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	Lawsuit Reveals How Catholic Church Handles Clergy Who Abuse Minors Sexually Voice from the Desert March 12, 2010 http://reform-network.net/?p=2888 This Texas lawsuit contains very interesting information about how the Roman Catholic Church handles clergy who abuse minors sexually. See paragraphs 16 through 34 in particular. * * * CAUSE NO. 10-968-C JOHN DOE, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF § Plaintiff, § § vs. § § EDMOND CARMODY, INDIVIDUALLY; § AND AS BISHOP OF THE ROMAN CATH- § NUECES COUNTY, T E X A S OLIC DIOCESE OF CORPUS CHRISTI, § A CORPORATION SOLE, HIS PREDE- § CESSORS AND SUCCESSORS; ROMAN § CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF CORPUS § CHRISTI, A CORPORATION SOLE; § AND ESTATE OF THOMAS L. MEANY, § § Defendants. § 94TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED PETITION WITH REQUEST FOR RULE 194 DISCLOSURES TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: COMES NOW JOHN DOE, Plaintiff herein, and files this his First Amended Petition With Request for Rule 194 Disclosures, complaining of Defendants, EDMOND CARMODY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS BISHOP OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF CORPUS CHRISTI A CORPORATION SOLE, HIS PREDECESSORS AND SUCCESSORS; ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF CORPUS CHRISTI, A CORPORATION SOLE; AND ESTATE OF THOMAS L. MEANY. He pleads as follows: I. DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN 1. Plaintiff intends a Level 3 Discovery Control Plan pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 190.4. Plaintiff moves that the Court hold a hearing and enter an Order that discovery be conducted in accordance with a discovery control plan tailored to the circumstances of this specific suit. II. PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 2. Plaintiff JOHN DOE is an individual whose identity has previously been disclosed to the defendants. He is a resident of Nueces County, Texas. 3. Defendant EDMOND CARMODY, Individually is an adult natural person who is a resident of Nueces County, Texas. He is the sole person who, at the time of this filing, is the Corporation Sole known as The Roman Catholic Diocese of Corpus Christi. His principal place of business is Chancery Office, Diocese of Corpus Christi, 620 Lipan Street, Corpus Christi, TX 78401-2434. He may be served individually with citation at that location pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(a)(2). The Roman Catholic Diocese of Corpus Christi, A Corporation Sole may be served with citation upon its current bishop, Edmond Carmody, Chancery Office, Diocese of Corpus Christi, 620 Lipan Street, Corpus Christi, TX 78401-2434 pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(a)(1) or (a)(2). 4. Defendant ESTATE OF THOMAS L. MEANY is a juridical entity created by action of the Nueces County Court at Law No. 3 in Docket #45630-3. Service may be had upon its Independent Executor, Mr. John F.S. McCloskey, 5818 Kerry Dr., Corpus Christi, TX 78413 pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(a)(1) or (a)(2).[1] 5. An Original Petition was filed and served but the bishop and diocese defendants have not answered. Thus, this First Amended Petition displaces the Original and further, adds the Estate defendant. Citation and service of the First Amended Petition is requested on all three defendants. 6. This Court has both subject matter and in personam jurisdiction over the defendants. 7. Venue is proper in Nueces County, Texas pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.002 (a)(1) or (a)(2). 8. For purposes of simplification, the defendants will be referred to in their usual referents as Carmody, bishop, diocese or estate. Where “the Church” is used, it refers to the Roman Catholic Church, a/k/a the Holy See, at Vatican City State, a sovereign nation located within the confines of the city of Rome, Italy.[2] III. FACTS 9. John Doe, since early adolescence, has an extensive history of mental illness. Of relevance here, in early February 1971, Plaintiff spent approximately that entire month at Austin State Hospital with a deferred diagnosis of “adjustment reaction of adolescence,” with “incipient schizophrenic processes . . . not ruled out.” 10. After discharge in mid-March, his parents, then living in Rye, TX, put him on a bus in Houston and sent him to Corpus Christi bus to get a job on a fishing boat. On arrival in Corpus, Plaintiff, a catholic, went to Holy Cross Rectory seeking money and a place to stay. Father Thomas Meany answered the door and they talked for about a half hour. That first day, Meany fed the plaintiff at the rectory, then took him to Aransas Pass where he introduced him to Rodney Duzak, a boat captain. Then, Meany took plaintiff to a deserted beach at Port Aransas and initiated oral and anal sex upon the plaintiff. Plaintiff was told that the sex was “payback” for the meal at the rectory and the introduction to Duzak. It was made clear that it was either sex or “take a walk.” Plaintiff, a person of unsound mind, complied. They returned to the rectory and plaintiff remained there for approximately a long weekend during which there was repetition of the sexual contact at the beach. After that, Meany took plaintiff back to Aransas and bought him his fishing gear and commercial fishing license. After a two week deployment on the Duzak-captained boat, plaintiff returned home to Rye, TX for approximately a week and returned to Corpus by bus. 11. During this second trip to Corpus, there was no contact with Meany and plaintiff again returned home to Rye, TX by bus for a second week long shore leave. 12. After the second shore leave, plaintiff made his third trip to Corpus and re-connected with Meany for another 4-5 day stay at the rectory where the sexual abuse continued. Meany then took plaintiff to the Jackson Motel in Port Aransas to await the next fishing deployment. 13. Afer the second weekend with Meany and the attendant sexual abuse and exploitation, plaintiff self-referred back to Austin State Hospital, in early May, 1971. Unlike the first admission in February which is reflected in the medical records as “adjustment reaction of adolescence,” possible schizophrenia, the post Meany self-admission records reveal the following in the patient’s own words: “I want to be like other kids. I have never loved any girl and that’s what I want. I don’t (sic) do anything wrong. I just want to do what I want for a change, and not what everyone tells me to do.”[3] 14. The abuse relationship continued at the very least through a period of another psychiatric hospitalization of John Doe at Rusk State Hospital in 1982. 15. Thomas L. Meany died on July 20, 2008. His Will was filed for probate on August 25, 2008 and reveals the existence of the Thomas L. Meany Living Trust into which the probate assets are to be distributed. The Applicant for Letters Testamentary, is John F.S. McCloskey to whom, upon information and belief, letters testamentary have been granted. 16. In May 2008, plaintiff contacted defendant Bishop Carmody and related the abuse history. Carmody, a person with his Master’s Degree in Education at Our lady of the Lake University in 1968, and a Teacher’s and Counselor’s certificate from the State of Texas, minimized the damage, offered counseling at the church’s expense up to $3000.00, some religious artifact blessed by the pope, and harshly advised that plaintiff should forgive and move on – reminiscent of a public statement Carmody had made as bishop of Tyler, Texas in the Monsignor Flynn case in the late 1990s and the now published accounts of payments made by this diocese and Carmody for some 7 cases of sexual abuse, presumably during bishop Carmody’s tenure. This cruel treatment of the plaintiff is in spite of Carmody’s training and Texas counselor’s certification – not to mention the explicit admission of the Roman church in its Catechism of the Catholic Church (1994) that “Connected to incest is any sexual abuse perpetrated by adults on children or adolescents entrusted to their care. The offense is compounded by the scandalous harm done to the physical and moral integrity of the young who will remain scarred by it all their lives . . . .” Id. at par. 2839 (emphasis added). He also had, as of 1994, the Roman church’s admission that “Scandal takes on a particular gravity by reason of the authority of those who cause it or the weakness of those who are scandalized. . . . Scandal is grave when given by those who by nature or office are obliged to teach and educate others.” Id. at par. 2285. $3,000.00 indeed! The audacity of the treatment of the plaintiff by this bishop should horrify the conscience of any person with any moral compass. It constitutes a re-injuring of the already scarred for life plaintiff. 17. By way of further background to the “patterns and practices” involved in this case as well as others around the world, in 2001, then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, formerly known as the “Holy Office,” formerly known as the “Office of the Inquisition” issued a letter to all bishops of the Catholic church concerning “very grave sins” and the secret manner in which they are to be handled exclusively by his congregation in Rome. It is a fascinating admixture of sins and crimes – fascinating as much for the strange admixture as for what is omitted. Delicts against the sanctity of the most August eucharistic sacrifice and the sacraments, namely: 1. Taking or retaining the consecrated species for a sacrilegious purpose or throwing them away. 2. Attempting the liturgical action of the eucharistic sacrifice or simulating the same. 3. Forbidden concelebration of the eucharistic sacrifice with ministers of ecclesial communities which do not have apostolic succession and do not recognize the sacramental dignity of priestly ordination. 4. Consecrating for a sacrilegious purpose one matter without the other in the eucharistic celebration or even both outside a eucharistic celebration. Delicts against the sanctity of the sacrament of penance, namely: 1. Absolution of an accomplice in sin against the Sixth Commandment of the Decalogue. 2. Solicitation in the act, on the occasion or under the pretext of confession, to sin against the Sixth Commandment of the Decalogue, if it is directed to sin with the confessor himself. 3. Direct violation of the sacramental seal. A delict against morals, namely: the delict committed by a cleric against the Sixth Commandment of the Decalogue with a minor below the age of 18 years. (See par. 16, infra). 18. First to be noted is that there apparently exists a serious problem concerning profanation of the sacrament of penance or “confession to a priest” to which our rules of evidence grant a privilege. Apparently what we dignify with a privilege includes priests forgiving their sex partners, soliciting sex from a penitent who probably has been confessing “sins of the flesh,” and most startlingly, violation of the confessional seal – the very seal to which our courts give high deference. The question “How long has this been going on?” will be of significance in this case. 19. Next to be noted is the elevation of these serious matters, including “a delict against morals . . . committed by a cleric with a minor below the age of 18 years,” with purely cultic matters like “Consecrating for a sacrilegious purpose one matter without the other in the eucharistic celebration or even both outside a eucharistic celebration,” and clerical matters like “forbidden concelebration of the eucharistic sacrifice with ministers of ecclesial communities which do not have apostolic succession and do not recognize the sacramental dignity of priestly ordination.” Why mix matters of clear moral turpitude and even criminality with cultic and clerical matters which bear no resemblance in the world of mens rea? Another critical question in this litigation. Finally, if these are the sins that are so grave that they bear special attention at the Vatican in secret, where is that old catholic favorite, abortion? Another critical question in this litigation. 20. Further, these and other official church documents will show, at time of trial, that these minor children were considered accomplices in their own abuse, thus providing justification for the conspiratorial conduct involved, including conspiracy of silence. A critical insight into the mind set of this institution towards children can be gleaned from a deposition taken of George Rueger, Auxiliary Bishop of Worcester, MA on April 2, 2003 in Case No. 02-1475 in Massachusetts Superior Court in Braio v. Diocese and Rueger. In that deposition, the undersigned addressed the significance of the crime committed “with” a minor. The colloquy excerpt follows: > Q. (BY MR. SHEA) Okay. Now, moving back down to the 17 first bold lines on the bottom of this page, I’m 18 trying to get a sense of this idea that if a 19 cleric becomes involved in sexual conduct with a 20 minor, that somehow this is a sin committed 21 obviously by the cleric, but with the minor, 22 that the minor is sinning along with the priest. 23 I think you’ve indicated that frankly 24 you believe that that may or may not be true, 1 but it’s possible that that could be correct; is 2 that right? 3 A. (BY BISHOP GEORGE RUEGER) He is sinning with a minor, the minor 4 is his accomplice. What the gravity of the 5 minor’s culpability is is hard to say. > 21. The 2001 Ratzinger letter is also noteworthy for its revelation of a theretofore unknown document, published in secrecy in 1962 by Ratzinger’s predecessor Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani, the now well publicized Crimen sollicitationis. Crimen addresses the same confessional matters set out in the 2001 letter in exhausting procedural detail. Significantly, it draws back the veil on the place that sexual abuse of children occupies in the belief system and how it is an integral part of the pattern and practices of the Roman church. It shows the basis on which a priest can be forgiven for this heinous crime and be protected from prosecution.[4] 22. The macabre ritual used to exculpate and protect a priest who has committed this crime follows: FORMULA B: THE FORMULA OF ABJURATION I, (name of priest), the son of ______________, being ____ years of age, and being personally brought to trial [arraigned], and having genuflected before you (name of bishop receiving the abjuration and his qualities) and having before me and touching with my hand the most holy Gospels, and knowing that no one can be saved unless he believes what the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Roman Church holds, believes, preaches, professes and teaches, I confess and I am sorry that I have sinned against that church through the abuse and profanation of the sacrament of penance . . .[5] Now, sorrowful and penitent for the aforesaid, I abjure all the same with a sincere heart and a real faith and I detest in the same way in general all other errors and heresies contrary to the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Roman Church and at the same time humbly accept and promise faithfully to implement all the penances given to me by R.P.P. [the reverend dignitary] that have already been imposed or will be disposed: and if I have not stood firmly in some matter despite these promises and oaths of mine (May God prevent this) I subject myself to all the penalties and castigations which have been stated and promulgated by the sacred canons and other general constitutions against delinquents [who have acted] in this way. Thus, may God help me and these Holy Gospels cf His, which I touch with my hands. I… the aforesaid have abjured, sworn, promised and obligated myself as above, and in testimony [of my good faith] in this matter I have signed with my hand this written promise of my abjuration which I have related orally with words (at ____________the place in which the abjuration has been made) on this ____ day of the month of ____ in the year _______. /s/ Signature. After the absolution has been imparted, the one who received the abjuration and gave the absolution will put his signature here in the way it Is noted in Formula C, which follows. FORMULA C: THE FORMULA OF ABSOLUTION Once the penitent, kneeling on both knees and having first touched the Holy Gospels of God, has read and signed the formula of abjuration, [the bishop or his delegate] absolves him, wearing at least the purple stole, and, while sitting, will recite the psalm Miserere or De Profundis with the Gloria Patri. Then standing he will say: Kyrie, eleison, Christe eleison, Kyrie, eleison, Pater Noster, secretly up to “And lead us not into temptation. But deliver us from evil.” Save your people, Lord. My God, they are hoping in you. Lord, hear my prayer. And let my cry come unto you. The Lord be with you. And with your spirit. Let us pray: God, of whom it is proper always to have mercy and to treat with forbearance, we supplicantly beseech you, that the compassion of your holiness absolve with clemency this servant of yours whom the shackle of excommunication binds. Through Christ our Lord. Amen. Then, again sitting down, he should absolve the penitent still kneeling before him with these words: By the Apostolic authority which I exercise in this matter, I absolve you from the bond of excommunication, which you [perhaps] have incurred, and I restore you to the holy sacraments of the church, to the communion and unity of the faithful, in the Name of the Father and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. With these acts, the one who has imparted the absolution should impose the salutary penances (for the most part a penance of reciting determined prayers, of performing some pious pilgrimage or accomplishing other works of piety, of observing a particular fast or of dispensing alms in pious causes etc.) and finally, then the formula of abjuration and he signs below in this way: In the execution of the orders of R.P.D. (the reverend superior) (the name, etc. of the one delegating him)] the aforesaid (name, etc., of the penitent) was administered by myself [the delegate] the abjuration concerning (e.g.formal, or grave or light) . . . and the salutary penances in the usual form of the church, these on the day and year given above. So be it. (the signature of the person absolving the other). 23. What these two documents demonstrate is precisely what the Roman church itself admits as morally wrong in its own teachings in its 1994 Catechism. “Scandal can be provoked by laws or institutions, by fashion or opinion. Therefore, they are guilty of scandal who establish laws or social structures leading to the decline of morals and the corruption of religious practice . . . .” Id. at par. 2286. In this regard, the church at par. 2286 points the finger at business leaders and the press, but certainly not itself. 24. What the 2001 Ratzinger letter and Crimen demonstrate is that the sexual abuse of minors presents the church with an opportunity to take a perpetrator priest, arguably facing criminal prosecution, and make that priest’s freedom contingent on his acknowledgment of the theory of extra ecclesiam nulla salus, “outside the church there is no salvation,” first asserted by St. Cyprian of Carthage. In his mid-third century letter to Jubaianus, bishop in Maurentania and repeated in various formats to the present day.[6] 25. Simply put, Crimen demonstrates that the issues of clericalism and abuse of minors provides the feed stock for the Church to continue to advance its outrageous assertion that it alone is the sole means of salvation and in a circular line of reasoning, that its priests are therefore to be protected as its agents with special “ontological” powers. It is institutional narcissism in its vilest form. The fact that it even exists supports Plaintiff’s allegations in this case as detailed below, of systemic fraud, fraudulent concealment, misrepresentation and conspiracy to conceal clergy sexual abuse of minors by the Catholic hierarchy, including Defendants herein. Further, as Formulae B and C in Crimen clearly demonstrate, the concealment and location-shifting of a perpetrator is achieved through the use of a liturgical ritual which demonstrates actions taken by both a priest-perpetrator and bishop in the course and scope of their employment. 26. The Institutional negligence and intentional deceit by this and other Defendant Dioceses is evident in its conspiratorial intent to advance its institutional interests at the expense of children and it goes to the very heart of the Roman Catholic church abuse scandal. At their meeting in Dallas in 2002, the Bishops of the United States, through the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, authorized the creation of a National Review Board for The Protection of Young People and further authorized a survey, statistical study, and report to be compiled through the facilities of John Jay College for Criminal Justice and reported to the public by February 2004. These reports have now been completed and released in the form of two extensive documents. The first document, entitled The Nature and Scope of the Problem of Sexual Abuse of Minors by Catholic Priests and Deacons in the United States (the John Jay Report), contained a statistical study. The second, entitled A Report on the Crisis in the Catholic Church in the United States (February 27, 2004) (the “Report”), identified some of the problems evident in this case. These reports can be found at { PRIVATE HREF=”#http://www.usccb.org/nrb/” http://www.usccb.org/nrb. The findings and conclusions of these reports further support Plaintiff’s claims here. 27. For example, in reviewing “The Response of U.S. Church Officials to Sexual Abuse of Minors by Priests,” the Review Board concluded that approximately 4% of all clergy in the United States had sexually abused minors. The Review Board further concluded that an “inadequate response by bishops and other church leaders to this problem over the last twenty five years” contributed to the issue and noted that “[t]he fallout resulting from this epidemic of abuse and the shortcomings in the response of a number of bishops and other Church leaders continues to this day.” Some bishops were willing to acknowledge that “in the past, secrecy has created an atmosphere that has inhibited the healing process and, in some cases, enabled sexually abusive behavior to be repeated.” 28. The Review Board placed much of the blame for this crisis on what it characterized as “Secrecy and Avoidance of Scandal.” In that section of the Report, the Board acknowledged explicitly the gravamen of the Plaintiff’s complaints in this case: [T]ime and again Church leaders failed to report incidents of possible criminal activity to the civil authorities . . . . [I]t is clear in hindsight that the Church could have prevented numerous acts of sexual abuse had its leaders reported all allegations of sexual abuse by priests. Where the evidence warranted, offenders could have been prosecuted and punished before they were able to perpetuate their misconduct; and by their example, other priests could have been deterred from engaging in similar misconduct. 29. With respect to the causes of action pled in this case, the revelations of the Review Board are compelling. “There appears to have been a significant surge in acts of abuse in the 1960s and continuing into the mid 1980s. The fallout resulting from this epidemic of abuse and the shortcomings in the response of a number of bishops and other Church leaders continues to this day.” Id. at 4 (emphasis added). “The bishops acknowledged that ‘in the past, secrecy has created an atmosphere that has inhibited the healing process and, in some cases, enabled sexually abusive behavior to be repeated.’” Id. at 5 (emphasis added). This is precisely the evidence that Plaintiff seeks to obtain from a thorough review of all files of priests in the Diocese of Corpus Christi against whom credible allegations of sexual abuse of minors have been leveled. See Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. 196 F.3d 409, 430 (1999)(agreeing that a jury could find “a duty of care including a duty to investigate and warn or inform so as to prevent or alleviate harm to additional victims” that may have been sexually abused by Diocesan priests). 30. Another court has responded to the cited reports at 41-45, supra. “A contemporary court cannot ignore, for example, the fact that recent reports suggest that ‘based on survey responses [that] . . . the total number of priests with allegations of abuse was 4,392 . . .’ it can no longer be said as a matter of law that such conduct [does not impose employer liability under the theory of Respondeat Superior].” Nelligan vs. Norwich R.C. Diocese et al., No. CV02-0099218-S, Connecticut Superior Court, March 5, 2004. Formulae B and C of Crimen buttress the Nelligan court’s conclusion. See par. 24, supra. 31. This case graphically illustrates one of the Report’s conclusions: “There is a larger pattern of protection of priests first, rather than protecting children first.” That larger pattern, discerned by the Connecticut Superior Court in 2004, has since exploded in both Ireland and Germany as of this filing. Further, since the filing of the original petition and this filing, there have also appeared news reports of an alleged gay prostitution ring operating out of the Vatican choir. 32. The failure to disclose the community of the risks involved here flies in the face of the institution’s repeated assertions that it, as an institution, is a “constitutive element” of society with the right and duty to press its values on society in general, an admission of its “special relationship with society in general” admitted by Canon Lawyer Father John Beal, Associate Professor at the Catholic University of America, whose deposition was taken in the Teczar case in the 141st Judicial District Court of Tarrant County in Case No. 141-198356-03. Father Beal also admits that the institutional church has known of this problem for centuries, with the most recent published reference in a papal document published in its “Acts” in 1741, Sacramentum Poenitentiae, more recently cited in the secret 1962 unpublished Crimen sollicitationis. 33. Father Beal also provides testimony in his deposition that the promise of openness and transparency promised by the U. S. Catholic Bishops in 2000 in Dallas, which included defendant Bishop Carmody, as reflected in their so-called “Dallas Charter for the protection of the Young, is illusory. He admits that when the “Charter” went to Rome for approval or recognitio, the Charter was changed to the so-called “Essential Norms” that take control of the church’s investigative process and place it under the secrecy provisions set forth in a letter from the Vatican’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in a letter to all bishops of the Catholic church issued in May 2001, the so-called “Ratzinger letter.” 34. As a direct result of the sexual abuse by Meany and the institution and the re-injuring of the plaintiff by the Carmody defendant in 2008, and the events pled herein, following the abuse, John Doe presently suffers from chronic psychological injuries, including low self esteem, depression, sexual dysfunction, suicidal thoughts, and other symptoms consistent with post traumatic stress disorder. IV. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: ASSAULT BY OFFENSIVE PHYSICAL CONTACT AND CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT SEXUAL ASSAULT[7] 35. Defendant diocese and Estate are the parties defendant to this cause of action. 36. At time of trial, Plaintiff will prove that Monsignor Meany, with the full enablement of the defendant Diocese intentionally or knowingly made illegal sexual contact with the Plaintiff which, under the circumstances, was without effective consent, and that Meany, under the circumstances provided to him by defendant diocese, knew the Plaintiff would find the sexual contact offensive, and that the physical contact was the proximate cause of the Plaintiff’s injuries. 37. Pleading further with respect to the conduct of Meany and Defendant diocese, Plaintiff will demonstrate that his injuries were inherently undiscoverable and that the evidence of his abuse is objectively verifiable thereby tolling limitations. 38. Pleading further and in the alternative, at time of trial, Plaintiff will prove that Defendant Meany was an employee, agent, ostensible agent or apparent agent of the diocese Plaintiff also pleads that the employer diocese has vicarious liability via the theory of respondeat superior. Plaintiff pleads that this conduct is the proximate cause of his severe emotional injury and suffering. 39. Pleading further and in the alternative, because of this informal fiduciary obligation (confidential relationship) of this Diocese to him, under recognized agency principles of Restatement 2nd Torts § 282, the diocese of Corpus Christi, and its Bishops are liable to Plaintiff for the tortious conduct of Monsignor Meany even if he, as an Agent, failed to disclose his intentionally tortious conduct to his ecclesiastical corporation Principals. 40. With respect to the conspiracy to commit this tort, at time of trial, Plaintiff will prove that Meany and defendants Meany and Diocese conspired between themselves along with others and agreed to and intended the common objective (a) before the fact of making minors sexually available to priests and (b) after the fact, moving unfit and dangerous priests from one diocese to another to fraudulently conceal their felonious intent and to commit all the other intentional torts hereinafter set forth. Plaintiff will further prove that the aforesaid conspiracy occurred before, during, and after the fact of the perpetration of the crimes that form the basis of this lawsuit. 41. Finally, at time of trial, Plaintiff will prove that the aforesaid conspiracy was and is the proximate cause of his severe injuries, suffering and concomitant damages. 42. Pleading further and in the alternative to the conspiracy cause, Plaintiff asserts that all entities and individuals who are named as Defendants are liable for acts and/or omissions pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 876, under the legal doctrine of concert of action, as joint venturers, as agents of these entities, and as shareholders of this entity, under which theory, the conduct of these Defendants was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries and damages for which he seeks ordinary and exemplary damages from all Defendants, jointly and severally. > V. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: BREACH OF CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP AND CONSPIRACY TO BREACH A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP 43. All defendants are parties respondent to this cause of action. 44. At time of trial, Plaintiff will prove that there arose between him and the defendants a special or confidential relationship arising from moral, social, domestic, or purely personal relationships in which Plaintiff, of necessity, trusted and relied upon Defendant Diocese, Bishop Carmody Individually, and Meany. These Defendants, because of their proximate relationship with the Plaintiff and their public assertions that the institution to which they belong, i.e., the Roman Catholic Church, is a “constituent element of society,” had a concomitant responsibility to deal with Plaintiff, inter alia, with the highest degree of trust, confidence and honesty, a duty of candor, a duty to act with integrity of the strictest kind, a duty of full disclosure, and with utmost good faith and loyalty. These Defendants have intentionally breached their fiduciary duty by their tortious conduct which was and continues to be the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s severe emotional injury and suffering. 45. Pleading further, to the extent that Carmody or any other bishop is found to have breached a fiduciary duty to the Plaintiff, his employer diocese of Corpus Christi is vicariously liable on the theory of respondeat superior. 46. Pleading further by way of conspiracy, Plaintiff will show that all Defendants conspired to breach the above mentioned duties to provide a benefit for themselves, which conspiracy was and continues to be a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. 47. Pleading further, Plaintiff asserts that the breach of fiduciary dut(ies) of these Defendants was “inherently unknowable” and Plaintiff was either unable to inquire into the fiduciaries’ actions, unaware of the need to do so, and/or fraudulently directed away from discovery by the consistent statements of the Roman Church, and each and every diocesan bishop, including all bishops of Corpus Christi, that they did not know there was a problem. 48. Pleading further and in the alternative to the conspiracy cause, Plaintiff asserts that all entities and individuals who are named as Defendants are liable for acts and/or omissions pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 876, under the legal doctrine of concert of action, as joint venturers, as agents of these entities, and as shareholders of this entity, under which theory, the conduct of these Defendants was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries and damages for which he seeks ordinary and exemplary damages from all Defendants, jointly and severally. VI. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT I.I.E.D. 49. Both Defendants are parties respondent to this cause of action. 50. At time of trial, Plaintiff will prove that Meany, with the aid and assistance of the diocese and its bishop at the time, engaged in an intentional or reckless course of conduct, which, under the particular circumstances of Meany’s abuse of position and power was extreme and outrageous in character, directed at the Plaintiff, that was and continues to be the proximate cause of the Plaintiff’s severe emotional distress for which he seeks both actual and exemplary damages. 51. Pleading further, to the extent that Meany or Carmody or any individual defendant is found to have intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon a Plaintiff, the employer diocese is vicariously liable on the theory of respondeat superior. 52. Pleading further and in the alternative, because of this fiduciary obligation of these Defendants to him, under recognized Agency principles of Restatement 2nd Torts § 282, these Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for the tortious conduct of Meany even if he, as an Agent, failed to disclose his intentionally tortious conduct to his ecclesiastical Principals. 53. Pleading further and in the alternative to the conspiracy cause, Plaintiff asserts that all entities and individuals who are named as Defendants are liable for acts and/or omissions pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 876, under the legal doctrine of concert of action, as joint venturers, as agents of these entities, and as shareholders of this entity, under which theory, the conduct of these Defendants was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries and damages for which he seeks ordinary and exemplary damages from all Defendants, jointly and severally. VII. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION: FRAUD, AND CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT FRAUD 54. Defendant diocese and its former and present bishop are parties respondent to this cause of action. 55. Defendants consistently misrepresented to the public, including Plaintiff and his care-givers, that its priests were holy, celibate, sexually safe, moral priests who would not be sexually dangerous to minors. These Defendants knew from the lurid and well-documented history of the institution’s response to its priests acting out sexually with minor boys, that these representations were false or were made recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion. Plaintiff relied on these misrepresentations and thereby suffered injuries. This fraud was and continues to be the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s severe emotional injury and suffering. 56. Pleading further and in the alternative, at trial, Plaintiff will prove that the Defendants’ conduct also constitutes common-law fraud in that the Defendants had a “confidential relationship” with the Plaintiff in which the Plaintiff justifiably relied on these priests as “men of God” who did not disclose material facts to the Plaintiff concerning Meany when they had a duty to do so or, in the alternative, they voluntarily made partial disclosures that created a false impression. The Defendants knew that the Plaintiff would rely on their partial disclosures and false impressions which they did to his detriment and Defendants’ benefit, and the conduct complained of was the proximate cause of his damages. Plaintiff also seeks an award of both ordinary and exemplary damages for this conduct as provided by law. 57. Pleading further and in the alternative, because of this fiduciary obligation of these Diocese Defendants and Carmody to him, under recognized Agency principles of Restatement 2nd Torts § 282, these Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for the tortious conduct of Meany even if he, as an Agent, failed to disclose his intentionally tortious conduct to his ecclesiastical corporation Principals. 58. Pleading further, to the extent that Carmody or any individual defendant is found to have committed any of the above stated fraud torts against Plaintiff, his alter ego or employer Diocese of Corpus Christi is vicariously liable on the theory of respondeat superior. 59. Pleading further and in the alternative to the conspiracy cause, Plaintiff asserts that all entities and individuals who are named as Defendants are liable for acts and/or omissions pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 876, under the legal doctrine of concert of action, as joint venturers, as agents of these entity, under which theory, the conduct of these Defendants was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries and damages for which he seeks ordinary and exemplary damages from all Defendants, jointly and severally. 60. Plaintiff further pleads that based on the testimony of Father Beal, Associate Professor of Catholic University, that the fraud involved constitutes an on-going tort. VIII. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION: FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT AND CONSPIRACY TO FRAUDULENTLY CONCEAL 61. Defendants Diocese and Carmody are parties respondent to this cause of action. 62. At time of trial, Plaintiff will prove that the Defendants had actual knowledge that the conduct of Meany and the related conspiracy were wrongful and that they concealed this wrongful conduct from the Plaintiff and law enforcement authorities through misrepresentations or remaining silent when they had a duty to speak, that the Defendants had a fixed purpose to conceal the wrong, and that the Plaintiff relied on the misrepresentations or silence to his detriment, in that it delayed his discovery of a concealed cause of action against the Defendants. 63. Plaintiff will prove that Defendants and others unknown to Plaintiff conspired, acting in concert, have and continue to engage in a plan of action to cover up the incidents described herein and to prevent disclosure, prosecution and civil litigation including, but not limited to, denial of abuse, spoilation of evidence, and coercion, failure to seek out and assist victims, and breach of trust and confidence. 64. Pleading further, to the extent that any individual defendant is found to have committed fraudulent concealment against the Plaintiff, his employer or alter ego Diocese of Corpus Christi is vicariously liable on the theory of respondeat superior. 65. Pleading further and in the alternative to the conspiracy cause, Plaintiff asserts that all entities and individuals who are named as Defendants are liable for acts and/or omissions pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 876, under the legal doctrine of concert of action, as joint venturers, as agents of these entities, and as shareholders of this entity, under which theory, the conduct of these Defendants was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries and damages for which he seeks ordinary and exemplary damages from all Defendants, jointly and severally. 66. Plaintiff further pleads that based on the testimony of Father Beal, the fraud involved constitutes an on-going tort. IX. SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION: NEGLIGENCE 67. Diocese Defendants are the parties respondent to this cause of action. 68. Pleading further and in the alternative, at time of trial, Plaintiff will prove that the Diocese Defendant had policies and practices in place that took into account actual knowledge of the possibility that Plaintiff and similarly situated minors could be subjected to sexual assault, under the rubric of actual, pretextual, or simulated “counseling,” yet negligently did or failed to do those things that reasonably situated individuals would do or not do regarding Meany and other priests. Among the negligent acts arising out of the defendants’ policies and practice, include, but are not limited to: 1. investigation, hiring, supervision, reassignment, and retention of priests known to have abused minors (Section 302B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts); 2. failing to inform the public that priests assigned to their parishes were a threat to their children; 3. ignoring warnings from medical professionals retained by the Dioceses that certain priests were potentially dangerous to children and others; 4. lying to victims who requested information about priests who abused them; 5. failing to provide those medical professionals evaluating abusive priests with the necessary facts and, in some cases, lying to them about the priest’s background or concealing material facts; 6. ignoring warnings from others within the diocese and bishops conference who believed that certain priests were a threat to children; 7. failing to report the crimes committed by certain priests to law enforcement and obstructing or interfering with law enforcement investigations concerning abusive priests; 8. failing to alert parishioners and the community at previous parishes where abusive priests had served that their children were exposed to known or suspected child molesters; 9. making decisions which reflected that the interests of abusive priests and the desire to avoid scandal to the Church were vastly superior and more important than the interests of children who had been abused by priests; 10. using Church influence to alter the outcome of the criminal legal process relating to priests who had been engaging in illegal sexual acts; and 11. fostering an environment and culture where abuse of children could flourish and in which it was clear that there was no accountability for criminal acts towards children. 69. The Diocese Defendants herein have intentionally and/or negligently destroyed or illegally withheld investigation documents from the civil authorities, victims families and the public. Plaintiff requests the court issue proper sanctions, including presuming all things are against the Diocese Defendant. (omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorem — all things are presumed against a despoiler). These negligent acts, singly or in combination, were and continue to be the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s severe injuries and damages for which he seeks actual damages. 70. Pleading further and in the alternative to the negligence cause, Plaintiff asserts that all entities and individuals who are named as Defendants are liable for acts and/or omissions pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 876, under the legal doctrine of concert of action, as joint venturers, as agents of these entities, and as shareholders of this entity, under which theory, the conduct of these Defendants was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries and damages for which he seek ordinary damages from all Defendants, jointly and severally. X. SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION: NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 71. Defendant Diocese is the party respondent to this cause of action. 72. Plaintiff pleads Section 311of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the legal doctrine of negligent misrepresentation involving the risk of physical harm. Defendant knowingly allowed Meany to have unfettered access to minors such as the Plaintiff, and such knowing conduct proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries. The aforesaid negligent misrepresentation was and continues to be a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries and damages. 73. Defendant Diocese and its bishop at the time and on the occasions in question, acted with heedless and reckless disregard for the safety of the Plaintiff, which disregard was the result of conscious indifference to the rights, welfare, and safety of Plaintiff in violation of the laws of the State of Texas. The actions and inactions of Defendants Diocese and Bishop herein proximately caused the damages sustained by the Plaintiff. 74. Pleading further and in the alternative to the negligence misrepresentation cause, Plaintiff asserts that all entities and individuals who are named as Defendants are liable for acts and/or omissions pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 876, under the legal doctrine of concert of action, as joint venturers, as agents of these entities, and as shareholders of this entity, under which theory, the conduct of these Defendants was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries and damages for which he seeks ordinary and exemplary damages from all Defendants, jointly and severally. XI. EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION: DEFECTIVE PREMISES 75. The Defendant Diocese is liable to Plaintiff for this cause of action. 76. At time of trial, Plaintiff will prove he was an invitee to the premises in question (Holy Cross Rectory, 1109 Staples St., Corpus Christi, TX). Defendants owed a duty of care to those who may be harmed by criminal acts on its premises when the risk of criminal conduct is so great that it is both unreasonable and foreseeable. Defendant was aware of the potential for criminal acts of assault by Meany to Plaintiff on its property and at other locations and breached its duty of care to Plaintiff. 77. Pleading further and in the alternative to the premises defect cause, Plaintiff asserts that all entities and individuals who are named as Defendants are liable for acts and/or omissions pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 876, under the legal doctrine of concert of action, as joint venturers, as agents of these entities, and as shareholders of this entity, under which theory, the conduct of these Defendants was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries and damages for which he seeks ordinary and exemplary damages from all Defendants, jointly and severally. XII. STATEMENTS TO THE COURT 78. Plaintiff pleads tolling of the statute of limitations based on the doctrine of “unsound mind” of the plaintiff as discussed in the factual assertions above. 79. Plaintiff herein pleads the discovery rule because his injuries are inherently unknowable and the evidence of his abuse is objectively verifiable under S.V. vs. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1996). 80. Plaintiff pleads delayed discovery of the conspiracies which continues to this day despite the exercise of reasonable diligence on his part, thus tolling the statute of limitations. 81. Plaintiff pleads continuing fraud and fraudulent concealment of this fraud on the part of Defendants, thus suspending the running of limitations as to all claims. 82. Plaintiff pleads continuing fraudulent concealment of facts under Defendants’ control giving rise to his causes of action against all Defendants, thus suspending the running of limitations. 83. Plaintiff has pled fraudulent concealment of fraudulent statements and other fraudulent misrepresentations known to Defendants concealing Plaintiff’s claims, thus suspending the running of limitations. 84. Plaintiff pas pled breach of fiduciary duty, including the duty to disclose and the use of deception to conceal breach of duty of due care against all Defendants, thus suspending the running of limitations against all Defendants. 85. Plaintiff has pled a continuing civil conspiracy to conceal criminal acts, to conceal the commission of criminal acts, to conceal negligence by unlawful means, to conceal fraud, to conceal the breach of the duty of trust and confidence, and to conceal the use of deception to avoid claims until limitations expire by illegal means, thus suspending the running of limitations against all Defendants as to all claims. 86. Plaintiff has pled that he was were unable to discover this fraud, the fraudulent concealment, or the other civil conspiracies despite reasonable diligence on his part until within two (2) years of the filing of his case. 87. Plaintiff pleads that the actions of all Defendants, because of their conduct, statements and promises, preclude them under the doctrine of estoppel from claiming the bar of limitations to any of Plaintiff’s claims. 88. Plaintiff pleads the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel. 89. Plaintiff asserts that the statute of limitations has not run on these causes of action pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.0045. 90. Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants have acted in concert to fraudulently conceal their predatory priests by recycling them from treatment centers, from parish to parish, diocese to diocese, by concealing the extent and nature of priest abuse and the harmful effects of such abuse. XIII. DAMAGES 91. As a result of the conduct and incidents described herein, Plaintiff will need to incur lifelong counseling expenses which are reasonable and necessary and in all reasonable probability such expenses will continue in the future for the remainder of his life. 92. As a result of the conduct and incidents described herein, Plaintiff experienced severe emotional and psychological pain and suffering in the past and in all reasonable probability will sustain severe psychological and emotional pain and suffering in the future as a result of his injuries. 93. As a result of the conduct and incidents described herein, Plaintiff suffered mental anguish in the past and, in all reasonable probability, will sustain mental anguish in the future. 94. As a result of the conduct and incidents described herein, Plaintiff suffered many other damages including loss of faith, loss of trust, loss of self esteem, depression and in all reasonable probability, his social and professional adjustment in the past has been affected and in all probability his future social and work life will be adversely impacted. 95. Plaintiff suffered lost wages in the past and a diminished wage earning capacity for the future. 96. Plaintiff also seeks punitive and exemplary damages in order to punish and deter the outrageous conduct of the Defendants. By clear and convincing evidence, facts as alleged above will be proven by Plaintiff, namely that Defendants acted maliciously, either by an act or omission, and thereby exposed Plaintiff to an extreme degree of risk of both immediate and actual, factual and potential harm considering the probability and magnitude of the continuing injuries to him. Defendants further had actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved, but nevertheless proceeded with conscious indifference to the rights, safety and welfare of the Plaintiff John Doe. The exemplary damages cap does not apply under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.008(c). 97. As a result of the conduct and incidents described herein, Plaintiff seeks actual damages, punitive damages and attorney’s fees in excess of the jurisdictional limits of the Court. XIV. REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURES 98. Pursuant to Rule 194, defendants are requested to disclose, within 30 days of service of this request, the information or material described in Rule 194.2 (a) through (l) inclusive. XV. REQUEST FOR RELIEF 99. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff requests that the Defendants be cited to appear and answer and that, upon trial of this case, he have judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for all damages described herein, including actual damages, punitive damages, costs of suit, attorneys fees and interest as allowable by law in accordance with article 5069-1.05 of V.A.T.S. and for such other relief to which Plaintiff may be justly entitled. He also requests a Level III Discovery Order. Respectfully submitted, Daniel J. Shea, P.C. By: /s/ Daniel J. Shea DANIEL J. SHEA State Bar No. 18163850 1928 West Bell Street Houston, TX 77019-4814 (713) 942-7500 (713) 942-7507 Telecopier djs7500@aol.com [1] Upon information and belief, John F.S. McCloskey is also the Trustee of the Thomas L. Meany Living Trust. [2] Note that in the narrative that follows, the Church, i.e. the Roman Catholic Church, refers to other non-catholic churches as “ecclesial communities,” reserving solely to itself the concept of “church.” [3] These records were provided to defendant diocese through counsel by letter of June 25, 2009. In spite of these voluntary disclosures by John Doe, upon information and belief, diocese takes the public position that this is sex between consenting adults (age 17 for John Doe). This also belies the threshold set by then Cardinal Ratzinger in his letter of May 18, 2001, Ad exequandam,” to wit, that this is “[a] delict committed by a cleric against the Sixth Commandment of the Decalogue with a minor below the age of 18 years.” See pars. 16 to 19, below. [4] The Crimen document prescribed special procedures for processing cases of an especially vile form of clergy sexual abuse: solicitation of sex during confessional, or outside the confessional under the pretext of confession. Further, the document also includes within its scope sex with children and even sex between clerics and brute animals. The Pope and various regional bishops had issued a series of similar disciplinary laws against solicitation as far back as 1561. Both the 2001 Ratzinger letter and Crimen sollicitationis are available to the Court and defendants at www.bishop-accountability.org. [5] This is the Roman church’s theory called extra ecclesiam nulla salus, “outside the church there is no salvation.” It plays a critical role in the intent elements in this case. [6] The emergence of extra ecclesiam nulla salus in the mid third century precedes by at least a century the first synod ever held to decide the official contents of the Bible, the Synod of Laodicea (Asia Minor) in 363 A.D., consisting of twenty to thirty bishops. The resulting decree stated quite simply that it was now officially resolved: “Let no private psalms nor any uncanonical books be read in the church, but only canonical ones of the New and Old Testament.” One then has to question the extent to which Cypran’s doctrine had an effect on the development of the New Testament Canon and many of the questionable passages in the NT that seem to support the sacramental practices and church structures that exist to this day. Did that Synod have an “agenda?” [7] Each of the intentional torts pled herein is, where appropriate, coupled with a conspiracy to commit that tort. They are pled together, and not in the alternative, since a finding on the underlying tort is required to sustain a conspiracy finding.
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