA can be used to interpret patterns of ties between DN actors including affiliation, resources, social and physical mobility (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 18; McGloin and Kirk 2010; de Nooy, Mrvar and Batagelj 2005, 5). The main purpose of SNA is to identify ties between actors and analyse how these ties are used in relation to the operation of a network (van der Hulst 2011). The second analysis chapter 7 extends on this by discussing the types of DN resources relevant to a DN of clergy perpetrators of CSA and how ties are used to share DN resources.

Having demonstrated that clergy perpetrators are connected in the form of a DN, specific examples of resource sharing between linked DN actors shows the operational strategies utilised by DN actors. Resources can be material and non-material (Granovetter 1973), and, in this context, resources include victims, victim information and shared methods used by clergy perpetrators to groom and offend.
against victims; therefore, further evidencing the operation of a DN utilising ties to facilitate CSA (Everton 2012, 17). The analysis in this chapter also shows that DN actors co-opted light network attributes of the Catholic Church to support the methods used to commit CSA and to remain covert. Clergy have a unique level of access to children due to their clerical roles, which allow unsupervised contact with children (Calkins et al. 2015, 580; RCICA 2017b, 625). Most priests agree that clergy CSA occurred in an environment of the light network attribute of clericalism, imposed by the highest authority which they felt powerless to confront (Power 2014, 4). The view that clericalism contributed to clergy perpetrated CSA is widely supported in research (Appleby 2002, 13; Berry 1992 cited in Doubleday, Wiley and Bottoms 2013; Cozzens 2004; Doyle 2003; Frawley-O'Dea 2007; Lane 2010; Robinson 2007; Seasoltz 2010). The ways in which clericalism and the institutional setting of the Catholic Church were used by clergy perpetrators to commit CSA is evidenced in the analysis in Chapter 7. This strategy of co-opting light network attributes is similarly apparent in an analysis of ways the DN co-opted grey network attributes to facilitate continued clergy CSA.

The third and final analysis chapter 8, analyses how grey network actors, consisting predominantly of Catholic clergy hierarchy, facilitated further clergy CSA. This was done through prioritising protection of the Catholic Church over victims of clergy CSA. This has been documented in the RCICA (2012-2017) and the VPI (2012-2013), though in the context of this thesis, grey network responses to clergy CSA served as and were utilised by DN actors as a DN resource. As stated by Weinhold (2009, 534), a desire to protect clergy privilege and power portrays clerical narcissism, which translated into protection of clergy perpetrators rather than the victim (Gardner 2012, 107). Additionally, this veneer of respectability led to an inability to accept opposition or fault by clergy which was often mirrored by the laity in an unwillingness to believe victims of clergy CSA (Robinson 2007; Gavrielides 2013, 625).

The grey network significantly aided in the cover-up of clergy CSA and protecting DN actors through transferring known clergy perpetrators to new parishes and, therefore, new victims. There is evidence that the motivations for silencing whistle-blowers may have extended beyond a motivation to protect the Catholic Church to a desire to
protect individual grey network clergy who may have broken vows in non-secular ways, such as being in sexual relationships with consenting adults. Complaints of clergy CSA to grey network actors, Bishops, were responded to by denial and minimisation of the complaint. This response served as a DN resource as DN actors were further supported by the grey network’s silencing of complaints of clergy CSA and by the harsh treatment and silencing of whistle-blowers.

In summary, the analysis begins by showing that ties between clergy perpetrators of CSA in the Victorian Catholic Church evidence a DN. How different types of ties were used to facilitate CSA and support DN resilience evidences the operation of a DN. Additionally, analysis of the types of DN resources shared between DN actors and how light network attributes of the Catholic Church were co-opted, demonstrates the operational strategies of the DN. Finally, it will be shown that the illicit activity of the DN of clergy perpetrators was protected and supported by the grey network. The grey network was an important DN resource, as repeated transferring of known clergy perpetrators of CSA significantly contributed to the resilience of the DN.
Chapter 6 Analysis: Dark network Clusters, Strong Ties and Weak Ties

This chapter focusses on evidencing the existence of a network of known Catholic clergy perpetrators of CSA in Victoria. The network map (see Appendix 2) provides a visual representation of this. The structure of a network regarding how DN actors are connected reflects the patterns of interaction between actors, and the use of DN actor ties to share DN resources (Cunningham, Everton and Murphy 2016, 14). Transfers of clergy are the responsibility of Bishops. This will be discussed in Chapter 8 regarding the grey network serving as a DN resource. The focus in this chapter is the structure of the DN and how this benefits the operation of a DN.

Of the 322 Catholic institutions in Victoria (Catholic Australia 2018), clergy perpetrators of CSA were present at 105 of these institutions. Of these 105 institutions, there were clusters of clergy perpetrators of CSA present at 16 institutions. Known clergy perpetrators were geographically placed at a limited number of institutions. This demonstrates that despite having many available transfer options, known clergy perpetrators were transferred to a relatively select few institutions. Clusters of actors are unified DN subgroups which benefit from solidarity, shared norms, trust and collective behaviour (de Nooy, Mrvar and Batagelj 2005, 61; Everton 2012, 23). When conducting SNA, it is rare that actors are located randomly throughout the network. It is more typical for actors to be clustered in distinct subgroups (Everton 2012, 13). This is particularly apparent regarding DN clusters of clergy perpetrators.

6.2 Dark network clusters

The 16 cluster graphs in Appendix 3, provide examples of single Victorian Catholic institutions which had more than two clergy perpetrators of CSA present. In some examples, this occurs simultaneously where more than one clergy perpetrator of CSA has committed CSA at the same institution at the same time as other clergy perpetrators of CSA. In other examples, the clusters demonstrate sequential placement of clergy perpetrators of CSA at the same institution. In some of the
clusters, the sequential placement of clergy perpetrators of CSA occurs within a short time frame, and in other clusters, there are various intervals between these sequential placements such as in clusters 15 and 16. The following data analysis shows that DN actors belonging to clusters shared strong ties. Strong ties were used to facilitate CSA through mutual support of offending and sharing DN resources. In larger networks, clusters of DN actors with strong ties contribute to the efficiency of the DN (Demiroz and Kapucu 2012, 274). As the DN being analysed here is extensive, clusters and strong ties are an important part of the DN structure.

6.2.1 The importance of clusters with strong ties

The repeated and purposeful placement of clergy perpetrators of CSA in certain parishes resulted in clusters of clergy perpetrators with strong ties. Actors are connected by these ties and use these to transfer or share network resources and to protect other actors in the DN (Cunningham, Everton and Murphy 2016, 13). Referring back to the theory chapter 3, cluster actors on a broader level are connected by shared attributes which are characteristics of individual actors or of the group (Scott 2013, 3). Everton (2016) argues that religious beliefs and socio-political factors will contribute to groups being drawn together and limit ties to outsiders. Similar to police corruption networks, these shared attributes include an overarching culture of secrecy and a common affiliation within an institution (Demiroz and Kapucu 2012, 272; White and Terry 2008, 675). DN actors in the context of the DN being analysed here, were also connected by a shared desire to commit CSA. As in online paedophile DNs, DN actors provide each other with social reinforcement, mutual support and justifications for committing CSA (Bourke and Hernandez 2009, 190; Holt, Blevins and Burkert 2010, 20; Harkins and Dixon 2010, 91). These characteristics were similarly present in a DN cluster of clergy perpetrators of CSA.

In addition to these ties, DN actors in clusters have a closer connection, or strong tie, through their geographic placement. Strong ties are shared amongst actors who move in the same circles, such as in clusters, and provide support for actors within a cluster (Cunningham 2016, 14; Onnela et al. 2007). It should be noted that the clusters
identified here vary in student numbers and clergy on staff. Data was difficult to obtain in regard to exact student numbers and the number of clergy on staff at each institution in relation to the years of offending being examined. St Alipius provides an example of a cluster where student numbers were quite low and 4 of the 5 staff were perpetrating CSA during 1970-1971. In this cluster example it is clear that these clergy perpetrators had close connections and the advantage of being able to cover for other DN actors. Other clusters had greater student numbers and there was likely a greater proportion of lay teachers and non offending clergy. However, clusters 5 and 7 are high schools with a greater number of students and staff and both clusters maintained a consistent and sometimes sequential presence of DN actors for decades. Therefore, this highlights that despite these DN actors having a higher risk of detection due to being outnumbered by non-offending staff, they were able to continue their CSA. This raises further key points.

As shown in data Chapter 5 and discussed later in Chapter 7, multiple DN cluster actors were in the role of dormitory master and DN actors often had sleeping quarters at the institution (McAlinden 2012, 148; BRA 2016ac; BRA 2013). In a larger school environment, it could be argued that DN actors may have less opportunities through close connections to provide strong support for other DN actors. However, these DN actors were closely connected through living arrangements and therefore had ample opportunity to support one another. In addition to this, the presence of clusters in an environment where there is a perceivable higher risk of detection, highlights the confidence DN actors had in silencing victims, witnesses and the overarching protection of the grey network. This confidence is validated by the fact that they continued to commit CSA for decades without repercussion. Therefore, whether the cluster is present in a smaller school with a higher ratio of DN actors or a larger school with a smaller ratio of DN actors, this did not interfere with DN actors continued offending. Strong connections between DN actors in larger institutions are also apparent through evidence of victim sharing between DN actors in larger institutions (BRA 2014b; RCICA 2015e, 39). Identification of clusters and, therefore, actors with the strongest ties provides greater quality information regarding resource sharing and is a valuable tool for disrupting networks (Schwartz and Rouselle 2009, 203-204).
Identifying clusters of DN actors is a focus of SNA. These unified groups have strong and immediate ties, shared norms, trust and collective behaviour (de Nooy, Mrvar and Batagelj 2005, 61; Everton 2012, 23). DNs create their own set of norms wherein illicit activities are normalised through social reinforcement of other DN actors (Lauchs, Keast and Yousefpour 2011, 112; Granovetter 1992, 45). However, if illicit activities were truly normalised, then DN actors would not be compelled to hide these activities. Therefore, it is more accurate to state that this normalisation of illicit activity was limited to within the DN, and there was a full awareness that this illicit activity was not normal outside of the DN. Cluster actors use their strong ties to provide strong emotional and material support for illicit activity and, therefore, reduce risk of detection (de Nooy, Mrvar and Batagelj 2005, 61; Everton 2012, 23; Cunningham, Everton and Murphy 2016, 14). A further benefit to DN actors within a cluster is that they can conduct illicit activities together (Xu and Chen 2008). This means that cluster actors do not need to risk exposure by seeking DN resources outside of the safety of their cluster.

Not all DN research refers to or focuses on clusters. Drug smuggling DNs are operated by smaller interactive groups, each specialising in a stage of the operation (Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004, 91). SNA of police corruption networks discusses different groups within the network carrying out various illicit activities (Lauchs, Keast and Yousefpour 2011). This highlights the different characteristics between various types of DNs. Research on a variety of DNs in various contexts shows that DNs do not operate in the same ways (Cunningham, Everton and Murphy 2016, 294).

The importance of clusters and strong ties is apparent in Krebs’ (2002) SNA of the September 11 terrorist network. In this DN, the hijackers were broken into clusters and each cluster contained one pilot. The benefit of this network formation is that if one cluster is detected by authorities, only that cluster is at risk. In this thesis it is evident that the detection of a clergy perpetrator in a cluster did not result in the cluster being dismantled. It will be demonstrated that risk to that cluster was dealt with by transferring that actor out of the cluster, protecting the cluster rather than individual actor.
The failure to meaningfully detect and disrupt clusters of clergy perpetrators may be, in part, due to the belief that clergy CSA was committed by a few bad apples (White and Terry 2008, 662), and the possibility of clergy committing CSA in clusters was not adequately considered. In addition, Bishops were instructed by the Pope to maintain absolute secrecy of complaints of clergy CSA, under the *Crimen Sollicitationis*, which dates back to 1922 (Scorer 2014, 58; Robertson 2010, 6)). Therefore, detection of one DN actor did not put the cluster at risk as the focus was on the one known clergy perpetrator of CSA subject to complaint. Moreover, the clergy perpetrator subject to complaint was rarely at risk either. This was due to the protection of the DN by fellow clergy perpetrators, which will be demonstrated in the following analysis Chapter 7. Therefore, clergy DN clusters faced comparatively less risk of detection by civil authorities compared to DN clusters in other contexts. This is largely due to the response to clergy CSA by the grey network which will be discussed further in Chapter 8.

### 6.2.2 Overview of clusters of Catholic clergy perpetrators in Victoria

As is the case for researching DNs generally, data was limited to what was known and does not include clergy CSA not disclosed, reported or documented. Therefore, it is important to note that the data included in this research only represents a portion of clergy CSA cases. Despite this limitation, entering the data into a network mapping software program evidenced 16 clusters of clergy perpetrators of CSA working and offending in Catholic institutions in Victoria. The clusters were formulated based on longitudinal data covering over six decades (1939-2001). These clusters showed the presence of DN actors, clergy perpetrators of CSA, over extended periods of times and illustrated clergy DN actor movement in and out of clusters over this period. As is shown below, for some clusters there was a simultaneous presence of DN actors, others show the sequential presence of DN actors while others show a combination of sequential and simultaneous presence of DN actors at a specific institution.

Cluster 1 shows that in 1971, at St Alipius in Ballarat, four clergy perpetrators of CSA worked and offended at this school simultaneously (RCICA 2016, 4). These four, now
convicted, perpetrators of clergy CSA also lived together in the presbytery. This demonstrates very strong ties of kinship and support (Family and Community Development Committee 2012, 3). As stated by Schein (2004), closer ties may be due to working in close proximity to other DN actors. These strong ties provide mutual confiding and reciprocation and foster trust between actors (Cunningham, Everton and Murphy 2016 14; Granovetter 1982, 1973, 1362). These strong ties enable support for each other’s offending through covering up for each other, sharing and also silencing victims. As mentioned previously, the focus for this chapter is on identifying the ties between DN actors. Analysis and examples of how DN actors used these strong ties and other types of ties, to facilitate CSA is provided in the following chapter 7. In cluster 1, in addition to showing the simultaneous presence of four clergy perpetrators of CSA in 1971, there were also three clergy perpetrators of CSA present in 1973.

Table 6.1: Cluster 1

Although not included in the above graph, Cardinal George Pell, while working as assistant priest in the parish of Ballarat East was also living at St Alipius presbytery from 1973-1983 (RCICA 2016b, 50, line 47). Pell has recently been charged and convicted of multiple offences of CSA committed in Victoria (Davey 2018, Dreher 2018). Pell being convicted is significant in highlighting the extent of clergy CSA as he became the third highest ranking official in the Catholic Church, and the highest-ranking Vatican official to be charged and convicted of clergy CSA (Griffith 2018; Crowe 2018). Further to this, in the final analysis chapter 8, it will be shown that Pell
also belonged to the grey network of clergy CSA. Pell provides an example of a cleric who belonged to both the dark and grey networks. This places him in a strategically powerful network position regarding facilitating and covering up clergy CSA and for protection of the grey and DNs. Grey network actors are analysed in Chapter 8 regarding how their response to clergy CSA served as a DN resource.

As the graphs show, clergy perpetrators were not always working and offending in a parish simultaneously, though it is apparent that these perpetrators were placed sequentially in many cases. When one clergy perpetrator became problematic regarding complaints of CSA, they were often transferred to another parish (Shaw 2008). Furthermore, the data demonstrates that they were frequently replaced by another clergy perpetrator of CSA. This sequential replacement of clergy perpetrators of CSA exemplifies how a DN responds to disruptions to the network and re-establishes its structure (Bakker, Raab and Milward 2012, 35). Disruption of a DN involves removing ties so that DN resources cannot be shared (Duijn, Kashirin and Sloot 2014, 5). Therefore, replacing lost ties with another tie renews this tie and the DN structure. An example of this sequential replacement of clergy perpetrators is apparent in cluster 3, where Br McGee is transferred in 1944 and is replaced by Br Eastmure in the same year. The replacement of DN actors with another DN actors is crucial to DN resilience. If DNs are not able to replace actors, this effectively reduces the network’s potential access to existing and new resources and the DN will cease to exist (Bakker, Raab and Milward 2012, 51). Several of the cluster graphs show a combination of sequential and simultaneous placement of clergy perpetrators.

Cluster 2 (see Table 6.2, Appendix 3), extends over a period of 43 years, during the period of 1966-1990 there is sequential placement and a consistent presence of clergy DN actors at this institution. The graph also illustrates the presence of multiple clergy perpetrators being present at the same time. In 1969-1970, 1976-1979, 1986-1988 there were two clergy perpetrators present, and in 1982 there were three clergy perpetrators present and in 1983 there were four clergy perpetrators present simultaneously. This consistent presence of clergy perpetrators demonstrates the DNs ability to replace DN actors and, therefore, maintain DN resilience. The fairly
constant presence of clergy DN actors at this institution is testament to the resilience of this cluster.

Table 6.2: Cluster 2

As is a common limitation when studying DNs, cluster data was not always based on precise dates and, therefore, can only show overlapping years (Rostamin and Mondani 2015, 4; Ouellet, Boivin, Leclerc and Morselli 2013). Narrowing this data to specific days or months may reveal sequential rather than simultaneous placement as one clergy perpetrator may have been transferred mid-year and another may have started the following month. Despite the lack of precision in dates, the results are significant as the timing of these placements illustrate a consistent presence of clergy perpetrators at this institution. Therefore, demonstrating clergy DN actors being placed at institutions where they had support for CSA offending through the strong ties present in clusters.

The data showed that some DN actors belonging to clusters were transferred to another institution and later returned to the same cluster. In clusters 1 and 2 there were three perpetrators in each who worked and offended at their respective parish for a period, were transferred to another parish and subsequently returned to the same parish at a later date. In cluster 1, Klep, Aulsebrook and Fox and in Cluster 2, Eastmure, McGee and Hackett were all returned to parishes where they had previously committed CSA. Returning clergy DN actors to clusters with strong ties
provided these DN actors with strong support from fellow clergy perpetrators. Moreover, these transfers also represented DN actors with strong ties being transferred to an institution where they became a weak DN tie. As discussed in the theory chapter 3, weak ties have the ability to access DN resources beyond what can be accessed from their strong ties and can form bridges that tie clusters of actors together (Granovetter 1973, 1983; Stark 2007; Everton and Cunningham 2013, 98). Therefore, changing the type of DN actor tie from strong to weak back to strong, serves to renew DN resources within the original cluster the DN actor belonged to. This strategy is also present in other clergy DN clusters.

St Augustine’s in Geelong, cluster 3 (see Table 6.3), had a procession of clergy perpetrators of CSA. The following chronology covering four decades demonstrates a successive presence of clergy perpetrators of CSA and clusters of perpetrators at this institution. Br McGee worked and committed CSA between 1939-44 and 1951-54 (BRA 2016l), Br Eastmure between 1944-45 and 1954-62 (BRA ndl). Interestingly, these dates also demonstrate clergy perpetrators of CSA being transferred to other parishes and returning in later years to the same cluster. As discussed above, this movement of clergy perpetrators out of clusters as a DN strategy to protect other DN cluster actors was apparent here. However, additionally, these same DN actors were being transferred back to the same cluster years later, significant time had passed since complaints may have been made. Not only were some DN actors returned to clusters, some of these were returned to promoted roles, which placed them in a position to better protect that cluster. These promotions were a function of the grey network, which will be discussed in Chapter 8. Of significance to this analysis is how these promotions of known clergy perpetrators were a powerful DN resource.

In DNs, actor cooperation is rewarded through the transfer of resources (Milward et al. 2006, 350), which may be material and/or non-material. Being promoted into a more senior position provides the non-material DN resources of social and physical mobility and, influence (Wasserman and Faust 1994; McGloin and Kirk 2010, Granovetter 1973). A further example of this is Br Hackett, who worked and offended at St Augustine’s between 1957-59 and returned as the superintendent there between
1967-69 (BRA nds). Another perpetrator, Br Webster, preceded Hackett as superintendent between 1954-59 (BRA 2011b). Other clergy perpetrators working successively at St Augustine’s, cluster 3 (see Table 6.3), included Br Jordan in the early 60s (BRA 2016i), Br Thomas in 1969 (BRA 2016z), Br Houston from 1969-70 (BRA 2016g) and Br Alford was in charge of the dormitory from 1970-78 (BRA nd). Notably, between 1954 and 1959, Eastmure and Webster worked at this institution simultaneously. Hackett was also at this institution for three years during this period. Therefore, over this period there were three clergy perpetrators of CSA present at this institution, one of which, Webster, was the superintendent or principal, of the institution. In 1967, Hackett, became superintendent.

The fact that clergy perpetrators were in the role of principal meant that the person CSA complaints would be made to was also a clergy DN actor and in a position to silence or cover-up complaints and, therefore, protect the DN cluster and the DN more broadly. This reflects a particularly powerful position in the cluster and the DN as the ability to silence CSA complaints made this cluster a safe place to commit CSA. As the Catholic Church was already a closed system with little outside oversight (Keenan 2013), placing DN actors in the role of principal or superintendent further imbedded the inability of victims to complain about clergy CSA and consequently protected the DN.

Further examples of a combination of sequential and simultaneous placement of DN actors was present in the following clusters:

- Cluster 4. In 1961-1964, and 1971-1974, 2 perpetrators were present simultaneously, and 3 perpetrators were placed at this institution between 1970-79.

- Cluster 5. In 1956-1972, 2 perpetrators were present simultaneously. In 1961-1963, and in 1964-1966, 3 perpetrators were present simultaneously.

- Cluster 6. 2 perpetrators were present sequentially and were present simultaneously from 1984-1986.

- Cluster 7. In 1978, there was 3 perpetrators present simultaneously. In 1979, 2 perpetrators were present simultaneously, and there was a fairly sequential placement of clergy perpetrators between 1962-1983.

- Cluster 8. In 1961-1962 and 1971-1972, 2 perpetrators were present simultaneously. In this cluster there is a three- to four-year gap between 1967-1970, where there were no known clergy perpetrators present at this institution.

- Cluster 9. In 1971, 1975, 1977, 1978 and 1980-81, 2 perpetrators were present simultaneously. In 1976, 3 perpetrators were present simultaneously. Between 1970 and 1985 there was a consistent presence of known clergy perpetrators of CSA.
In some of the clusters the placement of clergy perpetrators was separated by several years, and simultaneous presence of clergy perpetrators was for small periods of time or no overlap in presence. As mentioned previously, the available data relies on years rather than specific days and months clergy were transferred to an institution. Therefore, an overlap of a year may represent anywhere from one month of simultaneous placement up to a year. Graphs representing examples of these clusters, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 can be found in Appendix 3.

The cluster graphs illustrate that the sequential placement of clergy perpetrators was apparent in the 16 clusters represented in the network map. These placements were not always immediately sequential though several parishes were victim to decades of sequential placements of clergy perpetrators of CSA. The cluster graphs include known clergy perpetrators from these parishes though in some cases specific dates of offending or of placement were not available in the data set. Therefore, where one clergy perpetrator was transferred from a parish in 1970, for example, and another arrived in 1970, it is not known whether there was an overlap in the time both clergymen were at this parish. As stated above, in cluster 1, the data showed that four clergy perpetrators were working and offending at this institution during 1971; therefore, in this example the simultaneous placement and offending was clear.

Despite the inability to produce graphs based on precise dates, it is apparent that a disproportionate number of clergy perpetrators of CSA were transferred to certain institutions or parishes, 16 of the 105 in the boundaries of this data and 16 of the 322 Catholic parishes in Victoria (Catholic Australia 2018). The seemingly selective transferring of known clergy perpetrators lends support to the argument that clergy perpetrators were strategically transferred to institutions where there were or had been other clergy perpetrators. From a SNA perspective these actions portray the DN utilising strong ties present in clusters of perpetrators, to provide support for offending and provide a safe place to commit CSA.
However, strong and weak ties serve different but crucial roles in the maintenance and facilitation of a DN. Without these ties, actors within the DN would not have the support of other actors in the form of covering for one another and sharing resources. Additionally, as actors and resources move out of the clusters with strong ties, it is imperative that these actors and resources are replaced for the network to maintain a strong support system and renew resources.

6.3 The importance of clergy DN weak ties

It will be evidenced that the use of strong and weak ties to share DN resources were a key feature of clergy DN clusters. The data shows that the clergy DN actors shared victim information in regard to their vulnerability and actively protected each other’s covert offending and, therefore, protected the DN. The following paragraphs will discuss cross-institutional links or weak ties, between clergy perpetrators and how these ties were utilised to share resources to facilitate clergy CSA. The importance of strong ties in providing support and protection within cluster has been discussed. However, it is weak ties that provide reach and serve as sources of new information and resources (Levin and Cross 2004, 1480; Cunningham 2016, 14; Onnela et al. 2007).

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, of the 105 institutions included in the network map only 16 of these are classified as clusters. Therefore, there was a further 89 Catholic institutions which had between one and two known clergy perpetrators of CSA present. Clearly, clusters provided significant support for committing CSA through mutual trust, reinforcement and protection. However, it is also apparent that it was necessary to transfer clergy perpetrators in and out of clusters when they represented a risk to the DN by drawing unwanted attention via complaints of CSA. This is not to say that clergy perpetrators of CSA did not offend outside of these clusters. Solitary DN actors also committed prolific CSA utilising DN resources and the protection of the grey network through frequent transfers. As in the US cycling team doping network, network ties were only activated in times of vulnerability as remaining otherwise dormant maintained covertness (Bell, Ten Have and Lauchs 2016, 65). DN resilience
is an active process that involves balancing efficiency and security (Duijn, Kashirin and Sloot 2014, 7). Therefore, while a clergy perpetrator may be a valuable resource in a parish, if their CSA offending was drawing too much attention and posed a risk to the network they were transferred to a new parish and the issue was considered resolved by all stakeholders.

6.3.1 Clergy perpetrators utilising strong and weak ties strategically

Gannon exemplifies clergy perpetrators who were a part of a cluster of perpetrators but also committed CSA as a solitary perpetrator in several parishes and utilised weak ties to commit CSA. Gannon would visit cluster 11 on holidays (BRA ndaa), which provides an example of a DN actor maintaining ties with another cluster of perpetrators. Gannon’s visits to this cluster served a dual DN purpose. The strong ties in the cluster would provide support and protection for Gannon’s CSA, though as a weak tie, Gannon acted as a bridge to sourcing new information and resources (Levin and Cross 2004, 1480; Cunningham 2016, 14; Onnela et al. 2007). Gannon was not the only example of this cross-over between perpetrators belonging to a cluster with strong DN ties and also committing CSA as solitary perpetrators in other parishes, as a weak DN tie. Further examples include Frs Fox (BRA ndn), Claffey (BRA 2016a), Baker (BRA nda), Dowlan (BRA ndb), Best (BRA), Daniel (RCICA 2015c, 24), Day (RCICA 2015c, 8), Monk (BRA ndaa), Morey (BRA 2013a), O’Keefe (BRA ndac), Ridsdale (RCICA 2016,10), Rubeo (BRA 2012), Searson (Family and Community Development Committee 2012a, 14) and Br Howard (RCICA 2015c, 22).

This indicates a transferring of sources from clusters where these individuals received and provided strong support for CSA and were transferred to other DN institutions to extend network reach. Network actors who had committed CSA in a cluster were a valuable DN resource as they had acquired valuable knowledge and tools for the proliferation of clergy CSA. These actors could transfer these resources to new parishes to establish a new link to the DN of clergy perpetrators. Weak tie actors were not only very useful in acquiring new DN resources, they also extended DN reach so that DN resources reached a greater number of DN actors (Cunningham, Everton and Murphy 2016, 11; Granovetter 1973; Onnela et al. 2007).
Focusing on individual DN actors, some DN actors committed CSA at institutions where they were the only known DN actor. Additionally, they were also transferred to parishes where there were clusters of other known clergy perpetrators. Therefore, these perpetrators were part of multiple clusters at different times. In cluster 1, Fr Ridsdale, was also part of clusters 5, 9, 11 and 12. Similarly Frs Monk and Day (aka Monsignor Day) were actors in clusters 11 and 12. Br Edward Dowlan was one of the actors in clusters 1, 3, 4, 9 and 10. As these DN actors were prolific perpetrators, it can be reasonably argued that these DN actors were transferred out of clusters when subject to complaints of CSA but were returned to clusters where they could be better supported and protected through stronger ties.

The transfers of Fr Klep provide an example of this. When Klep was transferred back to "Rupertswood", Sunbury, cluster 2, in the role of principal, parents demanded Klep’s removal, but the Salesians refused (BRA 2017e). Eventually, after the parents threatened legal action, the Salesians sent Klep on a study trip to Rome and the United States (BRA 2017e). When Klep returned to Australia, Klep helped to train priests at Salesian Theological College in Oakleigh (BRA 2017e). It has been recognised by both the RCICA and the VPI that moving perpetrators after complaints were made was a common strategy of the Catholic Church in order to cover-up CSA. This strategy can be understood as a technique utilised to protect clergy DN clusters and, therefore, is a valuable DN resource. The literature does not show examples of this occurrence in other DN contexts. However, the strong support of DN actors, apparent in clusters is well evidenced (Cunningham, Everton and Murphy 2016, 14; Granovetter 1982, 1973, 1362; Aiello et al. 2012).
Fr Ridsdale and Br Dowlan’s movement between clusters with strong ties and institutions with weak ties to commit CSA is evidence of DN actors utilising strong and weak ties to commit CSA. Ridsdale was convicted of 54 sexual assaults against mostly boys plus several girls, aged between 6 and 16 years of age between 1961 and 1980 (BRA 2017k). Dowlan was charged with 64 offences against 23 boys (BRA ndb). These offences occurred in St Alipius, St Thomas More College, Forest Hill; St Patrick’s College, Ballarat and Cathedral College, East Melbourne (Family and Community Development Committee 2013, 22). The number of convictions for these 2 clergy perpetrators demonstrates the unfettered access they had to child victims as these figures do not include undisclosed CSA or charges without conviction. In the case of Dowlan, these convicted offences occurred across 7 Catholic institutions, 4 of which were DN clusters. These clergy perpetrators provide examples of utilising DN ties to access and share DN resources. The types of DN resources being used and how these were shared is analysed in the following analysis chapter 7 to evidence DN operation.

Of significance here is the fact that it is unlikely that this high rate of offending occurred without the knowledge and support through the covering up CSA by other clergy with whom they were residing and working, the Catholic hierarchy through transfers and some of the laity. This highlights not only the extent of the cover-up of clergy CSA but
also how this served as a significant DN resource which allowed these DN actors to commit CSA at multiple institutions against many victims and demonstrates the resilience of this DN.

**6.4 Structure of DN and resilience**

Understanding the structure of a network contributes to understanding how the network operates and maintains resilience. As stated previously, DN resilience is dependent on a DN's ability to replace actors and maintain network operationalisation when the DN is confronted with a threat of exposure (Bakker et al., 2012; Milward and Raab, 2006). Baran (1964) conducted research on network vulnerabilities based on structure. In doing so he ascertained that the star like network was obviously more vulnerable to attack and that the mesh like network was least vulnerable as removal of one node still maintained a connection between other nodes (Barabasi 2014, 145). Multiple smaller hubs or clusters would need to be removed simultaneously and not replaced to make the DN vulnerable as this would have the effect of centralising the DN. A centralised core makes a network much more vulnerable as there is a central point to attack (Cockbain, Brayley and Laycock 2011, 149). However not all networks are centralised (Morselli and Petit 2007). A decentralised network provides alternative links to network institutions and maintains network connections (Barabasi 2014, 144). The network map created from the data for this research (see Appendix 2) most closely resembles a decentralised network, which contributes to an explanation for the longevity or resilience of this DN.

The Victorian Catholic Church DN map in Appendix 2 is decentralised as there are multiple institutions, creating a loose structure and making the network less vulnerable. If one institution is removed from the network, the network can continue to function utilising alternative ties. These ties were established and maintained through the transfer of DN actors in and out of clusters with strong ties and institutions with weaker ties. Burcher and Whelan (2015, 104-105) found that applying SNA to the 'London Bombers’ could identify key actors and provide useful strategies for DN disruption. In small networks key actors are easily identified; in larger networks SNA can help identify key actors (Schwartz and Rouselle 2009, 188). However, in decentralised
networks targeting key actors rarely shuts down the network but, instead, causes further decentralisation, making key actors more difficult to target and, therefore, increases resilience (Brafman and Beckstrom 2006). Furthermore, attempts at disruption can make DNs stronger as they are likely to reorganise the structure and replace compromised DN actors to improve their resilience (Fielding 2017, 24). A similar occurrence is apparent in the example of the dark web drug site ‘Silk Road’ being disrupted and consequently shut down. Although this DN did not reorganise itself and continue operation, other individuals learned from the vulnerabilities of Silk Road, and multiple dark web drug sites emerged with improved DN resilience.

The decentralised structure of the network being analysed highlights the added DN resilience. It has been evidenced in previous paragraphs that the decentralised structure was utilised through transfers of clergy perpetrators in and out of institutions, to protect the DN. Network studies have found that DNs tend to be more decentralised as placing DN actors on the periphery of the DN protects them from detection (Tenti and Morselli 2014). Further to this it has been identified that central DN actors are not necessarily actors who hold powerful positions, as DN actors of high status often not apparent in network reconstructions (Agreste et al. 2016, 30). For example, although the Victorian Catholic Church is a decentralised network, clergy DN actors such as George Pell, who also belong to the grey network and hold powerful positions, do not appear in any of the clusters. Therefore, as in centralised networks, targeting the core or central actors is likely to be ineffective in disruption of this network.

6.5 Conclusion

In summary, this chapter began by evidencing the existence of a network of clergy perpetrators of CSA. This DN was present in the form of 16 clusters and also ties between 89 parishes. The strong ties between DN actors in clusters and weak ties with DN actors in isolated institutions showed that individual actors were not offending autonomously but were utilising ties to other DN actors, which demonstrates a DN. These ties were not stagnant, and clergy perpetrators moved within the network utilising strong and weak DN ties. It is these ties which enabled SNA to be conducted,
as SNA is based on analysing the influence of the collective behaviour of other actors on individual actors (Everton 2012, 17). Identifying these structural patterns within a network is a key focus of SNA as is identifying clusters of actors who have strong ties through which resources flow (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 249). A DN of clergy DN actors connected by weak and strong ties has been evidenced throughout the above analysis. The following analysis chapter 7 discusses how these ties were utilised to share DN resources to operate as a DN and facilitate clergy CSA.
Chapter 7 Analysis of the Operation of a Dark Network of Clergy Perpetrators of CSA

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapter evidenced a DN of clergy perpetrators of CSA connected by strong and weak ties. This chapter extends on this by examining the types of DN resources used by and being shared between clergy DN actors by utilising these ties. The purpose of SNA is to map DN actor ties and show how individual DN actors are connected and interpret how these ties are utilised to share DN resources (Everton 2012, 17; Bright, Hughes and Chalmers 2012, 153). Ties are channels through which material and non-material resources are transferred (Everton 2012, 17 and 92; Cunningham, Everton and Murphy 2016, 4). Evidencing these ties being used to share DN resources demonstrates the operation of a DN. Furthermore, DN success depends on its ability to share resources (Duijn, Kashirin and Sloot 2014, 5). In the context of this research, DN resources include providing mutual support by covering for one another’s offending, sharing victims and victim information and shared knowledge regarding methods for grooming, committing CSA and silencing victims. Distinct examples of DN actors sharing knowledge regarding methods for grooming, committing CSA and silencing victims are not overtly apparent. However, the pervasive patterns in the methods utilised by clergy perpetrators to groom victims, commit CSA and silence victims demonstrate a common knowledge which could be assumed to be a shared DN resource. Additionally, as outlined in Chapter 5, there is evidence of clergy DN actors mentoring other DN actors. Research shows that criminal mentors model actions and provide guidance, support and social persuasion for criminal activity (Laferriere and Morselli 2015, 861; Sutherland 1947). Therefore, in the context of this research, where a clergy perpetrator mentors another clergy perpetrator it can be assumed that the same modelling and guidance in regard to criminal activity was apparent. A distinguishing factor between various DNs is that the type of resources utilised or sought varies between DN types. The primary resource sought for this clergy DN was child victims.

7.2 Dark network resources according to type and motivation
While DN theory has been applied in various contexts these are not uniform as each DN will behave differently in accordance with differing goals and motivations (Cunningham, Everton and Murphy 2016, 294). The clergy DN being analysed here was not directly comparable to any other DN type though there are some similarities. Generally, the DN resources required depend on the motivation behind the illicit activity. As for the clergy DN being analysed here, online paedophile DNs and child sex trafficking DNs seek child victims as the primary DN resource. Although a distinguishing factor is that online paedophile DNs and child sex trafficking DNs can have an additional element of also using victims to obtain the resource of financial gain (Cockbain, Brayley and Laycock 2011, 154). Whereas, the DN of clergy perpetrators of CSA were not motivated by financial gain but by a mutual desire to commit CSA and, therefore, victims were the primary material DN resource.

Non-material clergy DN resources included victim information regarding whether a child has been groomed, sexually abused or was vulnerable to CSA. Additionally, patterns in how DN actors groomed, committed CSA and then silenced victims and their families regarding CSA, demonstrate the DN resource of shared knowledge (Duijn, Kashirin and Sloot 2014, 5; Moldoveanu and Baum 2011, 393; Everton 2012; Morselli 2009). Although these DN resources were used by individual clergy perpetrators of CSA to facilitate their own crimes, it was the sharing of, and patterns in the use of these resources which demonstrated the operation and protection of the DN.

In addition to strong and weak ties discussed in the previous analysis chapter 6, other ties relevant to this research include ties of trust that resource sharing would be reciprocated and an overarching affiliation with the Catholic Church (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 18; McGloin and Kirk 2010). This chapter demonstrates how the overarching light network attribute of clericalism was used by DN actors as a DN resource. The light network attribute of clericalism provided DN actors with the unquestioned trust and superiority bestowed on clergy, which was utilised as a DN resource to commit CSA (RCICA 2017b, 614). Further explanation of how the clergy DN exploited and used clericalism as a DN resource follows.
7.3 Clergy dark network resources

7.3.1 Light networks exploited by dark networks

The study of DNs is complicated when these are entwined with licit organisations. Some DNs operate with a degree of legal cover and can blur lines between licit and illicit activities (Demiroz 2012, 272). An example of the entwining of licit and illicit organisations is the use of illicit organisations by licit organisations to dispose of toxic waste or to launder money (Fielding 2017, 22; Hall 2012, 369). These examples highlight a discrepancy between law and policing, as some illicit activities are ignored by law enforcement agencies (Hall 2012, 373). In the context of this clergy DN, the licit Catholic Church was used to hide clergy CSA and this crime was often dealt with internally rather than through criminal law. Clergy believed they were subject to canon law only, through which CSA was regarded as a sin as well as a crime. Therefore, the Catholic Church response was focussed on sin, and punishment was in the form of penance (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 96; Robertson 2010a, 43). This is part of the justification used to keep clergy CSA complaints internal, which will be discussed further in the following analysis chapter 8 in regard to the grey network as a DN resource.

Similarly, police corruption DN actors rely on their position as members of the licit police force to provide resources, opportunity and power as coercive tools to support corrupt activities (Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain 2012, 197). When licit networks function with a degree of legal cover this adds to the challenge of studying DNs (Demiroz 2012, 272). It has been evidenced in the RCICA and the VPI that clergy used their position and the structure of the Catholic Church to commit CSA. However, this has not been framed in the context of these attributes being DN resources as the theory of dark networks has not previously been applied to Catholic clergy perpetrators of CSA. Examples of clergy perpetrators using the DN resource of their clerical status, to groom victims, commit CSA and silence victims and their families will be provided. Prior to this, the following paragraphs explain what clericalism is and how this was exploited by the DN as a unique resource which significantly contributed to the
facilitation of clergy CSA. Exploitation of clerical status and the Catholic belief system is the resource which distinguishes clergy CSA networks from other CSA networks.

7.3.2 The dark network resource of clericalism

The unquestioning faith bestowed on Catholic clergy by the Catholic community provided clergy perpetrators of CSA with a façade of being beyond reproach and, therefore, above suspicion. Clergy perpetrators of CSA took advantage of the light network attribute of clericalism to access and control child victims. Clerics are associated with God, which has led to a veneer of respectability that can lead to an inability to accept fault (Robinson 2007). The Catholic perception of clergy being above reproach or suspicion had the effect of providing unquestioned and immediate trust (BRA 2016ac; BRA 2013; Doyle 2006, 190). Clericalism served as a significant DN resource as clergy benefit from this perception to access child victims and facilitate CSA. The following data excerpts provide examples of how the exulted status bestowed on clergy not only placed them in positions of absolute trust but protected them from disclosure. David Ridsdale, the nephew and victim of Gerald Ridsdale, describes Fr Ridsdale’s status in the family and as a priest:

As a priest, Ridsdale held an almost supernatural level of power in our family and exerted a great deal of control over the family. He was treated as being better than his siblings and took full advantage of his exulted status. Gerald was charismatic, and many were in awe of him. (RCICA 2015e, 65)

This exalted status and perception of clergy being beyond reproach was a common reason for victims feeling unable to report clergy CSA. A victim of Fr Daniel stated, "I didn’t question what he was doing because he is a priest, a figurehead of the Catholic Church" (BRA ndh). Similarly, a victim of Fr Wilson stated that reporting the CSA committed against him was not considered an option, as saying anything detrimental about clergy would not be tolerated within his family (BRA 2018). These examples demonstrate how the Catholic perception of clergy being beyond reproach served to
maintain the silence of their victims, as victims themselves often had this opinion of clergy and felt they would not be believed (RCICA 2017a, 519).

In the context of CSA occurring in the Catholic Church, the added component of the power differential intensifies the coercive relationship between children and clergy (Family and Community Development Committee 2012, 6), making disclosure of clergy CSA even less likely. DN actors utilised the light network attribute of clericalism by using their clerical status and power differential to silence child victims by telling them that no one would believe a child over a representative of God (Robinson 2007; Gavrielides 2013, 625). A fear of negative outcomes is a common reason for delayed disclosure of CSA (Pipe, Lamb, Orbach and Cederborg 2007; McElvaney 2015). Consequently, the light network attribute of clericalism becomes a DN resource used by DN actors to remain covert.

This barrier to disclosure is not unique to the Catholic Church, as there is a tendency in youth-serving organisations for children's reports of CSA to not be believed and the denials of the abuser to be believed (Palmer and Feldman 2017; Shakeshaft 2004; Shakeshaft and Cohan 1994). Therefore, as children experience or observe this response, this reduces the likelihood that they will come forward to disclose CSA because they doubt they will be believed (Palmer and Feldman 2017, 29). Regarding victims of clergy CSA, the doubt of being believed was compounded by the Catholic perception of Clerics being completely trustworthy and representatives of God. This was supported in the final report of the RCICA (2017a, 541) in finding that attempts by victims of clergy CSA to disclose abuse to adults within the institutions were often not believed, and the victim was blamed, punished or even further abused. The hesitancy of victims to disclose CSA and the responses to disclosures served as a DN resource for remaining covert. Clergy status provided DN actors with a perception of infallibility which protected them from exposure. In cases where victims did question clergy’s virtue, a religious duress, to placate rather than displease God, was used by clergy perpetrators of CSA to control victims (Doyle, Sipe and Wall 2006, 230).
7.3.3 Religious duress as a DN resource

The light network attribute of clericalism supported the control of vulnerable child victims in the form of religious duress (Doyle, Sipe and Wall 2006, 230). Religious duress is fear based on a belief in a requirement for obedience to God, which creates compliance from victims. “Threats and blame in the name of God and the threat of being sent to hell was used to overcome resistance to or disclosure of CSA as this had a powerful effect on children” (RCICA 2017a). Fogler et al. (2008, 308-309) similarly state that clergy perpetrators exploit the fear of punishment from God to gain compliance from victims, though add that compliance was also gained through promises of spiritual rewards such as going to heaven. Therefore, the fear of not being believed and the existing power differential between clergy and child victims was compounded by a fear of displeasing God.

Statements from two of Fr David Daniel victims describe techniques used by Daniel to silence his victims. One victim said in court that “Daniel's sexual abuse of him began at the age of 6 and continued on countless occasions to the age of 22”. Daniel warned this victim to “keep quiet about the abuse or you won’t go to heaven” (BRA ndh). This is an example of the use of religious duress as fear of not going to heaven is real for Catholics. Similarly, a victim of Fr Searson was told by Searson that if he told anyone about the CSA that he would go to hell and that the CSA was the devil punishing the victim for his sins (RCICA 2017a, 472). Similarly, another victim of CSA being sexually abused by a nun was told that she was evil, and this victim, even as an adult, still believes she will go to hell (RCICA 2017a, 470). Although the focus of this thesis is on clergy, this last example has been included to demonstrate that nun’s also committed CSA and that this warrants flagging for future research.

These examples evidence that victims were sexually abused and kept silent out of fear of the potential repercussions of disclosure imposed through religious duress. Clergy perpetrators utilised their religious duties and position, which are light network attributes, as a DN resource for gaining compliance and silence from victims. The next DN resource analysed is that of shared knowledge regarding how to facilitate
CSA. The data evidences patterns in the methods used by DN actors to groom, commit CSA and silence victims. These patterns reflect a shared knowledge which is a network resource (Duijn, Kashirin and Sloot 2014, 5; Moldoveanu and Baum 2011, 393; Everton 2012).

7.4 Dark network resource of shared knowledge

7.4.1 Patterns in grooming methods

Grooming is a process used by perpetrators to prepare the child victim, but it also extends to the manipulation of parents and the environment for CSA (Kloess, Beech and Harkins 2014, 128; Brown and Gilchrist 2006, 297). There is extensive research available on CSA and methods used by paedophiles to groom victims (Malatesta 2008; Grosskopf 2010; Agustina 2015; Kennison, 2004) though this has not been applied in a Catholic clergy CSA context. Methods of grooming will be analysed here to demonstrate that there are distinct patterns utilised by clergy DN actors to facilitate CSA. These grooming patterns represent the DN resource of shared knowledge. The following analysis shows that grooming extended beyond the child to their family and community.

Some of the grooming methods used by clergy perpetrators were similar to those used by paedophiles in the general community (Family and Community Development Committee 2012, 5). Fr O'Donnell bribed young males with money and gifts (BRA 2017j). Fr Pickering "lured victims to his bedroom with promises of watching television or videos or receiving pocket money for altar-serving or doing odd jobs" (BRA ndaj). An altar boy from the Doveton parish under Fr Thomas O'Keeffe in the 1970s stated,

He ran cricket for all the boys of Holy Family school during school lunch and recesses as well as on Sundays after Mass. After matches we would go to the presbytery and have ice-creams and soft drink. Eventually, after he had established a rapport with us, he'd offer us some of his magazines, all pornography. My older brothers also recall this. We never told our parents. After O'Keeffe moved to the Thornbury parish, he remained in contact with my
family. He used to visit us in Doveton on Sunday nights. Often, he’d bring new board games for me and my brothers. On a few occasions during school holidays my brothers and I (and a few other kids) would stay at O’Keeffe’s presbytery in Thornbury. We’d all see films, play sports and games. Porn magazines would be shown around in the evenings. (BRA ndac)

A victim of Br Webster stated

He was singled out by Webster and made to feel special. He was made a waiter at the Brothers' table, which was a privilege that entitled those boys to wear a special uniform. He was given a watch, a puppy and additional pocket money. He was also given cigarettes from the age of 12 when the CSA started. Other St Augustine’s boys said that this victim was Webster's pet. As Webster was the head of the orphanage, there was nobody to whom the victim could complain at the time of the abuse (BRA 2011b).

Prior to grooming, potential victims were selected by identifying vulnerable or already victimised children and vulnerable families such as single parent families or a family with a recent family loss or illness (Craven, Brown and Gilchrist 2007; Van Dam 2006). The role of clergy made grooming of victims easier, as clergy were privy to personal details of members of their parish, the process of selection was made easier. Some clergy perpetrators of CSA began the grooming process by entrenching themselves in the family and psychologically grooming the victim’s family (Craven, Brown and Gilchrist, 2006; Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 76). The grooming process effectively placed the perpetrator in a position of control whereby the family could be manipulated. The perpetrator then manipulated opportunities to commit CSA (McAlinden 2012, 85). Additionally, clergy were frequently placed in unsupervised positions of trust (Calkins et al. 2015, 581; Smallbone and Cale 2015).

Research on general population paedophiles states that victim vulnerabilities are easier to detect when the perpetrator has regular contact with a child (Erooga, Allnock and Telford 2012). This highlights the importance of entrenchment into and grooming
of the family to increase contact with the child. Increased contact creates further opportunities for grooming and a gradual desensitising to sexual touch of the child by the perpetrator (Smallbone and Wortley 2001). Although this grooming strategy can be applied to child sexual abusers generally, clergy exploited their clerical position which granted them an unquestioned trust and access to victims. Visiting or helping vulnerable families is not an unusual role of clergy though clergy perpetrators of CSA took advantage of their clerical roles to groom families and victims.

An example of parents being groomed, and the high level of trust placed in clergy is apparent in the story of Paul Levey. In 1982, his father agreed to send Paul, then 14, to live at the presbytery at Mortlake with Fr Ridsdale where he and Ridsdale shared a bedroom (RCICA 2015h, 92). More than 20 years prior to this, in 1961, a boy from Campberdown was sexually abused by Ridsdale when his father was hospitalised and Ridsdale was minding him (BRA 2017k). The fact that it was known by other clergy and members of the community that Ridsdale had children living with him, and that this was allowed to continue, is demonstrative of the willingness of other clergy to allow this and the level of grooming and trust achieved within that community.

The following example, further detailed in the data Chapter 5, demonstrates the potential extent of control the grooming process can exert over victims and their families. Paul Hersbach testified at the RCICA in relation to his own and his family’s abuse by Fr Rubeo. Hersbach’s father and twin brother were sexually abused by Rubeo as children and neither twin knew about the other’s abuse (RCICA 2014, 52). When Rubeo became the parish priest at East Preston the Hersbach family moved with him to his new presbytery and lived there for a year. While living there Paul Hersbach was sexually abused by Rubeo on multiple occasions (RCICA 2014, 53). Additionally, a culture of shame and secrecy surrounding sex was used by the Church as a method of social control (McAlinden 2012, Inglis 2014). This was an important element of the grooming process as control was extended to framing discussion of sex as off-limits and, therefore, aided in the silencing of victims and their families. The CSA committed by Rubeo continued over two generations of the Hersbach family.
This example not only demonstrates the control Rubeo had over this family but also highlights that this grooming and control could be so pervasive that it extended over decades and generations. The grooming process began with Rubeo becoming a frequent visitor to the Hersbach twins’ home (BRA 2014c). This grooming served to facilitate long term CSA and kept victims silent. This example highlights a pattern of grooming methods which was a valuable DN resource for protecting the DN and demonstrates the resilience of this DN. Had the Hersbach family not been so extensively groomed by Rubeo, they may have been able to disclose or report the CSA committed by Rubeo. However, grooming the community serves to protect the DN actor in the event of this occurrence.

The grooming of child victims and families extended to communities and allowed DN actors to present themselves as trustworthy (Craven, Brown and Gilchrist 2006; McAlinden 2012, 123). This not only created offending opportunities but also placed the perpetrator in a position of being more believable than a child disclosing CSA (McAlinden 2012). Transferring DN actors from clusters allowed these perpetrators to groom the new parish community, families and child victims. As stated in the previous chapter, weak tie actors were very useful in acquiring new DN resources (Levin and Cross 2004, 1480; Cunningham, Everton and Murphy 2016, 11; Granovetter 1973). Groomed parish communities, therefore, became a valuable DN resource which the DN would seek to retain by maintaining a presence of DN actors to share current resources, procure new resources and extend the DN’s reach.

Grooming means “to prepare, as for a specific position or purpose”, though in the context of CSA there is no distinct definition which encapsulates this process (McAlinden 2012, 22). However, the grooming methods outlined above are a crucial part of the process of obtaining the primary DN resource of child victims for the purpose of committing clergy CSA. The following analysis of patterns in the methods used to commit CSA by clergy will demonstrate how the light network attribute of an institutional setting was utilised as a DN resource, which created further opportunities to offend. Patterns of situational offending demonstrate how clergy perpetrators abused their position of trust to commit CSA. The first part of this analysis will discuss
the institutional setting broadly in relation to how this facilitated CSA. This discussion is followed by an analysis of specific situational contexts in which clergy CSA occurred, demonstrating distinct patterns used by DN actors to commit CSA.

7.4.2 The institutional setting

The culture and structure of the Catholic Church as a contributing factor for the occurrence of clergy CSA has been examined in the RCICA and the VPI. However, the analysis in this study focuses on how the light network attribute of clericalism and the closed system of the Catholic Church was exploited by the DN to facilitate CSA. These closed systems functioned as significant DN resources. They provided clergy perpetrators with ample and unique opportunities to commit CSA. Clergy perpetrators were able to use their clerical status to create opportunities to commit CSA and to silence victims. Additionally, the institutional setting of the Catholic Church provided a variety of situational contexts conducive to committing CSA. Of significance is the apparent patterns in use of particular situational contexts to commit clergy CSA. These patterns represent a shared knowledge and normalisation of the illicit behaviour specific to the DN being analysed here.

Children are particularly vulnerable in institutional settings due to the high trust placed in adults in these settings (Calkins et al. 2015, 581). Although child sexual offenders will generally seek opportunities to gain access to children, a conviction will make further access extremely difficult (Child Protection Offender Reporting Act 2004). Whereas, in relation to known clergy perpetrators, with no prior warning to parishes or recorded conviction, access to victims is unfettered (Lawther n.d., 1). In addition to this, the respected status of clergy means their access to children is likely to be unsupervised (Calkins et al. 2015, 591).

Institutional CSA occurs because of the exploitation of a power imbalance between institutions and children (Australian Senate 2001, 2004; CICA 2009). In addition to this abuse of power, the CSA committed in institutional settings has been defined as
comparatively worse (Blakemore et al. 2017; Magalhães et al. 2009) and occurs for a longer period (Spröber et al. 2014). Additionally, institutional CSA is more likely to involve multiple perpetrators, which is less likely in other extra-familial CSA settings (CICA 2009; Australian Senate 2001; Australian Senate 2004; Spröber et al. 2014). The data supports this theory as the previous analysis chapter 6 evidences multiple clusters of DN actors offending at one institution over extended periods of time. DN actors worked in the institutional settings of Catholic primary and high schools where they had significant access to children not only in the classroom but also anywhere on school grounds and in border or orphanage dormitories. The following examples demonstrate patterns in situational CSA committed by clergy in these institutional settings. There was an apparent confidence shown by DN actors that they could commit CSA without fear of reprisal. This confidence demonstrates the mutual trust and support present amongst DN actors with strong ties (Cunningham, Everton and Murphy 2016 14; Granovetter 1982, 1973, 1362) and a broader collective trust that complaints would be silenced (Kramer 2010, 82).

While there is not one consistent pattern of clergy CSA, there are some distinct patterns for how and where clergy CSA was committed. How clergy CSA was committed was analysed in terms of patterns used to groom, commit CSA and silence victims. Where clergy CSA was committed was apparent in patterns of situational clergy CSA. The situational contexts included the confessional, school classrooms and dormitories, the victims’ home and on holidays or outings with DN actors. DN actors utilised one or a combination of these locations to commit CSA. The following paragraphs will outline the various, though common, situational contexts where clergy CSA was committed. Overarching the situational context was the light network attribute of clericalism which provided clergy DN actors with unquestioned trust and power. Police corruption networks similarly used the light network of the police service to facilitate illicit activities (Merrington 2017, 61), and both of these DN contexts provided unique opportunities to conduct illicit activities. It is argued here that the situational context of the institutional setting and the Catholic Church culture contribute to explaining the occurrence of clergy CSA.
7.5 Patterns of situational clergy CSA

Apparent patterns in the situational context of clergy CSA include but are not limited to, school classrooms and dormitories, on outings or holidays and in victims’ homes. A United States study by John Jay College found that 40.9% of clergy CSA occurred in the priest’s home or presbytery, 16.3% in the church, 12.4% took place in the victim’s home, 10.3% occurred in a holiday home and 10.3% occurred in schools (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 254). Although the data for this research does not provide a complete account of the situation and context for each offence, it does reiterate these as specific places where clergy CSA occurred. The patterns in situational offending indicate a shared knowledge of the best places to commit CSA regarding access to victims and support from other DN actors in sharing resources and remaining covert.

7.5.1 Clergy CSA committed in the confessional

The confessional is a unique situational context for clergy and was utilised by DN actors as a multi-functional DN resource (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 16). Clericalism was exploited as a significant DN resource in this situational context. Where a victim is seeking forgiveness, they are extremely vulnerable as the priest has the power to grant or withhold absolution. Fr Ridsdale committed some of his CSA offences during the sacrament of confession. After confession and committing CSA, Ridsdale would perform the rite of absolution so the child would be forgiven for their sins (BRA 2017k). While at Doveton parish, Fr Searson committed CSA against children during confession (RCICA 2015, 190). Scannell aka James Henry aka Br Frederick raped a 12-year-old boy who had an absent father at St Anne's in Kew. “In the Ritual of Confession after the rape, the boy was required to confess his sin for having participated in the sexual event, that is, for having been raped” (BRA 2014). Similarly, Fr Ridsdale committed CSA during the sacrament of Confession. After confession and committing CSA, Ridsdale would perform the rite of absolution so the child would be forgiven for their sins (BRA 2017k).
Some victims submitted to solicitation out of fear of not receiving absolution (Doyle, Sipe and Wall 2006, 40). Threats of religious punishment, such as going to hell, were similarly used to coerce children into submitting to CSA (Sprober et al. 2014, 7). When discussing clergy DN actors throughout this thesis, clergy has been used to refer to priests and brothers. In the context of discussing the confessional as a DN resource, this refers solely to priests as only priests provide the rite of confession.

Clergy committing CSA is not a recent phenomenon as solicitation of sex by priests in the confessional, dates back to the 1500s (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 16). This pattern of committing clergy CSA is significant as approximately half of clergy CSA is committed by priests (Ackerman and Khan 2012, 254; Family and Community Development Committee 2012e, 2). The priestly duty of hearing confession in the privacy of the confessional provided further opportunities to commit CSA (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 16). Not only did priests have access to the unique situational context of the confessional they also mostly worked unsupervised (Calkins et al. 2015, 580; BRA 2016ac; BRA 2013; BRA nda; BR ndk). This is also true of clergy in the role of teachers, as they were in sole control of a class of children.

7.5.2 Clergy CSA committed in school classrooms

Data Chapter 5 provides several examples of DN actors who committed CSA in the classroom, often while the whole class of students were present. In the case of Dowlan, CSA would be committed at the back of the classroom and the other 20-30 students in the classroom would be too intimidated to look around (RCICA 2015e, 23; RCICA 2015a, 86). Similarly, Br Fitzgerald would make the whole class of kids put their heads and hands on the desk and go to sleep and they would get into trouble if they looked up (RCICA 2015a, 68). This pattern of offending was also used by Br Best (RCICA 2015b, 21). To demonstrate that individual DN actors used a variety of situational contexts to commit CSA, Dowlan was also in charge of a junior boarder’s dormitory which was described by one victim as “Dracula being in charge of the blood bank” (RCICA 2015b, 22). Committing CSA in situations where there were numerous witnesses and a high risk of detection, demonstrates the confidence and trust DN
actors had that victims would remain silent, and, if not, they would be protected by the DN.

### 7.5.3 Clergy DN actors supervising school or orphanage dormitories

The data shows multiple DN actors being placed in supervisory roles where they had access to vulnerable child victims. These victims were particularly vulnerable for many reasons. There was a strong power imbalance as the clergy were not only adults but representative of God (Doyle 2006, 194; Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 240). These children were isolated and accessible, and this is demonstrative of a pattern of situational or opportunistic offending (Calkins et al. 2015, 581; Smallbone and Cale 2015). Research by Terry and Freilich (2012, 437) found that victim access played a critical role in victim selection. Orphanages and boarding institutions were a valuable DN resource due to the ample opportunities for CSA and access to victims.

In the context of committing CSA in a dormitory, this is also conducive to covert offending as DN actors were frequently working without supervision (McAlinden 2012, 148; BRA 2016ac; BRA 2013). This is not to say that other children and clergy were not aware of the offending; however, dormitories created an environment where the DN actor had power, control and privacy. The unfettered access some DN actors had to children, particularly in the role of dormitory master, is demonstrated in data Chapter 5. Testimony of a victim of Br Dowlan described how victims were taken from their dormitory beds on a nightly basis (RCICA 2015b, 8).

Child victims were defenceless as resistance would often lead to violent physical beatings or increased severity of the CSA (RCICA 2015b). The diocese of Ballarat had a particularly high percentage of clergy CSA and had a particularly high number of orphanages and boarding schools (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 179). Although there are fewer orphanages currently in Australia, there are 9,492 Catholic orphanages across the globe (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 153); therefore, highlighting that while
this access to victims may have decreased in Australia, Catholic orphanages globally are a significant DN resource for clergy DN globally.

The significance of dormitories as a DN resource is apparent in the fact that Victorian Catholic orphanages and schools which had boarders, such as in clusters 2, 3, 4 and 13, experienced decades of sequential and simultaneous presence of clergy DN actors. As perpetrators of CSA seek vulnerable victims, these institutions provided easy access to already vulnerable child victims. A significant number of clergy perpetrators who committed CSA in dormitories were often in charge of the dormitories and had a bedroom nearby. This includes Br Webster and Houston in cluster 3, Fr Aulsebrook, Fr DeDood and Fr Fox in cluster 2, Br Dyson and Br Hesford in cluster 7 and Br Dowlan and Br Ring in cluster 10 (RCICA 2015e, 36 -39; BRA ndg; BRA ndj; BRA ndn; BRA 2017c; BRA 2016g; BRA 2011b). Nine DN actors belonging to 4 different clusters are linked to institutions which had school children boarding there. Therefore, approximately 10% of clergy perpetrators committed clergy CSA at Catholic boarding schools, indicating boarding dormitories as a valuable DN resource and a safe place to commit clergy CSA. This percentage is similar to research from the United States, which found that 10.3% of clergy CSA occurred in schools (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 254). Although, if this 10.3% includes school dormitories and classrooms, the percentage in this study would still be similar as these DN actors used both situational contexts to commit CSA. A higher percentage of 12.4% was found in the same United States study regarding clergy CSA committed in the victim’s home.

7.5.4 Clergy CSA committed in the victim’s home

Examples of DN actors visiting families at their home for the purpose of grooming has been analysed above. This grooming process frequently resulted in the committing of clergy CSA. Many clergy perpetrators of CSA would befriend Catholic families of strong faith and abuse the unquestioning trust bestowed on Catholic clergy, to commit CSA against children in their homes. These perpetrators would eat meals with the family and offer bedtime prayers (BRA 2016ac, BRA ndb). Due to the Catholic perception of clergy being above reproach or suspicion, parents granted these
perpetrators unsupervised access to their children (BRA 2016ac, BRA 2013). Fr Baker abused his position of trust, and once he had groomed parents, he would offer to take boys for driving lessons or to help with school work to create opportunities for him to commit CSA (BRA nda, para 9; BRA nda, para 15; BRA 2016ac; BRA 2014b; BRA 2013a; RCICA 2015b, 51; BRA ndp; BRA 2018).

The data contains 10 known examples of clergy perpetrators of CSA who abused victims in their own homes after grooming and establishing the complete trust of parents (BRA 2013; BRA ndj; BRA 2017p; BRAA 2016ac; BRA 2017k; RCICA 2015h; 92; BRA 2016a; BRA 2017k; BRA ndh; BRA ndu). As the data set contains 99 clergy perpetrators, this equates to close to 10% of victims, which is consistent with the John Jay College 2011 study (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 254). It appears that these patterns in situational offending represent not only opportunistic offending but also a progression in opportunities to commit CSA as the grooming process of families and communities allowed further opportunities to commit CSA. Although clergy assume a role of trust, this trust would require building on as a part of the grooming process, so families would allow DN actors to take children away on outings, holidays or camps (BRA 2016ac, BRA ndb, BRA nda, para 9). Therefore, it can be reasonably argued that the different situational contexts of committing CSA reflect the extent to which the child, family and community have been groomed.

7.5.5 Clergy CSA committed on outings or holidays with victims

As mentioned in the paragraphs on clergy committing CSA in victim’s homes, families were groomed to gain unsupervised access to child victims and to gain sufficient trust to be allowed to take children away on trips (BRA 2016ac; BRA ndb; BRA nda, para 9). Several clergy perpetrators committed CSA in this context. These perpetrators included Br Farrell (RCICA 2015b, 51), Frs Morey (BRA 2013a), Pickering (RCICA 2015g, 46), Glennon (BRA ndp), Wilson (BRA 2018) and Gubbels (BRA 2014b). Being allowed to take child victims away from their families served to decrease the risk of detection and provided opportunities to meet with other DN actors and engage in victim sharing. The following victim statement not only exemplifies this occurrence but
also provides an example of a clergy DN actor connecting with perpetrators outside of the clergy DN. In the example below, Pickering is utilising DN weak ties to potentially access DN resources. Additionally, such a meeting would provide social reinforcement of CSA, which increases reoffending due to the support and sharing of DN resources (Wilcockson 2006; Holt, Blevins and Burkert 2010, 20).

BTU provided the following evidence at the RCICA:

I remember one occasion, I travelled with Fr Pickering to Adelaide for about five days for a holiday. By this time, I regularly visited Pickering, so my mum didn't question me going away with him on a holiday. Having five children, it would have been a bit of a break for her. I would have been about 16 or 17 years old. We stayed in a hotel and I stayed in the same room as Fr Pickering and he continued to abuse me. I remember one night during this trip, we went to a local hotel for dinner where Pickering met up with someone, who I think was called Fr Gavin, and three other men. I don't remember Fr Gavin's last name, but he was quite young, about 30 years old. I don't know who the three other men were, they were not priests, but my impression was that they were involved in the church in some way. All the men had boys with them around the same age as me. I was made to sit on the kids' table while the men sat on a different table. (RCICA 2015g, 46)

The above example demonstrates an extension of the DN beyond Victorian borders and beyond clergy within this Archdiocese. The data does not detail CSA for each of the boys though it is known that Pickering brought a victim with him. This meeting of Catholic clergy and laity bringing young boys with them on a trip where one is known to be a victim of Pickering is likely to be a meeting of mutually affiliated perpetrators of CSA. As has been discussed in the previous chapter 6, weak ties serve an important function in the operation and resilience of a DN. While Pickering is increasing his risk of detection by committing CSA outside of the safety of the DN, he is potentially acquiring new DN resources. While weak tie actors are very useful in acquiring new information and DN resources (Levin and Cross 2004, 1480; Cunningham, Everton and Murphy 2016, 11; Granovetter 1973), extending the DN to weak ties also increases DN vulnerability and visibility (Sparrow 1991).
These strategic decisions will affect the resilience of the DN. Weak ties can form bridges that tie clusters of actors and new individuals together, which is of particular importance in networks without a core (Granovetter 1973, 1983; Stark 2007; Everton and Cunningham 2013, 98; Prell 2015, 76; Fielding 2017; Brown and Konrad 2001, 438). The DN being analysed in this thesis has a decentralised structure and would, therefore, benefit from forming bridges through weak ties. By doing this, material or non-material resources such as information, influence, trust or finance will reach a more actors when accessed through weak ties (Granovetter 1973).

Although, Pickering’s actions in this example may increase risk of exposure, a distinguishing feature of licit and illicit organisations is that illicit organisations are constantly faced with a trade-off between efficiency and secrecy (Toth et al. 2013 cited in Duijn 2014). Illicit organisations that maintain control over illicit activities while also maintaining secrecy are more successful in their criminal achievements (Bouchard and Nguyen 2010, 132). This success depends on the illicit network’s ability to efficiently share information and resources throughout the network (Duijn 2014, 5). Therefore, network disruption relies on early disruption of the flow of information and resources as illicit networks are fluid, and disruption must occur swiftly to pre-empt reorganisation by the illicit network to avoid disruption (Spapens 2011; Morselli 2009).

Moreover, this example of Pickering meeting with mutual affiliations also demonstrates the role of a broker in a DN. The risks involved in introducing new DN actors can be mitigated through DN actors positioned in the role of brokers. Brokers are situated between unconnected actors and are in a position to control the flow of DN information and resources (Bright, Hughes and Chalmers 2012, 23; Burcher and Whelan 2015, 109; Burt 2005). As a broker, DN actors can help contribute to cultivating trust between DN actors who are not known to each other and, therefore, manage the network of contacts (Della Porta and Vannucci 2011). Mitigation of risk is also achieved by using various methods to silence victims. The following section analyses patterns in the methods used by DN actors to silence victims and, therefore, protect the DN.
7.6 Shared DN methods for maintaining silence and DN protection

Despite CSA disclosure being unlikely or significantly delayed (Pipe, Lamb, Orbach and Cederborg 2007; McElvaney 2015; Gartner 2018, 9), the data provided examples of child victims who did attempt to disclose clergy CSA. These attempts often resulted in physical and psychological abuse and in some cases this abuse was used to pre-empt any attempt at disclosure by child victims. Death (2018, 94) similarly found that disclosing CSA by victims of a Catholic clergy perpetrator of CSA network in Western Australia was met with physical beatings, being called liars and being shamed. With these factors in mind it can be understood how many child victims did not disclose their sexual abuse by clergy until decades later when, as an adult, they were no longer restricted by these coercive methods of maintaining silence.

This section examines patterns in the methods used by DN actors to remain covert and support further clergy CSA. These patterns are a DN resource as similar strategies were used by individual DN actors to silence their victims. This silencing of victims extended beyond an individual actor silencing their victims, as DN actors would also silence victims of another DN actor to protect the DN more broadly. Methods used to silence victims include the use of intimidation through physical and psychological abuse (RCICA 2017a, 528). The following paragraphs evidence this through examples of child victims being physically abused to create barriers to any attempt to disclose clergy CSA. Although this physical abuse had an element of psychological abuse, there were further examples provided where child victims were manipulated into silence solely through DN actors utilising psychological abuse. Victims of CSA were berated and belittled by actors as a method of transferring guilt and blame to the child victim. The exploitation of clericalism was very apparent as an overarching component to these methods. This was in the form of religious duress, which was a method of exploiting DN actor’s clerical status to instil fear of religious reprisal into child victims in order to keep them silent.

A further overarching component which aided silencing techniques was the prevalence of boys as victims of clergy CSA. This is supported by a study conducted by John Jay
College on a U.S national level to assess the nature and scope of CSA within the Catholic Church between 1950–2002 (John Jay College 2006). The John Jay College study (2006) found that most victims were male (81%), between the ages of 11 and 14, with approximately 6% being under the age of seven (Ackerman and Khan 2012, 254; Parkinson, Oates and Jayakody 2012). The higher rates of sexual abuse of boys by clergy may be explained by research which shows that while girls are more likely to experience familial CSA, boys are more likely to experience extra-familial CSA, which occurs outside of the familial environment in a perpetrator’s home, institution or a public place (Richards 2011; ABS 2005). The over representation of male victims is significant as males are less likely or take longer than females to disclose CSA (Cashmore and Shackel 2014, 77; Hunter 2011; Priebe and Svedin 2008). This is compounded where the perpetrator is a trusted family or church member, the likelihood of disclosure decreases further, and the impact is more severe (Fogler et al. 2008). The first situational context being analysed is the exploitation by DN actors of the unique setting of the confessional.

7.6.1 The confessional

The seal of confession is “the obligation of a confessor not to reveal what a penitent tells them during confession” (RCICA 2017, 170). If the seal is breached by a confessor, this attracts a penalty of automatic excommunication which can only be waived by the Pope (Code of Canon Law 1388; RCICA 2017b, 854). The following example has been previously discussed in regard to sharing the DN resource of victim identification. This example is referred to again here to demonstrate that the examples being used here often evidence more than one DN resource being utilised. This example also shows the sanctity of the seal of confession being overlooked in favour of warning Fr Pickering that one of his victims had disclosed the CSA Pickering had committed (RCICA 2015f, 49); therefore, placing the protection of the DN ahead of adherence to canon law. In this example a victim of Fr Pickering goes to confession at a neighbouring parish where his confession was heard by another clergy perpetrator, Fr Baker (RCICA 2015g, 49). Baker then told Pickering that the boy had complained. A couple of months after disclosing his abuse in the confessional, Pickering asked the boy why he had gone and told Baker about what was happening
between them. BTU stated that “He told me it was a stupid thing to do and who did I think I was” (RCICA 2015g, 49); the boy’s complaint went no further (RCICA 2015c).

This response provides an example of a DN actor using victim information acquired during confession to provide support for another DN actor by sharing this information and by silencing the victim. It also demonstrates mutual trust between clergy DN actors based on an expectation of reciprocation (Milward et al. 2006, 350). As stated by Moldoveanu and Baum (2011, 393), trust also involves a belief that relevant information will be reported to one another. As stated above, Baker and Pickering worked in different parishes, which demonstrates that, as stated in the literature, weak ties serve as sources of new information and resources, apparent in the identification of the victim to Baker. Interestingly, strong ties are argued to be more likely to provide DN resources of support and reciprocated trust (Cunningham, Everton and Murphy 2016 14; Granovetter 1982, 1973, 1362), though in this example these DN resources were similarly apparent in DN actors with weak ties. In the above example, this victim was silenced by a verbal scolding by Pickering. Attempts to silence victims of clergy CSA often extended to physical punishments for objecting to or disclosing clergy CSA.

7.6.2 Corporal punishment as a DN resource

The Old and New Testaments link religion and corporal punishment, which justified the use of corporal punishment to discipline and rear children to break their will and rid them of sin (Hall-Fitzgibbon 2017, 40). This adds to the context in which many child victims were being abused and highlights the fact that children’s rights were not a priority in the decades when much of the clergy CSA in the data was committed. This also explains why, where the victim overcame the intimidation of their abuser and decided to report the CSA, the response of physical violence was accepted in the era of corporal punishment.

Compounding barriers to disclosure of clergy CSA in the context of the Catholic Church, doing so could also result in physical punishment. There are examples in the
data where child victims have disclosed clergy CSA to another cleric which resulted in verbal and or physical punishment. Corporal punishment by teachers was a common occurrence in schools until it was banned in non-government schools in 1985 and private schools in 2006 (AIFS 2017) and would now be considered physical abuse. However, in the time period under analysis, corporal punishment was viewed as a method for instilling discipline and respect for authority into children in school environments (Scutt 2009, 7; Rowland, Gerry and Stanton 2017, 172). Corporal punishment was also embedded in religious texts, “He that spareth his rod hateth his son: but he that loveth him chasteneth him betimes” (Prov 13:24), which entwines the act of punishment with that of love. Where punishment can be lawfully administered to a child but not an adult, this places a child in a particularly vulnerable position.

The lawful administration of physical punishment also provides the DN with a licit resource which can be utilised to facilitate clergy CSA. When this vulnerability is coupled with clericalism, the belief that clerics are superior to the laity (Doyle 2006, 190), the child becomes doubly vulnerable to abuse. This vulnerability is a DN resource, as responding to disclosure with physical abuse served to silence child victims and protect other DN actors from exposure and, therefore, protected the DN’s illicit activity. Preventing a victim from disclosing also meant that the child could continue to be abused, and the child becomes a valuable DN resource for the continued proliferation of clergy CSA.

Covering for fellow DN actors within the network also entailed physical abuse, particularly where a victim was being non-compliant and insisting on disclosure. In 1969, Paul was a student at St Alipius in Ballarat. The following description of the response to a victim’s attempt to report his victimisation exemplifies the use of physical abuse to silence victims.

Br Best, the school principal, also teaching Grade 6, called Paul to his office. Paul was aware of Br Best’s fondness for belting the boys, the nervous child entered and was told by Best: "It's all right. Just want to talk to you" (BRA 2017). Best then sexually penetrated the boy. Soon afterwards, Paul told his own
class teacher, Fitzgerald, what Best had done. Fitzgerald responded by hitting him and then asked the boy again what happened and when Paul repeated the claim he was struck again. After being asked a third time, Paul replied: "Nothing happened". (BRA 2017). Paul could not bring himself to tell his parents, so he approached a Catholic priest who responded with a "backhander" and threatened his life, saying, 'If you tell anyone what happened I will f***ing kill you'. (BRA 2017)

This victim’s attempts to disclose his sexual abuse was repeatedly met with a response of physical abuse by another DN actor. This case demonstrates the strength of ties and support within a DN cluster. This demonstrates that DN actors could commit CSA and the mutual trust between DN actors ensured that any attempt to complain by victims would be silenced. The use of violence and intimidation are a common DN strategy for remaining covert. Sports doping networks and the Italian mafia also used threats and inflicted harm to remain covert and maintain silence regarding the network’s illicit activities (UNODC 2008 cited in Bell, Ten-Have and Lauchs 2016).

A victim of Br Coswello complained about Coswello’s CSA to the head Br at St Vincent's but was told that he was lying and was physically assaulted with a leather strap (BRA ndg). A member of the student representative council at the time, made an official complaint to Br Nangle, headmaster of St Patrick’s, against Dowlan. The student representative council was disbanded because of the complaint, and the student who made the complaint was taken down to the back of the school by clergy brothers, and he was viciously beaten the night the complaint was made (RCICA 2015b, 22).

Br Houston committed CSA at St Augustine’s, Geelong. Three of Houston’s victims attempted to complain to orphanage staff at the time. One victim reported Houston’s CSA to two Brothers, separately, but was strapped by each Brother for reporting it (BRA 2016g). When another victim reported Houston's CSA, the head Br strapped
the child in front of the orphanage boys, stating, “This is what we do to boys who fabricate stories about us” (BRA 2016g). The reaction of staff demonstrates the difficulties faced by a child in an institutional setting in disclosing clergy CSA. It also explains how this atmosphere of impunity allowed clergy perpetrators of CSA to continue to commit CSA (BRA 2016g). These methods of silencing complaints are a network resource utilised to remain covert. Strong ties between DN actors provide support for other DN actors to continue DN activities with a low risk of detection.

The use of physical abuse was not limited to silencing victims but also as a precursor to CSA, as students were frequently sent to clergy’s office for discipline where they would be beaten and then sexually abused (BRA ndn, RCICA 2015b, 21; RCICA 2015b, 59). Non-compliance on the part of the victim could also result in physical abuse. On one occasion when Br Fitzgerald called BAB to come and sit on his knee, BAB refused. “After that, I started to get physical abuse from Brother Fitzgerald“ (RCICA 2015a, 59). The co-occurrence of psychological, physical, and sexual abuse is supported by statistical evidence (Finkelhor, Ormrod, and Turner 2007; Goldsworthy 2015). Sprober et al. (2014, 5) also found that many victims report being subjected to physical, sexual and emotional abuse and additionally draw attention to the fact that in earlier decades, corporal punishment was a regular practice and children had few rights. Organised crime literature has been part of the analysis above, which highlighted similarities in the defining characteristics of organised crime networks and the DN being analysed here. This analysis of the use of physical abuse as a coercive DN resource highlights further similarities to organised crime research. Violence is considered to be a defining element of organised crime, which is “used to gain compliance with the organisations’ directives and codes of behaviour‘ (Rider et al. 2015, 224).

SNA attribute data relate to shared attitudes, opinions and behaviours of actors (Scott 2013, 3). A consistency in the methods used represents shared knowledge, information and behaviours amongst DN actors. These are based on a common light network attribute of a belief system which supports attitudes and opinions which effectively shift blame to victims. In addition to physical abuse, psychological abuse
was another DN resource used to prevent disclosure of clergy CSA. The following paragraphs will provide examples of how guilt and blame for CSA were placed on the child victim by DN actors as a further strategy for maintaining silence. The disparity in power between the perpetrator and victim was reinforced so that the victim was convinced they were not credible or that if they did disclose the CSA, they would be blamed or not believed.

7.6.3 Psychological child abuse and victim blaming

Patterns in the use of psychological abuse or manipulation to blame victims served as a DN resource to embed guilt and to silence victims (RCICA 2017a, 528). This psychological abuse was committed in the form of victim blaming, belittling and instilling fear through religious duress and exploiting victim’s religious beliefs. Child victims were often blamed for the CSA by clergy perpetrators, and in some cases child victims were required to confess their sin for participating in the sexual act (BRA 2014, BRA 2017k, Family and Community Development Committee 2013a, 18). Blaming the victim served to exonerate and excuse their own criminal actions (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 287; Doyle, Sipe and Wall 2006, 243) and allow clergy to continue to commit CSA covertly.

A victim of Br Dowlan supports this notion of transferring guilt and blame to the victim. He explained that the Catholic Church was founded on guilt and, therefore, if something happened to you, you were guilty because you were complicit despite having no control over what occurred (RCICA 2015e, 52). In 1988, when Fr Aulsebrook was the boarding co-ordinator, a boy went to Aulsebrook’s office one night when offered to play computer games. The boy was given a soft drink spiked with a sedative (BRA 2016ac). After raping him, Aulsebrook told the boy, “Get out of my sight. You disgust me” (BRA 2016ac). In court, the Judge said Aulsebrook’s remark was calculated to transfer his own guilt onto the boy (BRA 2016ac). Similarly, Br Houston would silence his victims through intimidation and psychological abuse. After abusing one boy, Houston told him, “Don’t tell anyone. That’s right, you can’t tell anyone because you’ve got no one” (BRA 2016g). These methods used by DN actors
were psychologically abusive and served the DN purpose of reinforcing a belief that victims were too blame and, therefore, gained compliance in keeping victims silent.

In cases where child victims disclosed clergy CSA in the confessional, the application of the seal of confession here supported the theme of victim blaming by implying that the child was confessing a sin. As stated by Fr Brennan and supported by Bishop Curtin in their evidence at the RCICA, where a child disclosed CSA in confession, the child was not disclosing a sin, and the seal of confession only applied to the sins of the penitent (RCICA 2017b, 856). Sacramental theologian Dr Frank O’Loughlin gave evidence that the “confessional seal applies only to the confessing person’s own sins”, and “Not to those of anyone else” (RCICA 2017b, 856). Therefore, not only did clergy have a moral obligation to report clergy CSA to police but the use of the seal of confession as a justification for non-reporting was invalid. A victim of clergy CSA gave evidence that as a child he disclosed the CSA he was subjected to by a Brother and that the priest responded by saying “That didn’t happen” (RCICA 2017b, 853). This demonstrates the rite of confession being used to protect the DN. Catholicism teaches that relief and forgiveness from the guilt of sin is only available through confession and absolution being given by a priest (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 215). Therefore, the source of relief and forgiveness is also the cause of the sin, intensifying the victim’s guilt, shame, and trauma (Doyle 2006, 205). As discussed in the literature review chapter 2, the Catholic Church’s teachings of children being sinful (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 256) serves to reinforce the child victims’ feelings of guilt and blame for their own abuse.

Trauma and control over a child victim were amplified by clergy using religious scripture to place guilt and shame on already traumatised victims (Robinson and Hanmer 2014). Catholics are indoctrinated to believe that priests take the place of Jesus Christ and are to be obeyed and never criticised (Robertson 2010, 3). The Church’s emphasis on CSA as a sin against God rather than as a sin against the child resulted in sins against children being easily forgiven (Robinson 2013). This view of CSA being a sin against God rather than the victim and clergy DN actors being able
to be absolved of their sin, allowed for DN actors to relieve their guilt and continue committing CSA.

The above examples signify methods of maintaining the silence of victims of clergy CSA. Although these methods were used to keep victims silent, it appears that in some contexts this was more for the purpose of compliance as clergy CSA was not always covert. In other DN, such as secular paedophile networks, the desire to remain covert is fuelled by a desire to avoid detection and possible criminal prosecution. In the case of this clergy DN, an array of DN resources were utilised to protect DN actors and there was less concern with criminal prosecution. As discussed earlier, clergy believed that they were only subject to canon law, through which CSA is regarded as a sin as well as a crime though the Church response was focussed on sin and punishment in the form of penance (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 96; Robertson 2010a, 43). This parallel system of criminal justice was hidden from the public and resulted in clergy perpetrators of CSA not being punished and victims being silenced (Robertson 2010, 2).

There are examples where the occurrence of CSA was common knowledge. A victim stated at the RCICA that he finds “it inconceivable that none of the Brothers, lay teachers, nurses or even some of the parents knew about the abuse by Br Dowlan”. "It was just so blatantly obvious and every boy in the class knew that their turn was going to come at some stage" (RCICA 2015a, 12). This demonstrates the apparent collective trust the DN had that their offending would not be reported. In response to the question of whether the church was aware that Farrell was committing CSA, another victim’s response was

Absolutely. We know they knew, because Ronald Conway spoke at our trial — that is, the Christian Brother psychologist at the time — and he knew my brother was being offended against in 1973. Farrell was referred to him, and he answered and told the Catholic hierarchy that a Christian Brother had been referred to him for sexually abusing a boy in 1973. If they had dealt with that then, I would not have been a victim. I was a victim in 1974 because they put
These examples provide victim testimony that the occurrence of clergy CSA was known by other clergy and school lay staff. This is not to say that there were not attempts by lay and clergy adults to disclose and condemn clergy CSA. Attempts to expose DN actors were silenced through intimidation, which will be further discussed in the following analysis chapter 8 regarding treatment of whistle-blowers.

It has been evidenced that a variety of shared methods were used by the DN to silence victims, to gain compliance for future offending and remain covert. These methods were not only used by individual DN actors to protect themselves but were similarly used to protect fellow DN actors with strong and weak ties. This demonstrates the trust between actors within the DN that other actors would reciprocate actions which protected individual DN actors and the DN as a whole. The overarching light network attribute of clericalism had been utilised to instil fear, guilt and blame in victims to prevent exposing the DN. It has been discussed above that the confessional was used to lay blame on victims. Additionally, the seal of confession was incorrectly applied to disclosures of clergy CSA by victims, as the CSA was not their sin. As stated, the DN distorted the seal of confession to benefit the DN. When applying the seal of confession to DN actors confessing to CSA, then the seal could be legitimately applied as they were confessing their own sin. However, confessing to CSA also benefited the DN.

7.7 The rite of confession absolves guilt of DN actors

The confessional provided an anonymous and confidential avenue for disclosure of CSA (Keenan 2013, 163). The application of the seal of confession may have contributed to the failure of leaders in the Catholic Church to respond appropriately to clergy CSA (Keenan 2013, 166). Dr Keenan concluded that given the way the men had “used the secrecy and safety of the confessional space to resolve the issues of guilt”, the “very process of confession itself might therefore be seen as having enabled the abuse to continue” (Keenan 2013, 163). RCICA findings similarly state that the
“act of religious confession was an important aspect of clergy perpetrators continuing to offend because they felt a degree of absolution” (RCICA 2017, 204). Therefore, the ability to use the rite of confession to absolve clergy perpetrators’ sin functioned as a DN resource as it negated the sin of breaking the vow of celibacy.

The above paragraphs portray a duplicity of responses to disclosures of clergy CSA during confession. Where a DN actor was disclosing their own CSA offences, they were granted forgiveness by fellow clergy and under the seal of confession the perpetrator’s admission was a safely guarded secret. Whereas, in the above example, a child’s disclosure of being a victim of clergy CSA was silenced. Both responses served to maintain the secrecy of clergy CSA, protect the Church and in effect support the DN of clergy perpetrators of CSA who were safe in the knowledge that this was the way disclosures were responded to.

This use of the rite of confession was apparent in the example of Fr Ryan, discussed earlier in relation to DN actors as mentors. Ryan used the confessional to not only groom his victims (Family and Community Development Committee 2013a, 18) but also to reconcile his offending (RCICA 2015f, 90). Treating clergy CSA as a sin requiring forgiveness and penance rather than a crime to be condemned and punished (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 96; Robertson 2010a, 43) facilitated further CSA. The consequences of being found guilty of committing CSA were negligible in comparison to non-clergy CSA perpetrators. In this example, Fr Ryan was granted absolution and the seal of confession was abided by; therefore, demonstrating that the seal of confession was selectively used by actors within the DN to support and reconcile their continued CSA. Even under canon law if clergy are accused of paedophilia, this is viewed as something beyond the perpetrator’s control and, therefore, can be used as a defence under ecclesiastical law as clergy cannot be blamed for uncontrollable impulses (Robertson 2010a, 28).

Under Canons 1395 and 1321 no one can be punished for an offence unless it is “gravely imputable by reason of malice or culpability” (Robertson 2010a, 47). This has
been used as an excuse because paedophilia is considered to be a psychosexual disorder and, therefore, even if tried under canon law, the ultimate penalty of dismissal cannot be imposed (RCICA 2017b, 716). Interestingly, the defence team for recently convicted clergy perpetrator, Cardinal George Pell, used a similar defence for the sentencing argument. The sentencing argument was that “if the offending had occurred, Pell must have experienced a moment of irrationality”. During sentencing, Judge Kidd’s stated, “I conclude that your decision to offend was a reasoned, albeit perverted, one, and I reach that conclusion to the criminal standard”. Pell was “sentenced to six years in jail after being convicted of sexually abusing two 13-year-old choirboys in 1996”. Judge Kidd described Pell’s offending as “brazen and forceful” and “breathtakingly arrogant” because he believed the victims would never complain (Davey 2019).

Although this defence was not sufficient to prevent Pell from being incarcerated, the defence’s sentencing argument of irrationality, applied under canon law, could prevent Pell’s dismissal. It is not known whether this was the applied reasoning, though if so, it demonstrates not only clerical narcissism but a prioritisation of canon law above criminal Law. The role of canon law and its application, or deficient application, is relevant to the analysis of the DNs as these legitimate functions of the light network of the Catholic Church have been exploited by the DN to commit CSA without consequence. Some detail of Pell’s conviction has been provided above because as a convicted DN actor and also as a former Archbishop who had significant influence in responding to clergy CSA, Pell provides an example of the overlap between the dark and grey networks. Chapter 8 examines how the response to clergy CSA by the Victorian Catholic Church grey network served as a significant DN resource.

The analysis so far has evidenced patterns in the methods used by DN actors to groom victims, commit CSA and to silence victims. These patterns include how to commit CSA and where to commit CSA, demonstrating the DN resource of shared knowledge. The following section further evidences that knowledge for committing CSA was shared between DN actors through mentor roles and identifying victims to one another. Moldoveanu and Baum (2011, 397) discuss individual, collective and interactive
knowledge states of DN actors. They argue that the knowledge states of DN actors can demonstrate the importance of these to the coordination of the DN. Mentors can provide offenders with guidance and support regarding criminal behaviours (Laferriere and Morselli 2015, 861). Moreover, mentors can exert a stronger influence when the individual being mentored has limited experience with the illicit activity (Laferriere and Morselli 2015, 872). The following paragraphs provide examples of mentor relationships between clergy DN actors.

7.8 DN actors supported by other DN actors acting as mentors

In criminal organisations, mentors instruct their proteges in codes of behaviour and offending methods and are introduced to other DN actors (Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy 2006, 18). Mentoring of clergy perpetrators will be examined as a method for perpetuating and extending the DN of Catholic clergy perpetrators of CSA. Clergy roles are normally appointed by the Bishop though in the case of a cleric requesting a spiritual director, the cleric can choose the person himself (Family and Community Development Committee 2013c, 7). The following examples evidence both of these occurrences.

In 1971, Fr Paul Ryan applied to Bishop Mulkearns to sponsor him as a Ballarat candidate for the priesthood. Despite Ryan being asked to leave the Adelaide Catholic seminary he was accepted as a candidate in Ballarat, and he spent the next five years at the Melbourne seminary. It was discovered by seminary authorities in 1976 that during his seminary training Ryan had been engaged in sexual relationships with about six trainee priests (BRA 2017m). Ryan became a frequent visitor to a later parish of Pickering’s in Gardenvale (BRA 2017m). Despite knowledge of the complaints of CSA against Ryan and Pickering, Ryan was later placed at Gardenvale under the care of Pickering by the Catholic Church authorities (D’Brass 2013, 2). Ryan also travelled to England to stay with Pickering (RCICA 2016a, 33). In reference to Ryan committing CSA, he said that he thought he was doing the wrong thing because he believed the sexual act itself was a sin and he reconciled his activities by going to confession with his regular confessor and mentor, Pickering (RCICA 2015f, 90). At the RCICA, Bishop
Finnigan stated that Ryan seemed to have a great trust in Pickering and praised Pickering for being “a wise, spiritual counsellor, an understanding man, he would offer him hospitality and encouragement” (RCICA 2015f, 90).

Fr Ryan’s case highlights the DN resources of support and trust being utilised to provide social reinforcement for committing CSA. Pickering’s history of CSA was known by Bishops and previous parishes where he had been transferred from following CSA complaints. As Ryan had already drawn attention to the DN, to protect the DN, Ryan was placed under the care of Fr Pickering, an older, more experienced clergy perpetrator. The relationship between Ryan and Pickering was not the only example of strong support for perpetrators through mentoring roles of other clergy perpetrators.

Fr Klep committed CSA in the 1970s and early 80s (BRA 2017e); despite this, at Rubeo’s request, Klep took on the role of spiritual director to Fr Rubeo in 1994. At that time Klep was facing charges of CSA and was later convicted; nevertheless, his counselling role to Rubeo continued. (Family and Community Development Committee 2013c, 6). Despite this not being the decision of the Bishop of the time, it would seem logical in any other context that this was an inappropriate arrangement considering Klep’s CSA charges. The data does not evidence knowledge of Rubeo’s perpetration of CSA although Rubeo was transferred from Doveton in 1984 and replaced by another DN actor, Fr Searson (RCICA 2015g, 5). This pattern of replacing one DN actor with another has been evidenced in the previous chapter 6. Despite it being unclear whether Rubeo’s CSA was known by the hierarchy, it has been evidenced at the RCICA that Rubeo was sexually abusing Paul Hersbach’s father in the 1960s, which was well before this mentor relationship began (RCICA 2014a, 54).

In addition to DN actors acting as mentors, the patterns of committing CSA align with the illicit activities of DNIs being normalised and being perceived as common behaviour amongst DN actors (Granovetter 1992, 45; Lauchs, Keast and Yousefpour 2011, 112; Petroczi et al., 2008, 1). This is particularly apparent in clusters of actors which have shared norms, strong trust and collective behaviour (Everton 2012, 23). Additionally,
the normalisation of and patterns in illicit activity aligns with definitions of organised criminals. Organised criminals establish norms, provide contacts and referees, transmit information about suitable targets and maintain a code of silence (Fielding 2017, 21). Fielding (2017, 17) discussed organised crime in terms of patterns of interaction and argues that organised criminals tend to show more uniform patterns of offending (Fielding 2017, 21). A further distinguishing feature is that organised crime is usually a career for these criminals (Albanese 2014, 88). This is apparent in the network in this thesis as many of the DN actors committed CSA over decades. The definition of an organised crime group provided under international law is of a “...structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit” (UN 2004, Article 2[a]).

This definition aptly describes the DN of clergy perpetrators being analysed here, the material benefit being child victims. Although there are variations in the distinguishing features of organised crime networks, these all fit within the classification of dark networks (Demiroz 2012, 271). DNs normalise certain patterns of behaviour to protect one another and the network from exposure (Lauchs, Keast and Yousefpour 2011, 112; Petroczi et al. 2008, 1). Therefore, when analysing patterns of committing CSA for the DN actors in this study, the focus is on uniform patterns of offending. Additionally, organised crime literature argues that these enterprises are reliant on the cooperation of multiple actors who may not be geographically close (Scott and Carrington 2014, 252). Cooperation between connected actors is reliant on pre-existing or developed social relations based on trust (Scott and Carrington 2014, 252). To further evidence the operation of a DN, the following section evidences DN actors utilising strong and weak ties to share resources. These resources include sharing victim information regarding vulnerability or whether the child has already been groomed or sexually abused.
7.9 Utilising dark network ties to share DN resources

7.9.1 Sharing victim information

The DN resource of victim information was available to DN actors in numerous ways. The clerical role provided access to personal family information which would not be likely to be available otherwise, as clergy were viewed as trusted confidants. This was even more evident in the context of priests providing the rite of confession. The confessional was used by DN actors to identify potential victims. As children would share their troubles in the confessional this was conducive to easy detection of vulnerability. Children would also disclose clergy abuse in the confessional, and this was used as a way of identifying victims (RCICA 2015g, 49). The following testimony provides evidence of this.

A victim of Fr Eames’ stated that Eames used to visit the family's house for free meals, and Eames would sexually abuse her on the couch in the lounge room. This victim stated that in “Confession priests had access to children's inner-most thoughts and feelings enabling selection of the most vulnerable victims” (BRA ndk). To further support the confessional being used as a DN resource to identify CSA victims, this is apparent in the following evidence from the RCICA regarding a victim’s attempt to report his sexual abuse:

The first time I ever told anyone about Fr Pickering sexually abusing me was in about 1968, when I was about 13 or 14. I went to a neighbouring parish, St Colman's at Balaclava, to go to confession. My confession was heard by Fr Baker, and I confessed to what Pickering had been doing to me. As soon as confession had finished, Baker wanted to chat to me. We had a conversation in the church about what I had just told him in confession. The conversation was not about the abuse that I disclosed to him; instead, what Baker wanted to know was where I lived. I thought this was odd. (RCICA 2015g, 49)
It was common practice for clergy to visit parishioners in their homes, where children often became victims of clergy CSA. This will be discussed later regarding patterns in committing CSA. In the context of identifying victims, the following example demonstrates these home visits being used for this purpose.

Another witness from the RCICA with the pseudonym BAC gave evidence that the parish priests of Ballan and Gordon, as well as other priests, came and visited his family home. At that time, parish priests in Ballarat regularly called on their parishioners at home (RCICA 2015a, 43). “I also remember Br Gerald Fitzgerald coming to our house once and Br Stephen Farrell and another Christian Brother whose name I cannot remember coming a couple of times” (RCICA 2015a, 43, line 17-20). When BAC started at St Alipius, he was sexually abused by Farrell (RCICA 2015a, 44). It cannot be said why these priests from outside the parish would visit this victim’s home, though it is significant that BAC was later sexually abused by one of these visiting clergy. This demonstrates a victim being identified and later sexually abused.

Another form of victim identification is apparent in the following evidence. A victim of CSA using the pseudonym BAV, testified that not long after being sexually abused by Br Best he was in the school yard and someone pinched him on his face. BAV looked up and saw it was Fr Ridsdale and with him was Br Best (RCIC 2015e, 24).

Ridsdale just smiled at me. Sometime later I was in Grade 6 and I went to the beach with Ridsdale and some of the other boys from the school. On the way back, I sat next to Ridsdale in the front passenger seat of the car. Ridsdale sexually abused me. Another time, I was sorting out bottles in the shed behind the presbytery at St Alipius Catholic Church. Ridsdale was there and he started to touch me. He then took me into his bedroom in the presbytery and sexually abused me.

As stated previously, DN resources may be material and/or non-material, such as victims and victim information (Cunningham, Everton and Murphy 2016, 4). The identification and sharing of victims represent the facilitation of trust between actors and rewarding this trust through the reciprocation and sharing of network resources (Milward et al. 2006, 350). Identifying vulnerable targets to one another is a valuable
DN resource and is based on a system of trust. Moldoveanu and Baum (2011, 393), argue that trust is a system of interactive beliefs based on actor’s propensity to report relevant information to one another. This affiliation between perpetrators makes it more likely that they will commit CSA together (Hu, Kaza and Chen (2009, 662). This is evidenced in some of the clusters analysed in the previous analysis chapter 6, where clergy committed CSA simultaneously at an institution.

The following section provides examples of the primary DN resource of victims being shared with other DN actors. Evidencing sharing of DN resources is an important aspect of demonstrating the operation of a DN. The ties between DN actors are facilitated by trust which is based on a reciprocation of resource sharing (van der Hulst 2009, 106; Milward and Raab 2006, 350; RCICA 2017a). As stated earlier, victims are the primary DN resource. Sharing of other DN resources such as knowledge and information are precursory to procuring the DN source of victims. Similarly, online paedophile networks exchange the DN resource of child victims in the form of pornography and by identifying children to abuse (Henshaw, Ogloff and Clough 2015, 417; Webb, Craissati and Keen 2007).

7.9.2 Victim sharing within clusters

Victim sharing is shown to have occurred within clusters and exemplifies DN actors with strong ties sharing DN resources. Three St Alipius boys were all sexually abused by the same three clergy perpetrators, Dowlan, Best and Ridsdale, at this institution (BRA ndb). The simultaneous perpetration of clergy CSA highlighted the difficulties faced by victims in reporting their sexual abuse. Reporting victimisation to another cleric at this institution effectively disclosed victim status to another perpetrator. Another form of victim sharing was apparent in the example provided in the above section regarding victim identification. This example evidenced a victim of CSA committed by Br Best was in the school yard and his face was pinched by Fr Ridsdale and with him was Br Best (RCICA 2015e, 24). The fact that this child was consequentially abused by Best evidences victim sharing between DN actors. An alternative explanation could be that the child being pinched on the face by Ridsdale
while he was with Best, and this child being subsequently sexually abused by Best was coincidental. However, this is hard to accept as coincidence when there are further examples of these two clergy perpetrators sharing other victims.

Another example of one student being sexually abused by both Ridsdale and Best is Robert Walsh. Walsh was abused by both clergy perpetrators while a Grade 6 student at St Alipius (Family and Community development 2013b, 3). Analysis of a clergy perpetrator of a CSA network in Bindoon, Western Australia, also found evidence of child victims being identified as such by clergy for the purpose of resource sharing in the form of victim information (Death 2018, 95). These examples of victim sharing demonstrate not only sharing of DN resources between DN actors but also the DN resource of trust.

The figure below shows the section of the map in Appendix 3 which illustrates three DN actors belonging to the same cluster, sharing DN resources in the form of victims.
Further evidence of victim sharing at an institution was apparent in the case of another victim of clergy CSA, who was sexually abused by Br Dowlan (RCICA 2015e, 37), Br Ring and another unnamed Brother (RCICA 2015e, 39). Neil Wileman gave testimony at the RCICA, stating,

Brother [REDACTED] was also a teacher at St Patrick's. I can't recall exactly what he taught. He was very physically abusive. He would regularly hit students across the head with an open hand for minor misdemeanours. The Brother also

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victim</th>
<th>Abused by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Br Best and Dowlan, Fr Ridsdale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walsh</td>
<td>Br Best and Fr Ridsdale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAQ</td>
<td>Br Fitzgerald and Dowlan, Fr Ridsdale</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
sexually abused me during the same period as both Dowlan and Ring were abusing me (RCIC 2015e, 39).

The CSA committed against this victim provides an example of a victim of one DN actor becoming victim to two other DN actors belonging to the same cluster. This provides another example of the function of strong ties within a cluster as these perpetrators shared DN resources of support, trust and a victim. There was no direct evidence of the identification of the victim by Dowlan to Ring; however, when three clergy commit CSA in the same institution against the same child this is difficult to view as coincidence. This is particularly evident when this pattern of victim sharing occurs across multiple institutions with different DN clusters. DN actors sharing victims was not confined to cluster actors with strong ties as victims were also shared with weak DN ties at other institutions.

7.9.3 Victim sharing cross-institutionally

In addition to the strong ties of clusters of DN actors, there were weak DN actor ties across institutions. Some clergy perpetrators utilised these ties to visit one another at their parishes and commit CSA against children at the institution they were visiting (Krstic 2012, 8). Whilst clergy visiting each other across institutions may be reasonable expected, the transport of victims by DN actors to visit other DN actors is evidence of the operation of a DN. Victims were taken to other parishes by DN actors for overnight stays and would sometimes take a boy from the school they visited back to their own parish for a visit or to take them on a trip (BRA 2014b). In reciprocation, other DN actors would bring boys to visit other DN actors (BRA 2014b). Strong ties between DN cluster actors and individual weak tie actors being utilised to share DN resources evidences the operation of a DN. This is evident in ties by DN actors that were used to support illicit activity through sharing the material DN resource of victims.

In cluster 3, Frs Glennon and Pidoto were regular visitors to St Augustine’s and are known to have committed CSA here (BRA 2014b). Pidoto also visited Fr Daniel from Healesville parish (Krstic 2012, 8). Scott (2013, 124) states that overlapping cluster
membership creates network interrelations. A victim who lived at St Augustine’s orphanage from the age of 10 to 16, stated “he was sexually abused by Br Webster, Br Eastmure and others. This victim stated that the Brothers would drink alcohol at night and then one or more of them would come to the dormitory to pick a boy to molest” (BRA 2011b). Another victim stated that while he was at St Augustine’s, Gubbels would visit the orphanage and sleep in a dormitory with the boys, and on one night, he was sexually abused by Gubbels (BRA 2014b). This evidences that Gubbels visited this cluster for the purpose of committing CSA. Br Alford from St Augustine’s reciprocated by taking some boys in a mini-bus to Melbourne to visit Gubbels at the Corpus Christi seminary (BRA 2014b). The following witness statement evidences a reciprocation of DN resource sharing between Gubbels and Alford.

In 1975, when I was eleven, I was put into St Augustine’s after my parents separated. Jack Gubbels used to visit there. He slept in a dormitory with the boys. One night, Gubbels hopped into bed with me and handled my genitals. On another occasion Br Alford, from St Augustine’s, took some of us boys in a mini-bus to Melbourne, where we visited Gubbels at the Corpus Christi seminary. (BRA ndq)

The parish of Springvale, where Gubbels was positioned, did not have a DN cluster. Therefore, these actions represent Gubbels as a weak DN tie utilising DN resources of clusters with strong ties. Additionally, Gubbels’ brought in new DN resources, which is a strength of weak DN ties (Stark 2007, Everton and Cunningham 2013, 98). Also apparent was the reciprocation of sharing DN resources, which provides an example of how DN resources were transferred between strong and weak ties.

The DN resources of victim identification and information and evidence of victim sharing has been demonstrated. Returning to Gubbels as an example of many of the above methods of grooming, committing CSA and sharing of DN resources, prior to taking his victim on an overnight stay at another institution, Gubbels groomed the victim’s family and would visit for family meals, say good night to this boy in his bedroom and return later entering the boy’s bedroom through the window and commit CSA (BRA 2014b).
7.10 Conclusion

DNs in various contexts have various motivations and, therefore, seek a variety of resources. It has been evidenced that the clergy DN being analysed here used resources specific to the facilitation of CSA. Strong and weak DN ties were used to share DN resources, which demonstrates the operation of a DN. These resources were predominantly non-material and included sharing victim information, knowledge regarding how and where to commit CSA and reciprocated protection to silence victims and remain covert. These resources were used and shared for the purpose of accessing the primary material resource of child victims.

Overarching the ability to facilitate CSA is the light network attribute of clericalism. The trust and power granted to clergy by virtue of their clerical status was exploited by DN actors to commit CSA and to silence victims. Additionally, the light network attribute of the canon law served to frame CSA as a sin rather than a crime. This allowed for the confessional to be used to remove that sin and absolve DN actors of guilt and blame. The exploitation of these light network attributes resulted in many DN actors committing CSA without recognition of CSA as a criminal offence. This distinguishes clergy CSA networks from secular CSA networks, particularly regarding the resilience of the DN. The following chapter 8, analyses ways in which the grey network of the Victorian Catholic Church added a further layer of protection to this clergy DN. The grey network, similar to the DN, showed patterns in their responses to clergy CSA. Patterns utilised to silence complaints of CSA served as a DN resource as these allowed DN actors to continue to commit CSA. Similarly, the consistent practise of transferring known clergy perpetrators of CSA to new parishes significantly contributed to the resilience of the DN.
Chapter 8 Analysis of the Grey Network as a Dark Network Resource

8.1 Introduction

As stated in theory chapter 3, DNs are those which are illegal and covert; light networks in contrast are legal and overt. A third category of networks are grey networks, which use their licit status to maintain secrecy and cover-up illicit activities within the DN (Neil and Peterie 2018, 132). In contrast to the illicit nature of DNs, grey networks function in a manner which facilitates the illicit nature of DNs. A grey network consists of actors who are not necessarily perpetrators but contribute to the facilitation of illicit actions through direct actions or inaction. As has been evidenced in the RICA and VPI, the Victorian Catholic Church further enabled the continuation of clergy CSA through a response of denial and cover-up with protection of the Catholic Church as its priority (Robinson 2010, 26; Doyle 2006, 189; Tapsell 2014). These actions served as DN resources which contributed to the protection and resilience of the clergy DN.

Although grey networks are rarely referred to as such in the literature, the context of what constitutes a grey network is referred to. For example, Cockbain, Brayley and Laycock (2011, 154) discuss facilitators of child sex trafficking networks who enable this illicit activity by turning a blind eye to suspicious activity such as allowing men to check in to hotels with young girls. This example refers to facilitation through inaction. It is likely that there were individuals who had knowledge of clergy CSA occurring and did nothing. However, the data evidences facilitation of clergy CSA through specific actions of grey network actors. These actions include minimising, denying, covering-up and silencing complaints of CSA. Furthermore, known clergy perpetrators were transferred to new parishes by grey network actors in response to CSA complaints. These actions served to protect the DN regarding covertness, allowing access to new victims and extending opportunities to commit CSA. Individuals in similar roles are referred to in the literature as legitimate actors, facilitators and grey network actors. Regardless of the terminology used, these individuals fill a position within a criminal network which facilitates the illicit activity of the criminal or dark network.
Studies on organised crime show that the role facilitators play in criminal networks is neglected (Levi, Nelen and Lankhorst 2005, 117). It is argued that legitimate business actors such as lawyers and accountants may use their position to facilitate crime (Karin and Morth 2018, 228; Burcher and Whelan 2015, 106). Lawyers may carry out illicit financial transactions on behalf of the DN and use privileged knowledge to hide their complicity (Karin and Morth 2018, 228; Middleton and Levi 2015). Comparatively, Bishops facilitated clergy CSA by approving transfers of known clergy DN actors to institutions where children were accessible. Ironically, the position of these facilitators could equally be used to report suspicions or knowledge of illicit activity.

Focussing solely on the DN does not suffice in providing a complete explanation of all the DN resources available to and used by the DN of clergy perpetrators of CSA. As stated in the organised crime literature, defining the essential characteristics of organised crime based on illicit activities and illicit actor’s activities overlooks the potentially more serious activities of licit actors benefiting from organised crime (Cribb 2009; Hall 2012, 372). A police corruption network structure is similar to a clergy DN because it is a DN within a light network (Lauchs, Keast and Yousefpour 2011, 114). Similar to police corruption networks, it is likely that the structure of the light network of the Catholic Church influenced the structure of the DN. In police corruption networks this is determined by the power and position of DN actors, who utilise their influence and ability to exercise discretion in ways that benefit the DN (Lauchs, Keast and Yousefpour 2011, 114). Grey network actors in the Catholic Church included those who were not committing CSA but used their position and power to cover-up clergy CSA and transfer known clergy perpetrators of CSA to new parishes.

Interestingly, both police corruption DNs and the Victorian Catholic grey network not only operated within light networks but also had strong cultural codes of silence. Moreover, both of these networks had the capacity to govern or influence a significant portion of the population. These are similarly stated as being characteristics of organised crime groups and Mafia, which are said to have “added social and cultural dimensions and the capacity to govern” (Dalla Chiesa 2010; Varese 2011). Evidence
that the grey network used their hierarchical status and the culture of the Catholic Church to support the clergy DN will be analysed in the following sections.

The grey network of the Victorian Catholic Church played a significant role in the facilitation of clergy perpetrated CSA. As the light network attributes of clericalism and corporal punishment were exploited by DN actors to commit CSA, so were the responses to clergy CSA by the grey network. The grey network’s responses to complaints of CSA were a major contributing factor to the DN’s resilience. Considering the DN being analysed in this thesis operated for over six decades, this attests to the resilience of this particular DN. Therefore, the grey network’s role is a crucial factor in the analysis of the DN.

8.2 Grey network responses as DN resources

The significant role of the grey network in contributing to continued clergy CSA lies in the utilisation of the extended powers of Catholic Bishops, Archbishops, Cardinals and Popes to facilitate clergy CSA. Evidence of covering-up clergy CSA from the Pope to the laity will be discussed in the following paragraphs as will examples of known clergy perpetrators being promoted to roles such as dormitory master, vice principal and principal. This gave these DN actors increased power, access to victims and further control over silencing complaints of CSA. Additionally, methods used to maintain DN numbers and, therefore, DN resilience, through placing DN actors in recruitment roles to support the proliferation and resilience of the DN, will be discussed. If a DN were reliant on a finite set of actors, then, logically, the DN could only exist for as long as these actors are part of the DN. The DN was able to utilise transfers, promotions and covering-up of clergy CSA by the grey network to protect DN actors, to commit further CSA and maintain DN resilience.

The grey network used consistent methods to avoid being seen, to allow the illicit occurrence of clergy CSA to continue while simultaneously protecting the reputation of the Catholic Church, which has been the priority (Family and Community
Development Committee 2013b, 3). This consistent response supports the argument that the Catholic Church knew of the occurrence of clergy CSA and that this was a major issue which required covering up. While the responses to clergy CSA have been documented in the RCICA and the VPI, these have not been analysed in the context of these being DN resources.

8.3 Grey network actors’ response to clergy CSA

The grey network comprised members of the Victorian Catholic Church and range in position from Popes to the laity. Qualifying as a part of the grey network entails individuals engaging in activity which facilitated the coverup of clergy CSA and silencing of victims and their families. Individuals in the grey network were not necessarily committing CSA, though there is some overlap between the dark and grey networks. This overlap occurs where a DN actor is in a position of status. As such, they have the power to transfer DN actors to other parishes and cover-up complaints of clergy CSA, which are functions of the grey network.

Responses to clergy CSA by Popes served to facilitate clergy CSA; despite a public response of shock and disapproval, in practise, clergy CSA was denied, and actions were taken to cover-up clergy CSA. As was the case for Bishops and Archbishops, the Popes’ response to the occurrence of clergy CSA served to protect clergy perpetrators of CSA, and this response of cover-up filtered down through the hierarchical ranks of the Catholic Church. As stated by Doyle, Sipe and Wall (2006, 278), “Corruption does not seep up from the bottom it is raining down from the top”. In his previous position as a Cardinal and a Vatican official, former Pope Benedict spent 10 years as head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith. During those 10 years, every CSA report from around the globe came to his office (Family and Community Development Committee 2013d, 4). Despite this, while visiting Scotland in 2010 in response to the CSA problem he commented to reporters,

These revelations were for me a shock and a great sadness. It is difficult to understand how this perversion of the priestly ministry was possible. He added,
it is also a great sadness that the authorities of the church were not sufficiently vigilant and insufficiently quick and decisive in taking the necessary measures. (Black and McLaughlin 2010, 1)

Pope Benedict’s instruction to Catholic clergy, in 2001, to send all reports of clergy CSA to his office highlights the denial and cover-up response which was filtered down through the ranks of the Catholic Church. Similarly, Pope Benedict’s predecessor Pope John Paul II responded to sexual corruption by stating, “keep quiet, deny, apologise if necessary, and when in doubt, attack the messenger” (Family and Community Development Committee 2013d, 4). This highlights a contradiction in public responses and instructions given to Bishops by Popes Benedict and John Paul II. These responses, utilised by grey network actors, were likely aimed at protecting the Catholic Church though these responses served to protect and facilitate clergy CSA. The consistent response of denial, minimisation and cover-up played a significant role in the resilience of the DN, as DN actors were protected by not only the strong and weak ties of the DN but there was an added shield provided by the grey network.

8.4 Transferring known clergy perpetrators of CSA

Decisions by Archbishops and Bishops on where to transfer known clergy perpetrators of CSA were vital to DN resilience. Transfers served to protect individual DN actors and also the cluster the DN actor belonged to. It is this response to DN disruption which is vital to DN resilience (Bakker, Raab and Milward 2012, 35). DN resilience is dependent on a DN’s ability to replace actors and maintain network operationalisation when the DN is confronted with a threat of exposure (Bakker et al., 2012; Milward and Raab, 2006). Not only did Bishops and Archbishops protect DN actors by transferring those who were subject to complaint, transfers to schools gave these known perpetrators further access to victims, therefore, facilitating further CSA. When Melbourne Archbishop Hart (2001-2018) was asked during the VPI who decided on placement and duties of parish priests, he replied, “Ultimately, I do” (Family and Community Development Committee 2013c, 4). Hart referred to a provision in canon
law which states that if a priest’s ministry becomes harmful that he can be removed from office. However, in practise the priest was simply moved from that particular office and given another job rather than being defrocked (RCICA 2015f, 68).

The following graphs demonstrate transferring DN actors as a consistent response by Bishops and Archbishops to complaints of clergy CSA. The individual Diocese graphs cover the time span of clergy CSA included in the data and the corresponding Bishops in power over this time. The graph below (Fig. 8.1) shows that the response of transferring DN actors was consistently used by five different Bishops. This excludes any theory of this response being an exception rather than the rule. This consistent response also indicates a normalisation of or a mandatory response to instructions from popes of these periods, as mentioned above.

**Figure 8.1 Bishops who transferred clergy perpetrators between 1939-2001**

Interestingly the graph below (Fig. 8.2) of the Ballarat Diocese also shows a consistent response by two long serving Bishops, Collins and Mulkearns, though the data does not show any such transfers during 1997-2012 while Connors was Bishop. As is common with DN data, sourcing complete data was difficult due to the covert nature of DNs. Also, in the context of clergy CSA, disclosures were often significantly delayed. The absence of data regarding transfers of known perpetrators may reflect an absence of DN actors or unavailable data. It may also reflect Bishop Connor acting
against the mandated response to complaints of clergy CSA. However, this is unlikely considering that Connors supported the DN through silencing and covering up complaints of clergy CSA.

As was the case for the Melbourne Archdiocese and Ballarat Diocese, transferring known perpetrators was a consistent response to complaints of clergy CSA used by Bishop Stewart of Sandhurst Diocese. These transfers by Stewart related to the one cluster apparent in the Sandhurst Diocese at St Vincent’s orphanage in Bendigo. During 1959-1984, five of the 41 parishes in this Diocese showed the presence of DN actors, and the one cluster present shows the sequential placement of three out of a total of seven known clergy perpetrators in this Diocese being placed in this cluster, indicating a preferential placement of known clergy perpetrators at institutions where perpetrators were protected by the strong ties present in DN clusters. Additionally, as discussed in the previous chapter 7, strong ties provided access to DN resources such as prior groomed victims and community.
The Diocese of Sale had three known clergy perpetrators. There is only one example of a known perpetrator being transferred to another parish within that Diocese. Of significance is the transfer of one known perpetrator, Br Tobin, to the Archdiocese of Melbourne to cluster 7 at Assumption College, Kilmore, providing a further example for a preference to transfer known clergy perpetrators to DN clusters which are considered safe regarding protecting the clergy perpetrator. Additionally, this demonstrates that transfers were not confined to within the current diocese. This signifies the extended reach of the DN and its ability to protect the DN.

Focussing on one DN actor highlights the significance of this consistent response as a DN resource. Fr O’Donnell served under four Melbourne Archbishops, Daniel Mannix, 1917-1963; Justin Simmonds. 1963-67; James Knox, 1967-1974 and Frank Little from 1974 onwards (RCICA 2017d, 48). O’Donnell committed CSA from 1944-1990 and was consistently transferred from parish to parish despite substantiated complaints of CSA at eight parishes (RCICA 2016b, 238 and 242). A total of 56 people made either a claim or a complaint of CSA that was substantiated against O’Donnell (RCICA 2016b, 242). This demonstrates how these transfers served to support the longevity or resilience of clergy CSA.
It cannot be evidenced here that Bishops purposefully transferred known DN actors to parishes where other DN actors were present or had been present. However, as it was Bishops who made these decisions then they have also made the decision to transfer the previous DN actor. Therefore, they would have known if they had transferred a DN actor to that parish previously. Transferring of clergy between parishes or institutions is in itself a legitimate and common practise. However, this was done in response to complaints of clergy CSA and without telling the new parish of the perpetrator’s history of offending. This aligns with grey networks implementing methods that occupy an ambiguous space regarding legality and transparency (Neil and Peterie 2018, 141).

A further layer of protection and a sense of security was provided by the grey network as DN actors could rely on the desire to protect the Church to ultimately serve to protect the DN. Moreover, DN actors were transferred to schools and parishes where they had access to victims rather than to a role which would not involve contact with children. The following paragraphs provide examples of how such transfers and the duties or roles DN actors were placed in facilitated clergy CSA and DN resilience.

Fr Baker's fellow-priests and Bishop were aware of Baker’s CSA at his early parishes, which resulted in him being removed from parish work to hospital chaplaincy in 1971-4 (BRA nda). The Archdiocese often "quarantined" a problem priest in hospital chaplaincy for a period before transferring them to a new parish (BRA nda). After complaints of CSA at Gladstone Park, Baker was transferred to Eltham, without warning parishioners of Baker's history of CSA. Baker worked unsupervised and he continued committing CSA at Eltham (BRA nda).

Similarly, in 1969, despite complaints of CSA from previous parishes such as Ringwood, the Archdiocese promoted Eames from Assistant Priest to Parish Priest, priest in charge at Yea 1969-74, Aspendale 1974-80 and Winchelsea 1980-92 (BRA ndk). This meant that, unlike in his earlier parishes and as in the case of Baker, Eames was now unsupervised, and Eames continued to commit CSA (BRA ndk). In Eames's
various transfers, as was the common practise, the Archdiocese did not inform each new parish of the previous complaints against Eames (BRA ndk). These examples demonstrate how DN actors were protected by the grey network through transferring them in response to complaints. Further to this, the extended periods spent in various parishes indicates some DN actors’ ability to commit CSA without the need for a transfer. Therefore, it can be argued that these parishes or communities, had been groomed so that complaints of CSA were minimised or controlled to an extent that transfers were not necessary for extended periods. As discussed in the previous analysis chapter 7, grooming parishes created opportunities for clergy CSA (McAlinden 2012,123). Therefore, groomed parishes provided a safe place to transfer DN actors as there was an established support system for the covering up of clergy CSA.

Similarly, Br Edward Dowlan was transferred by Bishop Mulkearns, from one parish to another following complaints of CSA. In a 1973 report provided as evidence in the VPI (2013), it states that “Dowlan is overtly affectionate in expression with his boys” and that, “Ted felt that he was not imprudent in his expression of affection when confronted with this remark” (Family and Community Development Committee 2013, 21). After St Alipius, Dowlan was sent to St Thomas More School in Forest Hill until a complaint of CSA was made by one family. When DN actors subject to complaint were transferred, not only was the new parish not told of offending, but the parish the DN actor was transferred from was not told where the clergy perpetrator was being transferred to. When Dowlan was transferred from St Thomas More, the school was told that Dowlan had gone on a religious retreat when in fact he had been transferred to St Patrick’s, Ballarat, where Dowlan committed further CSA (Family and Community Development Committee 2013, 20).

The above examples also demonstrate the grey network’s use of deception to placate complainants of clergy CSA, a practise which acted as a DN resource in protecting DN actors. Another form of deception used by the grey network to quieten complaints was to transfer DN actors to a role outside the school system, as stated regarding Baker’s transfer above, for a period, before transferring them back into the school
system where they had access to victims. Not only did this function as a DN resource, it also supported the resilience of the DN of clergy perpetrators of CSA.

Further examples of deceptive actions and a willingness of the grey network to overlook clergy CSA are provided in the following paragraphs. These examples show an additional element of deception intended to avoid detection as a known perpetrator. This adds weight to the evidence of the extent of measures taken by the grey network to protect DN actors. Br Francis Keating who took the religious name of Br Ibar committed CSA in Catholic schools across Australia. A parent of a victim of CSA committed by Ibar at De La Salle College in Malvern, Melbourne, complained about the CSA in 1978 (BRA ndy). The De La Salle order responded by supporting Ibar for two years’ study at a university in South Australia (BRA ndy).

In 1981, Ibar was appointed a school in Scarborough, in Queensland, where he became deputy principal and then principal. Ibar left the brotherhood in 1991 and worked as a lay teacher, Mr Keating at Catholic schools in Port Augusta and Port Pirie in South Australia in 1992-3 and in Ferntree Gully and Werribee, Victoria in 1993-5. He then worked as an administrator in the Catholic Education Office, Melbourne, until the Victoria Police charged him in 1997 (BRA ndy).

This example demonstrates an additional method of changing identity being utilised to avoid detection and facilitate continued CSA. The fact that this DN actor was allowed to utilise this method and continue to work in the Catholic education system highlights the grey networks compliance and complicity regarding actions of DN actors.

A similar example is apparent in the example of Br Coffin where in Melbourne, despite his record of child-sex crimes in South Australia, a former trainee priest, Coffin was accepted by the Marist Brothers in 1972 to work as a lay teacher at their College in Preston under the new name of Mr Coffey (BRA 2015). In 1980, Coffey became school principal and remained there until 1985 (BRA 2015). Although changing surname indicates an attempt to deceive and remain covert this was not an attempt to deceive the Catholic Church as Br Coffin aka Mr Coffey was known to have committed
clergy CSA by the Church. Despite this knowledge the Catholic Church employed Mr Coffey in the Catholic school system. Therefore, changing name would appear to serve the purpose of remaining covert from police as he had received a suspended sentence in South Australia in 1972 for a child-sex crime (BRA 2015).

The grey network, specifically Archbishop James Gleeson, further aided Coffey’s ability to remain covert: by transferring Br Coffin to another state, Victorian police had no record of his crimes, and when he was later charged in Victoria for CSA, he received a lenient sentence because there was an assumption that he was a first-time perpetrator (BRA 2015). The data provides further examples of known perpetrators being not only transferred within Victoria but also interstate. During 1979, the Melbourne archdiocese arranged for Fr Gubbels to transfer "on loan" to the Townsville diocese in Queensland (BRA 2015b). In Queensland, despite being junior, Gubbels was put in charge of a parish at Collinsville in 1980-81 (BRA 2015b).

A further example of the grey network obstructing police was apparent in the data regarding Fr Barry Robinson. Despite the Melbourne Archdiocese knowing that Robinson had admitted to committing CSA in Boston in 1994, he was accepted into ministry in Melbourne. In 2011, there was an attempt to place him as a parish priest of Healesville, which has had several other known perpetrators there. In addition to this, church officials “obstructed justice when facilitating Robinson’s sudden departure from the United States whilst under police investigation” (Family and Community Development Committee 2012a, 6). These examples highlight not only the extent of the protection of DN actors provided by the grey network but also demonstrate clerical narcissism in the apparent disregard of criminal and secular law through protecting clergy perpetrators who have been found guilty of CSA.
8.5 Extending dark network boundaries and protection from secular law

Although this data set was limited to the boundaries of Victoria, the above examples demonstrate that the dark and grey networks extended beyond these boundaries to other Australian states, and these extended boundaries were utilised to protect the DN of perpetrators. The following example shows that the grey network also transferred DN actors beyond Australia’s borders to other countries to evade police in Australia and, therefore, protect the DN. These overseas transfers also extended network reach and allowed further institutions to be groomed.

Br Julian Fox was appointed as the head of the Salesian Order in Australia, supervising Salesian schools in several States (BRA ndn). The Victorian police wanted to interview Fox, but in 2003 the church gave him a job in Rome as a web-master on the Salesians’ worldwide website (Family and Community Development Committee 2012b, 7). Fox used Rome as his base, but he travelled the world (Family and Community Development Committee 2012b, 7). This transfer of Fox to Rome by the grey network showed the grey network not only protecting this DN actor and obstructing a police investigation but placing Fox in a position which provided significant opportunities to acquire new DN resources such as victims, new DN actors, safe places to hide clergy subject to complaints and connections to other DN actors globally. The promotion of DN interests by the grey network was also apparent in the role promotion of known clergy perpetrators of CSA.

8.6 Promotion of known clergy perpetrators of CSA

Promoting DN clergy perpetrators of CSA was reliant on the grey network as the hierarchy would approve such promotions. The following examples evidence known perpetrators being returned to higher positions in parishes and schools where they had previously committed CSA. The data for Fr Rapson evidences that Rapson’s sexual offending against children was known prior to being promoted in the education
system. In 1986, Rapson was transferred to Salesian College Rupertswood, where he eventually became the vice-principal (BRA 2015f). In 2013, Rapson was charged with CSA against 8 schoolboys between 1973-1990 (BRA 2015f). One victim was sexually abused by Rapson during 1990 when he was Rupertswood’s College Vice Principal (Monagle 2013, 1). The mother of another victim states that her son disclosed to her that he had often been raped by Rapson in 1988, while attending Rupertswood (O’Brien 2012, 1). The available dates demonstrate that Rapson’s offending commenced well before his promotion to Vice principal and continued beyond this appointment. Similarly, in 1967, Fr Anthony Eames was committing CSA against girls in Aquinas College Ringwood (BRA ndk). In 1969, despite complaints, the archdiocese promoted Eames from Assistant Priest to the unsupervised position of Parish Priest at Yea 1969-74, Aspendale 1974-80 and Winchelsea 1980-92 (BRA 2016ac).

During the administration of Ballarat by Bishop O’Collins, from 1941 to 1971 several DN actors were promoted despite complaints of CSA. In the 1950s, O’Collins promoted Fr Day to the rank of a monsignor (BRA 2013a), and Fr Fox became vice-principal and a principal of two Melbourne schools (BRA ndn). Br Schofield rose to become the principal of Christian Brothers schools in Queensland despite being the subject of complaints of CSA against boys while working at St Augustine’s boys’ orphanage in the late 1940s (BRA 2016w). In 1982-86, DN actor, Fr Frank Klep, was back at "Rupertswood", Sunbury, as principal (BRA 2017e). This demonstrates the important role of the grey network in facilitating clergy CSA and placing DN actors in positions of power regarding protection and resilience of the DN. The consistent response by Bishops aligns with SNA, which assumes that actors do not make independent decisions but are strongly influenced by the behaviour of other actors (Everton 2012, 17). This explains not only the consistency of the response across each individual diocese but also across all four Victorian diocese.

It has been evidenced that the Victorian Catholic Church grey network maintained and replaced DN actors through transferring clergy perpetrators subject to complaints of CSA. As stated, a DN’s ability to maintain and replace actors and ties significantly
enhances the DN’s resilience (Hu, Kaza and Chen, 2009; Krebs 2002; Raab and Milward 2003). Furthermore, silencing complaints is another crucial factor in DN resilience; as stated in research on corrupt police networks, once one member blows the whistle the whole network collapses (Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain 2012, 200). However, in the context of this thesis and the available data, there is no indication of dark or grey network actors attempting to blow the whistle on the DN. The following section discusses the methods used by the grey network to cover-up and silence complaints of clergy CSA, which also significantly contributed to the DN’s resilience.

8.7 Grey network patterns for the cover-up of clergy CSA

8.7.1 Clergy CSA complaints

Complaints of clergy CSA were covered up by the grey network, and many clergy CSA victims did not disclose to any person or report their abuse in an official capacity for a number of reasons. Some of these reasons have been discussed in the previous analysis chapter 7 in regard to the methods used by DN actors to silence victims; further explanation is provided here. Apart from the fact that CSA is often committed by a trusted adult, after the child has been manipulated and isolated and the abuser is trusted by the child’s parents, it is extremely unlikely that a child will disclose abuse (Family and Community Development Committee 2012, 4). An added difficulty in victims being believed is that CSA often happens in private and, therefore, there are no witnesses (Family and Community Development Committee 2012, 3).

Of all claims of CSA in the Archdiocese of Melbourne, 66% were male and 26% were female (RCICA 2017b,104). Barriers to disclosure pertain to CSA in the general community and also clergy CSA. However, regarding clergy CSA, there was the additional barrier of clericalism, which intensified the doubt of victims that they would be believed (Palmer and Feldman 2017, 29). Despite the improbability of victims reporting or disclosing clergy CSA, the grey network employed strategies to further ensure silence. Strategies include minimisation, denial and cover-up of the incidence of clergy CSA. There are similarities in the strategies used by the DN to silence victims. As the DN used a pattern of methods to silence victims, the grey network
used similar methods to silence complaints which went beyond the victim. Therefore, when the DN actor had not successfully silenced a victim and clergy CSA was disclosed, the grey network silenced complaints from secondary victims and concerned laity.

8.7.2 Minimisation of the occurrence of clergy CSA by grey network actors

Various strategies were used to minimise the occurrence of clergy CSA, one of which was to allow victims to believe that they were the only victim, which added to their reluctance to disclose or report abuse and supported the continued denial and minimisation response by the Church. An example of this occurrence is apparent in the following excerpt from the VPI.

Pell sent two CSA victims a letter each dated the same day. Both victims complained about the same sexually-abusive priest. To one victim, he stated that the Church investigation showed that CSA had taken place and the Church apologised (Family and Community Development Committee 2012c, 18). To the second victim, Pell stated the Church investigation had shown that sexual abuse could not be substantiated. The second letter also states that no other complaints had been received about the perpetrator.

(Family and Community Development Committee 2012c, 18)

The following witness testimony provides an example of an attempt by Pell to buy a victim’s silence.

David Ridsdale, a victim of his uncle, Gerald Ridsdale, was struggling in his adult life and decided to ring family friend George Pell for some advice regarding the CSA he had suffered (RCICA 2015d, 72). The following is the response he received from Pell:

I told George I had been abused by Gerald. His first reaction was, “Oh, right”. There was no shock. His tone then became terse relatively quickly and I could sense anger in his voice. I started to get a sense he was insinuating things
about my story and I felt like I'd done something wrong. George then began to talk of my growing family and my need to take care of their needs. He mentioned things such as, I may soon have to buy a car or a house for my family. I do remember with clarity the last three lines we spoke together:

Me: ‘Excuse me, George, what the fuck are you talking about?’ George said, ‘I want to know what it will take to keep you quiet’. My response was, ‘Fuck you George, and everything you stand for’. I hung up the phone. (RCICA 2015d, 73)

Pell’s responses to clergy CSA demonstrate the grey network utilising common tactics to minimise and silence complaints of clergy CSA. Another method of minimisation of clergy CSA was to downplay the harm caused by CSA. The Catholic church frequently minimised clergy CSA by viewing this as a problem requiring treatment, not a criminal offence, and as something that was not particularly harmful to children (Pratt 2005, 263). This minimisation is present in the terms used to describe clergy CSA. Euphemisms such as ‘imprudent behaviour’, ‘horseplay and wrestling’, ‘evidence of questionable judgement’, ‘affinity with boys’, ‘moral problems’, over familiarity with youngsters’, ‘stress’, ‘unfortunate incidents', and ‘a problem with boys’ were used to describe CSA in church files (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 34; Doyle and Sipe 2006, 190). According to Sipe (2015), these euphemisms were also used by psychiatrists and police to minimise the offenses, and he adds that the term alcoholism was used as a cover word for clergy CSA. An example of the minimisation of inappropriate sexualised behaviour by clergy towards children is apparent in testimony given by George Pell at the RCICA.

Cardinal George Pell was questioned regarding the response to Br Fitzgerald’s inappropriate behaviour towards children. When asked if anyone had come to him with innuendo, rumours or complaints about Brs Fitzgerald, Farrell or Dowlan, Pell replied there was “talk of eccentricity of Fitzgerald” (RCICA 2016b, 53). The eccentricity referred to Fitzgerald lining children up as they were leaving their classroom every Friday to kiss them goodbye, which sometimes involved tongue kisses (RCICA 2015e, 65). Pell stated that this was merely a show of affection and people were aware of it, and they were not insisting that anything be done (RCICA 2016b, 54). There is a significant minimisation of sexualised behaviour apparent here.
Another example of minimising the occurrence of CSA was apparent where Br Keating’s barrister told the Melbourne County Court that “Keating was ‘not a real paedophile’ because while at Scarborough, Keating had a ten-year heterosexual relationship with a woman” (BRA ndy para. 18). Further examples from the data evidence the minimisation of clergy perpetrated CSA extended to outright denials.

Testimony at the VPI (2013) by Philip Nagle shows a similar pattern of victims being treated with relative unimportance, minimisation and disregard. Whether these tactics were used to protect the church’s reputation and finances is second to the affect they had on the proliferation of clergy CSA and supporting of the DN. Nagle was sexually abused by Stephen Farrell at the age of nine on numerous occasions during 1974 at St Alipius Primary School in Ballarat (Family and Community Development Committee 2012, 2). Nagle stated that he “was intimidated and bullied into signing an agreement that was on their terms and that if I did not sign and agree to the terms, they would have any compensation claim tied up in the courts for many years” (Family and Community Development Committee 2012, 2). In line with the stance of minimisation, at a meeting with provincial leader Br Godfrey, it was implied that “what happened to Nagle was not so bad, and from their point of view probably did not need compensating” (Family and Community Development Committee 2012, 3). Godfrey stated in writing that “he would have Nangle, the headmaster at St Patrick’s College at the time Nagle was abused, contact Nagle’s parents to apologise for what happened, though no apology was made” (Family and Community Development Committee 2012, 3).

At this time, Farrell was part of a cluster of perpetrators, and, therefore, exposure of his CSA would put the other DN actors at risk of exposure and any ties between those actors and other actors or hubs. Four now convicted perpetrators of CSA, including Farrell, all resided at the Brothers residence at St Patrick’s College in Sturt Street (Family and Community Development Committee 2012, 3). Demonstrating a cluster of four DN actors with strong ties, as they lived, worked and offended together. These strong ties and mutual support for offending provided the DN with a significant resource in the form of child victims. Nagle stated that Farrell’s CSA was known by
Church authorities, as Farrell had been referred to Ronald Conway, the Christian Brother psychologist at the time (Family and Community Development Committee 2012, 3). Farrell was not convicted for this abuse until 1997, 23 years after Nagle was sexually abused (Family and Community Development Committee 2012, 2).

8.7.3 Denial of clergy CSA

Chapter 6 discussed the use of denial by DN actors in response to victims or their families disclosing clergy CSA. Denial of clergy CSA was also used as a method of silencing victims by actors within the grey network. Victim testimonies provide many examples of their attempts to alert clergy to the occurrence of CSA, which were responded to by denials. The following example shows George Pell’s response to a child disclosing Br Dowlan’s CSA. Although Pell has recently been included in the DN due to his recent conviction (Griffith 2018), he also played a significant role in the covering up of CSA as part of the grey network and, therefore, is included in both analysis chapters 7 and 8.

A victim of Br Dowlan stated,

one day at a local Ballarat swimming pool in the 1970s he saw Fr George Pell at the pool. The victim allegedly told Pell that something had to be done to stop Dowlan abusing young boys at St Patrick’s College, Ballarat. According to the victim Pell replied, "Don't be ridiculous" and walked out. “Pell didn't ask any questions. He didn't ask, 'What do you mean' or 'How could you say that?’ He just dismissed it and walked out". (BRA ndb, RCICA 2015e, 48)

Pell has denied that he knew children were being abused in Ballarat by priests and Brothers during the time he was there. However, contrary to this, victim statements show that the occurrence of clergy CSA was known among Ballarat's priests (BRA ndb). Pell had a significant role in the grey network as the data shows links between Pell and other DN actors and of Pell protecting the DN by minimising clergy CSA and silencing victims. Pell developed a separate CSA protocol, the Melbourne Response
The Melbourne response was in line with the Church’s response of denial and minimisation, and victims were paid meagre compensation on the condition that the Church did not admit responsibility (Gleeson 2016). As Pell rose through the ranks of the Catholic Church, he also had extended powers and became the Catholic church’s third ranked official in the Vatican. Recently, Pell has been charged with clergy CSA committed in the 1970s and 1990s (Griffith 2018). Pell represents a member of the Catholic Church hierarchy who not only played a significant role in the grey network regarding covering up clergy CSA but was also be part of the DN of perpetrators.

The Church’s response to victims of CSA has not only been one of denial and minimisation of CSA occurring but also denials of responsibility for the occurrence. The mother of a victim of clergy CSA committed by Fr Paul Ryan went to see Bishop Connors after her son had taken his life. Connors told her that he was sorry about her son, but the church had no money and that she needed to take responsibility for her own healing (RCICA 2015d, 90). While Bishop Connors did not place Ryan at the parish where the CSA was committed, this denial of responsibility for addressing the harm caused is congruent with the grey network’s response of minimisation, denial and callous treatment of victims, primary and secondary.

A letter was sent to Bishop Mulkearns which set out allegations of seven complainants of CSA committed by Monsignor Day. Mulkearns responded that

… he had been assured that the police had investigated the accusations and satisfied themselves that there was no substance to the charges. He later said that this information was given to him by Mr Kearney, clerk of the Magistrate’s Court in Mildura who accompanied Day to see him (RCICA 2015h, 11). He also wrote … With regard to the question of moving Monsignor Day from the Parish of Mildura, this is clearly impossible under the circumstances. Any such move would be tantamount to a public declaration that I consider him guilty. (RCICA 2015h, 11)

The above responses to complaints of clergy CSA were further entrenched by a pattern of not keeping records of such complaints. Silencing claims of clergy CSA
extended to few records being kept, and those that were kept contained little incriminating evidence (Tapsell 2014; Scorer 2014, 54). This, and other methods utilised by the grey network for maintaining secrecy, restricted what was known about the DN and could, therefore, make disruption more difficult and, therefore, make the DN more resilient (Fielding 2017, 24). However, charges not being laid due to the difficulty of obtaining evidence was not always the case. Further paragraphs will outline the example of a police officer in Mildura, Denis Ryan, who had evidence of clergy CSA and was gathering further evidence but was intimidated into silence by his superiors and clergy from his parish (RCICA 2016, 10); therefore, demonstrating actions taken by the grey network to stop the collection of evidence to support claims of clergy CSA. Of significance here was the response by Bishop Mulkearns who adamantly refuses to remove the clergy perpetrator for fear of appearing guilty. Through inaction, Mulkearns was in effect supporting continued offending by Monsignor Day for the next few years that Day spent at Mildura parish (Family and Community Development Committee 2012, 5). This support translates into support for the DN and a highly valuable DN resource as DN actors were allowed to continue their illicit behaviour without consequence.

The above examples have discussed actors within the grey network employing distinct and consistent methods of denial, minimisation and silencing clergy CSA complaints. The transferring of DN actors made it seem as though the Church was doing something about clergy CSA, though in reality this was not the case. It was, therefore, of equal importance for the grey network’s management of perpetrators to remain covert. If this practise became known to victims and communities, this would reveal the grey network’s complicity in clergy CSA.

Grey networks are characterised by secrecy and cover-up despite their apparent legal status and utilise methods which cannot be openly acknowledged (Neil and Peterie 2018, 132). The legal status of the Catholic Church grey network has recently been questioned. Acknowledgment of the role of the grey network in facilitating clergy CSA in a legal context, is present in the conviction of Adelaide Archbishop Philip Wilson, who was found guilty on May 22, 2018 of covering up CSA during the 1970s (Notzon
As such, Wilson is the highest-ranking Catholic cleric ever to be convicted of this offence under s316 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), although this conviction was later overturned on appeal (Wakatama and Milington 2018). In Victoria under s325 of the Crime Act 1958, “A person commits an offence where they knowingly act to assist a person who has committed a serious indictable offence avoid apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment”. The transferring of known clergy perpetrators of CSA fits within this definition. Further successful convictions of grey network actors would be a step forward in the disruption of grey and dark networks of clergy CSA. Following this conviction, South Australia and Canberra will bring in laws to oblige priests to report allegations or offences of CSA even when heard in the confessional (Borys 2018, 1). However, the response by acting Adelaide Archbishop Greg O’Kelly, that priests would not obey the law, shows the Church’s continued stance of denial of the issue of clergy CSA and non-compliance with criminal law (McGuirk 2018).

8.7.4 Catholic laity silencing complaints of clergy CSA

Child victims sometimes disclosed clergy CSA to a parent, and these disclosures were frequently responded to in the same way. This was likely due to the influence of clericalism and grooming by the DN actor. The following paragraph is an example of a common response by parents when their child disclosed their victimisation. Andrew Collins was a victim of Br Toomey. When Collins went home and told his parents that Toomey had sexually abused him, his mother called him a liar and refused to believe that Toomey could do anything like that (RCICA 2015b, 59). Collins was also beaten and grounded by his parents (RCICA 2015b, 60). This is a familiar scenario for many victims of CSA disclosing clergy abuse to their parents. When parents react in this way the victims were silenced, and the grooming tactic of their abuser, stating that no-one would believe them, is confirmed. This also demonstrates the influence of the overarching light network attribute of clericalism, which had the effect of making clergy CSA beyond the realm of possibility for devout laity. The unquestioned trust bestowed on clergy by not only parents of victims but Catholic laity who had a duty to report the CSA claims, is demonstrated in the following example.

At Gladstone Park, Fr Baker befriended a local family who had a son. Baker sexually abused this boy on trips away and in the boy’s bedroom. The victim’s
father complained about Baker to the chairman of the parish school board, Brian Cosgriff, who was also a magistrate (BRA nda). Cosgriff consulted another Catholic layman, Brendan Murphy, who was a barrister. These two men of law neglected to notify the police and, instead, merely notified Archbishop Frank Little (BRA nda). Archbishop Little’s secretary, Monsignor Peter Connors, who later became the bishop of Ballarat, visited the victim’s family and convinced them to keep the matter secret (BRA nda).

This evidence highlights the fact that the DN were also protected by certain members of the Catholic laity. It is significant that a magistrate and a barrister considered clergy CSA to be a matter for the Catholic Church to deal with rather than a legal matter. This further supports the notion that clerical narcissism functioned as a DN resource, as clergy perpetrators of CSA were considered to warrant different treatment than CSA offenders in the general population. Neglecting to inform police not only ignores a duty of care by the magistrate and barrister but also endangered further victims by not holding this clergy perpetrator legally accountable for his crime of CSA and, therefore, allowing continued CSA.

Another common strategy used by grey network actors to silence CSA complaints made by parents after their children had disclosed clergy CSA was for the grey network to exploit, using religious duress, the well-intended spiritual allegiance of Catholic families for the purposes of covering clergy CSA. An example of this occurrence is apparent in the silencing of the family of two sisters who had been sexually abused by Fr Fasciale during visits to the family home. The family complained to Fasciale’s superior in Geelong, Fr Bernard O’Regan, who asked the family to keep quiet to protect the reputation of the priesthood (BRA 2017p; RCICA 2015, 5). This method was shown to also be used by individual perpetrators in the DN to silence victims in the previous chapter 7, highlighting a shared method for covering up CSA being utilised by both grey and dark networks. Shared knowledge is a network resource (Duijn, Kashirin and Sloot 2014, 5; Moldoveanu and Baum 2011, 393; Everton 2012), and this apparent pattern in methods utilised to silence primary and secondary victims is an example of this.
Despite the Church’s knowledge of Fasciale’s crimes, when he died, church leaders gave this perpetrator of CSA a grand funeral, demonstrating the church's high regard for this priest (BRA 2017p; RCICA 2015, 7). One year after the funeral, a victim of Fasciale asked to discuss her concerns about this cover-up with the new Archbishop George Pell. The reply from the new vicar-general, Monsignor Denis Hart (on behalf of Archbishop Pell), stated that "a careful consideration of the Archbishop's diary shows that it is not possible for an appointment to occur" (BRA 2017p). Soon after Fasciale's funeral, George Pell became the new archbishop of Melbourne, with Denis Hart as his vicar-general. This sequence of responses to complaints of CSA, demonstrates the grey network’s divergent treatment of victims of clergy CSA and DN actors. While the victim is refused a voice and effectively silenced, the DN actor is treated with honour despite knowledge of his crimes. Giving this perpetrator a grand funeral also utilises the light network attribute of clericalism through a demonstration of the elite status of all clergy. The grey network’s priority was to protect the DN actor and silence the complaint. The following paragraphs will exemplify and discuss the grey network’s response to individuals who were not easily silenced in regard to complaints of CSA.

8.8 Treatment and silencing of whistle-blowers

The data provides examples of individuals who were aware of the occurrence of clergy CSA and endeavoured to put a stop to it or to pursue the prosecution of offending clergy. These individuals belong to the light network of the Catholic Church; they acknowledged clergy CSA as criminal and also in breach of canon law and refused to be part of the cover-up of clergy CSA. In stark contrast to the minimisation of CSA being committed by Catholic clergy in Victoria, there were some Catholic laity who staunchly defended victims and spoke up against clergy CSA. These individuals were intimidated into silence and experienced harsh repercussions from members of the Catholic church. Not only were victims and their families silenced by the Catholic Church hierarchy, whistle-blowers were treated with contempt. This treatment extended to clergy who spoke out against clergy CSA. Fr Cocker from Wollongong, New South Wales, provides an example of how clergy whistle-blowers were treated. This example is beyond the data boundaries, though due to the limited examples of
clergy informing on clergy perpetrators of CSA, this example is included here. Fr Cocker informed on a cluster of clergy perpetrators of CSA who were engaging in victim sharing (Robertson 2010, 33). This resulted in the conviction of these clergy perpetrators which was followed by Fr Cocker’s ostracisation by the Catholic community (Robertson 2010, 33). The following paragraphs provide examples of clergy using intimidation to silence those who spoke out against clergy CSA and of the laity shunning these individuals, effectively isolating them from the community and at times from employment.

While whistleblowing is discouraged in many organisations, “whistleblowing in the Catholic Church is not a career enhancer as those who speak out against clergy CSA are trapped into silence” (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 225). One of the earliest whistleblowers on the occurrence of CSA by clergy was a nun named Mary MacKillop, who much later became Australia’s first saint. However, after she had raised the issue of CSA in the 1860s she was excommunicated in 1871 (Family and Community Development Committee 2012c, 7; Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 52). Mary MacKillop provides an early example of the response of the Catholic church to those who spoke out against the occurrence of CSA by clergy though Mary MacKillop and the Josephite sisters were eventually returned to their roles (RCICA 2017a, 179).

The mother of one of Ridsdale’s victims outlines what occurred and what warned her of Ridsdale’s CSA (RCICA 2015f, 11). The parents of a victim of Ridsdale were told by Bishop Mulkearns secretary that there was no need to be concerned about the welfare of their child in relation to Ridsdale, and there had been no reports of improper behaviour by Ridsdale. That same day, at around 5pm, Ridsdale visited the victim’s house unannounced and spoke to the victim saying that there must be some misunderstanding relating to the previous night at the presbytery (RCICA 2015f, 16). These parents, along with another concerned couple had a meeting with Mulkearns, who did not respond to their concerns. The parents were shunned by their former parish priest (RCICA 2015f, 21). Ridsdale was subsequently transferred to the parish of Mortlake where he continued to commit CSA (RCICA 2015f, 32).
The above example demonstrates that the persistence of parents of child victims of CSA did in some cases result in the removal of a DN actor from the parish. Although this often came at the cost of ostracisation from the Catholic community. This ostracisation lends support to the strategy addressed above, where parents were encouraged to be silent about disclosures of CSA by their children. By utilising both strategies, the grey network can limit the options for families, and, either way, restrict their capacity to legitimately challenge the management of clergy CSA. Additionally, although the perpetrators were transferred to new parishes and were no longer a threat to children in the previous parish, the new parish was not informed regarding the complaints of CSA at the previous parish. As was discussed in the previous chapter 7, clergy perpetrators were frequently transferred to parishes which had been groomed by previous clergy perpetrators or where an established cluster of perpetrators were effectively functioning. Thereby, protecting the cluster at risk due to persistent complaints while at the same time protecting the DN actor and providing the actor with a new source of victims.

As outlined in data Chapter 5, Denis Ryan, a former Victorian police officer, stationed at Mildura between 1962 and 1972 became aware of CSA occurring in the parish (RCICA 2016, 10). In 1971, the headmaster of St Joseph’s College in Mildura, John Howden requested that Ryan come to see him without letting Ryan’s Detective Sergeant know that he had called (RCICA 2016, 10). Howden told about a complaint from a parent that Monsignor Day had committed CSA against her daughter (RCICA 2016, 10, 42). Ryan obtained a further five statements from students alleging that Day had sexually abused them as children (RCICA 2015h, 10). Ryan presented this evidence to his superiors and received a response stating that no further police action be taken (RCICA 2016, 11).

Ryan was warned in early December 1971 by a Mildura priest, Fr Taffe to “Drop the inquiry into Monsignor Day or you’ll be out of a job” (RCICA 2015h, 11). On 10 December 1971, Ryan and Howden wrote a letter to Bishop Mulkearns detailing allegations of the seven complainants who had made statements and requested a meeting with the Bishop (RCICA 2015h, 11). Mulkearns responded that he had been
assured that the police had investigated the accusations and satisfied themselves that there was no substance to the charges (RCICA 2016, 12; 50). Where police did not lay charges against DN actors, this was used to justify their continued appointments. At the RCICA, Fr Jack Madden, a retired Catholic priest of the Ballarat Diocese was asked why Monsignor Day was given another appointment following complaints of CSA (RCICA 2015k, 28). Madden’s response was that police had not acted against Day despite the complaints, and Madden, therefore, felt there was no alternative but to give Day the appointment he was requesting (RCICA 2015k, 29).

The grey network used other methods to protect DN actors, by utilising methods to circumvent police investigations. Church leaders are known to have used their position to persuade police and judges to support Church methods of dealing with complaints of clergy CSA, by letting Bishops deal with perpetrators (Doyle, Sipe and Wall 2006, 56). In other instances, where police had a suspect clergy under surveillance, these targets were tipped off and covert police investigations had to be aborted (Robertson 2010a, 33). Similarly, Pickering was tipped off when a victim made an inquiry at the church office. “Pickering caught the next plane out of the country to England, and Victoria Police did not want to spend time and money bringing him back from England. The church said they did not know where he was, but in fact they did” (RCICA 2015c, 14).

Mulkearns informed Taffe that he had been appointed assistant priest of Port Fairy and expressed his gratitude to Taffe for his “co-operation in handling the difficult situation which arose in Mildura” (RCICA 2016, 14 and 59). Therefore, demonstrating social reinforcement and network ties being utilised to reward Taffe supporting the cover-up of clergy CSA through promotion. Whereas, in contrast, Ryan was instructed to apply for a transfer from Mildura. Ryan did not want to leave Mildura, so he submitted his resignation from the Victoria Police in April 1972 (RCICA 2016, 16; 65). Additionally, there is no evidence that the Catholic Church globally has protected those few priests who informed on clergy perpetrators of CSA (Robertson 2010a, 33). The treatment Ryan was subjected to demonstrates some of the intimidation tactics utilised by not only Catholic clergy but also by senior police. Both Ryan and Detective
Sergeant Barritt were Catholics; though while Ryan placed his professional obligations above his Catholic affiliation, Barritt supported and protected the DN by silencing Ryan (BRA 2017b). It is these actions which qualified Barritt as a grey network actor, as he effectively covered up clergy CSA and, therefore, facilitated further clergy CSA by Day.

Lay teachers who attempted to disrupt the DN were similarly bullied and threatened into silence by grey network clergy. Not only did the grey network of the Catholic hierarchy transfer known perpetrators from parish to parish, often these transfers were to institutions as a replacement for another DN actor who had been transferred due to complaints of CSA. The data provides specific examples of this occurrence. When Graeme Sleeman became principal at Doveton, being aware of the parish’s past experiences of clergy CSA with Fr Baker at Doveton, Sleeman specifically asked for a pastorally-minded replacement (Family and Community Development Committee 2013b, 2). Fr Searson, a known perpetrator (BRA ndae), was appointed as replacement, and complaints soon followed from children not wanting to go to confession with him (Family and Community Development Committee 2013b, 3). Despite numerous complaints by Sleeman to his superiors, nothing was done regarding Searson. A group of parents met with the then Bishop Pell to complain about Searson, and nothing was done (Family and Community Development Committee 2013b, 4). Sleeman eventually resigned as he felt that staying was condoning Searson’s behaviour. His resignation was accepted, and Sleeman was shunned by the Catholic authorities (Family and Community Development Committee 2013b, 4). In 2005, Sleeman was virtually bankrupt and accepted a payment in return for signing a deed of release (Family and Community Development Committee 2013b, 6).

The grey network responded in the same manner to Carmel Rafferty, a teacher at Holy Family School, Doveton, from 1992 to 1993, when she discovered that Searson was committing CSA against students (Family and Community Development Committee 2013b, 4). When Rafferty reported this, she was subjected to significant covert bullying and lost her teaching career, as she was excluded from further teaching posts in the Catholic education system (Family and Community Development Committee
Another teacher at this school who had objected to Searson's CSA, also lost their career for speaking out and fighting for the safety of the children (Family and Community Development Committee 2013b, 5). This response by the Catholic Church was not unique to this school; similar evidence is apparent in other schools where lay teachers have attempted to report and remove clergy perpetrators of CSA.

Ian Lawther, a parent of a victim of CSA provided evidence to the VPI (2013) regarding the treatment of Pam Krstic at his child's school, who reported CSA being committed by Fr Pavlou. Krstic was told her personal feelings were getting in the way of her professional judgment and subsequently lost her job following a nervous breakdown. Lawther stated that he personally knew of three other teachers who had received the same sort of treatment in Catholic schools, and that he had heard of many more (Lawther n.d., 30). As the parish priest was the employer of the principal and all school staff (RCICA 2015f, 13), this further highlights the challenges faced by employees of Catholic schools when reporting CSA and demanding something be done about clergy committing CSA. As has been discussed previously, in some institutions the principal was a perpetrator of CSA and, therefore, part of the DN, and even when this was not the case, it has been shown that clergy perpetrators would likely still be protected by non-offending clergy principals as grey network actors.

The above examples provide evidence of lay Catholic teachers, who would be considered part of the light network of the Catholic Church due to their condemnation of clergy CSA, being forced out of the Catholic school system. In comparison to this treatment of potential threats to the clergy DN, potential threats to a DN of corrupt police were at times responded to through placation due to their position and power to disrupt the DN (Lauchs, Keast and Yousefpour 2011, 124). However, the whistleblowers discussed above had comparatively little power to disrupt the DN of clergy and were, therefore, silenced and dismissed as outlined above. Similarly, Lance Armstrong used his position as a globally recognised sporting icon to publicly vilify and attack the credibility of individuals attempting to disclose the team doping network (USADA 2012, 72). The above discussion highlights the stark contrast between
treatment and responses to DN actors in comparison to those who objected to and fought against Catholic clergy CSA.

It has been shown that grey network actors and their related actions are interdependent with other actors, rather than independent. This interdependency is based on a system of trust in which dark and grey network actors rely on this mutual system of trust to avoid detection. In cases where an individual betrays this trust or code of silence, and speaks out against clergy CSA, they are dealt with harshly by the grey network and sometimes ostracised by the Catholic community. This is apparent in the above examples of the treatment of whistle-blowers who were intimidated into silence by the laity, clergy and police. In contrast, where responses to clergy CSA upheld this trust and code of silence, this cooperation was rewarded by the grey network by transferring resources such as job security and job promotion (Milward et al. 2006, 350).

This, therefore, demonstrates that the grey network had distinct methods of maintaining compliance, through a system of denial and covering up of clergy CSA. This system mirrored responses to clergy CSA by Popes, which was one of denial and cover-up. It is apparent through this consistency in responding to clergy CSA complaints that this was a system of shared methods utilised to deny and cover-up clergy CSA directed by the Pope and filtering down through the Victorian Catholic Church hierarchy and to the laity. This secrecy being commended by the Catholic hierarchy is apparent in the following example. On 8 Sept 2001, Cardinal Castrillón wrote to Bishop Pican, who was given a three-month suspended prison sentence for concealing knowledge that a priest in his diocese had committed CSA against a number of boys. Cardinal Castrillón, then Prefect of the Congregation for the Clergy wrote to him, congratulating him.

You have acted wisely, and I am delighted to have a fellow member of the episcopate who, in the eyes of history and of other bishops, would prefer to go to prison rather than denounce his priest-son. For the relationship between
priests and their bishop is not professional but a sacramental relationship which forges very special bonds of spiritual paternity. (Tapsell 2014, 232)

Despite apparently having a system based on strategic methods for hiding clergy CSA, Br McDonald, Deputy Province leader of Christian Brothers, denied that the “Christian Brothers organisation effectively physically terrorised and sexually abused children in the classroom” (Family and Community Development Committee 2013, 16). In line with the bad apple theory, McDonald replied that the organisation did not do it, rather some individuals did it, and a number of clergy perpetrators of CSA were protected, though this was not by organisational design (Family and Community Development Committee 2013, 16). This example shows a clear denial of a systemic or organisational problem, though, ironically, this denial is in itself a function of the grey network. Although, there was a partial truth in what McDonald was saying, in that, it was not the light network of the Catholic Church which directly protected the DN; rather, it was the utilisation of the licit functions of the light network by the grey network which protected the DN. The light network attributes in conjunction with the grey network’s response to clergy CSA were exploited by the DN to commit CSA, protect DN actors and maintain a resilient DN. There is an additional element, which is referred to in the literature and by DN actors, which introduces a further motivation for the grey network’s cover-up of clergy CSA.

8.9 Grey network and celibacy violations

In the context of this thesis, the focus is on the crime of CSA, a violation of criminal law and of Canon law. However, for clergy, there are sexual relationships which are legal in criminal law but a violation of canon law. It is these sexual relationships which break a clergy’s vow of celibacy and are arguably used as a method for gaining reciprocal trust and silence from non-celibate clergy in regard to breaking of vows and also CSA. Chris Wilding, clergy CSA victim and founder of Broken Rites, discussed two main reasons for the culture of hierarchical deceit about clergy CSA. The first reason stated was that “some of the Bishops have themselves been involved in sexual crime or sexually predatory behaviour, which sets up a pattern of institutional secrecy”
(Family and Community Development Committee 2013d, 2). Secondly, “Bishops are part of a network which operate for institutional and personal advancement and can use their position to promote clergy who share these behaviours” (Sipe, quoted in Family and Community Development Committee 2013d, 2).

An example of a DN actor expressing a confidence in being protected by the Catholic hierarchy, or grey network, due to knowledge of offences committed by members of the grey network is as follows. Fr Searson, a former priest at a Doveton parish school, and known perpetrator of CSA, when challenged about his CSA, stated, "I’m not worried about what the bishops might do to me, because of what I know about the bishops". Knowledge of offending between DN and grey network actors serves as a safety net against disclosure. Although, this may be superfluous considering that even Bishops who had not offended chose to maintain silence of DN offending and were, therefore, part of a culture of CSA and deceit (Family and Community Development Committee 2013d, 2). Even so, this warrants exploration in regard to trust as a DN resource, and also the CSA of seminarians as a source for grooming victims or for DN recruitment, as trust and the ability to replace DN actors are vital components for DN resilience. For a DN to continue to function and build on network ties it must replenish and add to DN actor numbers. Therefore, methods to facilitate and provide further opportunities for committing clergy CSA include not only the silencing of victims but also recruiting by DN actors for potential future DN actors to support longevity of the DN. The fact that DN actors were placed in roles by the grey network where they were tasked with the recruitment of boys for the seminary and training of seminarians, lends weight to the argument that seminaries were a DN asset.

8.10 Grey network actors placing DN actors in recruitment roles and supporting dark network resilience

Research on CSA perpetrators has previously focused on the disposition of individual perpetrators (Ostrowski 2010, 46; White and Terry 2008, 662). This thesis does not intend to analyse the cause of clergy CSA, although, despite the abused abuser theory being shown to be unreliable (Hall and Hall 2007, Keenan 2013, McDevitt 2012), this theory may be applicable to clergy perpetrators of CSA (RCICA 2017b,598). The
data evidences DN actors being tasked with the role of recruiting young boys for the priesthood (Family and Community Development Committee 2012, 4). Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy (2006, 17) argue that mentors play a key role in the criminal achievements of their proteges and that proteges are chosen based on their potential for success. The protégé is instructed in codes of behaviour, offending methods and is introduced to other perpetrators (Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy 2006, 18). For young seminarians a lack of parental supervision provides the opportunity to meet and be informally supervised by extra familial mentors and to be potentially co-opted by accomplished perpetrators (Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy 2006, 35).

DN actors in the role of recruiting or training young boys include the following. At Healesville, Fr David Daniel trained about 30 altar boys. One of these victims wanted to become a priest, and the victim’s ‘training’ included sexual assaults by Daniel (BRA ndh). DN actor and grey network actor George Pell was the head of the Melbourne Corpus Christi seminary between 1985-1987. As stated previously, Fr Klep helped to train priests at Salesian Theological College in Oakleigh (in Melbourne's south-east) (BRA 2017e). Ronald Conway, mentioned above, was known to sexually abuse his patients during counselling sessions, and trainee priests were sent to him for assessment (BRA ndak). Therefore, Conway played a significant role in both dark and grey networks of clergy CSA. DN actors were also sent to Conway for counselling, and where committing CSA was disclosed, Conway failed to act on the mandatory obligation required to report CSA. Conway served an important function of the grey network by providing treatment so that the Church could be seen to be doing something about clergy CSA, while safe in the knowledge that DN actors would not be reported. Utilising Conway as a psychologist appears to be a strategic and well considered method for concealing clergy CSA and protecting the DN.

Many of the clergy perpetrators of CSA who have come to light in the past three decades were inducted into the traditional seminary system at high school age (O’Dea 2004, Cozzens 2000). The seminarians were “young boys whose meaningful emotional and sexual development was paused at a crucial age, and they were given no guidance for maturing into a life of celibacy” (O’Dea 2004, Cozzens 2000). Doyle, Sipe and Wall (2006, 278) state that there is much evidence to show that seminary candidates were subject to sex in seminaries by sexually active priests and spiritual
directors. This is supported by 10% of priests, who state that as seminarians they had some form of sexual contact with a priest or fellow seminarian. Further to this, trainee priests were often sexually abused by older priests in an attempt to recruit them into the DN (BRA 2017m, Coldrey 2001, 65). If a trainee priest partakes in sexual activity willingly or as a victim, this breaking of the vow of celibacy can be used to keep them silent, and, therefore, they become part of the grey network. If a trainee cannot be recruited as a perpetrator and part of the DN, the DN actor can use the sexual abuse they committed against the trainee as a threat to kept them silent about clergy CSA.

The sexual abuse of seminarians was presented by DN actors to seminarians as a requirement for progression in the organisation. Sipe (1995, 173) provides an example of a young seminarian being approached by a Bishop for sex, and when the seminarian declined, the Bishop said, “You know Father, if you want to progress in this organisation, you are going to need friends”. Similarly, Bell, Ten-Have and Lauchs’ (2016, 63) research on sports doping networks shows similar methods being utilised by Lance Armstrong as part owner of the team. It was made known to team members that in order to keep their position on the team, compliance and involvement with the doping network was required (USADA 2012, 128).

Seminary training teaches candidates that “celibacy makes them superior to the non-celibate because it requires a higher degree of internal strength and dedication, which is given to the elect by God” (Doyle 2006, 196). “Consequently, celibacy is a kind of clerical garb that fortifies the illusion that clerics are ontologically superior and set apart” (Doyle, Sipe and Wall 2006, 241). This highlights the entrenchment of clerical narcissism, which places the importance of clergy above the laity, and which is apparent in the treatment of clergy CSA victims. Seminary training lays the foundations for potentially narcissistic, emotionally and sexually immature boys to be groomed for recruitment into the DN of clergy perpetrators of CSA.

As stated by D’Alton, Guilfoyle and Randall (2013, 701), vulnerability factors to the perpetration of CSA were exacerbated by the clerical training and culture. There
appears to be a normalisation of sexualised behaviour toward children in seminaries. As a seminarian, Pidoto took his victim into a bedroom with three other seminarians and said, “Isn’t he cute” (BR 2015e). Once Pidoto became a priest, he would befriend boys and take them to the Corpus Christi Seminary and sexually abuse them (Family and Community Development Committee 2012b, 6). Pidoto was seen with these boys by other priests and student priests, but they did not see anything unusual about this behaviour (BR 2015e). This normalisation of sexualised behaviour is part of grooming behaviour, which desensitises victims and prepares them for CSA (Smallbone and Wortley 2001; McAlinden 2012, 22).

This data demonstrates a normalisation of behaviour regarding the sexualisation of children in the seminary and beyond, providing social reinforcement for CSA. Social reinforcement makes reoffending very high due to high levels of mutual support and communication (Wilcockson 2006; Holt, Blevins and Burkert 2010, 20). This social reinforcement results in a shared attitude amongst DN actors, which aligns with this being a shared DN attribute. These mutual affiliations, support and sharing of resources are some of the characteristics of a social network and are also characteristics present in a DN of clergy perpetrators of CSA. Breaking of celibacy vows and committing CSA required a high degree of mutual trust from dark and grey network actors to remain covert

This method of recruitment was significant, considering global statistics on the Catholic Church membership showing that there was a substantial increase in seminarian numbers between 1975 and 2015 (see Fig. 7.3). Figures from 2018 state that globally there are 116,160 seminarians, with the strongest increase in numbers apparent in Africa and Asia, whereas as there has been a decrease in numbers in America, Europe and Oceania (Holy See Press Office 2018). Therefore, from the perspective of seminarians as a potential DN resource, this highlights a decrease in this DN resource in the Australian context. However, if clergy perpetrators are recruiting from seminaries, the significant increase in Africa and Asia is noteworthy, as clergy CSA has not been the subject of investigation in these countries and could provide a safe place to commit clergy CSA.
Covering up clergy CSA by the grey network involves a level of trust that other individuals in the grey network will respond in the same way and not reveal one another’s complicity in this cover-up (Cherney 1997, 3). Although not all individuals in the grey network are committing clergy CSA, they are complicit in offending through direct actions aimed at covering up clergy CSA. Moldoveanu and Baum (2011, 393), state that “trust can be understood as a system of interactive beliefs that the trustful and the trusted share about each other’s propensity to register and report relevant information to one another”. Trust is a necessary component within both the DN and the grey network. Moreover, trust is required between the dark and grey networks to ensure mutual silence regarding offending and methods used to hide this offending. Where clergy had broken their vows of celibacy in secularly legal ways such as engaging in sexual relationships with consenting adults but had broken canon laws, they had a vested interest in covering for their offending counterparts. From this perspective it was in the interest of all clergy who had broken their vows of celibacy through any sexual activity to cover for one another.

8.11 Conclusion

The above points are key to the functioning and reliability of the grey network and its support of the DN. The grey network was self-serving regarding protecting the Catholic Church but also self-serving on an individual level. Grey network actors who

(Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 23)
were also part of the DN or who had broken their vow of celibacy, benefited from silencing victims and denying the occurrence of clergy CSA to protect their own secular and/or non-secular offending. In canon law, fornication, adultery and the sexual corruption of boys are all ranked as the most serious offences along with homicide and idolatry (Doyle, Sipe and Wall 2006, 14). Therefore, clergy involved in any type of sexual relationship would be motivated to keep this hidden. The consistent patterns in responding to clergy CSA by the grey network demonstrates the characteristic of clerical narcissism and a prioritisation of protecting the DN. Where silencing methods failed, attacking the messenger was carried out through various forms of intimidation such as threats to employment, demotions, ostracisation and being defrocked for not respecting the obligation to silence (RCICA 2017b, 706). A fear of ostracisation by the Catholic community for disclosing clergy CSA contributed to non-disclosure (RCICA 2017a, 25). Similarly, threats of physical harm, harm to careers, reputation and financial situation were utilised by Armstrong’s sports doping network to silence individuals who publicly criticised the use of doping in sport (USADA 2012, 128). This code of silence served as a DN resource which protected and covered up the illicit activities of the clergy DN of CSA. Similarly, organised crime’s existence is ensured through use of threats, force and corruption to maintain a degree of immunity from criminal laws (Albanese 2014, 4). This consistency in the methods used in response to claims of clergy CSA demonstrates a unified, condoned and organised response to clergy CSA by Catholic clergy.

The types of responses to complaints of clergy CSA were similar in the grey and dark networks. Similar methods for silencing CSA complaints were apparent in the grey and dark networks. Both the dark and grey networks minimised and denied the occurrence of clergy CSA, and both used threats and intimidation as a method of silencing victims. Whether this indicates collaboration between the grey and dark networks is unclear. However, the role of Bishops, whether inadvertently or purposefully, in facilitating continued clergy CSA has been acknowledged (Doyle, Sipe and Wall 2006; 186, 189). However, shared patterns in the way CSA complaints were responded to indicate that this was a further example of sharing the resource of shared knowledge. The point of relevance here is that the clergy DN was able to utilise the grey network’s response to clergy CSA as a further DN resource; the consequence of
which was that these clergy offenders had increased power, access to victims and further control over silencing complaints of CSA.
Chapter 9 Thesis Conclusion

9.1 Summary

Using coded data relevant to Catholic clergy perpetrators of CSA in Victoria, Australia, between 1939-2001, an organised DN of clergy perpetrators has been evidenced. Themes outlined in the data Chapter 5 provide the foundation for the analysis. In conjunction with SNA which illustrates the ties between DN actors, this demonstrates the operation of a DN of clergy perpetrators of CSA. Ties between DN actors show that, rather than committing CSA as autonomous individual perpetrators, these clergy perpetrators utilised ties to support and share DN resources with fellow clergy perpetrators. In addition, it has been shown that these clergy perpetrators exploited the light network attributes of the Catholic Church and the grey network responses to clergy perpetrated CSA to facilitate clergy CSA.

The literature regarding clergy CSA is extensive regarding the culture and structure of the Catholic Church’s role in enabling the occurrence of CSA (RCICA 2017b, 588; Calkins et al. 2015, 581; Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 242; D’Alton, Guilfoyle and Randall 2013, 701; Keenan 2013; White and Terry 2008, 675). Theoretical explanations for clergy CSA are based on sexuality, opportunistic offending, celibacy and clerical narcissism (McAlinden 2012; Inglis 2014; Terry and Freilich 2012, 450; Calkins et al. 2015, 581; Smallbone and Cale 2015). Explanations for the apparent increase in offending, which tend to minimise the role of the structure and culture of the Catholic Church, include themes such as “moral panic”, media conspiracy, and “a few rotten apples”, which have little validity (Ostrowski 2010, 46; White and Terry 2008, 662). A review of the literature has shown that the response by Bishops and Archbishops of transferring known clergy perpetrators from parish to parish often resulted in clusters of clergy perpetrators of CSA in the same parish (Pratt 2005, 282; Steinfels 2002, 16; Neil 2015, 2; Clifton 2002, 2; Deery and Morris-Marr 2015, 1). However, Catholic clergy CSA networks have not previously been explored on an academic level (Smith 2013, Carney 2012, Vince 2012, Gavrielides 2013), and they have not been analysed using SNA of a clergy DN. This thesis has addressed this gap by comparing Victorian clergy perpetrator of CSA data to DN research in the
contexts of various DNs. This has provided insight into how characteristics, typologies and different operational strategies used by clergy perpetrators to facilitate CSA are comparative to DNs in other contexts.

SNA has proved to be a valuable tool by providing a visual representation of DN actors and how DN actor ties are used to share DN resources and facilitate CSA (Bright, Hughes and Chalmers 2012, 151). In relation to clergy DN actors, resources include victims, victim information, job security, protection through covering up for one another and shared knowledge of how to commit CSA and remain covert. A collective trust that sharing of DN resources and protection from CSA complaints will be reciprocated by other DN actors (Kramer 2010, 82; van der Hulst 2009, 106, Milward et al. 2006, 350) buoyed confidence in remaining covert and provided social reinforcement for committing CSA. However, DNs require different degrees of visibility dependent on the need for complete secrecy. In the context of clergy CSA DNs, complete secrecy was not necessary as the committing of CSA by clergy was known but covered-up by dark and grey network actors (Formicola 2013, 533; BRA ndj; Death 2015, 102; Scorer 2014, 58; Notzon 2018).

9.2 Research question findings

The first analysis chapter 6 utilised the data to evidence strong ties between clergy DN actors in clusters, and weak ties with clergy DN actors in isolated institutions. It is apparent that individual clergy DN actors were not offending autonomously but were utilising ties to other clergy DN actors to facilitate CSA, which demonstrates the operation of a DN. These geographical placements evidence that a disproportionate number of Catholic clergy perpetrators of CSA were transferred to certain institutions. The data evidences 16 clusters of clergy DN actors with strong ties, and also movement of clergy DN actors between these clusters. Furthermore, clergy DN actors appear as solitary clergy DN actors at institutions representing weak DN ties. The significance is apparent when considering the role of strong and weak ties in DNs. Strong ties provided support and social reinforcement for committing CSA and weak ties were a source of new DN resources. DN actors were tied by an overarching
affiliation with the Catholic Church and by their geographical placements within the network. DN actors with the strongest ties provided greater quality of information regarding resource sharing and can be a valuable tool for disrupting networks (Schwartz and Rouselle 2009, 203-204). It is these connections which enabled SNA to be conducted, as SNA is based on analysing the influence of the collective behaviour of other actors on individual actors (Everton 2012, 17).

Having established the presence of a network DN, the second analysis chapter 7 discussed how strong and weak ties were used to share clergy DN resources and facilitate clergy CSA. Examples of types of ties relevant to this research included ties of trust, religious affiliation, social and physical mobility and formal ties based on hierarchy (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 18; McGloin and Kirk 2010). DN actors utilised ties to share resources, which may be material and/or non-material (Cunningham, Everton and Murphy 2016, 4). Clergy DN resources outlined in analysis chapter 7 included shared methods of grooming and committing clergy CSA, victims, victim information, mutual support and trust for enabling continued clergy CSA. Clergy DN actors sharing victims was not confined to cluster actors with strong ties, as victims were also shared with weak ties at other institutions.

Some clergy perpetrators utilised these ties to visit one another cross-institutionally and would take victims to share with weak tie DN actors, which would be reciprocated, demonstrating a reciprocation of trust. Analysing cross-institutional links between clusters and solitary clergy perpetrators has shown that weak ties were utilised to share DN resources to facilitate clergy CSA and protect DN actors. Patterns in the methods of grooming and committing CSA demonstrate the DN resource of shared knowledge. Shared knowledge was similarly apparent in examples demonstrating sharing of victim information. This shared knowledge was a non-material resource shared between clergy DN actors to obtain the primary material resource of victims.

Moreover, the DN of clergy offenders was shown to exploit the overarching and overt, light network attributes of clericalism, corporal punishment and the institutional setting...
to facilitate clergy CSA and remain covert. The institutional setting was utilised by DN actors to exploit the power differential between institutions and children, where children are particularly vulnerable. Clericalism and corporal punishment were utilised to exploit the fear and respect granted to clergy, to silence and denounce clergy CSA disclosures. Clericalism provided unique opportunities to commit clergy CSA, as clerics were granted an unquestioned trust which provided unsupervised access to victims. Further to this, the confessional was a unique DN resource and setting, used by priests to identify and groom victims and commit clergy CSA. The sanctity of the confessional was used to not only instil guilt and blame on the victim but also served to remove guilt from clergy perpetrators of CSA. Furthermore, it has been evidenced that shared methods were used by the DN of clergy perpetrators of CSA to silence and to gain the compliance of victims. These methods were not only used by individual clergy DN actors to protect themselves but were similarly used to protect fellow clergy DN actors with strong ties from disclosure. This demonstrates the trust between actors within the DN that other actors would reciprocate actions which protected individual clergy perpetrators and the DN.

The dark network map (see Appendix 2), illustrated a decentralised DN, as there were multiple institutions, creating a loose structure and making the network less vulnerable. The DN could continue to function utilising alternative ties, established and maintained through the transfer of clergy perpetrators in and out of clusters with strong ties and institutions with weaker ties. It was evidenced that in addition to the strategies used by DN actors to commit CSA, silence victims and maintain DN resilience, this was further supported by responses of the grey network to complaints of clergy CSA. The final analysis chapter 8 showed how the grey network of the Catholic Church contributed to continued clergy CSA, by transferring known clergy perpetrators from parish to parish and hiding CSA (Falkenhain 1999; Smith 2013; Carney 2012; Vince and Rubinsztein-Dunlop 2012; Gavrielides 2013). Furthermore, a response of denial and cover-up of clergy CSA, prioritising the protection of the Catholic Church, significantly contributed to the resilience of this DN (Robinson 2010, 26; Doyle 2006, 189; Tapsell 2014).
In contrast to the illicit nature of DNs, grey network actors are not necessarily offenders, but they contribute to the facilitation of illicit actions through direct actions or inaction. The significance lies in the extended powers Catholic Bishops, Archbishops, Cardinals and Popes have, which were utilised to not only hide clergy CSA but provide DN resources such as job security and promotion. It has been stated that these actions were aimed at protecting the Catholic Church, though there is evidence that grey network actors also had a self-interest in maintaining silence regarding the occurrence of clergy CSA. The point of relevance here is that the DN of clergy perpetrators of CSA were able to utilise the grey network’s response to clergy CSA as an additional layer of protection. The consequence of which was that these clergy offenders had increased power, access to victims and further control over silencing complaints of CSA. Although the Catholic Church is ruled by canon law, the research shows that canon laws regarding CSA were rarely applied. It is the lack of action by the Catholic Church, demonstrating a narcissistic response, which allowed clergy CSA to continue (Guido 2008, 257).

In addition to exploiting the light network attribute of clericalism, DN actors could rely on the Catholic Church’s culture of silence regarding clergy CSA, a requirement ordered by Popes. The DN also exploited institutional features such as power, authority, secrecy and trust to commit CSA (McAlinden 2012, 148). The response of the grey network to complaints of CSA acted as a further layer of protection, through the covering-up and silencing of complaints of CSA and the approval of transfers of known clergy perpetrators of CSA to new unapprised parishes. This support of DN actors partially explains the resilience of the DN, which was apparent, as the ability to replace DN actors is crucial to DN resilience (Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain 2012, 201; Punch 2009; Shaw 2008). As the grey network played a significant role in the DN resilience, a change in responses to clergy CSA would also be required in order to disrupt this DN.
9.3 Limitations

As outlined in the theory chapter 3, the main challenge in conducting DN research is that due to the covert nature of DNs, it is difficult to access data which shows the relationships between DN actors (Xu and Chen 2008, 65; Cunningham, Everton and Murphy 2016, 295; Morselli 2009, 24). Additionally, access to crime network data is restricted and does not include unreported or unknown crimes (Rostamin and Mondani 2015, 4; Ouellet, Boivin, Leclerc and Morselli 2013). Researchers have approached the data access challenge by using data from a variety of sources to improve validity (Bright, Hughes and Chalmers 2012, 153; Bouchard and Amirault 2013, 120). In the case of this research, information was reliant upon victims who had come forward with allegations of CSA and that these allegations had been reported or recorded. As is the case for paedophile networks, DNs are hidden from view which makes reliable and complete data very difficult to obtain (Chen 2012, 102). As mentioned above, Windle (2013, 384) used three terrorist autobiographies to access DN data, and these are important sources for gathering data which is otherwise not accessible. This highlights the validity and importance of including CSA victim testimony in this data set. This approach was followed in this thesis by sourcing data from three sources to provide a robust data set and to validate findings.

In the context of Catholic Clergy CSA, the limitation of accessing data is extended due to the Catholic Church’s code of silence, a lack of records kept and the institutional setting as a closed system (Tapsell 2014; Scorer 2014, 54). Regarding the data on Catholic clergy CSA as a comprehensive data set is virtually impossible given the archival practises of CSA complaints, where complaints were not recorded, and code words or euphemisms were used when complaints were recorded (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 54; Gleeson 2016; Scorer 2014, 54). The literature review in Chapter 2 examines the culture of the Catholic Church as a closed system with little outside oversight and the role of supporting a DN of perpetrators of CSA (Keenan 2013). The data for this thesis was limited to known cases of CSA, which is representative of only a portion of clergy CSA as most cases of institutional CSA remain undetected (Firestone, Moulden and Wexler, 2009; Colton, Roberts and Vanstone, 2010). The lack of available data is a result of perpetrators of CSA exploiting institutional features.
such as power, authority, secrecy and trust to commit CSA (McAlinden 2012, 147). These features are heightened in Catholic institutions due to the lack of supervision and accountability which were exploited to avoid detection and facilitate CSA (McAlinden 2012, 148; Douglas 1986). This argument acknowledges that the Catholic Church institution was used to commit clergy CSA and to remain covert. This thesis has extended on this argument by examining these institutional features from a network perspective. It has evidenced that the actions of the grey network were a significant DN resource and contributing factor to this clergy DN’s resilience.

9.4 Findings summary

The aim of this thesis has been to provide evidence that, rather than clergy perpetrators of CSA offending autonomously, they offended with the support of an organised DN which protected them and provided DN resources. Additionally, clergy DN actors took advantage of light network attributes of the Catholic Church to commit CSA by exploiting their clerical status to gain access to, and silence victims. The resilience of the DN was further enhanced by the grey network of the Catholic Church through covering up clergy CSA and transferring known DN actors to institutions where they had further access to victims. Much of the DN research in various contexts is aimed at disrupting DNs. DN disruption usually aims to remove key DN actors to disrupt the flow of DN resources (Everton and Cunningham 2013, 94). However, detection of clergy perpetrators by way of a complaint was dealt with by the grey network by transferring the clergy perpetrator to another parish. Therefore, detection of a DN actor in the context of clergy perpetrators did not disrupt the flow of DN resources. This significantly contributed to the resilience of the clergy DN. The analysis provides explanation for the resilience of the DN being analysed, which is apparent in its continued operation over six decades. Although researching known DNs can reveal valuable insight into potential disruption strategies, unknown DNs remain completely hidden and, therefore, more successful DNs cannot be studied. This thesis has evidenced the existence of a previously unknown organised clergy DN within the Victorian Catholic Church. As this is a new area of research, there are many possibilities for the application of this research to a variety of cohorts and contexts.

230
9.5 Implications for future research

This thesis has focussed on a comparatively small cohort of clergy perpetrators of CSA. The theories of DNs and SNA could be similarly applied to various cohorts of known Catholic clergy perpetrators of CSA at a state, national, international or global level. However, on a global level this would be a massive undertaking. It is suggested that separate SNA research on individual states could be combined to provide a national SNA of DNs of Catholic clergy perpetrators of CSA. As nuns were not included in the data for this thesis, similar research, dependent on access to data, may evidence DNs of child sexual, physical and emotional abuse. As the focus for this thesis has been on clergy CSA and has not distinguished between the various types of child abuse experienced by many victims. However, it is unlikely that a separation of child abuse types would produce significantly varied results as physical, psychological and sexual child abuse occurred in conjunction in most cases. It cannot be said that this would be the same in other cohorts and separation of child abuse types may reveal significant variance in results.

Many Catholic clergy perpetrators of CSA were transferred to Latin America and Africa, where there has not been any investigation into the occurrence of clergy CSA (Robertson 2010, 30). This highlights the need for future research on DNs of clergy CSA operating within residential care in countries where clergy perpetrators have been transferred to. Although Australia does not have orphanages currently, the findings of this thesis show that orphanages were significant DN resources. Children were particularly vulnerable to CSA in such institutional settings. A study which included 142 countries, covering 80% of the world’s children, estimates that globally approximately 2.7 million children live in institutional care (Petrowski, Cappa and Gross 2017, 388). In Latin America, according to data from 2013, there are 240,000 children in residential care (Petrowski, Cappa and Gross 2017, 389). An Austrian study of the situational contexts of clergy CSA showed that 81.7% of clergy CSA occurred in boarding schools, orphanages, monasteries or convents (Lueger-Schuster et al. 2014, 58). In an Australian context, the RCICA final report (2018, 351) found that 49.2% of clergy CSA occurred in schools and 28.7% in residential institutions. It is unclear whether the percentage for schools includes boarder dormitories, though
based on the findings of this thesis, this is likely. There are seven clergy perpetrators of CSA in charge of school boarder dormitories apparent in the data for this thesis who used this situational context to commit CSA. Further significance of dormitories as a DN resource is highlighted by the fact that four of the boarding institutions, clusters 2, 3, 4 and 13, experienced decades of sequential and simultaneous presence of clergy DN actors.

The Catholic Church has had over 1600 years to perfect and culturally embed, the strategies used to facilitate clergy CSA. In 305 A.D., the Synod of Elvira were the first council for which there are written records which explicitly condemn clergy CSA (Berry 1992 cited in Doubleday, Wiley and Bottoms 2013; Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 54; Robertson 2010, 14). In Australia, the first known case of clergy CSA was committed by a Benedictine deacon, who confessed his crimes in 1849 (Cahill and Wilkinson 2017, 50). Recently a 19-article decree called "Vos Estis Lux Mundi", has been issued by Pope Francis. This decree includes that clergy are obligated to report clergy CSA to their Bishop and that anyone can report clergy CSA (SBS 2017, 1). The fact that reports of clergy CSA will still be dealt with within the Catholic Church and will not be directed to the criminal justice system, demonstrates that the response to clergy CSA has not changed. The 19-article decree does have positive elements such as raising the age of adulthood regarding CSA, from 16 to 18 to and incorporating possession of child pornography (SBS 2017, 1). This decree may be a step forward for the Catholic Church’s response to clergy CSA. However, the continued narcissistic response of keeping clergy CSA complaints contained within the Catholic institution, adds weight to the importance of acknowledgment and further research of Catholic clergy CSA as operating as an organised criminal network.
Glossary of Terms

BRA - Broken Rites Australia
CSA – Child Sexual Abuse
DN – Dark Network
RCICA- Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse
VPI - Victorian Parliamentary Inquiry into the Handling of Child Abuse by Religious and Other Organisations
References


234


Australian Catholic Bishops' Conference. 1996. “Pastoral letter to the Catholic people of Australia.” Canberra: ACBC.


http://www.religioustolerance.org/spankin8.htm


237


BRA. ndal. About us. “Our Catholic background.”


http://brokenrites.org.au/drupal/node/81

BRA. 2017b. Black Collar Crime, “This criminal priest, Monsignor John Day, was helped by the church's cover-up.” Accessed November 11, 2017.


http://brokenrites.org.au/drupal/node/143

http://brokenrites.org.au/drupal/node/73


242


https://www.catholic.org.au/dioceses/dioceses/page-1
http://masstimes.melbournecatholic.org.au/parishes/


Death, Jodi. 2013. ‘*They Did Not Believe Me*: Adult Survivors’ Perspectives of Child Sexual Abuse by Personnel in Christian Institutions. Queensland: Crime and Justice and Research Centre, Queensland University of Technology.


http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13674670802116101


https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137413727_7


Neil, David and Michelle Peterie. 2018. “Grey networks: The contradictory dimensions of Australia’s immigration detention system.” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 59 (1) 132-144. ISSN 1360-7456


DOI: 10.1080/17440572.2010.490649


DOI10.1007/s12117-008-9046-9


APPENDIX 1

INDIVIDUAL DN ACTORS - Name, order, place of offence, offences, other information regarding CSA.

1. Christian Brother Donald Pascal Alford, worked and committed CSA at St Augustine's from 1970 to 1978. Alford was in charge of one of the dormitories (BRA nd.)

2. Fr Michael Scott Aulsebrook a Salesian priest committed CSA in the 1980s and 1990s. Despite knowledge of his offending Aulsebrook was retained in the priesthood and promoted (BRA 2016). Aulsebrook was given a time away from teaching and later appointed as school principal in South Australia in 2003 (BRA 2016). In 2011, Aulsebrook was jailed for CSA committed in 1983 while at Rupertswood in Sunbury. This prompted more victims to speak out and Aulsebrook was jailed again in 2016. Fr Aulsebrook pleaded guilty to indecently assaulting two victims, a boy and a girl while sleeping in their beds in 1987, while staying with the family (BRA 2016ac).

3. Fr John Ayers a Salesian priest committed CSA in the 1960s at Rupertswood College. Offending also occurred in Adelaide previous to this in the early 1960s and after this in Sydney in the 1970s. In the 1990s the Salesians transferred Ayers to Samoa which put Ayers beyond the reach of Australian police. Ayers died in Samoa aged 83 in 2012 (BRA 2011).

4. Fr Wilfred Baker was ordained a priest in 1961, his parish appointments included Jordanville 1962-66, East Brighton 1966-68, Mordialloc 1968-69, Balaclava 1969-71, hospital chaplaincy 1971-74, Doveton 1974-75, Gladstone Park 1975-78, Eltham 1978-92 and North Richmond 1992-99 (BRA nda). All these parishes, except for North Richmond, were included in Baker’s CSA charges. Complaints were received from North Richmond parents, but these did not reach the courts. The data shows that 21 people made either a claim or substantiated complaint of CSA occurring between 1960 to 1985, across 16 institutions, in relation to Baker (RCICA 2015, 16-17). Baker was not placed on administrative leave until 1997 (RCICA 2015,16). Baker plead guilty to
16 counts of indecent assault and one of gross indecency, involving eight boys, aged 10 to 13, over a 20-year period between 1960 and 1979 (BRA nda).

In 1992, Baker still worked unsupervised at his final parish North Richmond, where there were more complaints in 1994 and parents refused to let their sons serve as altar boys for Baker (BRA nda). The then Principal of St James Primary School, was warned never to send children to the presbytery by themselves with Baker. She went to the then Regional Bishop for her area, Monsignor Connors for further explanation and Connors replied, ‘research tells us once a paedophile always a paedophile’ (RCICA 2015, 15).

5. Br Ted Bales aka Br Edward Vernon Dowlan (post 2001) a Christian Brother, was charged in 1994 with 64 offences against 23 boys (BRA ndb). These offences occurred in St Alipius, St Thomas More College, Forest Hill; St Patrick’s College, Ballarat; Cathedral College, East Melbourne (Family and Community Development Committee 2013, 22). Dowlan openly committed CSA in the presence of other boys at his first two schools in 1971-72. In a 1973 report provided as evidence in the VPI, it states that “Dowlan is overtly affectionate in expression with his boys’ and that, “Ted felt that he was not imprudent in his expression of affection when confronted with this remark” (Family and Community Development Committee 2013, 21). After St Alipius, Dowlan was sent to St Thomas More School in Forest Hill until a complaint of CSA was made by a family. The boys at the school were told Dowlan had gone on a religious retreat when in fact he had been posted to St Patrick’s, Ballarat in the position of dormitory master (Family and Community Development Committee 2013, 20; BRA nda). Dowlan continued to commit CSA at St Patrick’s. Dowlan was later sent to work at St Augustine’s boys’ orphanage in Geelong in 1981 (BRA ndb). Dowlan was also sent briefly to another orphanage, St Vincent’s boys’ home in South Melbourne, in around 1981 (BRA ndb). In 1985 after a complaint of CSA at East Melbourne College, Dowlan was removed from teaching to do a year diploma in theology (Family and Community Development Committee 2013, 21). It was not until 2008 that Dowlan officially signed off and left the Christian Brothers and was given a separation payment of $125000 and assistance with accommodation (Family and Community Development Committee 2013, 25).
In June 1996, Dowlan entered a guilty plea and the prosecution reduced the number of charges (Family and Community Development Committee 2013, 22). Dowlan, then aged 46, was sentenced to nine years and eight months jail with a non-parole period of six years (Family and Community Development Committee 2013, 22). Upon his release in 2001, Dowlan changed his surname to "Bales" to avoid media scrutiny (BRA ndb). On 29 April 2014 he appeared in the Melbourne Magistrates Court, under his new name of Edward Bales, facing 48 charges of CSA against 14 boys in the 1970s and 1980s while he was working as a Christian Brother (BRA ndb).

Br Brandon, executive officer for professional standards, Christian Brothers, was asked whether he accepted that there was a consistent course of action in moving Dowlan around to different schools without warning parents or children of his prior offending (Family and Community Development Committee 2013, 19). Brandon's response was that “Dowlan was moved from community to community because he was struggling in terms of his maturity and this was an opportunity for him to develop and that it was not done because he had offended in one place” (Family and Community Development Committee 2013, 19).

6. Br Luke Beltram of the De La Salle order, committed CSA against a 14 year old boy at St John’s College, Dandenong in the early 70s (BRA ndc).

7. Br Robert Charles Best, a Christian Brother and St Alipius primary school principal from 1968 to 1973. While working at St Alipius Br Best resided at St Patrick’s College where he supervised a boy’s dormitory (BRA 2017). In 1974 Best was removed from Ballarat and his teaching duties for 12 months. During this time Best spent time at St Bernard's College, Moonee Ponds where fellow clergy perpetrator, Fr Michael Glennon, was giving religious education lessons to children (BRA 2017). Best was sent to St Leo’s Christian College, Box Hill, from 1975-85, and attended school camps at Shoreham. Best taught at St Joseph’s College, Geelong from 1985-89 and at Warnambool Christian Brothers College, 1989-94, which later became Emmanuel College (BRA 2017). Best was transferred from school to school up until 1994. Best faced court proceedings from 1996 to 2011. In 1996 Best was charged with eight counts of indecent assault of five St Alipius boys, aged 11 or 12 (BRA 2017). More victims came forward and Br Best was found guilty on a further 6 counts of indecent assault in 1998 (BRA 2017). In 2009, Br Best faced 40 charges involving 14 victims.
from three schools and in 2011 was found guilty to 27 charges involving 11 victims (BRA 2017). After his jailing, more victims came forward and in February 2017, Best plead guilty to indecently assaulting another 20 boys. Best committed these CSA offences between 1968 and 1988 while teaching at: St Alipius primary school in Ballarat; St Leo’s College in Box Hill; St Bernard’s in Moonee Ponds; and St Joseph’s College in Geelong (BRA 2017).

8. Fr Anthony Bongiorno, a Catholic priest, was charged in 1996 with multiple charges of indecent assault of three boys between 1981 and 1987 (BRA 2017a). The mother of a victim was murdered in 1980 in Bongiorno’s parish of Thornbury just days after her son had disclosed the CSA and the mother intended to confront Bongiorno (BRA 2017a). A witness claimed he saw Bongiorno with blood on him on the day of the murder (BRA 2017a). The Sergeant investigating this crime was refused a DNA sample from Bongiorno’s sister and a judge refuse to allow Fr Bongiorno’s body to be exhumed (BRA 2017a).

9. Fr John Byrne, a Jesuit priest, violently and sadistically abused a student at Xavier College preparatory school (BRA ndd). The Jesuits paid the victim compensation. Fr Byrne was prefect of studies and discipline and would take a boy to his private quarters to be punished. Fr Byrne was removed from this position in 1972 one year after the victim was abused (BRA ndd).

10. Fr Peter Chalk, a Missionaries of the Sacred Heart order priest, was the subject of complaints of CSA between 1987 and 1994 (BRA nde). While police were collecting evidence in 1995, Chalk was sent to Japan by the Church and died in 2010 (BRA nde). Chalk resigned from the order and changed his surname to a Japanese surname, became a Japanese citizen and was teaching English to Japanese students (BRA nde).

11. Fr Robert Claffey, a Catholic priest, committed CSA children as young as 5 years in their schools, home and church (BRA 2016a). Claffey’s charges relate to various towns in western Victoria, including Ballarat, Warrnambool, Apollo Bay and Portland, between 1970 and 1992 (BRA 2016a). Bishop Mulkearns claimed that Claffey’s crimes were merely "improper behaviour" (BRA 2016a, para 7). This ‘improper
behaviour’ included touching boys while in their beds 'comforting' them after their sister died (BRA 2016a, para 17). Claffey began visiting the boys' house following the accident to "comfort" them at bed-time and in he was charged with indecently assaulting these two boys. Claffey plead guilty to offences involving the two brothers and received a good behaviour bond (BRA 2016a). More victims came forward and in 2016 Claffey was jailed for committing CSA against a further 12 victims (BRA 2016a). The sentence was 18 years and four months, with a minimum of 13 years and four months before being eligible to apply for parole (BRA 2016a). The judge in this case concluded that “Br Claffey was a sexual predator who groomed parents and children by visiting families, establishing trust, and threatening children to keep them quiet” (BRA 2016a, para 36).

12. Fr Bryan, Desmond Coffey, a Catholic priest, was charged in 1999 with multiple CSA offences which “occurred in presbyteries, in the sacristy of the church, in Coffey's car, or while Coffey was visiting families” (BRA ndf). Several victims told police that Coffey's CSA was reported to church authorities in the 1960s and '70s but the church response was to transfer Coffey to a new parish. “In July 1998, Coffey appeared in the Ballarat Magistrates Court, charged with five counts of buggery allegedly committed against another boy at Ouyen in 1975 and 1976.” However, the complainant was declined attending court, so these charges lapsed (BRA ndf).

In Ballarat County Court in February 1999, Coffey (then aged 64) pleaded not guilty concerning eleven children, 10 boys and one girl, aged between six and 11 years (BRA ndf). He applied to have a separate jury for each complainant, meaning that each jury would think there was only one complainant. However, the Director of Public Prosecutions opposed this, and Judge Kelly ruled that one jury would hear all the charges (BRA ndf). Coffey was found guilty of 12 counts of indecent assault involving eight boys and one count involving a girl while ministering in Ballarat city, Port Fairy and Ouyen between 1960 and 1975. He was also found guilty of falsely imprisoning one of the boys in a bedroom and was acquitted of two counts of indecently assaulting two other boys (BRA ndf).

Coffey was given a three-year sentence wholly suspended. There was an appeal against the leniency of this suspension, but the three-judge Court of Appeal dismissed
the appeal by a majority of two to one. One of the majority judges claimed that Coffey had "stopped offending in 1975" and Coffey's offences were "not the worst examples" of sexual crimes" (BRA ndf, para 25).

13. Br Gregory Coffey aka Coffin, a former trainee Catholic priest received a suspended sentence in South Australia in 1972 for CSA but despite this, was given a senior lay teaching position in a Melbourne Marist Brother Catholic school (BRA 2015). After his year at "Rupertswood", Br Coffin changed his name to Coffey (BRA 2015). Mr Coffey was promoted from vice principle to principle in 1980 until 1985 (BRA 2015).

From 1986, Coffey taught for three years at Loyola College, Watsonia. Coffey left the Catholic schools' system in 1990 and then worked part-time for the St John of God Brothers as Mr Coffey at their Churinga centre in Melbourne's north-east, looking after intellectually disabled young males (BRA 2015). In 1994 charged, sexually assaulting 6 boys-sentenced to 2yr good behaviour bond in Victoria (BRA 2015). The magistrate (Mr Breer), not aware of Coffey's South Australian conviction, presumed that Coffey was a first-time offender. The magistrate therefore imposed a lenient sentence, a two-year good-behaviour bond. In 1997 Mr Coffey received a 30-month suspended sentence for offences against boys (BRA 2015). This meant that the sentence would go on Coffey's record, even though the jail time was suspended. During 2007, the South Australian police charged Coffey regarding the eleven available victims but before this hearing date arrived, the hearing was cancelled because Coffey had died (BRA 2015).

14. Br John Francis Coswello, a Christian Brother, lived or worked at St Vincent's boys' home throughout the 1970s where he was in charge of a dormitory at night (BRA ndg). In 2009, Coswello was charged with multiple offences against boys and was granted separate juries (BRA ndg). Coswello did the first two years of his secondary education at St Patrick's Christian Brothers College in Ballarat where he was selected at age 14 to attend a Christian Brothers training college in Melbourne, where he spent two years with other aspirant Brothers (BRA ndg).
15. Fr Peter Philip Creede from the Vincentian Order, admitted to committing CSA against multiple female children but died before prosecution was possible (BRA 2016b).

16. Fr David Daniel, a Catholic priest, was charged in 1998 with 16 counts of CSA (BRA ndh). He was convicted of all offences which occurred between 1972 and 1994, in 2000 and sentenced to 6 years imprisonment (RCICA 2015c, 24). Four institutions were subject to claims or substantiated complaints, with most claims arising out of Healesville (RCICA 2015c, 24). Daniel was officially classified at the age 57, as a Serious Sexual Offender under the Crimes Act (BRA ndh). Daniel committed CSA in “children’s bedrooms, while the child was watching television with him in a darkened lounge room, or while a child was showering” (BRA ndh).

17. Chris D’Astoli was a trainee priest at Salesian College, Oakleigh from 1969 to 1970. He plead guilty to indecent assault and gross indecency against a 13-year-old boy and received a three-year good behaviour bond (BRA 2016c).

18. Fr Bernard Maxwell Day a Diocesan priest, committed CSA while he lived in a flat at St Catherine’s Orphanage in Geelong between 1961 and 1963 (BRA 2015a). He was the chaplain hearing the girl’s confessions and gave the girls sex education. Day had the run of the orphanage and it was accepted that he could call a girl to his quarters to give her "individual counselling" (BRA 2015a, para 6). There was no independent person outside the orphanage for the girls to complain to.

19. Monsignor John Day, a Catholic priest had a total of 50 years in the priesthood, and during that time he consistently committed CSA (BRA 2017b). Day died before charges could be laid (Family and Community Development Committee 2012, 5). The data produced to the RCICA revealed that 15 people made a claim of CSA against Day after his death. The alleged incidents occurred in the period from 1954-1973 at three parishes: Mildura, Apollo Bay and Timboon (RCICA 2015c, 8). Detective Ryan in Mildura had investigated Day but was pushed off the case which enabled Day to survive in Mildura for a few more years until the church gave him a trip overseas and Day returned to a new parish on the south coast (Family and Community Development Committee 2012, 5).
20. Fr Adelrick D'Cruz, a parish priest committed CSA and was charged with 3 counts of rape and 10 indecent assaults (BRA ndi). In May 2008, D'Cruz plead guilty to indecent assault of a teenage girl and was ordered to pay $500 to charity and received a 2-year good behaviour bond (BRA ndi).

21. Fr Frank DeDood of the Salesian Order settled a complaint of CSA against a boy while a student at Rupertswood, Salesian College, Sunbury. DeDood was sentenced to jail for three years, with a non-parole period of 20 months, for committing CSA against five young boys at two Catholic schools in Melbourne between 1978 and 1983 (BRA 2017c). The victims included four boys at Salesian College Sunbury, and one boy at Salesian College Chadstone. De Dood told one boy that “no one would believe him if he told anyone about being touched by a priest, and if he did, the boy would be expelled from the school” (BRA 2017c).

22. Br John Desmond Dyson a Marist Brother, plead guilty to indecently assaulting 3 boys aged 12-14 in the 1980s, boarders at Assumption college, Kilmore and was sentenced to 12 months jail (BRA ndj). Two of these victims were brothers whose father had died, and their mother was dying of cancer (BRA ndj). Dyson was a trusted father figure and frequent visitor to the family's home in Melbourne (BRA ndj).

23. Fr Anthony Eames a parish priest, was convicted on four counts of indecent assault and sentenced to six months jail for each of the four counts (BRA ndk). Despite complaints that he was committing CSA Eames was promoted from Assistant priest to the unsupervised position of Parish priest in Yea 1969, Aspendale 1974-80 and Winchelsea 1980-92 (BRA ndk).

One of Fr Anthony Eames' victim's states that in 1994:

When I was aged about 10 at Our Lady's primary school in Manifold Heights, Geelong in the early 1960s, Eames used to visit my family's house for free meals. While Mum was in the kitchen, Eames would mauel me sexually on the couch in the lounge room. It didn't occur to my parents that a Catholic priest could be a risk. And I didn't tell my parents about Eames because I knew that they would not allow me to say anything against a priest." Helen added: "In the
practice of Confession, priests had access to children's inner-most thoughts and feelings enabling them to select the most vulnerable victims (BRA ndk).

The archdiocese did not inform each new parish that there had been previous complaints against Eames (BRA ndk).

24. Br Wilfred Eastmure a Christian Brother, committed CSA at St Augustine's orphanage near Geelong and St Vincent's boys' home and Aquinas College in Ringwood (BRA ndl). Numerous complaints from former residents of St Augustine's and St Vincent's orphanages, named Eastmure being as one of the worst offenders (BRA ndl). The police began investigating Eastmure but found that he had died a couple of years previously (BRA ndl).

25. Br Ignatius Elmer a Christian Brother, plead guilty to 61 incidents of indecent assault 13 boys and was sentenced to five years jail (BRA ndm). One of Elmer's victims was at St Vincent's orphanage with two older siblings and Elmer committed CSA against all 3 siblings (BRA ndm). “By the time of the court case, the second oldest brother had taken his own life with a drug overdose” (BRA ndm). In 1976 there is a visitation report which stated, “Rex Elmer had been interfering with little boys, this was true, and it had been attended to by the Provincial” (Family and Community Development Committee 2013, 11). A letter from P.C. Naughtin, provincial, states that “he has confidence in Elmer’s sincerity that there will not be a recurrence” (Family and Community Development Committee 2013, 12).

26. Br Stephen Francis Farrell a Christian Brother, was one of four clergy perpetrators who taught at St Alipius parish school in Ballarat in the 1970s. He later he the Christian Brothers and taught in other Catholic schools as Mr Farrell and was married three times (BRA 2017d). Farrell “plead guilty to 9 counts of indecently assaulting 2 boys aged nine and ten at St Alipius and was sentenced to 2 years jail, suspended for 2 years “(BRA 2017d). Another St Alipius victim contacted police and Farrell plead guilty to the charge of indecent assault on a 10-year-old boy at St Alipius parish school in 1974 (BRA 2017d). Farrell was sentenced to three months jail, not suspended and a female judge ordered that Farrell be placed on the sex offenders register for life. On appeal, that sentence was wholly suspended (RCICA 2015a). Philip Nagle was
sexually abused by Br Farrell at the age of nine on numerous occasions during 1974 when Farrell was a teacher at St Alipius Primary School in Ballarat (Family and Community Development Committee 2012, 2). Although Nagle was not groomed prior to being sexually abused, he was a witness to grooming of other victims. Nagle stated:

I did not know what was happening to me was sex. I knew nothing about that…. Farrell did not groom me. I was asked to go and get some sports equipment out of what I thought was the sports room, but I have learnt later was actually the first aid bay or the sick room. He pinned me down on the ground, and he pulled my pants down and sexually assaulted me. That is what he did. There was no grooming. I was sexually assaulted on numerous occasions in grade 5 (RCICA 2015a, 36; Family and Community Development Committee 2012).

When I was in Grade 4, I used to go to recorder lessons after school sometimes. From the church side of the school, I could see into the Grade 5 classroom through some small holes in the whitewash which covered the windows. I saw Farrell who was a teacher at St Alipius playing catch and kiss with my brother in the classroom. I also saw Farrell doing the same thing with at least two other boys (RCICA 2015a, 36).

After leaving St Alipius, Farrell continued to visit the Nagle family at their property, about 20 kilometres outside Ballarat. It was during one of these visits Nagle witnessed Farrell committing CSA against his brother in their bedroom (RCICA 2015a, 37). Farrell’s offending incorporates a number of patterns of offending including, physical assault as part of the CSA, offending in victim’s homes and at school. In response to the question of whether the church was aware that Farrell was committing CSA, Nagle’s response was:

Absolutely. We know they knew, because Ronald Conway spoke at our trial — that is, the Christian Brother psychologist at the time — and he knew my brother was being offended against in 1973. Farrell was referred to him, and he answered and told the Catholic hierarchy that a Christian Brother had been referred to him for sexually abusing a boy in 1973. If they had dealt with that then, I would not have been a victim. I was a victim in 1974 because they put
him back in their system. You have got to check that out, for sure (Family and Community Development Committee 2012, 6).

27. Fr Nazzareno Fasciale a Catholic priest, was charged with multiple counts of indecent assault and gross indecency against 3 children. Fasciale admitted to CSA but died after being summoned to court. These were not the only victims as 20 people made a claim of CSA in relation to Fasciale (RCICA 2015c, 9). The alleged incidents took place between 1953 and 1985 at 13 different parishes and schools (RCICA 2015c, 9). In 1954, Fasciale assaulted two sisters aged 13 and 9 when he visited their home in St Mary of the Angels parish, Geelong (BRA 2017p). Following the complaint against Fasciale he went on extended leave to Italy and attended a retreat. Upon completion of the retreat Fasciale told Auxiliary Bishop Fox that he had, "Great confidence in being more prudent in the future" (RCICA 2015I, 6). Fasciale was appointed parish priest at Yarraville in 1973, a position he held until he retired in December 1993. There were concerns about his conduct with boys in the mid-1970s. Archbishop James Knox sent Fasciale to Father Daniel Winters for treatment between 1972 and 1976. In 1979, Archbishop Frank Little sent Fasciale for treatment, stating that with regular visits he was confident that Fasciale could continue as parish priest at Yarraville (RCICA 2015i, 7). Four brothers became victims of Fasciale while they were being raised by their widowed father (BRA 2017p). The boys’ devout father did not want to know about the CSA (BRA 2017p). At his next parish, St Brigid’s, Fitzroy North, another victim was sexually abused by Fasciale during a home visit in 1960 when she was 10 (BRA 2017p). A further two female victims said Fasciale committed CSA against them on numerous occasions at their home in North Fitzroy in 1959-61 (BRA 2017p).

28. Br Gerry Fitzgerald a Christian brother, worked as a probationary officer while living at St Vincent’s Orphanage in South Melbourne from 1943. In 1950 the Australian Provincial, Brother Mackey, wrote to Brother Fitzgerald censuring him ‘as strongly as possible’ for several matters, including “continuing to have dealings with the boys in defiance of the command given by the Brother Consultors, and allowing one or more boys to enter his room and kissing a boy” (RCICA 2016, 13). Fitzgerald was sent to Albert Park in 1951 but continued to work as a probation officer until 1962, when he was appointed a grade three teacher at St Alipius Boys’ School in Ballarat East (RCICA 2016, 13). In 1968, he was joined by Br Best who was principal of St
Alipius Boys’ School. Brother Dowlan taught at St Alipius Boys’ School in 1971, and at St Patrick’s College from 1973 until 1974. In 1973, Brother Farrell commenced at St Alipius Boys’ School. He left at the end of 1974 (RCICA 2016, 13). Further CSA crimes were committed but Fitzgerald died before police could charge him. BAP stated that “Fitzgerald would make the whole class of kids put their heads and hands on the desk and go to sleep and they would get into trouble if they looked up. Fitzgerald then picked a boy and made him sit on his knee behind the desk” (RCICA 2015a, 68). BAP also gave evidence that on one occasion the school took students for a picnic. “Br Fitzgerald separated our class from the rest of the students. He took us to a secluded beach where he made us take off all our clothes and swim while he watched us with binoculars” (RCICA 2015a, 70).

Another witness BAA had Fitzgerald as their Grade 3 teacher. BAA gave evidence that:

On at least a dozen occasions over the year, Fitzgerald chose me to sit on his knee whilst he taught the rest of the class. Whilst sitting on Fitzgerald's knee in front of the classroom, he would kiss me on the cheek and mouth and would also rub and stroke his hands on my legs, groin and backside. The rubbing and stroking were always over my clothes. I saw this happen to a lot of other students in the classroom and not just me (RCICA 2015a, 83).

Another victim of Fitzgerald BAB, testified to the same experience as BAA regarding being called to come and sit on Fitzgerald’s knee (RCICA 2015a, 57).

On one occasion Fitzgerald called BAB to come and sit on his knee, but BAB refused. “After that, I started to get physical abuse from Br Fitzgerald “(RCICA 2015a, 59). BAB stated that:

…after Fitzgerald abused me, he turned up at our house another four or five times. I felt intimidated by the fact that Fitzgerald could turn up at my home. I felt as though, even when I was away from school, he still had me in his grasp. He could still turn up and intimidate me in my own home (RCICA 2015a, 60). When I was in about Grade 5, I noticed that some kids in other classes were also staying back in the classrooms at play time with certain Brothers. As I was going to the playground, I sometimes saw boys sitting on the knees of Brothers
or being spoken to by Brothers. Because of this, I became consciously aware that it was going on to, not only kids in the grades below me, but kids in my grade and kids in the next grade up (RCICA 2015a, 61).

David Ridsdale is the nephew and victim of his Uncle Gerald Ridsdale. He attended St Alipius Boys' Primary School and his Grade 3 teacher was Br Fitzgerald. David Ridsdale gave evidence that:

…every Friday at the end of school Br Fitzgerald lined up our class and we all had to kiss him goodbye or potentially be strapped. Some kids got special kisses, meaning he used his tongue. This happened to me a couple of times and I would see him linger with other boys (RCICA 2015e, 65).

29. Fr Gerald Fitzgerald a parish priest, was investigated in 1964 regarding CSA but high-level negotiations saved him from prosecution. Fitzgerald worked at St Catherine’s girl’s orphanage in the late 1960s (BRA 2011a). A former resident of St Catherine’s Orphanage stated, “Father Fitzgerald was very fresh with the girls, always hugging or grabbing someone. One of my duties was to clean the chaplain's flat, so I was coming and going from the flat at various odd times. On about half a dozen occasions, I witnessed Fr Fitzgerald entering the flat with one or other of the girls. One time, when I entered the flat unexpectedly, I saw him in his underpants, taking a girl into the bedroom” (BRA 2011a, para 9).

30. Fr Julian Fox a Salesian priest, faced 10 charges of CSA committed at Rupertswood and Ferntree Gully between 1976 - 1985 (BRA ndn). Fox was sentenced to 4 years in jail as the judge was obliged to apply laws that existed in the early 1980s (BRA ndn).

31. Fr Desmond Gannon a parish priest, committed CSA in 14 parishes and schools against 25 victims (RCICA 2015c, 26). “Gannon admitted the complaints and told of an additional five or six children he had offended against in different parishes. He was permitted to resign on health grounds and on the same day was granted the title Pastor Emeritus in 1993” (RCICA 2015c, 26). This title provided not only status, it made him eligible for remuneration and allowances (BRA ndo). The parishioners were not informed that complaints of CSA were the reason for his resignation and were told the
reason for retirement was on the grounds of ill health, the parishioners donated $3,500 as a token of their appreciation (RCICA 2015d, 78).

32. Fr Michael Glennon a parish priest, acquired a 16-hectare rural property named ‘Karaglen’ where at youth group camps during the 1970s, children were obliged to take turns sleeping in Glennon’s bedroom (BRA ndp). In 1971, Glennon was also working with homeless boys. At the Marist Brothers boys’ school in Preston, he conducted “sex education” classes (BRA ndp).

In 1978 the first allegation surfaced when a 10-year-old girl said Glennon had sexually assaulted her in his car at “Karaglen”. Glennon pleaded guilty to indecent assault and was sent to jail, serving seven months of a two-year sentence (BRA ndp). This was the only time he ever pleaded guilty. During the next two decades, he would contest all subsequent charges fiercely.

In 1984 Glennon was charged with CSA and served 7 months of a 2-year sentence. In 1985 he was again charged with several sexual offences against 5 boys, and 1 girl aged 12-16 years and was released on bail (BRA ndp). In 1991 Glennon was found guilty of CSA though the conviction was appealed and won.

In 1992 the Victorian State prosecution office successfully appealed to High Court of Australia and Glennon was sent back to jail for at least 7 years. In 1997, Glennon faced 65 new charges involving 15 male victims and 1 female between 1974-91. Glennon committed many of his crimes while on bail awaiting trial for other sex offences. A jury found him guilty of 23 charges of CSA on three boys from 1986 to 1991. Three separate trials resulted in a total sentence of 18 years. In 2014, Glennon died while facing 10 more charges (BRA ndp).

33. Fr Jack Gubbels a Christian Brother, was “one of several trainee priests who used to visit St Augustine’s boys’ Orphanage to ‘help’ boys” (BRA 2014b).

Gubbels was also acting as honorary probation officer, placing young male offenders under his control. About 1979, in an unusual decision, the Melbourne archdiocese arranged for Gubbels to transfer, "on loan", to the Townsville
diocese in far-northern Queensland. This strange transfer would have required an agreement between the archbishop of Melbourne and the bishop of Townsville. In Queensland, despite being only 33 and very junior, Gubbels was put in charge of a parish at Collinsville, between Townsville and Mackay. In 1980-81 detectives went to arrest Gubbels but he was found dead. (BRA 2014b)

34. Fr Barry Gwillim a parish priest plead guilty to five counts of indecent assault and four counts of gross indecency and received a suspended sentence of 32 months jail (BRA ndr). Three Melbourne priests gave character evidence stating that jail would be bad for Gwillim though was no concern for Gwillim’s 15-year-old victim from St Peter’s at Keilor East (BRA ndr).

35. Br Julian Hackett a Christian Brother, committed CSA at St Augustine’s in Geelong where he worked and was visited by other clergy perpetrators between 1957 and 1959 (BRA nds). Hackett was superintendent at St Augustine’s from 1967-1969 (BRA nds).

36. Fr John Haines a Christian Brother, was sentenced to 4 years and 3 months jail after pleading guilty to 6 counts of an indecent act with a boy under 16 years and possession of child pornography (BRA 2016d).

37. Br Tom Hallam aka Anselm a De La Salle Brother, many victims stated that Anselm was a notorious child sexual abuser. A victim from St Joseph’s at Malvern reported the CSA to senior Christian Brothers and they ignored the reports, resulting in over 100 boys being abused (Brown 2012).

38. Br Bernard Hartman a Marianist brother, committed CSA against Ms Mairead Ashcroft between the ages of 8 and 11 years at St Paul’s College. Hartman would “tutor her in his bedroom and offer her 50c to take her clothes off and let him take a photo when the victim was aged 9-11”. In 1982, Mairead came home to find Hartman with her little sister of 7 years of age, on his knee (Ashcroft 2011). In court in Australia in 2015 he was charged with CSA of two boys and two girls committed while he was working at St Paul’s College in Altona, Melbourne. CSA victims were aged between 6 and 16 and occurred between 1976 and 1982 both at the school and at victims’ homes (BRA 2015b).
39. Br Bernard Hayes, a Christian Brother, committed CSA against a boy in 1969 at Alphington Christian Brother's College. The victim was given a written apology and a civil settlement (BRA 2016e).

40. Br Francis Hesford a Marist Brother, plead guilty to CSA against two girls aged 9 and 12 years at Assumption College, Kilmore in 1970 (BRA ndt). Hesford was not the only offender at this school at this time. Gannon was also found guilty of committing CSA against boys at this institution from 1969-1970 (BRA ndt).

41. Br Robert Heslin a Christian Brother committed offences against boys at Our Lady of Mount Carmel College, Middle Park; St Joseph's Pascoe Vale and St Bernard' College Essendon. The church acknowledged that CSA was committed against boys (BRA 2016f).

42. Fr Dan Hourigan a parish priest, was charged on 15 September 1995, with one incident of sexual penetration of a boy at Leongatha parish in the early 1980s (BRA ndu). The victim stated: "He was always at our house and was very friendly with my parents." "There were three incidents when he was aged 13 to 15." One of the CSA offences occurred in the driveway of the victim's family home (BRA ndu). Police were preparing to lay a further 20 charges relating to three other boys. Hourigan, aged 65, died unexpectedly three days after being charged (BRA ndu).

43. Br William Houston a Christian Brother, was charged in 1997 with 14 offences, including indecent assault and buggery. Houston committed CSA against multiple boys whom he was supervising at St Augustine's orphanage, Geelong (BRA 2016g).

In 2008, another 2 victims came forward and in October 2015, the Melbourne Magistrates Court ordered Houston to stand trial at the Victorian County Court, to face multiple charges relating to several orphanage boys (BRA 2016g). At the County Court, Houston won the right to face a series of juries, instead of one jury dealing with all the charges (BRA 2016g). In April 2016, the first jury returned a verdict of guilty on four charges of buggery, plus one of attempted buggery and three of indecent assault, committed against three boys at the orphanage (BRA 2016g). Houston, aged 77, then chose to plead guilty to 12 charges of indecent assault, committed against three other boys. Judge Kidd jailed Houston, aged 77, for 12 years and nine months with a minimum of eight
years. This cancelled the need for three further juries which he had been scheduled for Houston (BRA 2016g).

44. Br Maurice Howard a Christian Brother, committed CSA while ministering at St Patricks College in the 1940s to early 50s, Christian Brothers College in the 1960s, St Kevin's College, Toorak from 1969 to 1971 and in St Kilda in 1972 (BRA 2015c). Some of Howard's victims received a written apology and a monetary settlement (BRA 2015c).

45. Fr Kevin Howarth a parish priest in the Corryong parish Victoria committed CSA against two young sisters aged 11 and 8, in 1982-83, after the family had taken Howarth into their home and their trust (BRA 2013). In one of the offences, “Howarth made one of the girls masturbate him in the back seat of a car while he spoke to the girls' unsuspecting parents in the front seat” (BRA 2013). Other offences occurred in the family home and in a swimming pool (BRA 2013). More than a decade after this, one of the girls notified the police. In early 1996, the police charged Howarth with indecent assault and on 17 October 1996, Howarth, then aged 59, pleaded guilty to the charges. “The court sentenced Howarth to three months' imprisonment. The court allowed this to be served as an intensive correction order in the community. Howarth was ordered to attend the community corrections office for 12 hours a week, including eight hours of community work and four hours of counselling. Howarth was also fined $2,000” (BRA 2013).

46. Fr Jim Jennings a priest in the Vincentian order, was jailed for CSA in Victoria in the 1960s (BRA 2016h). Jennings faced multiple charges of gross indecency and indecent assault on a male child aged under 16, relating to 3 victims who were students at St Vincent's College Bendigo in the 1960s (BRA ndv).

47. Monsignor Penn Jones of the Christian Brother order, committed CSA against boys at a holiday camp at Shoreham in the 1960s while ministering at Parade College, East Melbourne in 1963-64.

While working at the cathedral, Penn Jones acted as a "chaplain" to the nearby Parade Christian Brothers College, where he gave individual counselling to boys about sex. Former students have told Broken Rites “that they were
summoned, one at a time, to the chaplain's office, where Jones would engage them in chat about "sex". Jones was obsessed with erections and masturbation and he "discussed" these topics in graphic detail. After interviewing two victims separately and examining their evidence, commissioner O'Callaghan upheld the complaints. He wrote to the victims on behalf of the archdiocese, accepting that both boys were sexually abused by Penn Jones. Monsignor Jones died before police could charge him. It is pertinent to note that Monsignor Penn Jones served as director, then chairman, of Catholic Church Insurance (CCI) from 1971 to 1992. CCI collects premiums from the church's individual orders and dioceses and covers them for various claims, including CSA by clergy and helps decide how much claimants should be paid.

(BRA ndx)

48. Br Fabian Jordan a Christian Brother, worked at St Augustine's boys' home and St Vincent's boys' home in Victoria in the early 1960s. In 1999 he was sentenced to a 12-months good behaviour bond for indecent assault of a 13-year-old boy at St Augustine's in the early 1960s, although this was not the only complaint against Jordan (BRA 2016i).

49. Br Frank Keating aka Br Ibar of the De La Salle order, plead guilty to indecently assaulting 12 boys aged 12-13, at De La Salle College, Malvern between 1972-78. Keating was sentenced to 36 months jail, 8 months to be served behind bars and the remainder suspended (BRA ndy).

When he joined the De La Salle Brothers in his teens, Keating took the religious name of "Brother Ibar", evidently named after an ancient Irish saint. Br Ibar Keating taught in De La Salle schools around Australia from the 1960s to the 1990s. One victim told police that Ibar "indecently assaulted most of the boys in my class". The victims told the police that the Catholic culture prevented them from contacting the police in the 1970s. Ibar left the brotherhood in 1991 and worked as a lay teacher, Mr Keating, at Catholic schools in Port Augusta and Port Pirie (South Australia) in 1992-3 and in Ferntree Gully and Werribee (Victoria) in 1993-5. He then worked as an administrator in the Catholic
Education Office, Melbourne, until the Victoria Police charged him in 1997. (BRA ndy)

50. Fr Frank Klep a Catholic priest of the Salesian Order, was charged in 2005 with 28 Incidents of indecent assault against 8 Rupertswood boys. Klep plead guilty to 13 indecent assaults on 10 Rupertswood boarders (BRA 2017e). Prior to sentencing another victim came forward and Klep was sentenced to 36 months. In 2006, this sentence was increased by appeal to 5 years and 10 months with possible parole after 3 years and 6 months (BRA 2017e). In 2013, Klep plead guilty to 14 charges and was released on bail. In 2014, he plead guilty to a further 12 counts of CSA and was sentenced to 10.5 years with a non-parole period of 6.5 years (BRA 2017e).

In the 1980s, some Rupertswood ex-students admitted to their parents that Klep sexually abused them in the 1970s. In 1982-6, Klep was back at "Rupertswood" as principal. Alarmed by this promotion, a dozen parents confronted the Salesians' Australian administration and demanded Klep's removal, but the Salesians refused. These parents also reported Klep to the then chief administrator of the Melbourne Catholic archdiocese, but he ignored the complaints. Eventually, "after the parents threatened legal action, the Salesians "solved" the problem by awarding Klep a "study" trip to Rome and the United States". Returning to Australia in 1989, Klep helped to train priests at Salesian Theological College in Oakleigh (in Melbourne's south-east). Despite the complaints of 1986, he was again put into contact with boys in 1992 as head of the Salesians' Don Bosco Hostel and Youth Centre, this centre included some vulnerable youngsters. The Salesians later transferred Klep from Australia to the Pacific island Samoa and they illegally concealed his Australian criminal conviction from the Samoan authorities. In Samoa, he was out of reach of the Australian police. In 2004, after more Melbourne victims contacted the Australian police, Samoa deported Klep back to Australia, where he eventually pleaded guilty regarding the additional victims. He was again convicted. Even as Klep entered jail in December 2005, eleven years after his first conviction, his Salesian superiors still had not removed him from the priesthood. (BRA 2017e)
51. Fr Don **Lane** a Jesuit priest, committed CSA while working in several Jesuit schools including Xavier College in Melbourne. The Jesuits have acknowledged CSA committed by Lane (BRA 2016j).

52. Fr Daniel **Lyne** of the Passionist order, worked as rector of the Passionist theological college (Holy Cross College) at Templestowe in Melbourne. Later in his career, Lyne left Australia to work in Catholic juniorates overseas in Africa and India (BRA ndz). Lyne was about to be prosecuted by NSW police for CSA offences between 1964 and 1968, when he suddenly died (BRA ndz).

53. Br Edward **Mamo** a Missionaries of the Sacred Heart Brother, was jailed in Victoria after pleading guilty to committing CSA against 7 boys at Monivae College between 1976 and 1980. Mamo was sentenced to 2 years and 3 months jail in 2013 with a minimum of 18 months to be served in jail (BRA 2015d). Mamo was jailed again in 2015 after pleading guilty to 21 additional indecent assaults against 14 victims at Monivae College (BRA 2015d). Mamo was sentenced to 34 months jail with 22 months suspended (BRA 2015d).

54. Fr Charles **McCann** a parish priest was summoned to answer a charge of indecent assault against child at St Kevin’s parish, Templestowe. The victim’s parents pressured their child to drop the charges (BRA 2016k).

55. Br Thomas **McGee** a Christian Brother, worked at several Christian Brothers' orphanages: in Bindoon and Castledare in WA; St Augustine's orphanage, Geelong, Victoria 1939-44 and 1951-54; and St Vincent's boys' home, South Melbourne (BRA 2016l). He also worked at St Vincent's hostel, South Melbourne. The Christian Brothers have apologised to Br McGee’s victims (BRA 2016l).

56. Br Gerard **McNamara** aka Br **Camillus** a Marist Brother, plead guilty to indecently assaulting six students, mostly aged about 11 or 12, in 1972-73 while working at St Paul's College, Traralgon (BRA 2017f). “On 17 June 2005, Judge Jim Duggan sentenced McNamara to a 36-month jail term which was suspended. These offences occurred in 1975 when McNamara was the principal and sports master of the school” (BRA 2017f). During 2017, prosecutors filed new charges in the Melbourne
Magistrates Court against McNamara regarding indecent assaults allegedly committed by McNamara against five more boys at Traralgon (BRA 2017f).

57. Fr Michael Merivale was a priest in the Melbourne Catholic archdiocese. In 2000, he plead guilty to seven charges of committing CSA against 3 girls between 1969 and 1975 at St Bernard's parish, Belmont and was sentenced to six months jail (BRA 2016m).

58. Fr Leonard Monk, a parish priest, committed CSA throughout his career. “About 1948, when the complaints about Monk in the Ballarat diocese had faded, Bishop O'Collins brought Monk back to the Ballarat diocese, appointing him to minister at Camperdown.” Again, Monk committed CSA against boys while at Camperdown. By the early 1950s, he was removed from this parish and transferred to new parishes. Monk's later parishes included Horsham in the 1950s, Linton in 1961 and Apollo Bay in the early 1960s, where he continued to commit CSA (BRA ndaa).

In 1973, after Bishop Mulkearns had taken over the Ballarat diocese from Bishop O'Collins, Monk was again given a listing in the annual Australian Catholic Directory as a chaplain at St Vincent's hospital, Melbourne. He continued this chaplaincy for several years until his name disappeared from the annual Directory. (BRA ndaa)

59. Fr Sydney Morey was originally a Marist Brother before becoming a priest. “Morey served in several parishes, including Mildura, Horsham and Terang, and reports of CSA have been received about Morey from parishioners in all those areas (BRA 2013a).

60. Br Morgan of the Missionaries of the Sacred heart order, committed CSA while working at Monivae College, Hamilton, Victoria in the 1960s. An apology has been written by the Missionaries of the Sacred Heart leadership (BRA 2016n).

61. Fr Roger Mount, a priest belonging to the St John of God order, committed CSA offences at Churinga' boy's home, Greensborough, Melbourne between 1968 and 1974 (BRA 2016o).
In the 1971 Australian Catholic Directory, Brother Gabriel Mount was listed as the Prior at "Churinga". Later, Br Gabriel Mount transferred to Papua New Guinea, where he left the St John of God order and became a senior ranking priest in the Port Moresby diocese. He reverted to his birth name, becoming Father Roger Mount. The Victoria Police obtained a court order to extradite Mount from Papua New Guinea back to Victoria. Mount was charged with some of his CSA offences in 2014. (BRA 2016o)

62. Br Berchmans Moynahan aka Br Joseph Martin of the order of St John of God, committed CSA against vulnerable boys at Churinga home for disadvantaged boys, in Greensborough, Victoria (BRA 2017g). However, Moynahan died during prosecution for CSA committed at Churinga (BRA 2017g).

63. Fr Gerard Mulvale of the Pallottine order, was arrested in Western Australia where he was a chaplain at St John of God Hospital and was extradited to Victoria. He was charged in the Melbourne Magistrates Court with 120 CSA offences against four teenagers from Mulvale’s youth group at St Christopher’s, two males and two females (BRA ndab). On 3 November 1995 in the Melbourne County Court, Mulvale was sentenced regarding two male victims, to three years jail, with parole after 27 months (BRA ndab). One of the female victims, Stephanie Piper committed suicide and her mother, Eileen Piper, provided a submission to the Victorian inquiry (Piper 2012).

64. Fr Hugh Murray of the Vincentian order, in 1959, was ministering at St Vincent's College, boarding school at Bendigo in northern Victoria, for several years. He had a further term at this school in the late 1970s (BRA 2017h). A submission from John Frederiksen dated September 2012 states that at the age of thirteen he was sent to the St Vincent's College Bendigo and at the age of fourteen he approached his form teacher/pastoral carer Murray for advice on sexuality and catholic guilt about masturbation (Frederiksen 2012). Fr Murray arranged for me to meet him in private where he proceeded to get me to masturbate in front of him (Frederiksen 2012). Murray was charged in 2010 with indecently assaulting 3 boys but was granted a permanent stay because of advanced age, he died in 2017 (Frederiksen 2012).
65. Br Peter Noonan a Christian Brother, committed CSA against young schoolboys in his custody. Despite the Christian Brothers Order acknowledging these offences, Noonan was allowed to remain a Brother until he died in 2004, aged 55 (BRA 2016p). Noonan’s CSA began at the start of his teaching career at St Mary’s boys’ school, St Kilda in the late 1960s and continued at St Kevin’s College, Toorak and CBC St Kilda, where he became the headmaster in 1987 (BRA 2016p).

66. Fr John Ignatius O’Callaghan a parish priest, committed CSA while ministering as the Victorian chaplain of the girls’ section of the Young Christian Workers movement. O’Callaghan’s offending also occurred in other parishes he worked in. One victim stated that "O’Callaghan molested me at the West Brunswick parish in 1958 when I was 11 years old (BRA 2017i). I know of five other girls who were also abused by him, including my sister." As a priest, he had easy access to the school grounds and he was always hanging around the toilets (BRA. 2017i, para 22).” In 1998 BRA received a different kind of report about O'Callaghan from another caller, "Max", who said: "In 1985, when O'Callaghan was at Clayton parish, he resisted a request to baptise my newly-born nephew because this baby was illegitimate, that is, the baby's parents were not married (BRA. 2017i, para 23).” O’Callaghan had a flexible interpretation of the Catholic Church’s public image of a "celibate" (that is, unmarried) priesthood. In the 1980s, according to fellow-priests, O'Callaghan had a private unofficial relationship with a woman, with whom he fathered two daughters (BRA 2017i).

67. Fr Kevin O’Donnell was a child abuser from 1942 to 1992 (BRA 2017j). The Melbourne archdiocese retained him in parish work until he retired from full-time ministry in 1992, aged 75, after clocking up his 50 years of CSA. On his retirement, he was given a parting tribute by Archbishop Frank Little and was given the distinguished title Pastor Emeritus despite his record of CSA (BRA 2017j).

In 1993, O'Donnell was still serving as a part-time relieving priest at several parishes. On 7 September 1994, O'Donnell was charged with 32 incidents of indecent assault at four parishes, involving seven boys and one girl. When O’Donnell came to court again in early 1995, he was charged with indecently assaulting 12 victims (ten boys, two girls), all aged between eight and 15, at each of the five main parishes (Chelsea, Seymour, Dandenong, Hastings and Oakleigh) in which O'Donnell served between 1946 and 1976. In early 1995.
after discussions between the prosecutors and the church lawyers, O'Donnell pleaded guilty to one representative incident of indecent assault for each victim. On 11 August 1995, Judge Kellam sentenced O'Donnell to a total of 39 months jail, with a minimum of 15 months behind bars before parole (BRA 2017j).

68. Fr Thomas O'Keefe a parish priest, committed CSA in several. In a statement to a VPI (2013), the Melbourne Catholic archdiocese admitted that O'Keefe was a known child-sex offender and has apologised to some of O'Keefe's altar boys (BRA 2016q). “He also ministered at parishes in Sandringham (early 1960s), Preston East and St Kilda West (late 1960s), Brighton (1969-71), Doveton and Thornbury (1970s). As O'Keefe had died, the police were unable to prosecute him” (BRA ndac).

69. Br John David Parker a Christian Brother, was charged in 1995 with CSA of a nine-year-old boy at Parade Christian Brothers College junior school in Alphington in 1958 (BRA 2016r). However, the victim decided not to proceed to the trial, as he was satisfied with having his allegation aired in the Magistrates Court (BRA 2016r).

70. Fr Paul Pavlou of the Salesian Order, plead guilty in 2009, to committing an indecent act with a 14-year-old boy and another charge of possession of child pornography (BRA 2016s). He was given an 18-months suspended sentence plus a two-year community-based sentence. Pavlou is facing four charges of sexual and indecent acts with a boy aged under 16 in 2003 and 2004 (BRA ndad). In the Melbourne Magistrates Court on 1 September 2017, Pavlou pleaded not guilty (BRA ndad).

71. Fr George Pell has been the subject of a complaint in 2002 that as a trainee priest Pell committed CSA against a twelve-year-old altar boy in 1961-62 at a holiday camp for boys on Phillip Island. According to a church document, the victim alleged that, on several occasions, Pell thrust his hand down the inside of Phil's pants and got "a good handful" of the boy's penis and testicles; and, on other occasions, Pell allegedly tried to guide the boy's hand into the front of Pell's pants. By the year 2000, when Phil was aged 50, he realised (from television news footage) that the trainee priest Pell had risen to become an Archbishop. Phil was shocked, "he did not think it right that someone who had behaved
indecently towards children should lead the church," the church document says. So, beginning in 2000, Phil tried to alert the church authorities. Phil emphasised that he was not seeking compensation. And he was not reporting this matter to the police (therefore there is no police investigation into Phil's complaint). Rather, Phil was concerned about the safety of children in the church's care; and he merely wanted the church authorities to be aware of the offences that were allegedly committed upon him at the altar boys' camp. In 2002, the hierarchy paid a senior barrister, Mr Alex Southwell QC, to examine Phil's complaint. Archbishop George Pell (who was indeed at the altar boys' camp) denied committing any abuse. Mr Southwell's report concluded that the former altar boy "appeared to speak honestly from an actual recollection". Mr Southwell said he was not persuaded that the former altar boy was a liar as alleged by Pell. (BRA 2017k)

72. Fr Dominic Phillips of the Vincentian Order, committed CSA against young girls while he was ministering in in Malvern Victoria, St Joseph's parish, 1953-55 (BRA 2016t). Phillip's offending was not confined to Victoria as he also offended in Adelaide and Queensland (BRA 2016t).

73. Fr Ronald Dennis Pickering a parish priest, was the subject of CSA claims from fourteen institutions. "Pickering had friends in very high places in the hierarchy, and they looked the other way" (Family and Community Development Committee 2012, 5). There will be evidence that in 1986 a complaint was made by Dr Barker to a Monsignor. The complaint was that Pickering had sexually abused a young boy at St James Parish, Gardenvale in 1982. Archbishop Little informed Pickering of the complaint and Pickering promptly went on extended leave to England (RCICA 2015c, 12). Pickering ultimately returned to Gardenvale later in 1986. Nothing was done following this complaint and he continued to offend (RCICA 2015c, 12).

The alleged incidents occurred in the period from 1960 to 1989. Unfortunately, when that first victim made his inquiry at the church office Pickering was tipped off and he caught the next plane out of the country to England, where he came from originally, and Victoria Police were not interested in spending money and time on bringing him back from England. The church said they did not know
where he was, but in fact the church did know where he was because he had superannuation entitlements and they were looking after those (RCICA 2015c, 14).

74. Fr Terence Pidoto was charged with 22 offences against seven boys. “In April 1999, the Office of Public Prosecutions gave authority for Pidoto to be charged on summons concerning eight incidents involving three of the complainants” (BRA 2015e). In 2000, Judge Campbell granted separation of trials. In 2001, the judge declared Pidoto a serious sex offender and sentenced him to 3 years jail with the possibility of parole (BRA 2015e). In 2002, Pidoto won an appeal against his conviction. In 2007, Pidoto was found guilty of 11 charges of buggery and indecent assault against 4 boys and was sentenced to 7 years and 3 months jail, min of 5 years to be served before parole (BRA 2016u).

75. Fr David Rapson of the Salesian Order, was charged with 5 Incidents of assaulting a 14-year-old boy at Rupertswood, Sunbury. At various times in the 70s and 80s Rapson worked at Rupertswood and in 1978 he spent time working at Boys Town, Engadine, NSW (BRA 2015f). In 1986 Rapson was transferred to Salesian College Rupertswood in Sunbury, where he became the vice-principal. In 1992 Rapson was sentenced to 2 years jail for CSA (BRA 2015f). “The Vatican reluctantly removed Rapson from the priesthood in 2004” (BRA 2015f). In 2013, Rapson was charged with CSA against 8 schoolboys between 1973-1990. These charges included 5 counts of rape and 8 charges of indecent assault to which Rapson plead not guilty (BRA 2015f). Rapson was sentenced to a minimum 10 years jail which was appealed, and a retrial ordered. In 2015, 4 trials with separate juries were conducted resulting in Rapson being sentenced to 12.5 years in jail with an eligibility for parole after serving 9 years and 4 months (BRA 2015f).

76. Fr Gerald Francis Ridsdale committed CSA against children during his seminary training in the 1950s and immediately after he was ordained. “Bishop O'Collins learned in 1961 that Ridsdale was committing CSA against a boy in Ballarat, however, Ridsdale continued as a priest and was moved from parish to parish never warning parishioners about their children being in danger” (Family and Community Development Committee 2013a, 3). ‘I think every boy in Mortlake was offended against by Ridsdale’ (Family and Community Development Committee 2013a, 6, para
2). Total number of child victims in Ballarat known, includes 116 claims with 107 of these substantiated, 67 of these offences were committed by Ridsdale (Family and Community Development Committee 2013a, 24). Ridsdale abused children at Horsham, Inglewood, Camperdown, Ballarat North parish (including Nazareth House and St Joseph's Home), Mildura, Swan Hill, Warrnambool, Ballarat East (including St Alipius Boy's School), Apollo Bay, Inglewood again, Edenhope, the National Pastoral Institute in Melbourne, Mortlake and Horsham parish (RCICA 2016, 10).

In 1993 Ridsdale plead guilty to offending against 9 boys at Apollo Bay, Ballarat East, Inglewood and Edenhope and was jailed for 12 months a minimum of 3 months (RCICA 2016, 9). In 1994 Ridsdale faced 180 charges including 21 of buggery, two of attempted buggery 102 of indecent assault and 55 of gross indecency and was jailed for 18 years, parole after 15yrs (RCICA 2016, 9). In 2006, Ridsdale was charged again with 35 offences committed against boys when he was a parish priest in Warrnambool, Ballarat East, Apollo Bay, Inglewood, Edenhope, Mortlake and Horsham. This resulted in 4 years being added to his sentence (RCICA 2016, 9). In 2013, instead of going before the Parole Board, Ridsdale was charged with multiple new offences against 14 victims, 11 males and 3 females. Ridsdale plead guilty to 29 charges including 1 count of buggery 27 counts of indecent assault, and one count of carnal knowledge of a girl. The offences were committed between 1961 and 1980 at various Victorian towns. The court decided not to proceed with more than 50 other charges. In April 2014, Judge Rozenes sentenced Ridsdale to an additional eight years in jail (with a minimum of five before becoming eligible to apply for parole). This means that he could be in jail until 2022 but eligible for apply for parole in April 2019 (BRA 2017k). Ridsdale was convicted of 54 sexual assaults against mostly boys plus several girls, aged between 6 and 16 years of age between 1961 and 1980 (BRA 2017k). An example of the high level of trust placed in clergy is apparent in the story of Paul Levey. In 1982, his father agreed to send Levey, then 14, to live at the presbytery at Mortlake with Ridsdale where they shared a bedroom (RCICA 2015h, 92). More than 20 years prior to this, in 1961, a boy from Camperdown was sexually abused by
Ridsdale when his father was hospitalised and Ridsdale was 'minding' him (BRA 2017k).

77. Br Bernard Ring a Christian Brother, committed CSA against a student at St Patrick’s College, East Melbourne (RCICA 2015e, 38). The victim stated that he was also being abused by two other brothers at the time he was being abused by Ring (RCICA 2015e, 39).

78. Fr Barry Robinson committed CSA and admitted to this in 1994 but was never charged. Despite knowledge of Robinson’s CSA, the Melbourne archdiocese accepted him into ministry in Melbourne (Family and Community Development Committee 2012, 6). In 2011, there was an attempt transfer Robinson to Healesville, which has had several other known offenders there. Due to the action of concerned parties his appointment did not go-ahead (Family and Community Development Committee 2012, 6).

79. Fr Victor Gabriel Rubeo committed CSA in various parishes in Victoria. Rubeo was not the only CSA offender in his various parishes.

After his period at Laverton, he was succeeded there (in the 1970s and 1980s) by Fr Fitzgerald, who was investigated by police in the 1960s for alleged child-sex offences at the Coburg parish in Melbourne's north. When Rubeo went to the Reservoir parish (in Melbourne’s north), he had been preceded there by a serial child-abuser, Fr Glennon, who ended up in jail (BRA 2012).

While students at St Mary’s in Altona, in the 1960's, two brothers were sexually abused by Rubeo (BRA 2012). Neither brother knew the other was also being abused. One brother states that “the CSA began when he was 11 years old and continued until he was 17 years old” (Hersbach 2012).

80. Br Michael Gerard Rush a Marist Brother, was sentenced in 2016 to 30 months jail for committing CSA against 7 victims at Assumption College, Kilmore between 1962 and 1967 (BRA 2017l).

81. Fr Kevin Ryan was the subject of a complaint of CSA against an 11-year-old boy at St Matthew’s parish school, Fawkner North in 1965 (BRA 2016v). Ryan went to
Corpus Christi seminary-Werribee, Melbourne where he studied for the priesthood with fellow student Gerald Ridsdale (BRA 2016v).

82. Fr Paul David Ryan of the Vincentian Fathers, was sentenced to 18 months jail for committing CSA offences against boys 13, 14 and 16 years of age (BRA 2017m).

In 1976, the week of his ordination, a mother complained that Ryan had abused her son at the Ballarat North parish. Ryan assaulted two altar boys in his parish house at Penhurst. Ryan began training for the priesthood at the Adelaide Catholic seminary (St Francis Xavier's seminary, conducted by the Vincentian Fathers in 1971. Half-way through third year, the Adelaide seminary asked Ryan to leave. In 1971 Ryan applied to Bishop Mulkearns to sponsor him as a Ballarat candidate for the priesthood at the Melbourne seminary (Corpus Christi College). Ryan’s Adelaide references were not good, but Ballarat accepted him as a candidate and he spent the next five years at the Melbourne seminary. In 1976 seminary authorities learned that Ryan had been engaged in sexual relationships with about 6 trainee priests during his seminary course. At the end of 1976, Ryan lived with Fr Pickering the parish priest of St Peter’s parish at Clayton. Ryan became a frequent visitor to a later parish of Fr Pickering’s in Gardenvale (BRA 2017m).

83. Fr Jim Scannell aka James Henry aka Br Frederick a Marist brother and later priest, plead not guilty to charges of buggery but was convicted and was sentenced to 2 years jail (BRA 2014). A 12-year-old boy was raped by Scannell and then subjected to the ritual of Confession at St Anne’s, Kew. “In the ritual of Confession after the rape, the boy was required to ‘confess’ the boy’s sin for having participated in the sexual event” (BRA 2014).

84. Br Aloysius Schofield a Christian brother, was the subject of complaints of CSA against boys while working at St Augustine's boys' orphanage in Geelong, Victoria in the late 1940s (BRA 2016w).

85. Br Paul Schulze a Jesuit brother was subject tp complaints of CSA while working at Xavier College, Melbourne. The Jesuits settled a complaint of CSA against a boy in the 1960s. Schulze also taught at St Ignatius parish primary school, Richmond.
86. Br Peter **Searson** aka Br **Bonaventure** a Marist Brother and then Priest, was subject to many complaints of CSA. The parishes or schools that were subject to claims or substantiated complaints of CSA in relation to Searson were Kew, Sunbury, the Holy Family Primary School and Holy Family Parish in Doveton (RCICA 2015c, 22). The alleged incidents occurred in the period from 1974 to 1985 (inclusive) (RCICA 2015c, 22).

In 1986, parents at the Doveton parish school petitioned the archdiocesan office, seeking the removal of Searson as parish priest. The vicar-general of Melbourne archdiocese at that time was one of Melbourne’s 4 auxiliary bishops, Bishop Hilton Deakin. Searson was not removed or disciplined. A succession of CSA priests was sent to Doveton parish including O’Keefe, Baker, Rubeo and Searson. Searson demonstrated bizarre behaviour including a knife incident in about 1995 and having a hand gun at school, animal cruelty, showing a body in a coffin to children and unnecessary physical and sexualised conduct with children (RCICA 2015c, 19). It took the church 15 years to do something about him. Peter Searson was moved 10 times (Family and Community Development Committee 2012a, 14). In 1978-1984, Searson was the Parish Priest in charge at Sunbury (Our Lady of Mount Carmel parish) in Melbourne’s outer north-west. Here there were complaints about Searson sexually harassing children at the parish primary school. Searson was taking children, one at a time, from the classroom to his study to give them "sex education" (BRA ndae). In 1984 Searson took charge of the Holy family parish at Doveton, an area of low-economic status near Dandenong, in Melbourne’s outer south-east (BRA ndae). At Doveton there were again complaints about him touching or sexually harassing children. Hampered by insufficient co-operation from church sex-abuse victims, the police finally managed to summon Searson to court for physical assault. In December 1997, Searson pleaded guilty to physically assaulting a 12-year-old altar boy. Searson (then aged 74) was placed on a six-months good-behaviour bond (BRA ndae).

87. Br John **Skehan** aka Br **Emilian** a Marist Brother, committed CSA in NSW and VIC. In 2014, he received an 8-month suspended sentence and was placed on sex
offenders register for CSA crimes committed against a 13-year-old boy in 1970 at St Colman’s in Shepparton (BRA 2014a).

88. Fr Patrick Stephenson a Jesuit priest, was subject to complaints of CSA committed while ministering at Xavier College (BRA ndaf). Stephenson was not the only priest subject to complaints of CSA at Xavier College (BRA ndaf).

89. Br Laurie Sweeney of the Salesian order committed CSA against a brother and sister at a Salesian club in Oakleigh, Melbourne in 1975. (Broken Rites 2016x) Sweeney ran the Don Bosco boys club which was attached to the school. (Beaumont 2012, 1).

90. Alan Edward Swingler was originally a Marist Brother but left the Marist order and became a lay teacher of religious studies at St Joseph’s Christian Brothers' College, Geelona, Victoria, where he stayed for 18 years (BRA 2016y).

In 1996 Swingler, aged 54, was sentenced to seven years jail, a minimum of five years on one incident of buggery, three incidents of gross indecency and nine of indecent assault of boys. Outside the court, the mother of one victim said that, even after the family complained to the school about the crimes, the school kept Swingler on its staff. (BRA 2016y)

91. Br Brian Mark Thomas a Christian Brother, committed CSA while working at St Augustine’s orphanage in Geelona in 1969. The Christian Brothers have settled a complaint of CSA (BRA 2016z). Br Thomas also worked in schools in NSW and Canberra.

92. Br Aubrey Tobin aka Michael Benedict a Marist Brother, committed CSA against boys in the mid-1980s at Assumption College, a boarding school at Kilmore. Prior to this Tobin worked and committed CSA against boys at St Paul’s College, Traralgon, a secondary school for boys (BRA 2017n).

93. Br Peter John Toomey a Christian brother, was charged in 2005 with assaulting 10 pupils aged 11 and 12 years at Trinity Regional College in Brunswick between 1972 and 1973 (BRA. 2017o). Br Toomey plead guilty to CSA against 10 boys and was
sentenced to 4 years and 3 months jail with the possibility of parole after 2 years and 6 months (BRA 2017o). Andrew Collins submission to RCICA in 1983 states, “When I was 14, Toomey arrived at St Patrick’s. He was my Form 3 class teacher. One day, Toomey called me out of class and sat me down in the corridor which was empty. He said, 'Look, I've noticed that you've started shaving. You probably notice your body is going through a few other changes and at lunchtime or after school I'll be in my dorm if you want to come and talk to me and I'll explain more to you'. He put his hand in between my pants and started fondling me” (RCICA 2015b, 59).

94. Father John Leslie Treacy was ordained in 1972 and belongs to the Sandhurst diocese in northern Victoria.

   His original parishes included Tatura, Beechworth, Tallangatta, Wodonga and Rushworth. In 1993 he plead guilty to indecently assaulting a boy from one of his parishes and was given a non-custodial sentence. The Sandhurst diocese later arranged for Treacy to move to Queensland, where Queensland bishops accepted him to minister in parishes and as a hospital chaplain, while he continued to be officially listed as a priest of the Sandhurst diocese. (BRA 2016aa)

95. Peter Paul Van Ruth a former Salesian Brother, “was jailed in 2011 after he pleaded guilty to committing CSA against two boys in 1969 while he was a Brother at Salesian College, Rupertswood, Sunbury” (BRA ndag). He was sentenced to 28 months in jail with a minimum of 16 months to be served behind bars (BRA ndag). After complaints of CSA were made Van Ruth joined the state education department in 1970. In 1978, he was accepted back into the Catholic education system going on to become deputy principal and principal at several schools (BRA ndag).

96. Br Frank Webster a Christian Brother, committed CSA while he was the principal at St Augustine’s orphanage, Geelong, Victoria, from 1954 to 1959 (BRA 2011b). The Christian Brothers accepted complaints and sent apologies to Webster’s victims. Webster was not the only cleric at this institution committing CSA. One victim stated that he was also abused by Br Eastmure and others (BRA 2011b).
97. Br Keith William **Weston** a Christian Brother, plead guilty to committing CSA against 4 boys aged 11-14 years at St Joseph’s Junior in Pascoe Vale (BRA ndah). “Weston was sentenced to 30 months jail, suspended for offences against boys” (BRA ndah). One victim stated that in 1966, in Grade 6 he was subjected to sexual abuse by the Principal of the school, Weston. Numerous other students of the school also experienced abuse by him (Keating 2012, 1).

98. Fr Ray **Whitehouse** a parish priest, committed CSA against an 11-year-old altar boy while working as an assistant priest at St Peter’s in East Bentleigh in 1974 (BRA ndai). “Melbourne Catholic archdiocese has admitted that Fr Raymond Whitehouse was a child-sex offender” (BRA ndai).

99. Fr Murray **Wilson** a Vincentian priest, committed CSA against a 13-year-old boy while working at St Vincent’s College Bendigo in the 1970s (BRA 2016ab). Wilson was in charge of discipline. “Wilson died mysteriously in 1979 at the age of 44 (by inhaling gas at St Stanislaus College in Bathurst NSW), before his victims could bring him to justice in court. In 2006, the Vincentian Fathers finally apologised to this victim” (BRA 2016ab).
APPENDIX 2 – Network map

Dark network map and clusters.pdf
Appendix 3

Cluster 1

St Alipius, Ballarat

Cluster 2

Salesian College, Sunbury 'Rupertswood'

Cluster 3

St Augustine's Geelong

307
Cluster 13

St Vincent's College, Bendigo

Cluster 14

Alphington Christian Brothers College

Cluster 15

St Joseph's College Geelong
Cluster 16

Salesian College, Oakleigh

Fr D' Astolli1  Br Sweeney  Fr O'Donnell
Appendix 4

Excel spreadsheet - data

Victorian clergy
99.xlsx