PHILADELPHIA (PA)
New Jersey Law Journal [New York NY]
December 11, 2023
By Colleen Murphy
“Our holding is also consistent with rulings by other courts that have considered whether Catholic dioceses, including the Archdiocese, are subject to personal jurisdiction because of alleged sexual abuses committed by priests,” Judge Robert J. Gilson said. “Like this case, those cases depended on the specific jurisdictional facts involved.”
In two published opinions, the Appellate Division reached opposing conclusions in deciding whether personal jurisdiction existed for dioceses named as defendants in claims of sexual abuse at the hands of Catholic priests.
In D.T. v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, the plaintiff alleged that he was sexually abused by a former Catholic priest, Michael McCarthy, in New Jersey in 1971 when he was 14 years old. At that time, McCarthy was a priest and teacher in the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, which is named as a defendant in the case. D.T.’s claims against the archdiocese were dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction because no facts established it purposely availed itself of any benefits in or from New Jersey related to the alleged abuse, according to the opinion. The appeals court affirmed that decision.
In JA/GG Doe 70 v. Diocese of Metuchen, the plaintiff alleged that another Catholic priest, Father John Butler, sexually abused him between 1995 and 1998. At that time, the plaintiff was between 9 and 12 years old. The issue before the court was whether one of the named defendants, the Catholic Diocese of Richmond, is subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey, according to the opinion.
Judge Robert J. Gilson authored both appellate opinions, which were joined by Judges Maritza Berdote Byrne and Avis Bishop-Thompson.
D.T. appealed an Atlantic County Superior Court order dismissing his claims against the Philadelphia archdiocese, according to the opinion. Those claims, which were filed in May 2020, alleged that the defendants negligently provided pastoral services to him when McCarthy abused him in New Jersey. D.T. further contended that the archdiocese was vicariously liable for McCarthy’s tortious acts and that it was negligent in hiring and supervising the priest. He also asserted a claim for assault and battery against McCarthy.
D.T. made two arguments on appeal. He first contended that McCarthy was an “agent” of the archdiocese, and that through his actions, it is subject to specific jurisdiction in New Jersey. He asserted that the archdiocese ”purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in New Jersey through the conduct of priests like McCarthy.” And D.T. further contended that McCarthy’s ”pastoral and mentoring activities” were not beyond the scope of the agency the archdiocese conferred on him as a priest, according to the opinion. He also argued that the trial court erred in focusing only on McCarthy’s abusive actions in New Jersey.
“Having considered these arguments in light of the record and governing law, we reject them,” Gilson said. “The facts disclosed during jurisdictional discovery established that the Archdiocese is not subject to jurisdiction in New Jersey because it did not purposefully avail itself of activities in New Jersey sufficient to satisfy the ‘minimum contacts’ required for personal jurisdiction.”
Despite the fact that the archdiocese formerly owned property in New Jersey, and that it supervised McCarthy, specific jurisdiction was not established, according to the opinion.
“Our holding is also consistent with rulings by other courts that have considered whether Catholic dioceses, including the Archdiocese, are subject to personal jurisdiction because of alleged sexual abuses committed by priests,” Gilson said. “Like this case, those cases depended on the specific jurisdictional facts involved.”
In JA/GG Doe 70, Gilson came to the opposite conclusion in an appeal by the Catholic Diocese of Richmond. In that case, Gilson agreed with the Middlesex County Superior Court that there was substantial, credible evidence in the record that Richmond purposefully availed itself of the benefits of allowing its priest to go to New Jersey to serve as a priest.
According to the opinion, the record established that Butler had been incardinated to Richmond at the time of his ordination in 1957, that he remained a priest incardinated to Richmond until 2002, and that in the 1960s, Richmond had been aware of Butler’s sexual propensities toward children. Further, Richmond encouraged and allowed Butler to go to New Jersey in 1970 to serve as a priest, and that Richmond maintained a significant degree of control over Butler while he served in New Jersey, according to the opinion.
Gilson stated that, based on the facts, the trial court held that Richmond was subject to specific personal jurisdiction in regard to Butler’s actions in New Jersey.
Gilson stated that applying the jurisdictional facts to the well-established law concerning specific personal jurisdiction confirms that New Jersey has specific personal jurisdiction over Richmond related to plaintiff’s action.
“Richmond purposefully encouraged Butler to go to another diocese,” Gilson said. “When Butler reached out to the Diocese of Trenton, Richmond approved Butler going to the diocese to serve as a priest.”
The plaintiff alleged that the abuse took place while Butler was serving as a priest in New Jersey in the mid-1990s and his claims arise out of the diocese’s intentional actions to allow him to serve as a priest in the state.
“Accordingly, Richmond should have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in New Jersey related to Butler’s priestly service in New Jersey,” Gilson said.
Neither counsel to D.T., Ruxandra M. Laidacker of Kline & Specter, nor counsel to the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, Nicholas M. Centrella of Clark Hill, responded to a request for comment.
Counsel to the Diocese of Richmond, David P. Corrigan of Harman Claytor Corrigan & Wellman, admitted pro hac vice of the Virginia bar, did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Likewise, counsel to JA/GG Doe 70, Jack P. Boyd of Jeff Anderson & Associates, did not respond to a request for comment.